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Intersentia 1
INTRODUCTION
THE PATENTS’ RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
A patent grants a right to exclude others from using the patented invention, i.e. 
an ius excludendi alios. Th e patentee’s right to exclude is also interpreted as 
allowing the patentee that alleges patent infringement to ask before a court not 
only damage compensation but also remedies that aim at stopping the infringing 
activity, mainly, injunctive relief.
In economic terms, the exclusiveness of patent rights is conceived as a necessary 
mechanism to ensure further innovation, facilitate further research and effi  cient 
market transactions on patent rights. In fact, patent laws have been largely 
justifi ed by mainstream economic theories as a mechanism to provide innovation 
incentives by securing temporary exclusive rights for a limited period. During 
that period of exclusivity, patents produce a deadweight loss that is in theory 
compensated by the benefi ts of fostering further innovation. In addition it is 
oft en argued that patents facilitate the process of bargaining in the market for 
technologies; are a mechanism to render the results of R&D available to the 
public through patent documents and provide a signalling mechanism that 
facilitates raising fi nancial resources for R&D companies. More controversial is 
the contention that broad patent rights on fi rst innovations are an effi  cient 
mechanism to induce sequential innovation, an argument put forward by the 
prospecting theory of patent rights. Yet this theory and its following critiques 
have importantly highlighted the special problems surrounding most modern 
technologies that occur sequentially or incrementally rather than through 
breakthrough advancements.
Th e patent system indeed attempts to balance two goals that are oft en in tension: 
providing innovation incentives and allowing access to patented technologies. 
Innovation incentives attain effi  cient outcomes from a dynamic effi  ciency point 
of view by allowing the creation of new and improved technologies and products. 
From a static effi  ciency viewpoint a loss occurs during the life of a patent due to 
the fact that patented products are sold at a price higher than marginal cost. 
Access to technologies allows fi nal users to enjoy the benefi ts of innovative 
products but it also permits producers of second innovations to use and develop 
further technologies. While access to patented technologies is oft en restricted to 
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allow innovation incentives in a pure trade-off  between static and dynamic 
effi  ciency goals, when innovation is sequential, both the incentives of fi rst and 
second innovators are implied in such trade-off .
Notwithstanding the exclusive nature of patents, economic studies have indeed 
provided compelling reasons to transform or to mitigate the exclusiveness of 
patents, at least under specifi c circumstances. In spite of the enormous 
contribution of economics to the analysis of patent law, the results of many 
studies, especially those in the context of incremental innovation remain largely 
contradictory. At the moment, no study can claim to off er a defi nite answer on 
the overall eff ects of patent’s exclusivity and limitations of such exclusivity and 
most studies rely on highly restrictive assumptions. While the majority of results 
depend on variables that would have to be empirically ascertained, their 
assessment is oft en impossible or too costly.
Whereas the exclusiveness of patent rights is generally assumed by the legal and 
economic scholarship, patent laws have historically established limitations on 
the right to exclude. Among other mechanisms to limit the exclusiveness of 
patents, diff erent laws have devised compulsory licensing provisions. A 
compulsory licensing provision allows the use of a patented technology without 
the authorization of the patent owner. While it is oft en argued that this practice 
might aff ect innovation incentives by diminishing the expected payoff  from 
exclusivity, numerous critics have also been formulated and arguments put 
forward for the inclusion of limitations and exceptions on the patentees’ right to 
exclude. A similar eff ect to that of compulsory licensing is obtained when a court 
deciding on patent infringement limits the relief granted to owners to damage 
compensation and refuses to issue an injunctive order. Th is might happen 
especially in Common Law countries were injunctive relief is conceived as a 
harsh remedy governed by equity principles and hence, the award of injunctions 
is subject to a factual examination.
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES
Th e fi eld of economic analysis of law has formulated a framework, which is 
suitable to study the eff ects of the patent’s right to exclude and the design of 
limitations such as compulsory licensing provisions as well as the aforementioned 
limits on remedies available for patent owners. Th e categorization of entitlements 
into property and liability rules is able to capture such diff erences and yet to 
recognize the underlying similarities between diff erent legal provisions that 
transform a right to exclude into a right to receive a monetary remuneration. 
Indeed, law and economics scholars have categorized compulsory licenses as a 
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liability rule mechanism by which legal entitlements – in this case those awarded 
by patent law – are protected against the unauthorized use by others only 
through the payment of remuneration. Along with patent compulsory licenses, 
there are other patent doctrines and even the application of antitrust statutes 
which can convert the patentee’s right to exclude into a liability rule. Conversely, 
a property rule puts the owner in the position of deciding whether to allow the 
use by third parties.
Law and economics has also developed an important analysis with regards to the 
most important problems with the use of such liability rules, namely the 
possibility that the remuneration for patent holders might be too low and/or 
might not refl ect the subjective value of the patent hence diminishing innovation 
incentives. Also, the case is oft en made that liability rules might diminish 
incentives for effi  cient negotiation over the use of patent rights. In addition, it is 
oft en posed that liability rules might create uncertainty surrounding the 
enforcement of patent rights, hence diminishing innovation incentives.
Indeed, diff erent legal doctrines embedded in patent statutes and case law 
coinciding with economic reasoning, allow what the law and economics literature 
describes as a switch from a property to a liability rule. Th eoretical discussions 
and case law have also highlighted the main justifi cations for this switch and the 
main problems associated with the administration of liability rules. 
Notwithstanding the prolifi c quantity of studies on this subject and their 
application to Intellectual Property (hereinaft er IP) and patents, this literature 
has also yielded highly contradictory conclusions that range from calls to the 
unlimited use of property rules to a more or less limited role for liability rules in 
the patent fi eld.
As predictable, the practice of compulsory licensing and other patent doctrines 
permitting similar eff ects remain highly controversial. In particular, 
disagreement about the use of these provisions has emerged during the 
negotiation of patent harmonization treaties from the Paris Convention to the 
TRIPS Agreement and including the recent wave of free trade agreements and 
bilateral investment agreements covering IP issues.
JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS RESEARCH
Recent events have stimulated the debate on the exclusivity of patents and the 
use of property and liability rules to protect patent rights. A fi rst motivation for 
these events is extrinsic to patent law and refl ects the evolution of modern 
technologies towards highly complex and multi-component products. A second 
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motivation for such recent events is oft en found in the uniformity of patent laws 
(one-size-fi ts-all) that might impede its adaptation to such complex technologies, 
especially as it regards the protection of the right to exclude. A third reason arises 
out of this increasingly complex landscape with the rigidity of patent law, a 
combination that is said to enhance the opportunities for patent strategic 
behavior. Instances of patent strategic behavior might comprise the acquisition 
of patents as well as their strategic use, enforcement and litigation.
However, many gaps and misunderstandings remain with respect to the use of 
liability rules in the patent fi eld. Confusion has been nurtured by economic as 
well as legal studies. Economic studies have led to ambiguous conclusions with 
regard to the eff ects of diff erent patent doctrines, especially in settings 
characterized by incremental and sequential innovations. Misunderstandings 
have also been stimulated due to the confi nement of legal discussions to the 
TRIPS Agreement and the use of compulsory licensing provisions solely in the 
context of developing countries and the protection of public health. In addition, 
the law and economics literature has largely reduced the defi nition of patent 
liability rules to compulsory licensing provisions. Th e study of liability rules 
provisions has been furthermore limited to the U.S. prevailing view, which does 
not contain special compulsory licensing provisions for patents and which until 
very recently, considered such provisions as a “rarity”.1 As a result, most law and 
economics studies focusing on IP and patent liability rules mainly referred to 
statutory compulsory licenses which exist in copyright laws or to the presence of 
compulsory licensing provisions in countries outside of the U.S. as a “rarity” of 
general patent law.
Th is gap has started to be fi lled, fi rstly by the insights of scholarly work and most 
recently by the debate following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the eBay 
case.2 In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in the context of a specifi c 
litigation between patentee MercExchange and the eBay company, that in patent 
law cases, injunctive relief should be granted upon the same grounds required in 
other law fi elds. As a result, courts deciding patent law cases were requested to 
use a factual test that assesses the convenience of granting an injunctive order 
upon the particular circumstances of the case. Such factual test had been 
bypassed for a long time and patentees had enjoyed a privileged position in 
litigation due to the emergence of a presumption that once a patent was infringed, 
the patentee had suff ered irreparable harm, a prerequisite for obtaining injunctive 
relief. Th e eBay case confronted the U.S. Supreme Court with a “new” reality of 
patent law, in which patents are used strategically in order to extract large 
1 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) at 215, stating that: 
“compulsory licensing is a rarity in (the U.S.) our patent system”.
2 EBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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settlements. In this new landscape, patents are not viewed as instruments that 
generate innovation incentives as legal and economic theory sustain but simply 
as “bargaining chips” that companies can commercialize but also employ as a 
“sword” to be used in litigation rather than a “shield” to protect valuable 
innovations.3
Applying the eBay precedent, an important number of decisions have denied 
injunctions for owners of valid and infringed patents, thus changing a 
“traditional” practice in the U.S. against any form of compulsory licensing or 
forced access to patented inventions. As a consequence, many scholars and 
political actors have questioned such move as a radical change. Some critics 
turned to property rights theory and the necessity of applying it to patent law. 
Yet others have taken the opportunity to remind of the diff erences between 
property and IP that justify a wider use of liability rules for IP rights.
Although this debate has not attained an equivalent impact in Europe, the 
“exclusivity aspect” of patents has been also recently put in evidence with regard 
to an alleged decline in the quality of patents as well as an increase in the number 
of cases refl ecting potential strategic behavior practices and litigation from 
patentees. Th e European patent landscape is however, largely fragmented in spite 
of the European Patent Convention and the creation of an European Patent 
Offi  ce. Patents remain territorial rights throughout Europe and importantly, 
patent litigation is decentralized and pertains to the jurisdiction of each country 
in the absence of a Community Patent and a unifi ed patent jurisdiction as 
foreseen in the project for a European Patent Litigation Agreement (hereinaft er 
EPLA). Surprisingly, the problems surrounding the indiscriminate use of 
property rules to protect patents and the increasing impact of patent strategic 
behavior have been recently interpreted as plainly favoring the abovementioned 
projects for further patent harmonization. Clearly, the problem of this Th esis 
only refers to particular patent doctrines and provisions allowing non-authorized 
uses upon the payment of compensation. Nonetheless, a warning emerges from 
this analysis against potentially curtailing the use of such provisions and 
doctrines through forthcoming harmonization. As it will be highlighted in the 
analysis that follows, it is the design of such doctrines and provisions that might 
enable or restrain their appropriate use when such use is justifi ed upon effi  ciency 
reasons and other public interest purposes.
3 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007), which revising the 
case on remand in the light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision considered that: “Such 
consistent course of litigating or threatening litigation to obtain money damages by a 
company of two employees, the inventor of the patents, a former patent attorney, indicates 
that MercExchange has utilized its patents as a sword to extract money rather than as a shield 
to protect its right to exclude or its market share, reputation, goodwill, or name recognition, as 
MercExchange appears to possess none of these” (emphasis added).
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Such recent discussions confi rm that innovation, technological changes, 
groundbreaking decisions and proposals for reform call for a constant assessment 
of the patent system. While economics has largely contributed to the 
understanding of IP, its eff ects and the way in which policy levers4 shape 
innovators’ incentives, the study of enforcement mechanisms, limitations and 
defenses, including compulsory licensing provisions and other patent liability 
rules have recently brought new perspectives to important national5 and 
international debates. Discussions on a patent reform in the U.S., European 
harmonization plans of a Community Patent and the EPLA as well as 
international debates within the WIPO6 and WTO have all acknowledged 
possible imbalances of the patent system as well as the potential role of liability 
rules. Th ese debates need to be constructed on the basis of policy-oriented 
analysis, including the economic analysis of law, which in spite of being one out 
of diff erent alternative approaches, is widely recognized in all negotiation 
forums. Indeed, while economic reasoning can either contradict or support other 
policy goals of public interest, it is growingly recognized as a fundamental tool 
to assess the costs, benefi ts and unintended eff ects of any patent reform on 
private parties and society, both at national and global forums of negotiation.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Th is Th esis aims at contributing with the debate surrounding the exclusiveness 
of patent rights. In this sense, the Th esis examines whether and in which specifi c 
cases is it effi  cient to transform the patentee’s right to exclude into a right to 
receive remuneration, i.e. a liability rule. Th is question is both timely and 
4 Policy levers refer to the design tools that policy makers have at their disposal to adjust patent 
or IP policy in general. Th is name was initially used by Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Th e Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002). 
See also Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1638–39 
(2003).
5 Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties (Aug. 2006), available at http://
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/SHAPIRO/royalties.pdf, last accessed on August 10, 2009, stating 
that “the U.S. patent system is widely seen as out of balance”. See also Federal Trade 
Commission (October, 2003), To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance Between 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, available at www.ft c.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf and National Academies of Science (2004), A Patent System for the 
21st Century, available at www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html expressing concerns about 
bad quality of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Offi  ce.
6 See WIPO, Exclusions from patentable subject matter and exceptions and limitations to the 
rights (SCP/13/3) Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Th irteenth Session, Geneva, 
March 23 to 27, 2009, available at: www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf. 
See also the discussions related with the Proposal for a Development Agenda within the 
WIPO (2004), Harmonization of Substantive Patent Law (WIPO), available at www.wipo.int 
and the Final Report of the WHO Commission on Innovation, Intellectual Property and 
Public Health, available at: www.who.int/intellectualproperty/en/.
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controversial. Controversial, as it was already mentioned that the issue of 
property vs. liability rules in patent law has been historically debated with 
regards to the use of compulsory licensing provisions and more recently proposed 
in the context of liability rules used by courts craft ing the remedies for patent 
infringement. Controversy also surrounds the consequences of this debate 
within the broader context of theoretical questions on the nature of IP rights and 
the advantages and disadvantages of applying property law insights to IP law, the 
justifi cation for patent protection and the interface between rights and remedies, 
e.g. whether it is the right that determines the remedy or the remedy that 
conceptualizes the right. From a policy-oriented perspective, the debate on the 
use of property and liability rules for patent protection is fundamental for the 
interpretation of limitations and exceptions in patent law, especially in the light 
of controversies regarding the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. Th is 
global Agreement set a minimum and global level of harmonization with regard 
to IP rights, including signifi cant provisions on patent law; yet it left  the 
possibility for countries to apply more rigorous standards within the limits set 
for by the same Agreement and also a signifi cant space for a fl exible application 
of its standards. Many obligations deriving from the TRIPS Agreement have 
been the object of diverging views and some of them, especially with regards to 
the limitations and exceptions to rights conferred, have confronted countries 
with problems of interpretation.
Th e research question of this Th esis is also timely, as the 2006 eBay decision by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which arrived at the beginning of this research project, 
actually opened the possibility for the use of liability rules for patents in the U.S. 
As a consequence of the simple re-interpretation of a long-standing traditional 
principle of equity which governs the grant of injunctions, a major change in 
patent law followed this decision. Whereas the eff ects of post-eBay litigation are 
still unclear, this Th esis examines an important number of decisions granting 
and denying injunctive relief aft er a factual consideration by diff erent U.S. 
courts.7 Th is important patent policy change has occurred in the context of 
several other decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, which have presumably aimed 
at restraining an increasingly protective trend initiated aft er the creation of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinaft er CAFC), which centralized 
the appeal of patent cases in the U.S.8 In a somehow surprising way, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in several occasions during the last few 
years, and it has reiteratively compressed what was perceived as an unwarranted 
extension of patents rights. In several cases, the Supreme Court has asserted the 
importance of using standards rather than rigid rules as tools to interpret various 
7 Decisions applying the eBay precedent were monitored since 2007, and a summary of the 
most important cases examined is contained in the Appendix.
8 See infra note 314.
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patent doctrines.9 Such decisions have been interpreted as redressing a lost 
balance in the U.S. patent system.10
At the same time, the European patent landscape is facing important challenges. 
Whereas the latest discussions have focused on the problems due to the 
fragmented system and the projects of harmonization, these debates confront 
the diffi  cult task of harmonizing many substantive patent law standards among 
European countries before proceeding to create a patent valid throughout the 
community and enforced by a centralized court.
Th e controversy of this Th esis involves also an important global dimension. At 
the international level, the question is mostly one of interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement with regard to the space allowed to the practice of compulsory 
licenses in their traditional way (Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement) and to the 
possibility of denying injunctions for infringed patents and substituting a 
property rule with the protection through a liability rule (Article 44 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). In this context, the objectives set for by article 7 of the same 
Agreement suggest that such interpretation should be guided by the 
aforementioned balance between innovation incentives and access to innovations 
as well as suggest a primordial role for economic analysis in the interpretation of 
the Agreement11:
“Th e protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations” (emphasis added).
Further harmonization at regional and global levels will have potential 
consequences in the context of social and economic welfare as well as economic 
development. Hence, it would be desirable that any such proposal be addressed 
in the light of a balanced patent system that takes into account all stakeholders. 
In this sense, this Th esis aspires at contributing towards such interpretation of 
the patent system.
9 See the KSR decision infra note 314, with regard to the non-obviousness standard and the 
eBay decision, supra note 2, with regard to the equitable standard to decide the grant of 
injunctions.
10 In addition, the CAFC has itself issued an important decision in the case of Seagate, see infra 
note 472.
11 Th e interpretation of International Treaties is based upon the text of the Agreement as well as 
the preambles that might further clarify the intention of the contracting states. Nonetheless, 
it is usually argued that articles similar to Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement do not contain 
operational rules.
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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Th e structure of the Th esis proceeds as follows. Th e fi rst chapter puts forward a 
general framework for liability rules in patent law, in a sense broader than that 
developed by previous research. For these purposes, the insights of the law and 
economics literature on property and liability rules are brought together with 
the literature on traditional compulsory licensing and the most recent use of 
patent liability rules contained in the law of remedies of common law countries. 
Both property and liability rules are then analyzed in their effi  ciency outcomes 
both at a general level and in the specifi c IP and patent contexts. In this latter 
framework, property and liability rules are examined from both a substantive 
and remedies-based perspectives. Secondly, the chapter compares diff erent types 
of liability rules sharing a similar rationale while diff erentiating these rules from 
systems that are justifi ed upon diff erent policy goals such as public interest. 
Th irdly, the theoretical framework of property and liability rules is confronted 
with the modern landscape of the patent system. A particular emphasis is given 
to the impact of remedies in current discussions about the alleged failure of 
patent systems to provide effi  cient incentives within a changing technological 
and economic landscape.
Th is critical review of previous literature and research aims at contributing to 
this dissertation and to further debates by describing the main insights that will 
guide the analysis in the next chapters and by identifying loopholes and empty 
spaces for scholarly contribution. Th e chapter mainly adds to current theoretical 
and policy debates by identifying several fl aws in the property and liability rules 
literature as applied to patent law. Firstly, and in contrast with the profuse and 
long-standing presence of liability rules in patent law, this literature has oft en 
condemned its use based upon U.S. practices, which have, simultaneously 
changed in a dramatic way over the last years. Secondly, property and liability 
rules are oft en treated in the literature as complementary tools even in the 
property law fi eld. In contrast, scholars have followed a rather diff erent method 
in their application to IP and patent law. Th irdly, the chapter proposes a 
categorization of two diff erent types of liability rules as a suitable framework to 
classify liability rules in the IP fi eld, i.e. ex-ante and ex-post liability rules. 
Fourthly, the chapter suggests that in the light of the TRIPS Agreement, current 
patent law only admits or at least markedly favors the use of the ex-post type of 
liability rule.
Th e second chapter provides a historical view on the use of patent liability rules, 
focusing on the legal as well as the economic reasoning surrounding their use. 
Th e chapter discusses the origins of patent law and compulsory licensing 
provisions, the process of international patent harmonization and negotiations 
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preceding and following the TRIPS Agreement from the perspective of the 
property and liability rules debate. According to the enhanced defi nition of 
patent liability rules provided in the fi rst chapter, a discussion of the pertinent 
enforcement rules devised in the TRIPS Agreement, especially with regards to 
the issuance of injunctions and the possibility of substituting injunctions with 
damage compensation is also included. Secondly, the chapter analyzes the 
debates following the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement both with regards 
to compulsory licensing provisions and patent remedies. Th irdly, a brief overview 
of patent harmonization in Europe and the implementation of the Enforcement 
Directive pertaining to the property and liability rules debate are provided. 
Finally, a brief outline is provided on the diff erent historical and legal treatment 
of injunctions and damages in Civil law and Common law countries. Th is 
historical overview is important in order to understand both the origin of 
liability rules as a policy design mechanism to balance the goals of patent law 
with the protection of competition and the avoidance of strategic behavior as 
well as the evolution and implementation of diff erent types of patent liability 
rules. History is also central to understanding the legal divergences and 
convergences in the use of remedies in general and their special evolution in 
patent law both in Civil law and Common law countries, which is further 
analyzed in the third chapter.
Th e third chapter aims at contributing to the debate about property and liability 
rules in patent law precisely by examining the use of ex-post liability rules 
administered by courts in three selected countries: the U.S., the U.K. and Italy. 
Th e chapter provides a comparative law and economics analysis of patent law 
provisions and case law allowing the switch from a property to a liability rule 
ex-post. Th e concept of ex-post liability rules serves to highlight the fact that, in 
spite of originating either in law provisions or in case law, all the rules examined 
are judicially-administered and taken on a case-by-case basis and thus resemble 
much more accurately the type of liability rules used in the entitlements 
literature, in comparison, for instance with ex-ante compulsory licenses. 
Moreover, the justifi cation of such rules is oft en based on the need to avoid 
strategic behavior and bargaining collapse in the senses of the debate about 
property and liability rules, rather than on the impact, for instance, of high 
search costs.
Th ree particular cases are examined: 1) compulsory licensing provisions for lack 
of working12; 2) compulsory licensing provisions for a patent that depends on the 
12 Th e term “lack of working” or “failure to work” refers to the absence of exploitation or 
commercialization of a patented invention. Th e term is oft en used in relation with “local 
working” or “national working”, that is, a requirement by which the patentee is obliged to 
work her patent in the territory of the state granting patent protection or otherwise risk that 
the patent might be subjected to a compulsory license. In order to determine whether a patent 
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use of a previously patented invention; and 3) damages substituting injunctive 
relief when this latter is denied aft er a judicial fi nding of validity and 
infringement of a patent, which is typically allowed by equitable doctrines of 
Common Law countries. Th e contrasting vision of Civil Law countries on the 
use of remedies, including injunctive relief is also discussed.
Th e chapter fi nds that in spite of the new harmonized framework set up by the 
TRIPS Agreement, the conditions to opt for a liability rule diverge widely within 
national laws. However, in all the aforementioned cases, courts and agencies are 
allowed to opt for protecting a patent through an ex post liability rule and face 
similar obstacles in the application of a case by case reasoning. In addition, and 
as pointed out by the law and economics literature, calculating the compensation 
due to the patent holder and fostering effi  cient bargaining between the parties 
are important concerns in all the systems under study. Th e chapter also 
highlights how law and economics contributions have typically focused on U.S. 
law and practice, in noticeable contrast with the overly importance of 
international Treaties regulating substantive and enforcement patent law and the 
complex and diverse rules in place in diff erent countries.
Th e fourth chapter aims at broadening such seemingly restricted view by 
applying the insights developed by the law and economics literature to the 
particular features of the selected patent systems and international framework 
discussed in the previous chapter. Th e chapter analyzes the standard models 
used by several law and economics scholars in order to study patent hold-ups 
and discusses their principal assumptions and results. Secondly, the chapter 
confronts such assumptions and results with the most important cases described 
in the previous chapter in order to discuss the grounds for using ex post liability 
rules in effi  ciency terms. Such grounds include the most recent discussions about 
patent hold-ups, the emergence of patent trolls and in general, of patent strategic 
behavior. Th e chapter proposes to broaden discussions on the grounds allowing 
the use of ex-post liability rules according to the experience about emerging 
practices of patent strategic behavior both in the U.S. and Europe.
Th e fi ft h chapter discusses the issue of calculating the appropriate compensation 
that substitutes a property rule, which is one of the most important critiques 
is being suffi  ciently worked, some legislations also refer to whether their exploitation is able 
to meet consumer’s demand and moreover, some patent laws require that the public demand 
is met at reasonable prices. Article 5-A of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington 
on June 2, 1911, at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 
1958 and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967)in fact establishes that: “Each country of the Union 
shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses 
to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by 
the patent, for example, failure to work”.
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against the use of liability rules in patent law. Th e chapter discusses the 
theoretical insights about property and liability rules and applies them to the 
diff erent options with regard to the calculation of such compensation. 
Aft erwards, the chapter concludes by comparing the diff erent available rules for 
patent protection in terms of costs and benefi ts.
Th e general conclusions of this Th esis are various and pertain to the legal as well 
as the law and economics fi eld. Most of the conclusions and suggestions can be 
applied only to this specifi c research and hence to the analysis, in law and 
economic terms of the use of property and liability rules in patent law. However, 
some of the conclusions also refer to more general questions such as whether 
property law should be necessarily refl ected in IP law or whether the object and 
aims of IP protection diff er so importantly that the benefi ts of applying the 
insights of property law to IP law will be outweighed by the costs of so doing. 
Such arguments were oft en made in the context of the eBay litigation against the 
curtailment of injunctive relief for patentees. However, the same arguments have 
led to contradictory calls for applying the insights developed in property rights 
law to IP and at the same time, a call against using general rules as the equitable 
evaluation of injunctions by judges in common law countries that also applied to 
tangible property. A closely related question, which is oft en posed at the 
intersection of Antitrust and IP law, is whether patent rights deserve a diff erential 
treatment. If the answer is affi  rmative, it is nevertheless debated whether such 
diff erential treatment should tilt towards more or less protection than that 
granted to other property. In answering this question, many analysts have rushed 
in concluding that to protect innovation incentives; patents should enjoy 
deference in the application of antitrust statutes. But such conclusions ignore the 
access side of the patent balance, so that in some cases, the application of 
antitrust law might aff ect innovation incentives but this might be nevertheless 
less costly than obstructing access to further innovation. In this sense, access 
does not only mean to diminish prices and to correct market failures in static 
effi  ciency terms but also the possibility for further innovators to use patents and 
continue the path towards scientifi c and technological progress, hence deriving 
potential gains to the market in terms of dynamic effi  ciency as well.
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CHAPTER I
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT RIGHTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Patents are defi ned both in the legal and economic scholarship as exclusive 
rights.13 Exclusivity has multiple consequences, inter alia, that any potential user 
must obtain previous consent from the patent owner, that the terms of such 
consent, including the price for using the patented invention, shall be fi xed 
through voluntary negotiations and that in case of infringement, a patentee can 
solicit from a court, remedies that compensate for any non-authorized use but 
also such measures capable of stopping and avoiding future infringement as well 
as such remedies that put the patentee “back” in the position she enjoyed but for 
the infringement.
Patent laws have nevertheless persistently provided for the possibility to 
transform the right to exclude of patentees into a right to receive remuneration 
i.e. what the law and economics scholarship denominates a “liability rule”. 
Unsurprisingly, such regimes have been subject to an extensive and ongoing 
controversy. In this sense, patent law provides a unique environment to apply 
and test the – contentious – insights of the law and economics literature on 
entitlement protection. Th is branch of study focuses on the use of alternative 
remedies for the protection of “entitlements” illustrating the use of property and 
liability rules across all legal fi elds and suggesting that the choice between 
remedies should be guided by the presence and importance of transaction costs.
In fact, recent discussions in the patent fi eld about the emergence and increasing 
impact of strategic patenting and litigation, which are evidenced in a set of 
broadly discussed case law and debates about patent reform and harmonization 
13 See Article 28 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, World Trade Organization Agreement, Annex 1C, available at: www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.
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have all addressed the question of when – if ever – should the patentee’s right to 
exclude be transformed into a right to receive monetary compensation.14
Th is chapter reviews the existing literature on the subject while attempting to 
put forward an alternative framework for understanding the use of liability rules 
in patent law. For these purposes, we bring together the insights developed with 
respect to traditional compulsory licenses as well as the most recent literature 
focusing on another type of liability rule in patent law based upon the law of 
remedies of common law countries. Both types of entitlement protection rules, 
i.e. property and liability rules are analyzed through their effi  ciency outcomes 
and from a dual – substantive and remedies based – perspective. Secondly we 
compare diff erent types of liability rules sharing a similar rationale while 
diff erentiating them from systems that are justifi ed upon diff erent policy goals 
such as the public interest. Th irdly, the theoretical framework of property and 
liability rules is confronted to the modern landscape of the patent system. A 
particular emphasis is given to the impact of remedies in current discussions 
about the alleged failure of patent systems to provide effi  cient incentives within a 
changing technological and economic landscape. Th e aim is to build up a more 
coherent framework that can be applied to examine the eff ects of property and 
liability rules in patent cases.
Th e chapter is divided as follows. Th e second section introduces the economic 
approach to law as applied to patents and discusses the economic rationale of 
patent law making a distinction between the goals of substantive and enforcement 
law. Section three discusses the law and economics literature on property and 
liability rules and its main positive and normative insights. Section four 
introduces the property v. liability rules debate within the fi eld of Intellectual 
Property (hereinaft er IP) rights highlighting the common arguments for and 
against the use of liability rules in this fi eld. Section fi ve focuses on the use of 
liability rules in patent law. It applies the property and liability rules framework 
to currently debated issues in patent law, in order to identify the economic 
14 For claims about the need of a Patent Reform in the U.S. see James Bessen & Michael 
Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put Innovators at 
Risk, Princeton University Press, 1–331(2008). For global discussions see WIPO, Th e 45 
Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, in WIPO about the 
Development Agenda, available at: www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/
agenda/recommendations.pdf, stating that “Th e WIPO Secretariat(…)should address in its 
working documents for norm-setting activities, as appropriate and as directed by 
Member States, issues such as: (a) safeguarding national implementation of intellectual 
property rules (b) links between intellectual property and competition (c) intellectual 
property-related transfer of technology (d) potential fl exibilities, exceptions and limitations 
for Member States and (e) the possibility of additional special provisions for developing 
countries and LDCs. See also WIPO, Exclusions From Patentable Subject Matter And 
Exceptions And Limitations To Th e Rights, supra note 6.
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grounds for switching into liability rules and the main problems with the switch. 
Th e case is made, that as recently stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the inherent 
economic function of patents has deeply changed. Th is, along with a global trend 
towards strengthening patent rights and diminishing the space for fl exibilities, 
might require that a strong presumption favoring property rules in the patent 
context be weakened under certain circumstances.
2. ECONOMICS OF PATENT PROTECTION
Economic analysis has played an important role in the IP fi eld long before the 
emergence of the “law and economics” movement.15 In addition to the specifi c 
analysis of IP rights, the application of the insights of the economics of property 
rights into this fi eld has been defended by several scholars.16 Moreover, the 
economic analysis of patent law has experienced an exponential growth and 
increasing specialization with regard to the diff erent subject areas as well as with 
respect to policy design and the specifi c legal or judicial doctrines that might 
play a role in such design.
In this sense, the growing importance of the “law and economics” or “economic 
analysis of law” movement has probably played an important role in such 
refi nements. Th e economic approach to law can be defi ned as the application of 
economic theory – especially but not only of price theory – to evaluate the 
formation, structure, processes and impact of the law and legal institutions.17 
Price theory relies on the concepts of scarcity of resources and focuses on the 
problem of making choices in order to allocate such inherently scarce resources.18 
In making choices, individuals must assess each alternative in a presumably 
15 William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law, Harvard University Press, (2003) at p. 1 arguing that the idea that IPRs might 
be needed to have incentives to create, dates from the Middle Ages in the Venetian Patent Act 
of 1474 and English Statute of Monopolies of 1624 among others, and referring discussions by 
Smith, Bentham, Mill, Pigou and Taussig and Plant around the 1930’s. See Arnold Plant, An 
Economic Th eory concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 Economica 30 (1934), reprinted in 
David Vaver (Editor), Intellectual Property Rights, Critical Concepts in Law (2006), Volume 3, 
at p. 45; arguing that “we are surely entitled, therefore, to attribute the existence of the patent 
law to a desire to stimulate invention”.
16 See Landes And Posner, supra note 15, at p. 8, referring to the entitlements literature and 
arguing that: “this fundamental insight of the economic analysis of the common law is 
applicable to intellectual property and illustrates one of the themes of the book – that the 
economic principles that inform and explain property law can guide thinking about 
intellectual property as well”. See also Epstein, infra note 65 and accompanying text.
17 See Cento Veljanosky, Economic Principles of Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), 
at p. 19.
18 While price theory studies the interaction of units in the economy, including fi rms, consumers 
or individuals, its insights have been extended to analyze diff erent concepts including the 
behavior of states within International Law.
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rational way, basing their decisions on the attempt to maximize benefi ts and 
minimize their costs. Whether they are trying to maximize utility, wealth or 
profi ts, the assumption is that individuals will generally make decisions in a 
rational way.19
While economics studies the choice of individuals and fi rms with regard to the 
allocation of resources, law can be regarded as a means of allocating rights or 
entitlements. Policy makers might want to achieve effi  ciency through the law, 
regulations and decisions. Furthermore, any law or judicial decision has eff ects 
on the incentives of individuals, fi rms and states. Hence, the economic approach 
to law considers law, including patent law, as a set of incentives. Whereas it is 
oft en said that economics uses an ex ante approach and conversely, law examines 
matters from an ex post view, it has been recently acknowledged that “many 
economic and legal problems arise from the temporal nature of economic activity 
and require a trade-off  between ex ante and ex post effi  ciency”.20
In spite of a growing consensus on the importance of evaluating the outcomes of 
legal rules and court decisions on effi  ciency grounds, the concept of effi  ciency is 
not as straightforward as it might seem at fi rst sight.21 Effi  ciency can be 
interpreted as requiring resources such as goods, services and entitlements to be 
allocated to the highest expected valued uses. In addition, effi  ciency relies on the 
concept of opportunity cost, i.e. the cost of using a resource defi ned as the return 
that such resource would have obtained in its best possible alternative use.22
But the concept of effi  ciency is oft en referred to, either in a static or in a dynamic 
context. In the light of the diff erences between allocative and dynamic effi  ciency, 
trade-off s might arise and in fact do oft en arise between these two perspectives. 
Static effi  ciency assumes a given level of technology and asks whether consumers 
and producers’ decisions take into account the real opportunity costs of 
19 See Veljanosky, supra note 18, explaining how rational choice theory relies at the same time 
on the assumptions of substitutability, meaning that goods are can substitute one another at 
the margin; marginality which means that in any activity to obtain the maximum utility or 
profi t, they must be allocated in a way that the marginal benefi t from the last unit of a resource 
is equal to its marginal cost. However, behavioural law and economics studies have questioned 
the rationality of individuals, and especially of consumers. For an overview on this fi eld see 
Cass Sustein (Ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
20 Veljanosky, p. 35, highlighting also how the “ex antelex post distinction arises in the design 
and exploitation of IPRs” where the trade-off  between ex ante dynamic effi  ciency and ex post 
allocative effi  ciency defi nes the IPRs trade-off .
21 See Landes and Posner, supra note 15 arguing that effi  ciency is an objective concept whereas 
fairness is indefi nite: “economics is complex and diffi  cult but it is less complicated than legal 
doctrine and it can serve to unify diff erent areas of the law”.
22 See Pierre Régibeau and Katharine Rocket, IP and Competition Law: An Economic Approach, 
p. 505–552, in The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition 
Policy, Edited by Steven D. Anderman, Cambridge University Press, 2007 at p. 506.
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resources. It comprises two diff erent aspects; allocative effi  ciency, which is 
achieved when the price of the good equals its marginal cost23 and productive 
effi  ciency, which entails that fi rms producing the goods are doing so at the 
minimum cost.
Dynamic effi  ciency takes into account how resources are used to expand 
production possibilities and capabilities, a process that is infl uenced by incentives 
to invest, Research and Development (hereinaft er R&D) decisions, and 
innovation.24 Th e industrial organization literature highlights the contradictory 
eff ects and diffi  culty of aligning these concepts. When a new product is 
developed, it is oft en the case that the producer cannot appropriate all benefi ts 
the product creates for consumers so that a (non) appropriability eff ect might 
lead to insuffi  cient investment incentives.25 New products, on the other hand, 
usually reduce the sales and profi ts of fi rms selling older products. Th us, a new 
product might impose losses on other fi rms which are not taken into account by 
the innovating fi rm and cause a business stealing eff ect that might lead to 
excessive investment.26 When these eff ects are aggregated across sectors, the 
result is that “even in the absence of any policy intervention, one would expect 
over-investment in some sectors and under-investment in others”.27
Furthermore, in order to decide whether a law or a legal reform under analysis 
would be effi  cient there are alternative thresholds that might be taken into 
account. Pareto effi  ciency, or the fi rst best theory, asks for policy changes that 
will improve the benefi ts of one party without decreasing benefi ts for any 
23 “As the cost of using a resource is equal to the benefi ts that it would have generated if it had 
been employed in another sector, the allocation of resources should be such that their 
marginal returns are equated across sectors”, Regibeau and Rockett, Ibid, at p. 507.
24 See Regibeau and Rockett, supra note 22 at p. 507 arguing that “there is no universally 
accepted defi nition of dynamic effi  ciency” and proposing one that “relates to any kind of 
investment decision”.
25 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Th e MIT Press, (2001), at p. 391, 
describing that “socially, a monopolist has too low an incentive to introduce a new product, 
because he cannot fully appropriate the social surplus (unless he can price-discriminate 
perfectly)”.
26 See Vincenzo Denicolo, Do Patents over-compensate innovators?, Economic Policy, Volume 
22 Issue 52, pp. 679–729, explaining that “Another reason why the patentee’s reward may 
exceed what he contributed to society is business stealing. If before the innovation the 
industry comprises incumbents holding some market power, the innovator may be able to 
steal at least part of the rents previously earned by those incumbents”. See also Jean Tirole, 
supra note 25 at p. 399, explaining that the business-stealing eff ect within the context of 
patent races as “by increasing its R&D eff ort, a fi rm reduces the probability of its rival’s 
obtaining the patent, and a typical result is that fi rms engaged in a patent race overinvest in 
R&D (if we assume away the appropriability eff ect) and thus duplicate too much of the 
research eff ort”.
27 Such diff erences between the private and public returns on investment can also result from 
public policy measures, fi rst and foremost on the application of industrial property laws, 
including IPR and competition laws. See Régibau and Rockett, at p. 508.
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involved party. However, under a Kaldor-Hicks approach, effi  ciency can also be 
attained when the benefi ts accrued to one party surpass any potential loss for 
another party so that – at least hypothetically – there could be compensation 
from the winners to the losers while gains are still achieved in terms of total 
surplus. Th is criterion, as we will discuss below, is of special importance in 
deciding between policies that aff ect both innovators and users but also in those 
aff ecting fi rst and second innovators.
2.1. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF PATENTS
Economic studies have advanced various utilitarian rationales for patent 
protection.28 Th e reward theory poses that IP rights, and specifi cally patent law, 
aims at giving incentives to innovate and thus, at encouraging investment in 
R&D activities. Th e general argument is that such incentives are necessary 
because information and knowledge-based products are public goods in an 
economic sense, which means that they are non-rival in their use and non-
excludable in the absence of IPR laws.29 Since R&D activities entail sunk costs, 
absent patent protection, anyone could free-ride from another’s invention.30 
Since the process of inventing and developing innovative products is costly, 
incentives would be insuffi  cient and there would be under-investment in R&D in 
the absence of appropriate incentive mechanisms.31 Th e patent system is hence 
28 Other non-utilitarian theories that justify Intellectual Property Rights based their assertions 
on diverse concepts such as natural rights, unjust enrichment, personhood concept, 
libertarian ideals, distributive justice goals, democratic, radical, and socialist and ecologist 
theories. See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property: General Th eories, 1600 Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics, available at: http://encyclo.fi ndlaw.com/1600book.pdf at p. 156–163, 
discussing utilitarian and non-utilitarian theories.
29 For the general concept of knowledge and information as public goods in the economic sense 
and the explanation of IPRs and patents as a mechanism to foster innovation incentives see 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives, MIT Press (2004), at p. 31–32. For a 
general discussion on the economic theories of patent law see Hahn, Robert, Economics of 
Intellectual Property Protection in Intellectual Property Rights in Frontier 
Industries: Software and Biotechnology, AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, Edited by Robert Hahn, at p. 14–16 and Peter Menell (2008), supra note 28.
30 Th is argument entails that: 1) sunk costs are signifi cant as to aff ect innovation incentives, 
which means they are signifi cant in comparison with prospective profi ts from the innovation, 
i.e. sunk costs will aff ect the decision whether to invest in R&D, which fairly depends on the 
technological sector; and 2) that anyone can “read” on the innovation, in the sense of reverse 
engineering and being able to imitate in a way that free rides on the eff ort by innovators. Th is 
latter requirement would mean that secrecy is not an option or fi rst-mover advantages are not 
signifi cant. In fact, as we will explain below, these two factors diverge across diff erent 
industries, aff ecting innovation incentives and the role of patents in varying degrees.
31 Economic studies also acknowledge the existence of alternative incentive mechanisms that 
coexist with IP rights (prizes, public-funded research), which have been deemed as potentially 
superior in specifi c cases such as life-saving drugs, drugs for neglected diseases and those 
mainly aff ecting poor countries. Since the focus of this Th esis is on the eff ects of specifi c 
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justifi ed as providing the ex-ante incentives necessary for optimal investment in 
R&D while at the same time, it is acknowledged that patent rights cause a 
deadweight loss due to the temporary monopoly allowed under its span.
Nevertheless, the causal relation between a stronger patent system and more 
innovation has been questioned in many industries. Reliance in patent rights 
seems to play its most signifi cant role within the pharmaceutical, chemical and 
biotech sectors, where it is also said to be necessary in the light of the enormous 
costs of R&D and those related to screening effi  cacy of new products and 
obtaining their marketing approval.32 Of course the subtle line of how much 
protection should the IP system give to right-holders is still imprecise. 
Paradoxically, the pharmaceutical and biotech sectors are involved in the 
production of potentially life-saving technologies; making patents more 
controversial exactly where they play a more fundamental role.33
A second theory proposed to justify patents is the prospect theory, which sustains 
that patents are valuable because they facilitate effi  cient commercialization of 
technologies and hence provide a boost for follow-up innovation. Th e normative 
suggestion of this theory is that pioneers or fi rst innovators should be granted 
broad and strong rights in order to foster subsequent development of 
technologies.34 Th e theory assumes that social and private interests of the 
patentees are aligned; however these statements are controversial since stronger 
patents or more patents can on the one hand facilitate licensing while on the 
other hand they might block or deter further development of technologies.35 
patent doctrines in the design of optimal patent policy, we deliberately leave aside 
considerations about alternative incentive mechanisms. Th is choice is motivated on the one 
hand by the overwhelming presence of IP and patent rights in global and national laws and on 
the other hand by the necessity of confi ning the study within reasonable limits and is not 
meant to suggest that patents might or not be superior to other mechanisms under certain 
circumstances, even those similar to the ones presented in this study. For a general discussion 
on this matter see Suzanne Scotchmer, supra note 29, p. 116.
32 See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Th eir Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 7552 (2000), (fi nding fi nd that fi rms 
protect the profi ts of their inventions through patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the 
use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities and that secrecy and lead 
time tend to be emphasized most heavily whereas patents are the least emphasized in most 
manufacturing industries, with the exception of and Frederic Scherer, The Economics of 
Human Gene Patents, 77 Academic Medicine 1348, 1353–54 (2002).
33 As stated in footnote 31, some authors argue for the superiority of other incentive mechanisms 
to encourage R&D of live-saving drugs, especially those for neglected diseases. See also the 
WHO Report on the Commission on Innovation, Intellectual Property and Public Health, 
which specially emphasizes this problematic aspect of patent-driven incentives.
34 See Edmund Kitch, Th e Nature and Function of the Patent System. 20 Journal of Law and 
Economics, N° 2 (1977):266.
35 See Suzanne Scotchmer, supra note 29, at footnote 105 at p. 27–28, objecting that strong 
pioneer patents can pre-empt competition because prospectors might either avoid competition 
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Nonetheless, Kitch’s prospect theory approaches this problem by relying on an 
optimistic view about licensing that has been put into doubt.36
A third justifi cation of the IP system is to indicate the value of a fi rm. Th is 
signaling function is especially important with respect to patents and within 
industries where small fi rms play a key role37 as it is the case with biotech start-
ups which need to enter into alliances to complete their research projects and in 
general with new fi rms trying to gain access to fi nancial markets.
All these economic rationales attempt to justify patent protection based upon the 
role of patents in shaping incentives to invest in R&D, innovate and develop 
innovations. Yet, a balanced reading of the theories suggests that patent law aims 
at providing optimal or suffi  cient incentives to innovate and not simply at 
maximizing the rewards for patentees. Th e justifi cation of the patent system 
would be rather to “align innovation incentives with the innovator’s contribution, 
while keeping in mind collateral damage ex post”.38 Under an effi  ciency 
perspective, patent laws are justifi ed precisely because the long term gains in 
dynamic effi  ciency terms must surpass the short term losses in static effi  ciency.39
On the contrary, arguments in favor of allowing inventors to capture all gains 
from their inventions usually disregard the social costs of the patent system. 
Moreover, the increasing role of strategic reasons as a central motivation for 
in the “innovation market” for second-generation products or avoid competition among 
second-generation innovators aft er the second-generation innovations exist and posing that 
the case for pioneer patents depends on whether the fi rst innovation is costly, in which case 
the patent is indeed justifi ed as a “reward”. See also Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, Columbia Law Review, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 839–960, 
(1990), at p.916, discussing the limitations of the prospect theory’ suggestion that broad scope 
should be preferred and highlighting that a broad patent might increase innovation incentives 
for pioneers however diminishing incentives “for others to stay in the invention game”.
36 See Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in Handbook of Law and 
Economics, Vol 1, Elsevier (M. Polinsky and S. Shavell Eds. 007), at footnote 19, p. 26, 
arguing that Kitch was “the earliest, and perhaps most extreme, licensing optimist. See also 
the discussion below about cumulative innovation and incentives to hold-up, at footnote 129 
and accompanying text.
37 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625 (2002).
38 See Th omas Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses (Minnesota Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 08–39, 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273293, 
at p. 20. Contrast with Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking lead to 
Systematically Excessive Royalties? available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139133 (July 22, 
2008), quoted in Cotter which advances that an optimal system allows inventors to capture all 
gains from their inventions or risk providing insuffi  cient incentives.
39 Economists compare the benefi ts and costs of alternative market structures by referring to 
the measures of total surplus, which corresponds to the sum of the consumer’s surplus and 
the producers’ surplus (‘‘PS’’). Nonetheless, there exists disagreement about whether it should 
be consumers’ surplus or total surplus that is to be protected from anti-competitive conduct. 
Similarly, patent law theories explain patents in terms of a tradeoff  between dynamic and 
static effi  ciencies.
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pursuing and using patents stresses the importance of considering the net benefi ts 
of the patent system, either to justify patent rights in general, or more importantly, 
for the interpretation of specifi c patent doctrines in a reasonable way.40
2.2. THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT ENFORCEMENT
To enforce means “to execute a particular law, writ, judgment or the collection of 
a debt or fi ne”.41 In order to attain the aims of substantive patent law, enforcement 
law aims at providing suitable rules to prevent infringement or obtain remedies 
if infringement has occurred. It is commonly acknowledged that substantive 
rights are of little value in the absence of eff ective procedures for their 
enforcement.42
Legal studies approach infringement as the most common violation of a patent 
right, which aff ects the right to exclude and triggers the use of litigation.43 Many 
economic studies face the problem of understanding infringement given that at 
fi rst sight, it seems that fi rms would always be better off  by settling and avoiding 
litigation costs and thus, it is oft en diffi  cult to explain in economic terms why 
disputes would ever arrive to courts.44 Moreover, economic studies also question 
why infringement would ever occur in equilibrium when parties know in 
advance whether remedies are weak or detection improbable, so that licensing 
would take place and parties will save on litigation costs.45
However, patent litigation is prevalent and aff ects diff erent industries in varying 
degrees. Additionally, the possibility of eroding profi ts through litigation might 
undermine innovation incentives and when asymmetries between small and 
large fi rms are signifi cant, the market structure might importantly determine 
innovation incentives.46 On the other hand, recent studies also warn about the 
eff ect of rising litigation costs on innovation that arise because innovators might 
40 See Dominique Guellec and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Economics of the 
European Patent System: IP Policy for Innovation and Competition, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 266, (2007) at p. 73–74, reviewing empirical studies on the reasons for 
patenting, economic value and performance of patents and concluding that: “patents are also 
taken for other reasons than simply avoiding to being copied, and it is to be expected that 
patents taken with these objectives in mind are much less socially benefi cial than others”.
41 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, Cambridge 
University Press (2005), at p. 575, recalling the defi nition of enforcement given in the Black’s 
Law Dictionary, sixth edition, 1990, at p. 528.
42 See Ibid at p. 634–635.
43 See Donald Chisum et al. Principles of Patent Law, Foundation Press, New York, 3rd 
edition (2004) at p. 1284.
44 See Scotchmer, supra note 29, at p. 201.
45 Ibid at p. 201.
46 Ibid p. 201.
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inadvertently infringe.47 Importantly, economic studies have also examined how 
much profi t is dissipated through litigation as well as the prevalence of litigation 
according to industries and fi rm sizes and with respect to the value of 
innovations, concluding that litigation can largely aff ect the incentives set by 
substantive IPRs law:
“Given the cost and prevalence of litigation, we can conclude that it constitutes an 
important modifi cation to the profi tability of intellectual property rights, and one 
that diff ers across diff erent types of fi rms and technologies”48
In the context of litigation, remedies are fundamental to achieve the goals of 
compensating for past infringement and preventing future infringement. Th e 
rules designed to govern litigation procedures including the remedies available 
in cases of infringement are able to shape the incentives of parties involved in 
patent disputes but also to generally aff ect incentives to innovate and incentives 
to strategically use such rules. Th e choice of remedies, thus, from an effi  ciency 
perspective should refl ect a balanced IP system: one that provides suffi  cient 
innovation incentives while keeping the costs of the system at its lowest.
2.3. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE AND 
ENFORCEMENT PATENT LAW
Th e literature on entitlement protection focuses on the choice between alternative 
rules to protect a given entitlement. Th is choice oft en refers to the remedy that a 
court can grant to right holders in case of violation or infringement. Additionally, 
patent law has specifi c mechanisms embedded in substantive law that establish 
either a system of property rules or a system of liability rules, e.g. compulsory 
licenses.
Hence, in applying the insights of the entitlement literature to the case of patents, 
it is important to take into account both substantive and enforcement patent law. 
Moreover, it is important to examine the interaction between substantive and 
enforcement law in the light of the economic rationale of patents and hence, to 
examine the role and limits of each body of law. It is in this context that the 
question arises whether substantive law is the unique set of rules that aim at 
balancing innovation incentives and access to technologies. Th e alternative 
would be to consider that it is also desirable to strike a balance through 
enforcement law. Th ese questions are especially important when substantive law 
is perceived to be unbalanced.
47 See Bessen and Meurer supra note 14 at p. 130.
48 See Scotchmer, supra note 29, at p. 204.
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A widely held view in economic studies is that enforcement law should be applied 
in a “neutral” way that assumes that the substantive law of patents has already 
stroke a balance between fostering innovation incentives and access to 
innovation.49 Th is view is oft en motivated by the application of property law to 
IP, with the consequence that once it is decided that a particular matter deserves 
protection, such protection should follow the logic of property, including the 
application of rules governing remedies.50
Legal scholars who emphasize that patent balance is a competence of legislatures 
which a court should not attempt to modify but should rather take “as a given”51 
also sustain that enforcement law should not attempt to alter the set of incentives 
as established in substantive law. Such position can also be found in countries 
such as the U.S. where many patent doctrines have been developed by courts.52 
Nonetheless, some authors arguing that courts should not attempt to strike a 
balance in patent policy through the use of enforcement law and specifi cally of 
remedies, have diff erentiated between damages as legal remedies and injunctions 
as an equitable relief:
“… To deploy the law of patent damages to correct for perceived fl aws in judge-made 
substance would lack both transparency and candor; and, as is always a risk when 
courts resort to indirect methods of addressing a problem, may give rise to 
49 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 10, arguing that “courts applying patent remedies or antitrust 
doctrine should take substantive patent law as a given, meaning that in interpreting the law of 
patent remedies or antitrust doctrine they should attempt neither to subvert nor to enhance 
substantive patent law’s embedded incentive scheme”.
50 See for instance Landes and Posner, supra note 15 at p. 8, arguing that “once a judgment is 
made that a particular “parcel” of intellectual property should be owned, the standard 
analysis of remedial options is applicable”.
51 Th is view might be particularly infl uential in civil law countries where legislation is the 
primary source of law while judicial activity is oft en unbound by precedents and hence, the 
legal framework for remedies is perceived as more rigid and impeding, to a certain extent, the 
application of equity. See for instance, Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, 
University of Michigan Press (1998), at p. 78, arguing that: “according to traditional 
comparative law doctrine, the civil law is mostly a codifi ed system where the role of 
bureaucratically recruited judges is to interpret and apply a written body of statutes. Common 
law, conversely, consists mostly of case law where technocratic judges are concerned with 
fi nding the applicable rule within the body of law made up by legal precedents”. But see ibid, 
at p. arguing against such commonly held view: “if we consider the role of case law, we fi nd 
more convergence between modern civil law and common law. In practice, courts in civil law 
countries make law just as much as courts in common law countries (…)”.
52 In eff ect, even in a common law country as the U.S., the eBay decision, supra note 2 has been 
criticized on the grounds that it refl ects an inappropriate judicial activism from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in contradiction to prior precedent and legislation by the Congress. See 
Beckerman-Rodau, Andrew, Th e Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting 
the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. Tulane Journal of Technology & 
Intellectual Property, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1089537. See also Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, highlighting the role of courts in 
delineating patent policy.
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unintended consequences when the resulting modifi cations are applied in unexpected 
contexts. On other hand, nothing in substantive patent law requires that courts award 
injunctive relief to every prevailing patentee, regardless of consequences. To hold 
otherwise would elevate patents to a position of unique privilege in comparison with 
other forms of property”.53
Moreover, the view that problems with substantive patent law should not be dealt 
with the use of enforcement rules neglects two important points. Th e fi rst is that 
patent strategic behavior and especially hold-ups probably arise not only because 
of defects of substantive law but also due to the inappropriateness of some 
enforcement rules as applied to the patent fi eld. Th e second point is that, even if a 
problem might be caused by a wrong substantive law design, a solution would 
still be needed. Hence, in the absence of substantive law reform, it is valid to 
examine whether enforcement law and the law of remedies leave enough 
discretion to deal with problems that might originate in substantive patent law 
and yet aff ect the patent system as a whole.
An alternative is then to consider that patent law design occurs both at the level 
of substantive and enforcement rules. Obviously, there are multiple questions 
regarding the scope, if any, for a discretionary application of enforcement rules. 
Th is is especially the case with respect to remedies, both in common law 
countries but also in countries with civil law tradition, where no corresponding 
equitable doctrines for enforcement exist. Th e general question of whether courts 
could and should aim at striking the balance of a perceived unbalanced system 
through the use of enforcement rules entails several inter-related questions with 
regard to the interface between substantive and enforcement law. Firstly, it is 
important to examine the linkage between rights and remedies in the sense of 
whether the right determines the applicable remedy or the available remedy 
determines the type of right. Th is question necessarily require a preliminary 
refl ection on the aims of enforcement law.
Enforcement law could be either interpreted as guided by effi  ciency – in the sense 
of attaining a patent system that maximizes net benefi ts – or by cost-eff ectiveness 
– enforcing patent law at the minimum possible cost. If guided by cost-
eff ectiveness, patent enforcement rules would aim at reducing wrongful behavior, 
i.e., patent infringement at the lowest cost. Law and economics analysis, which is 
guided by effi  ciency, oft en sustains that the aims of enforcement law are to deter 
wrongful behavior.54 In addition, compensation is oft en cited both as a refl ection 
53 See Cotter, supra note 38 at p. 11.
54 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, 
Preferences, and Distributive Justice. The Journal of Legal Studies 32:1 (2003), at p. 292, 
arguing that “from the perspective of welfare economics, the central purpose of law 
enforcement is to reduce harmful activity. One way to accomplish this goal is through 
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of fairness concerns or as a goal complementary to deterrence. Such view, which 
oft en refers to public enforcement in the context of criminal law would be 
however incomplete in the case of patent law, since enforcement rules are never 
applied in a vacuum.
Even if the aim of patent enforcement rules is to reduce patent infringement, 
such reduction should not be in contradiction with the aims of patent policy in 
general, but rather interpreted in the context of providing optimal incentives for 
innovation. Hence, when patent infringement is harmless or when it produces a 
social benefi t that surpasses any potential loss, effi  ciency would require 
limitations on enforcement. Examples are in fact abundant in substantive patent 
law where private and non-commercial uses are exempted and measures such as 
compulsory licenses in cases of public interest also allow exceptions to patent 
infringement. But of course, the question on the interface between substantive 
and enforcement law is whether is it suffi  cient to have such exceptions in 
substantive law or whether enforcement rules should also be interpreted in the 
light of the objectives of patent law.
Scholars are divided with regards to this question as some authors assume that 
attempting to balance the patent system also through enforcement law would not 
be advisable55 and some others argue in favor of keeping the balance both in 
substantive as well as enforcement patent law.56 Whereas the current international 
framework does not provide clear answers to such questions, especially as the 
answers might vary from country to country, Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement 
seems to favor a broader interpretation of the objectives of enforcement law in 
the light of the objectives of patent law in general:
“Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specifi ed in this Part are 
available under their law so as to permit eff ective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a 
deterrence: the reduction in the commission of harmful acts through the threat of sanctions 
(…)”. Economic analysis refers to public enforcement in the sense of publicly prosecuted 
crimes, which society wants to minimize. Private enforcement is conversely dependent upon 
the action of private parties that seek relief on the courts, as it is the case with most patent law 
cases.
55 See for instance, infra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text.
56 See Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, Villanova 
University Legal Working Paper Series, Working Paper 82 (July 2007), available at: 
http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art82, at p. 424 arguing that patent law is 
tailored through substantive and enforcement rules, including the availability of injunctions, 
in order to cope with the costs of uniformity of patent law, and highlighting how it is however 
impossible to perfectly tailor patent law on a case by case basis while arguing in favor of 
industry, technology and entity features that permit to develop guidelines for courts to decide 
in favor of a property or a liability rule.
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deterrent to further infringements. Th ese procedures shall be applied in such a 
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse” (emphasis added)
With these premises, the following chapters examine the interface between 
substantive and enforcement patent law in more detail, focusing on the 
entitlements (patent rights) and how they are protected (remedies and other 
substantive rules referring to the property and liability rules debate). Such 
interface is described in the context of civil law and common law countries and 
explained through the application of law and economics insights in order to 
provide an answer to these questions both from a positive and a normative 
standpoint.
3. PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES
One of the most important contributions of the law and economics movement 
has been to recognize the importance of transaction costs, i.e., costs arising out 
of economic exchanges through the market mechanism. Th e theorem posed by 
Ronald Coase was that absent signifi cant transaction costs, effi  ciency will be 
attained through bargaining in spite of the right’s initial allocation.57 Hence, the 
necessary requirements for effi  cient exchanges are clearly defi ned property rights 
and zero or low transaction costs.58 Under the label “transaction costs” scholars 
57 See Ronald Coase, Th e Nature of the Firm (1937), Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Nov. 
1937), pp. 386–405, at p.392: “We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the 
operation of a market costs something and by forming an organisation and allowing some 
authority (an “entrepreneur”) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved”. 
Although Coase did not use the name “transaction costs”, he referred to the “costs of using 
the market mechanism”, ibid at p. 403. See also Ronald Coase, Th e problem of Social Cost 
(1960), Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp. 1–44, “Once the costs of carrying out market 
transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be 
under taken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement 
is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about”. Scholars, however, 
have diverse interpretations of “transaction costs”, and whereas a strand of literature focuses 
on the role that transaction costs play in determining the distribution of property rights, 
broadly defi ned as all laws, rules and even social customs or organizations that generate 
incentives for behavior – a concept used by the “law and economics” and “new institutional 
economics” movements, i.e. studies following the insights of the Coase Th eorem – another 
approach uses neoclassical economics and defi nes transaction costs in a narrow way that 
equals such costs to transportation charges or taxes. See Douglas Allen, Transaction costs, in 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 0740, available at: http://encyclo.fi ndlaw.
com/0740book.pdf. In any case, transaction costs do not constitute losses to subtract from 
expected benefi ts, but rather refer to the costs that preclude the formation of an agreement.
58 Several authors argue that clearly defi ned rights and zero transaction costs are in fact the two 
sides of the same coin. Th e idea is that in the absence of transaction costs, property rights 
would always be clearly defi ned. Th is follows from a broad defi nition of property rights as 
“the ability to freely exercise a choice over a good or service” and the conception of transaction 
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have included the costs arising out of the market’s price-mechanism, among 
others, the costs of fi nding the parties with whom to bargain, the costs of 
negotiating a deal – including the possibility of strategic bargaining, e.g. holdouts 
and hold-ups strategies – and the costs of enforcing and monitoring any 
subsequent arrangement.59
Calabresi and Melamed60 (hereinaft er C&M) devised a categorization of legal 
entitlements into property and liability rules building upon the concept of 
transaction costs and the relative circumstances in which each rule prevails in 
law.61 Protecting a right through a property rule means that nobody can use or 
acquire such right without prior permission from the owner and thus, that a 
previous negotiation must take place.62 As a consequence, if an entitlement is 
costs as those related to “the ability to freely exercise a choice over a good or service”. See 
Allen, supra note 57.
59 “Transaction costs economics” is a study branch mainly developed by the studies of Oliver 
Williamson holds that the determinants of transaction costs are frequency, specifi city, 
uncertainty, limited rationality, and opportunistic behavior. Diff erent circumstances explain 
the choice between fi rms and markets as guided by the need of lowering transaction costs. 
Th is approach is based on the incompleteness of contracts that exposes parties making 
specifi c investments to holdups. Transaction cost economics investigate how diff erent 
governance structures attempt to solve the problem of contract incompleteness. For a survey 
on the branch see Peter Klein. New Institutional Economics, 0530 Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics. p. 467–468 at http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/0530book.pdf.
60 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of Th e Cathedral, 85 Harvard Law Rev., 1972. Summing up the burgeoning 
literature on property and liability rules that began with the C&M Article would go beyond 
the scope of this study. Hence, this section presents a brief summary of the propositions that 
directly aff ect the choice between property and liability rules in the area of patent law. For a 
survey on the property and liability rules literature see Matteo Rizzolli, Th e Cathedral: An 
Economic Survey of Legal Remedies (January 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1092144.
61 A third instance of entitlements exists in the form of inalienable rights: those for which no 
trade is allowed. In the patent law fi eld this category might point towards discussion about 
the (un) patentability of certain fi elds such as genes or living organisms. In spite of the 
importance of this discussion, this Th esis focuses on the alternative protection for alienable 
entitlements, that is, whether aft er the issuance of a patent, the right-holder should be 
protected through a right of exclusive or remunerative content. Nonetheless, policy levers that 
tackle the issues here discussed such as enforcement and exceptions in patent law, are in some 
instances related to those used to deal with inalienability of rights (patentability requirements) 
insofar as policy-makers also have to decide about the convenience of assigning or not a 
property right in the fi rst place. In this sense, liability rules can be viewed as a middle ground 
solution between a full right (under a property rule) and no right (under an inalienability rule 
that would follow from a fi nding of invalidity or non-infringement).
62 C&M used the word “entitlement” to refer to any confl icting situation in which the State has 
to decide who shall prevail, i.e. who is entitled to prevail. Such decision is called of “fi rst 
order” since it is the necessary premise for the actual enforcement. Th e “second order” 
decision regards the way of protecting the entitlement, e.g. through a property rule, a liability 
rule or an inalienability rule. Effi  ciency, they argued, “asks that we choose the set of 
entitlements which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in 
the sense that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it 
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protected through a property rule, a court asked to enforce such right in cases of 
unauthorized use or infringement, should issue a mandatory order to stop 
infringement; what is usually called an “injunctive order”.63
Liability rules operate under a diff erent mechanism that protects entitlements 
but permits non-authorized use or taking as long as the owner is compensated. 
Hence, the right to consensually and previously approve any unauthorized use, 
granting owners control over their rights is converted into a right to receive a 
monetary award, which grants no control but remunerates the owner. As a 
consequence, if an entitlement is protected through a liability rule it means that 
the relevant authority – whether a court or regulatory agency – would fi x a 
compensation to be paid to the owner.
C&M described four diff erent rules responding to two diff erent factors; to whom 
the right is allocated and whether the right is protected through a property or a 
liability rule.64 An additional parameter that has been taken into consideration 
that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off  than before”, that is, 
an application of the concept known as Pareto effi  ciency. See also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913), 
classifying “jural relations” in rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, immunities, 
liabilities and disabilities, each category having a co-related one. For instance, if X has a right 
against Y to stay out of his land that would mean that Y would have a duty towards X to stay 
out of that place. On the other hand, the right of X against Y to stay out of his land is 
accompanied by a privilege by X of entering the land. Interestingly, Hohfeld focused in the 
structure of entitlements without regard for their protection whereas C&M focused on 
remedies disregarding the structure of entitlements. In fact, C&M did not refer to the 
categorization of legal concepts devised by Hohfeld. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability and Automatic Injunctions, 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 31, 2008 (U of Chicago, Public Law 
Working Paper No. 182) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222.
63 Such order to desist on infringement activity is oft en called “injunction” in English and 
“inibitoria” in Italian as well as “cease and desist orders”. See footnote 317 with regard to the 
terminology used in diff erent jurisdictions.
64 See Carol Rose, Th e Shadow of Th e Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J., 1997, 2175–2200, at p. 2179, 
explaining how rules 2 and 4, which are examples of liability rules, are equivalent to splitting 
the value between the parties whereas a property rule does not allow the division of the 
entitlement. Moreover, she argues that rule 2, represented by the case of Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., poses the case of one single owner buying the right from a community whereas 
rule 4, represented by the case of Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co. illustrates 
the case of a community buying the right out from one single owner.
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is which option, i.e. whether a “put” or a “call” is given to the entitled party. 
Under a “call”, the option is given to a party to take a thing under specifi c 
circumstances. A “put”, instead, gives the option to the entitled person to sell 
their right for a determined price. While both types of options are ordinarily 
present in market transactions, it is oft en claimed that legal rules are seldom 
developed as “puts” since liability rules are oft en adopted to counteract a 
monopoly position that might give raise to holdouts. In this sense, it is interpreted 
that whereas the owner of a non substitutable asset is in a monopoly position, the 
owner of money that is in the position of buying out the right is not.65 
Nonetheless, several studies have attempted to apply the rationale of fi nancial 
markets’ and the alternatives of puts and calls into diff erent law fi elds, in what is 
called “optional law”.66
Beyond its descriptive implications, the property and liability rules categorization 
has been highly infl uential and controversial at a normative level. C&M initially 
suggested that from an effi  ciency point of view, a property rule would be superior 
to a liability rule when transaction costs are low whereas a liability rule might be 
preferable when there are high transaction costs.67 Th e latter situation is 
frequently found in the presence of multiple relevant parties with whom 
interested parties should bargain, risks of strategic bargaining, including hold-
ups and high monitoring or enforcement costs of any possible agreement. With 
low transaction costs, parties might bargain between themselves to achieve the 
65 See Richard Epstein, A Clear View of Th e Cathedral: Th e Dominance of Property Rules, 106 
Yale L.J. 2091, 2093–96 (1997), at p. 2093–2094, explaining that “Th ere is no reason to believe 
that if the holder of the asset is allowed to cash out safely from the transaction, he will foist 
the asset off  on a party, arbitrarily chosen, that can make better use of it than he. Puts, 
therefore, are never imposed as a matter of law on strangers but are the outgrowth of 
consensual transactions over organized markets. As between strangers, liability rules, 
however sharply constrained, always take the form of calls: Th e person who has the cash can 
dictate that some asset be moved in his direction, where there is every reason to believe that 
he can make at least some intelligent use of it, perhaps better than his incumbent.”
66 See Ian Ayres, Optional Law: the structure of legal entitlements, Th e University of 
Chicago Press (2005). See also Dan Burk, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Molecular 
Futures: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in Gene Patents and Clearing 
Models: From Concepts to Cases, Geertrui Van Overwalle, ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 2009; suggesting that a particular example of “puts” could be implemented in the case 
of a pharmaceutical research proposal for a library of receptors and ligands and citing that 
there is an example of a “put” system in the U.S. Statutory Invention Registration (SIR), which 
“allows inventors to publish enabling descriptions of an invention without receiving a patent, 
placing the invention into the public domain”. While this is a put that will be exercised at 
price of zero, particular examples could also be SSO’s commitments to license at RAND/
FRAND or licenses of right.
67 C&M not only considered transaction costs and effi  ciency as normative thresholds but also 
discussed distributive concerns and notions of fairness that guide the choice between 
entitlement protection rules.
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most effi  cient allocation. Conversely, if there are high transaction costs, effi  ciency 
requires that the right is allocated to the highest-value user:
“Where transaction costs are high, the allocation of resources to their highest-valued 
uses is facilitated by denying property right holders an injunctive remedy against 
invasions of their rights and instead limiting them to a remedy in damages”68
Th e problem of hold-outs has been typically used to justify takings of private 
property under the power of eminent domain.69 Th e emblematic example is a 
governmental taking of private properties for the development of a public interest 
project and where some of the involved owners whose property the government 
intends to take, might hold-out selling their properties in order to obtain a 
compensation that is higher than their true subjective valuation. A liability rule 
is logically justifi ed in order to avoid the ineffi  ciency of hold-outs, which are 
hence, the most common justifi cation for eminent domain under a law-and-
economics perspective under the application of the property and liability rules 
distinction.
In this sense a hold-out might arise whenever the owner of a property right in 
general, delays or refutes a transaction given that he or she is the only one 
authorized to voluntarily agree to any use or transfer. Likewise, a hold-up may 
be considered as a specifi c variant of holdouts, wherein specifi c investments have 
been made and are considered as sunk costs, so that a trading partner is 
susceptible of being held-up by its counterpart in a bilateral monopoly due to 
such specifi c investments.70
68 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1972), 1st Ed, Boston, Little Brown, p. 29.
69 See Th omas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Takings, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
available at http://encyclo.fi ndlaw.com/6200book.pdf at p. 330, claiming that “when the 
government is assembling a large amount of land to build a public project like a highway, 
individual owners whose land is necessary for the project acquire monopoly power in their 
dealing with the government. Th at is, they can hold out for prices in excess of their true 
(subjective) valuation of the land given that it would be costly, once the project is begun, for 
the government to seek alternative locations” ( emphasis added). Although the terms hold-
out and hold-up are oft en used interchangeably, in the context of patents the literature refers 
mostly to hold-ups.
70 See Richard Epstein, supra note 65 at p. 2092 explaining that “because property rules give one 
person the sole and absolute power over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows 
that its owner may hold out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in question” 
(emphasis added). He argues that “Th e standard practice in virtually all legal systems assumes 
the dominance of property rules over liability rules, except under those circumstances where 
some serious holdout problem is created because circumstances limit each side to a single 
trading partner. In these cases of necessity, the holdout problem could prove enormous, so that 
the strong protection of a property rule is relaxed. One person may be allowed to take the 
property of another upon payment of compensation, but only in a constrained institutional 
setting that limits the cases in which that right can be exercised and supervises the payment 
of compensation for it” (emphasis added). Whereas hold-outs, as Epstein explains might only 
create problems under special circumstances that limit “each side to a single trading partner”, 
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Subsequent work has suggested diff erent extensions and criticized these basic 
statements. To start with, the property and liability rules literature attempts to 
bring together dissimilar fi elds of law as property, contract and torts under the 
unifying concept of entitlement protection rules but there is still disagreement 
among scholars about the convenience of extending normative suggestions from 
one fi eld to the other.71
Moreover, the underlying concept of transaction costs encompasses diff erent 
types of costs that might be more or less relevant within diff erent contexts. A 
typical categorization of transaction costs distinguishes between costs due to the 
number of parties and diffi  culty of ex-ante negotiating on the one hand and costs 
due to strategic bargaining, including hold-ups and hold-outs on the other.72
this will always be the case in a hold-up, which could be viewed as a type of hold-out where 
parties are in a bilateral-monopoly due to their specifi c investments, and it is thus a case 
calling for some type of intervention. See also Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics, Hold-ups in 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition (2008), Edited by Steven N. 
Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume), explaining that “hold up arises when part of the return on 
an agent’s relationship-specifi c investment is ex post expropriable by his trading partner”.
71 Th ere are plenty of diffi  culties in this unifying exercise. For instance, see Rose, supra note, 64, 
criticizing the choice of using examples from the property fi eld including the Boomer case 
(Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, N.Y. (1970)) in the work by C&M but also in 
the subsequent work by Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995) and Kaplow and Shavell, 
infra note 74, in the grounds that it obscures their arguments. According to Rose, the work of 
C&M had in mind a setting of accident law whereas Ayres and Talley developed their insights 
with respect to contract law and Kaplow and Shavell also probably worked in the “shadows” 
of accident law. Th is Th esis focuses only on the problems inherent to the IP and more 
specifi cally the patent fi eld; however, at least some scholars have highlighted how the diff erent 
logic of tort and property law was refl ected diff erently in the statutes of unfair competition, 
patent and copyright law as well as the subsequent expansion of rights and remedies towards 
the logic of property law and the consequences of such mixed logic. In this sense, see Mark 
Lemley, Th e Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, Stanford Law Review, 
Vol 61:311, at p. 312, arguing that “courts, lawyers, scholars and treatise writers argue over 
whether trade secrets are a creature of contract, of tort, of property, or even of criminal law”. 
See also infra note 90.
72 See e.g., Rose, supra note 64 (dividing transaction costs into type I and type II, which 
correspond to these two groups of costs). See also Mark Lemley & Philip Weiser, Should 
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information? 85 Texas Law Review, 4, March 2007, 
p. 783–841, at p. 787, (adopting a similar categorization of transaction costs while arguing that 
the strategic use of injunctions is a particular transaction cost that “refl ects the fact that 
certain conditions – including legal certainty – can increase the value of an entitlement and 
make a holdout strategy rational”). See also Rizzolli, supra note 60, referring the main 
contributions in the property and liability rules literature according to the type of transaction 
costs considered and the normative suggestions. Search costs are considered by C&M who 
argue for liability rules. Strategic bargaining costs are considered by Lucian Bebchuk, Property 
Rights and Liability Rules: Th e Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, Michigan Law Review, 100(3), 
601–39 (2001), who argues for property rules. James Krier and Stewart Schwab, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules: Th e Cathedral in Another Light, 70 New York University Law Review, 
440–483 (1995), argue for put-options liability rules whereas Ayres and Talley, supra note 71 
argue for liability rules. Administrative costs of litigation are considered among others by 
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An important corollary of the C&M framework is that property rules need less 
“collective intervention” from authorities such as courts, regulatory agencies or 
even legislators. In order to set a property rule, all authorities need to do is to 
allocate the right and protect it. Conversely, for a liability rule to work out, 
authorities shall allocate the right and also determine the compensation.73
Economic studies on entitlements soon pointed out how any system of liability 
rules would entail signifi cant assessment costs since authorities need to set the 
compensation of the right and can easily incur into errors in the process of 
assessment. As a consequence of the diffi  culty and costliness of such assessment, 
authorities could be induced to avoid the calculation of subjective values and to 
concentrate on the objective value of entitlements with the consequent risk that 
such assessment would under-compensate right holders and produce signifi cant 
errors.74
Th e evident presence of administrative costs and errors has been used to criticize 
any preference for a system of liability rules justifi ed upon high transaction costs. 
Th e argument is that even if transaction costs are high, those costs must be 
compared against the costs incurred by authorities when calculating the 
compensation before suggesting any departure from a property rule.75
Yet, some scholars argue that liability rules have the eff ect of harnessing 
information and can thus minimize information costs for courts. Th is would be 
possible because under a liability rule the court would only have to determine 
the damage to the victim, whereas in a property rule framework, courts will also 
Smith, infra note 90, arguing for property rules and by Kaplow and Shavell, infra note 74, 
arguing for liability rules. Enforcement costs are analyzed by Smith infra note 92 and Keith 
Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 2, 
2, p. 137–191 (2006) who argue in favor of property rules and by Richard Brooks, Th e Relative 
Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 267, 289–90 (2003), who argues for liability rules. Rent seeking through 
multiple takings is examined by Kaplow and Shavell infra note 74 and Epstein supra note 65, 
who argue for property rules. Finally, denormalization costs, i.e. any expenditure made in 
anticipation of a possible taking are assessed by Hylton, who argues in favor of property rules.
73 However, in the following sections we will show how the case might be diff erent with IPR’s – 
and in general, with rights that have unclear boundaries – since in these cases, a court 
applying a property rule, has to identify the right and delimit it in order to avoid that a 
property rule might extend towards a non-protected entitlement. Such activity also entails a 
signifi cant –although diff erent type – of collective intervention, or else risk to fail on effi  ciency 
terms.
74 See also Krier and Schwab, supra note 70 and Hylton supra note 70.
75 Ibid. See also Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: Th e Simple Economics of 
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stanford Law Review, 1075–1111, (1980), at p. 1111. See 
also Michael Krauss, Property vs. Liability rules, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
available at: http://encyclo.fi ndlaw.com/3800book.pdf.
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have to know the prevention cost to the injurer.76 Because liability rules entail a 
comparison of costs and benefi ts they oblige parties to compare their opportunity 
costs to an amount of damages representing the judge’s best estimate of them.77 
As a consequence, the proposition that property rules should be preferred when 
transaction costs are low has also been questioned.78
Other scholars, however, have contended that property rules are superior to 
liability rules because, at least when it pertains to property, an “exclusionary 
strategy” generates informational advantages, based on the lower ex-ante 
transaction costs of establishing property rights.79 A similar view sustains that 
valuation problems associated with liability rules which can lead to under-
compensation, make of property rules a superior option, by outweighing any 
potential cost from strategic behavior.80 In addition, it has been pointed out, that 
under some circumstances, a comparative evaluation as required under property 
rules can be easier than absolute valuation under liability rules.81
Although the main normative implication of C&M is that in the presence of high 
transaction costs, bargaining would potentially breakdown82, scholars disagree 
about the magnitude of the problem in several areas and furthermore, there is 
theoretical disagreement about whether liability rules might help avoiding such 
breakdown or whether bargaining failures might be better solve under the 
shadow of a property rule.
76 See Kaplow and Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
Harvard Law Review, 713, arguing that, under a property rule, the court would have to 
determine the cost of prevention and the victim’s damage and allocate the right to the 
intruder, only if the cost of prevention was higher than the damage, whereas under a liability 
rule, all the court has to know is the amount of damage. Th e authors make a distinction 
between “takings” (where property rules are superior due to the possibility of mutual 
reciprocal takings) and “externalities” (where liability rules will be superior).
77 But see Krauss, supra note 75, at p. 780–790, saying that authors following the Austrian 
approach, for instance question the fact that authorities might discover information more 
effi  ciently (least costly) than the market. Moreover, in the light of the indeterminacy of 
choosing between property and liability rules on effi  ciency grounds, some scholars propose to 
base the choice on other criterion, such as justice.
78 See Kaplow and Shavell supra note 76, at p. 718, claiming that: “In addition, we will cast doubt 
on the belief that property rules are best when transaction costs are low.”
79 See Krier & Schwab supra note 72 at 459–64 arguing for property rules when administrative 
costs are high and citing Smith, at 685–86 (suggesting variable measurement costs may favor 
property rules). See also Keith Hylton, supra note 72, arguing that even if transaction costs 
are high, property rules are still superior to liability rules when right holders’ valuations are 
greater than potential takers. But see, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 76, at 729, 750–51 
(arguing that information about average harm can be developed at low cost and that 
information required for property rules is costly).
80 See Epstein, supra note 65.
81 See Brooks supra note 72.
82 See Hylton, supra note 72, at p. 142, explaining that bargaining failure is costly “because it 
results in forgone opportunities for both parties to enhance their welfare”.
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For instance, some scholars have argued that liability rules encourage two-way 
trading, which is the possibility to put an option in order to buy again an 
entitlement whereas property rules only allow one-way trading.83 Yet other 
scholars have highlighted that even if the choice of legal rules does not matter for 
effi  ciency purposes when ex-post bargaining is possible, the choice has important 
distributive consequences, which at the same time aff ect the ex-ante decisions of 
the parties and hence also effi  ciency.84
3.1. PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES IN IP
Th e property and liability rules framework has also been functional to numerous 
discussions in the IP fi eld. However plentiful, the insights developed to assess 
property and liability rules in IP are yet insuffi  cient in contrast with the 
complexities of laws and judicial practice. Moreover, the majority of economic 
studies have focused on common law and particularly in U.S. law, hence missing 
the opportunity from comparing alternative rules.
Given the enormous importance of economic analysis within the study of IP, the 
literature has tended to specialize and focus on multiple narrow subjects.85 In 
this sense, the choice between property and liability rules can be understood as 
one out of many policy levers that contributes shaping the incentives for actors 
in a given industry or group of industries. Economists defi ne the optimal design 
of the IP system as a “mix” of these inter-related policy-levers and tend to 
highlight for instance, how the use of such policy levers may transform the 
generality of patent statutes into a more industry-specifi c scheme.86 Oft en, 
however, such specifi c design of the policy levers is not necessarily the most 
effi  cient one.87
However, a puzzling result has followed such transposition, which might derive 
from a theoretical disagreement about the nature of IP rights. In spite of the 
important infl uence of economic analysis in IP even before the works of “law 
and economics” scholars, IP rights are still viewed by a great amount of scholars 
83 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 71.
84 See Bebchuk, supra note 72.
85 See Menell supra note 22 and Menell and Scotchmer supra note 36 explaining that during the 
1900’s the economic analysis of IP tended to focus on the overall eff ects of IP, patents or 
copyrights whereas the literature initiated with the studies by Nordhaus and most recent 
literature has focused on narrow and more specialized issues of law design, and specifi c laws 
of patents, copyrights or trademarks.
86 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, referring to “policy levers” as described by Pamela 
Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, Th e Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale 
L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002).
87 Ibid. p. 5.
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–including in law and economics – as granting owners a right, which in case of 
infringement must be protected through remedies typical of property law.88 Th is 
reasoning is oft en defended even in the context of sequential innovation or 
potentially severe bargaining collapse, instances in which it would be expected 
for economic studies to generally favor the application of Coase’s view of 
reciprocal externalities and C&M’s bilateral consideration of entitlement 
protection rules.89
Th e overwhelming presence of economic analysis in IP law is at least in 
contradiction with the view – shared by many legal scholars – of IP entitlements 
as property rights protected only through property rules insofar as the latter 
view would limit the insights of economic studies that suggest the use of 
alternative protection rules according to the transaction costs and other similar 
considerations. A likely explanation for the contradictory presence of economics 
in IP law yet the “dominant” vie of IP entitlements as property rights could be 
due to the “special” rationale of IP protection as a mechanism of producing 
innovation incentives. However, such answer is unconvincing at least for three 
reasons. Th e fi rst reason is that the infringer-owner dichotomy, typically found 
in scholarly comments is oft en unclear, especially in the case of sequential 
innovation and unclear IP rights. An infringer can at the same time be an 
innovator and infringement does not always occur willfully but is sometimes the 
result of failures in the patent system.90 Secondly, whereas an ex-ante explanation 
for IP rights is compelling, it is typically based on a trade-off  between ex-ante 
and ex-post effi  ciency put forward to justify IP rights. Th us, in spite of the 
importance of innovation incentives, IP systems need to balance both ex-ante 
and ex-post considerations.91 Th irdly, if there is a legal fi eld where entitlements 
are not so clearly defi ned as to call for clear rules for protection, it is precisely the 
IP fi eld. In the following section, these considerations will be particularly applied 
to the patent law fi eld.
88 See for instance, Epstein, supra note 65 and Kieff , infra note 121.
89 One of the path-breaking ideas advanced by Coase was to conceive that externalities are 
reciprocal in nature and hence, in the case of pollution, either the polluter could have the 
“right” to pollute or the other party could have the “right” to be free of pollution. C&M added 
to the decision on how to allocate the right, a further possibility of choosing between two 
types of rules, forming a matrix with four diff erent rules.
90 See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14, arguing that the patent system fails in giving proper 
notice of the boundaries of patent rights. See also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72 making a 
similar argument in the context of information rights, mostly protected through copyrights 
where uncertain boundaries give rise to similar problems of delineation.
91 But see Landes and Posner, supra note 15, at p. 11, arguing that most economic scholars have 
tend to oversimplify the problem of IP law to the tradeoff  of incentives versus access with the 
consequence that the “continuity between physical and intellectual property” is obscured.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
36 Intersentia
Th e most likely reason for such disagreement may come from the underlying 
controversy surrounding the nature of IP rights, a patched body of laws with 
dissimilar origins and heterogeneous functions, contents and performance. 
Patents, for instance, diff er from copyrights, trademarks and unfair competition 
laws in functions, content of rules and the performance of the system in 
innovation and competition.92 Whether patents are or should be assimilated to 
property law is not a completely resolved query.
3.1.1. Descriptive studies
It is oft en argued that with a few exceptions, property rules are the preferred 
choice for patent rights, that unfair competition laws give in many cases a right 
to be compensated and most copyright statutes around the world rely on property 
rules while containing specifi c liability rules.93 A preliminary observation is that 
– as described by the property and liability rules literature for the case of torts, 
property and contracts – both types of rules co-exist within the IP fi eld in 
varying degrees.
However, studies are not unanimous in interpreting the prevalence and 
importance of property and liability rules in IP. Some studies highlight that 
property rules prevail in “property rights” contexts and hence, in IP.94 However, 
it is important to mention that, fi rstly, in the context of property and liability 
rules and remedies literature, the notion of “property right” comprises diff erent 
92 See Henry Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, Yale Law Journal 116:1742, 2007, 
explaining the origin of IP in unfair competition laws and the diff erences between copyrights 
and patents upon information costs of delineation and enforcement of exclusion rights while 
diff erentiating between governance strategies that prevail in copyrights law and exclusion 
strategies that dominate patent law.
93 Several law and economic studies have addressed the prevalence of property rules or liability 
rules in IP laws with results largely varying according to the diff erent legal systems and fi elds 
under study. See in general, Roger Blair and Th omas Cotter, Intellectual Property: 
Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies, Cambridge University Press, 
2005 at p. 38–40, referring to liability rules in diverse IPRs while claiming that “intellectual 
property law in general prefers property rules to liability rules and that – if the premises upon 
which the intellectual property system is based are sound – a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of property rules probably makes more sense than would a presumption favoring liability 
rules”. See also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Virginia Law 
Review (April 2004, Number 2) 465–548, at p. 469, referring to the “strictly exclusionary 
nature of the patent entitlement, unbroken by legal privileges or liability rules”. For an 
analysis about unfair competition see Anselm Kamperman, Unfair Competition Law, 
Oxford University Press, 1977, at chapter 3, “Th e economics of pre-emption and the abuse of a 
dominant position, at p. 97 ss.
94 See Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules. New York University Law Review, Vol. 79, 
pp. 1719–1798, 2004, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=638723, (pointing out, that 
in spite of the fact that property rules are more abundant in statutes and practice, academics 
are inclined towards liability rules). See also Hylton and Epstein supra note 65.
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entitlements, not only property law95 and secondly, in the context of IP law, 
scholars have been increasingly divided as to whether IP is “property” and to 
what extent rules designing for tangible property should be applied to IP 
rights.96
Compulsory licenses
Notwithstanding the discussion about the prevalence of one type of rule or the 
other, the most common type of liability rules used in IP rights are compulsory 
licensing provisions. Under a compulsory license, the IP right, which is 
traditionally conceived as a right to exclude, is transformed in a right to receive 
compensation. Compulsory licenses, can be applied to diff erent IP rights, might 
be designed in diff erent ways and might be regulated by statutes or subject to 
case-by-case analysis as well as are justifi ed upon diff erent reasons. As a result, 
their economic eff ects might widely diverge according to these diff erences.
Compulsory licenses can be classifi ed according to multiple criteria. Based upon 
their justifi cation, a compulsory license system might aim at (1) maintaining a 
healthy state of competition in the market97; or (2) be based on overriding 
reasons of public interest, public non-commercial purposes and governmental 
95 See Balganesh supra note 48, at p. 609–610, footnote 59–60 and accompanying text arguing 
that the entitlement literature contributed to shift  away the focus from the concept of rights to 
the concept of remedies in the sense that property is not defi ned with respect to in rem rights 
or to ownership attributes but rather to the protection through a property rule.
96 See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding. Texas Law Review, Vol. 
83, p. 1031, 2005 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=582602; arguing that the term 
intellectual property is quite recent, since it is probably traced to the foundation of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) by the United Nations in 1967, although there are 
some previous references in older literature. Such name suggest that such diff erent area areas 
of protection such as copyrights, patents but also trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, layout designs and trade secrecy belong to the realm of property rights. 
For the view of IP as property rights, see Epstein supra note 65 and infra note 127. For the 
contrary view see Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72, stating: “Th e founding vision of intellectual 
property (IP) viewed owners of governmentally conferred rights – in patent and copyright – 
as the benefi ciaries of a government license and as entitled only to remedies suffi  cient to 
encourage innovation”. Among other critics, they highlight how this ‘law’ doesn’t take into 
account the diff erence between non-rival and rival entitlements and thus, the inherent 
diff erence between knowledge and information and other tangible (mainly real) property.
97 See Anthony Taubman, Rethinking Trips: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ For Non-Voluntary Patent 
Licensing, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 927–970; discussing the use of such distinction during the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations and sustaining that: “Both forms of intervention override the 
exclusive rights under a patent, and thus constrain the commercial interest in the leverage in 
the marketplace aff orded by exclusivity. But within national legal systems, they may have 
diff erent legal bases, diff erent administrative or judicial forms, and diff erent economic 
dynamics, even though they overlap conceptually and are both intended to advance the public 
interest”.
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uses.98 Such distinction was already refl ected in the Paris Convention, which 
addressed the fi rst type of compulsory licenses whereas it left  to national 
members the regulation of cases where public interest justifi es the use compulsory 
licenses.99 Of course, in the long run, all types of compulsory licenses tend to be 
justifi ed as advancing the public interest. Yet, some compulsory licenses favor 
the public interest by creating static effi  ciency gains, whereas others are supposed 
to protect competition also by protecting dynamic effi  ciency gains, which in turn 
would presumably advance the public interest.
Compulsory licenses based upon assuring a healthy competition in the market 
can also be read in transaction cost terms. Th ey can be furthermore sub-divided 
on the basis of whether they are justifi ed on high transaction costs due to (1) the 
complexity of relations, i.e. when there are many involved parties or it is too 
costly to monitor or clear the rights100; and (2) when transaction costs are due to 
the probability of strategic behavior and risk of hold-ups.101 In the fi rst group we 
can place the copyright statutory licenses which are usually grounded on the 
high costs of clearing and monitoring the rights whereas in the second group we 
may include compulsory licenses for failure to work a patent or for dependent 
patents.102
Compulsory licensing provisions found in copyright statutes103 are in fact the 
provisions most widely covered by law and economics discussions. In fact, most 
98 Compulsory licenses based upon public interest concerns allow government use, crown use 
or public non-commercial uses and are subject to great discretion, especially with regards to 
the defi nition of “public interest”. Nonetheless they are currently subject to the requirements 
of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1 and especially of Article 31, which establishes the 
requirements for compulsory licenses, also exempting the requisite of making prior eff orts to 
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms in cases of 
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use”. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement provided several safeguards for the use 
of public interest based compulsory licenses, which were also clarifi ed in the Doha Declaration 
(Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/ DEC/2, adopted 
on 14 November 2001, clarifying: that “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health”; and that countries have the right, 
inter alia: “to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licences are granted”; and to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency”). See Friedrich-Karl Beier, Exclusive Rights, 
Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in Patent and Utility Model Law, IIC 1999, Heft  3, 
p. 261, discussing compulsory licenses in member States of the EU and citing cases of licenses 
based upon concerns of national defense, the environment, work’s safety and health.
99 See Article 5-A of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra 
note 10.
100 Type I transaction costs, see supra note 70.
101 Type II transaction costs, see supra note 70.
102 For the concept of “failure to work” a patent see supra note 10.
103 See Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 278, 
November 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=532882, explaining liability 
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insights on IP liability rules have been developed with this specifi c type of 
licenses in mind, due to the fact that studies are typically based on U.S. law, 
where other compulsory licenses for patents were absent, at least until recently.
Conversely, we can place the provisions that address the failure to work a 
patented technology by a patentee on the second category of compulsory licenses. 
Th ese provisions have been described as a historical “left over from the early days 
of the patent system and industrialization” in the sense that in their origin they 
were mainly motivated by protectionism.104 However, this type of provisions are 
still important as the current debate surrounding the use of liability rules for 
patents centers on the question whether a patentee should ever be compelled to 
work her invention.105 So even though non-working provisions were historically 
rooted in protectionism; with the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, a 
possible reading of these compulsory licensing provisions is that the Agreement 
requires that a patent is not being worked – under an “absolute” or “global” 
rules in copyrights law “through a model of confl ict that sees law emerging as a political 
reaction to changes in relative prices resulting from technological change” and analyzing the 
following compulsory licensing provisions in U.S. copyright law; Title 17 of the U.S. law 
includes compulsory licenses for: secondary transmissions, requiring re-broadcasters to pay a 
fi xed fee for a license to rebroadcast copyrighted materials (section 111); digital audio 
transmission/webcasting license, which requires Internet “radio stations” to pay a statutory fee 
in order to rebroadcast copyrighted materials (section 114); the mechanical license which 
allows anyone wanting to record a composed song to pay a fi xed fee to the composer and also 
allows recording of “cover” versions of famous songs (section 115); the Jukebox negotiated 
licenses, which mandates negotiation for the licenses to play sound recordings of non-
dramatic musical works on jukeboxes (section 116); the Public broadcast license for the use of 
published non-dramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works 
in connection with non-commercial broadcasting (section 118); the Satellite retransmissions 
of television signals, which is similar to 111, but applies to satellite rebroadcast of content both 
from broadcasters and from cable operators (section 119); Satellite retransmissions of television 
signals into local markets, which grants satellite re-broadcasters a free compulsory license for 
local broadcasting, provided they agree to carry all television broadcast stations located 
within the local market (section 122).
104 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
105 See Friedrich-Karl Beier supra note, at p. 262, suggesting that “Compelling a patent holder to 
manufacture each protected product in every country, irrespective of the dimensions of the 
market concerned and the existence of the remaining framework conditions for economically 
sensible production or licensed production, would be utterly contrary to economic reason 
and to the principle of the international division of labor”. But compare for instance, 
Friedrich-Karl Beier (1999), ibid at p. 263–264; highlighting how the U.S. or Germany, have 
“traditionally rejected the national obligation to work patents and the concept of compulsory 
licensing”; with Amir Attaran and Paul Champ, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute. Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 27, p. 365, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=348660; at 
p. 366 and accompanying footnotes, quoting from several sources that by 1968, with the 
exception of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, all industrialized countries had had local working 
requirements, few countries changed their laws aft erwards with this respect and by 1997, only 
the Netherlands and Switzerland had introduced some changes aft er the agreement with 
respect to local working requirements.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
40 Intersentia
standard – meaning that the patented technology is not being worked at all for a 
compulsory license to apply. Th is could be a possible interpretation of the 
prohibition of discrimination with regards to the place in which the patented 
technology is produced that is established in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement 
as well as the fact that national market needs could also be satisfi ed through 
importation.106 As they currently stand, these compulsory licenses might sort 
out bargaining problems due to type II transaction costs. Another compulsory 
licensing provision aiming at solving a potential blocking is the one established 
for the case of patented technologies that might infringe on a previous patent, i.e. 
dependent patents.107
A second possible categorization between compulsory licenses divides those (1) 
certainly designed ex-ante, in the sense that a regulation, for instance, statutes, 
provide for a uniform application in all cases, and sometimes even for the due 
compensation; and (2) compulsory licenses which are tailored ex-post, meaning 
that the grounds for granting a license and the royalty will be assessed ex post 
and on a case-by-case basis.108
106 See Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, establishing that patent protection: “shall be available 
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the fi eld of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced”. See also infra note 243 
and accompanying text.
107 Th e TRIPS Agreement established in Article 31, that in these cases, “(i) the invention claimed 
in the second patent shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic 
signifi cance in relation to the invention claimed in the fi rst patent; (ii) the owner of the fi rst 
patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in 
the second patent; and (iii) the use authorized in respect of the fi rst patent shall be non-
assignable except with the assignment of the second patent. Examples of such compulsory 
licenses include the Italian Code of Industrial Property in Article 71 and the Directive 98/44/
EC of Th e European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:1998:213:0013:0021:EN:PDF, which establishes in Article 12. 1, that a breeder can 
request a compulsory license when she cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety without 
infringing a prior patent. For other examples see Appendix.
108 See Burk, supra note 66, making the point that any property or liability rules regime might be 
“determined by clear ex ante rules, or it may be determined ex post, aft er a taking, according 
to fl exible standards”. It is important to notice how this consideration opens the possibility of 
applying the insights of the economic literature on standards v. rules to diff erent IP liability 
rules. Nonetheless, the TRIPS Article 31 mandates that patent compulsory licenses are subject 
to the requirement any such authorization “shall be considered on its individual merits”, 
hence it seems that any compulsory license for patents would fall under this category –perhaps 
with the exception of public based compulsory licenses which we left  aside for the moment – 
whereas the ex-ante category will mainly involve copyright statutory licenses.
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Table 1. IP liability rules: Before and aft er the TRIPS Agreement
Liability rule Before the TRIPS Aft er the TRIPS
Ex ante Patents
Copyrights 
Copyrights 
Ex post Patents
Copyrights 
Patents
Copyrights 
Hence, another possible classifi cation of compulsory licenses is based upon the 
IP right involved. We already mentioned the diff erent cases of patent and 
copyright patents. Whereas compulsory licenses are not permitted for 
trademarks109, they might be used for other IP rights, such as design right. Th is 
is the case with design rights covering spare parts, which are subject, in some 
countries to a remunerative right as opposed to a right to exclude others.110
109 See Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement stating that: “Members may determine conditions on 
the licensing and assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory 
licensing of trademarks shall not be permitted”. Nonetheless, trademark law provides for the 
possibility of establishing exceptions to the rights conferred to trademarks owners as stated 
by Article 17 of the same Agreement: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights 
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions 
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties” as 
well as requires, to a diff erent extent, according with the legislation, the use of marks, now 
regulated by Article 19 of the same Agreement: “if use is required to maintain a registration, 
the registration may be cancelled only aft er an uninterrupted period of at least three years of 
non-use, unless valid reasons based on the existence of obstacles to such use are shown by the 
trademark owner. Circumstances arising independently of the will of the owner of the 
trademark which constitute an obstacle to the use of the trademark, such as import 
restrictions on or other government requirements for goods or services protected by the 
trademark, shall be recognized as valid reasons for non-use”.
110 A particular problem of competition is posed in the so-called aft ermarkets or markets for 
spare parts (a spare part is a part that serves to repair a complex product so as to restore its 
original look). Here, a primary market might exist which is competitive, yet, due to network 
eff ects and sunk costs, customers of the primary market might be locked-into the secondary 
market. In this latter, the owner of a patented technology, design right or copyright, could 
charge higher prices or refuse or insuffi  ciently supply the products, undermining competition 
and also causing harm to consumers. Th e European Directive 98/71/EEC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs refers to a 
complex product as one that is composed of multiple parts: “which can be replaced permitting 
disassembly and reassemble of the product”, a defi nition that is particularly important for the 
car industry but also for other industries in which it is necessary to replace parts of the 
complex product. See Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camasasca, European Competition 
Law and Economics: a Comparative Perspective, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001, 
describing that: “the essence of an aft ermarket arises in those cases where a consumer, having 
chosen a specifi c brand at one point in time, may fi nd it costly later on to switch to other 
brands“. With regard to the production of spare parts for cars, two important cases have 
addressed the problem of a dominant position acquired through a design right: 5 October 
1988, C-238/87 (Volvo), [1988] E.C.R. p. 6211 and Case 53/87 (Maxicar/Renault), [1988] E.C.R. 
Th e Directive 98/71/EC established a transitional provision in Article 14 which allows 
Member States to maintain their previously existing provisions relating to the use of the 
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Another possible way of classifying compulsory licenses asks whether it arises 
from a limitation or exception provision included in substantive law or whether 
it is the outcome of the law governing remedies, which pertains to the area of 
enforcement. In spite of the large amount of literature on the use of liability rules 
in IP, studies had largely ignored until recently these types of liability rules based 
upon remedies law. In addition, most of the economics literature on remedies 
had focused on the economics of damage calculation and much less on the choice 
of substituting injunctions with damages.111
Th is has recently changed, in particular aft er the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in the case of eBay112, which asserted that injunctions are an equitable 
remedy that should be granted or denied according to the specifi c circumstances 
of each patent law case and which also has had repercussions for copyrights and 
trademarks. Interestingly, the Supreme Court advised district courts to apply a 
four-factor test that balances the equities of the case in order to decide whether 
to protect a patent through an injunction (the paradigmatic property rule 
remedy). While such test centers around whether harm might be repaired, 
whether it might be substituted by monetary remedies and which party will 
suff er greater harms, the fourth aspect of the test asks about the public interest 
and whether this would be served or disserved by an injunctive remedy, hence 
mandating an analysis combining effi  ciency and public interest considerations 
in each particular case.113
Finally, another possible category of patent liability rules might be in place 
outside of the patent system, as a result of the application of antitrust law, when a 
fi rm is obliged to license its IP rights, a rationale, however, that also responds to 
the restoration of healthy competition in the market.
design of a component part used for the purpose of the repair of a complex product so as to 
restore its original appearance and such provisions may only be reformed if the purpose is to 
liberalise the market for such parts, the so-called “repair clause”. Th is problem might be 
solved through a liability rule regime for the rights covering products in a secondary market, 
so that a competitive market might emerge also in this market. See also the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 98/71/EC on 
the legal protection of designs, COM (2004) 582 fi nal and infra note 491.
111 Most studies analyze the economics of damages rules focusing on damages as complements 
of injunctive relief. See e.g. Blair and Cotter supra note 91, explaining that in U.S. law, patent 
and copyright owners are granted the greater between lost profi ts or a reasonable royalty for 
the unauthorized use of their works through a complex calculation, involving hypothetical 
answers about how markets would have evolved had infringement not taken place.
112 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 1.
113 Some scholars and court decisions have referred to the diff erences between a compulsory 
license and a decision denying injunctive relief. See Paice v. Toyota, concurring opinion. 
Under a law and economic lens it is however quite clear that in any case the denial of 
injunctive relief where the infringer is allowed to continue the infringement if it pays damages 
calculated by the court is a liability rule.
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Table 2. Categorization of patent compulsory licenses
Grounds of classifi cation Type of compulsory license Relevant agreement or law
Justifi cation Public interest TRIPS 
Competition TRIPS/ National or EC 
Antitrust laws
Patent law Limitation (substantive law) TRIPS and National patent 
laws
Remedies (enforcement law) Equity
Justifi cation on transaction 
costs
Ex-ante (information costs) Copyright laws
Ex-post (bargaining costs) Patent laws
Field of law Patent law TRIPS
Antitrust law National or EC Antitrust laws
In spite of a landscape in which diff erent types of liability rules exist in IP law 
and have been analyzed by scholars with dissimilar results one clear fact that 
emerges is that liability-rules have had a longstanding presence in IP laws. Th is 
presence has occurred mainly in the form of compulsory licensing provisions, 
which have played an important historical role as well as remain the focus of 
much scholar and policy-making attention, revitalized aft er the signature of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Less precision surrounds the implications of applying the 
property and liability rules discussion to the IP fi eld and the consequences in 
terms of understanding the main grounds suggested by economic theory to 
switch to a liability rule, i.e. transaction costs, as well as the main critiques 
formulated against the use of liability rules.
3.1.2. Critics against IP liability rules
One of the most signifi cant discussions of the entitlement literature for the IP 
fi eld is probably the one centering on administrative and error costs that pertain 
to the application of a liability rules system. IP liability rules schemes have been 
criticized – and property rules praised – because of the inherent problems of 
valuating assets by courts. Th e argument is oft en put forward that IP rights are 
even more diffi  cult and costly to valuate than other assets.114
“Whereas authors have highlighted, in the context of general studies, that liability 
rules have a potential information-facilitating eff ect, the case has been made that 
114 See Robert Merges, Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (1996), available at: www.law.berkeley.edu/
institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/contract.htm#FN62, arguing that “In light of the peculiar nature 
of intellectual property, the only way to get parties truly to bargain over the valuation of 
intellectual property rights is to make them into property rule entitlements”.
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bargaining over the valuation of IP rights would only be possible if rights are 
protected through property rules.115
Th is argument is reinforced by the above mentioned fact that liability rules in IP 
have been mainly studied with reference to statutory licenses for copyrights and 
related rights implemented by legislatures and widely diff ering from the C&M 
framework. Whereas compulsory licensing regimes for blocking or dependent 
patents might better refl ect the type of reasoning of C&M in the sense of 
foreseeing the possibility of a bargaining breakdown due to important 
transaction costs116, the fact that such regimes were absent in U.S. patent law, has 
lead most law and economics scholars to focus on copyright statutory licenses 
established ex ante.117
In fact, such rules widely diff er from the political economy explanations that 
some scholars put forward for other liability rules regimes and authors have 
indeed recognized the potential role of liability rules to prevent a bargaining 
breakdown.118 Yet, many scholars insist on the intrinsic diff erence between IP 
and other assets to conclude that an important problem surrounds the valuation 
of any IP asset that almost always surpasses any risk and cost of bargaining 
failure and proposing that neither a legislature-made nor a court-tailored liability 
rule regime might work better than a property rule:
115 See Merges, ibid.
116 See Merges, ibid, citing the French Patent Law, Law No. 68–1 (1968), amended by Law No. 
90–1052 (1990), in 3 World Intellectual Property Organization, Industrial 
Property Laws and Treaties, 32–41 (1980 & Supp. 1991); Japanese Laws Relating to 
Industrial Property, Published by the Japanese Group of AIPPI, 1988 Revision, 
Articles 83(1) and 93; Patent Law No. 121 (1959), amended by Law No. 27 (1987) in 4 World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Industrial Property Laws and Treaties (1980 
& Supp. 1991). See also Walter, Compulsory Licenses in Respect to Dependent Patents Under 
the Law of Switzerland and other European States, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright 
L. 532, 533 (1990); Patents Act of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1910), amended by Th e Act 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1987) (Rijksoctrooiwet) 34, in 5 World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Industrial Property Laws and Treaties (1980 & Supp. 1991); 
New Zealand Patent Act, 46, 51 (1953), in Brown & Grant, The Law of Intellectual 
Property in New Zealand 6.67 (1989).
117 See Merges, ibid, arguing that: “While the legislative liability rules described above are 
inferior to property rules, one might nonetheless argue that the legislature should have 
implemented a judicially-administered liability rule, consistent with the teachings of 
Calabresi and Melamed. Such rules can be found in certain corners of foreign intellectual 
property systems, such as “blocking patents.” In some countries, the holder of an improvement 
(or “subservient”) patent has the right to license a pioneering (or “dominant”) patent if a 
license is necessary to implement the improvement (footnotes omitted).”
118 See Merges, ibid, referring to the possibility of “bargaining breakdown” that might occur 
through fi rst (pioneer) and second (improver) negotiations for a license and to the role that a 
liability rule might play in preventing a social welfare loss that could follow such bargaining 
breakdown.
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“the costs of strategic bargaining are far diff erent from the costs of transactions in 
markets where multiple IPRs are needed as inputs. Input markets are notable 
especially for the repeated costs of locating right holders and negotiating individual 
licenses. And, with respect to these negotiations, the single most diffi  cult issue – and 
hence the most costly to resolve – is the valuation of each unique IPR”.119
In the following sections and chapters we will test such a general assertion in the 
context of patent law also challenging the assumption that valuation costs and 
errors will always surpass any potential cost from bargaining breakdowns. In 
particular, this chapter confronts the problem of patent valuation with the 
general context of bargaining problems in sequential and multi-component 
innovations. Th e following chapters also touch upon specifi c cases and problems 
surrounding the use of diff erent rules by courts as an alternative to strong 
property rules, including for the valuation of infringed patents.
Another focal point of disagreement regards the eff ects of entitlement protection 
rules on effi  cient bargaining. In the IP context proponents of both liability rules 
and property rules have based their arguments upon the eff ects of a rule on 
incentives to bargain, arguing from ex ante or ex post perspectives.120
Scholars approaching remedies from an ex ante perspective focus on the eff ects 
of entitlement protection rules on deterring infringement and in setting the 
terms of ex ante licensing.121 Under this perspective, the terms of a license that a 
potential licensee or a potential infringer accepts, would depend on the rule that 
would apply if infringement takes place. Moreover, bargaining under the threat 
of one or other rule diff erently aff ects the division of profi ts between a potential 
licensor and a potential licensee.122
119 Ibid, arguing that it might be the case that a “court-based liability rule” could be though as a 
“third-best solution”, that is, aft er property rights and aft er statutory compulsory licenses 
since the fi rst two alternatives might better deal with the problem of the volume of 
transactions.
120 See Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 36.
121 See Menell and Scotchmer, ibid, at p. 19, arguing that these “set of arguments are not 
concerned with what would happen in the out-of-equilibrium event of infringement, but 
focus instead on how potential remedies aff ect equilibrium profi ts and the ex ante incentives 
for R&D”.
122 See also Mark Shankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting 
Intellectual Property, RAND Journal of Economics, 32:1, 199–220 (2001), studying the 
choice between injunctions and damage compensation and focusing on rules for damage 
calculation and the role of property rules and liability rules in setting the threat points for 
parties bargaining in the biotechnology sector, specifi cally with regards to research tools. A 
relevant assumption of this study is effi  cient ex-ante bargaining and the conclusion is that if 
infringement leads to profi t-eroding competition between the infringer and right holder, a 
wide range of remedies will deter infringement, at least for stand-alone innovations, and are 
therefore equivalent from an ex ante point of view. Th is does not necessarily apply, instead, in 
the case of research tools where infringement does not dissipate profi t. Given the role of IP in 
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From an ex post point of view, other studies consider whether property rules, 
mainly in the form of injunctions, are more or less likely than judicially 
determined damages (liability) in order to encourage effi  cient bargaining. From 
the ex post perspective, these studies followed the main insights of the general 
property v. liability rules framework, which holds that property rules 
(injunctions) may be preferred when transaction costs of exchange are low and 
the costs of assessing violations of rights by courts are high.123 Nonetheless, a 
usual argument in the IP context is that a property rule facilitates bargaining 
between the parties whereas under a liability rule, a potential infringer would 
have diminished incentives to bargain ex-ante.124 Th is argument is moreover 
linked or used as a premise for arguing in favor of property rules that allow 
market players to organize themselves around contractual liability rules.
3.1.3. Privately organized liability rules
Several scholars have linked the problem of high transaction costs or a high 
likelihood of bargaining breakdown to the emergence of privately negotiated 
arrangements that create contractually based liability rules in order to solve such 
problems within the patents and the copyright areas. With such evidence, some 
studies argue for the use of market-arranged transactions and suggest that such 
arrangements would presumably be fostered by strong property rules:
“Th e organizations studied in this Article present what might seem to be a paradox in 
light of the literature on entitlements: they produce what appear to users as liability 
rules, but which are actually based on IPRs – quintessential property rule 
entitlements”.125
the division of surplus and the incentives for private bargaining between early innovators and 
follow-on improvers they conclude that for the case of research tools neither rule deters 
infringement, yet a credible threat of infringement can benefi t the patent holder. Th e study 
also interestingly points out that future economic research should aim at bridging the gap in 
studies assuming optimal ex-ante bargaining and those departing from bargaining failure 
(anti-commons), e.g. making the bargain process endogenous and analyzing how diff erent 
rules aff ect the bargaining outcomes.
123 See Blair and Cotter, supra note 91. But see Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting 
Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: Th e Perverse Benefi ts of 
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 97, 985, (1999), 
arguing, that “soft ” remedies, which do not actually restore the proprietary price, can be 
socially benefi cial because they increase consumers’ surplus without impinging much on 
profi t, at least for small price reductions.
124 See Scott Kieff , On Coordinating Transactions in Information: A Response to Smith’s 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 101 (2007) and Scott 
Kieff , Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Eff ects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L.J. 327 (2006).
125 Merges, supra note 113.
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Th ese market-based arrangements arise because of the need of lowering 
transaction costs between users. Th e typical examples are collective organizations 
of copyrights, but a similar argument might be applied to clearinghouses and to 
patent pools.126 In spite of the organizational diff erences, the most distinctive 
features of such arrangements is that they create a mechanism similar to a 
liability rule, which is collectively organized by its members instead of 
administered by a court or regulatory agency.127 Although such mechanisms 
seems to solve a variety of problems, potential instances of strategic behavior 
might arise among its members and the organizations themselves have been 
occasionally accused of harming competition.128
4. PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES IN PATENT 
LAW
Scholars have largely acknowledged that patent rights are mainly protected 
through property rules.129 Th e underlying logic is that patents are conceived as 
granting a right to exclude – and not any right to use an invention – which makes 
them analogous to property rights.130 Th is correspondence of patents to exclusive 
rights has lead to envisage patents as property and to the consequent application 
126 See Robert Merges, Institutions for intellectual property transactions: Th e case of patent pools 
in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society (Dreyfuss, Zimmerman and First, eds. 2001), Oxford University Press, 
New York, 123–165.
127 See Merges ibid, explaining that “In other words, the property rule entitlements granted at 
the outset actually lead to a liability rule-like regime, though one based on collective valuation 
by fi rms, rather than by an arm of government”. For an application to the biotechnological 
area see Van Overwalle, G. (Ed.), Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models. 
Patent Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability Regimes, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
128 Se Ariel Katz, Th e Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective 
Administration of Performing Rights (2005). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 
1, No. 3, 2005; criticizing the justifi cation of performing rights organizations on a natural 
monopolies (and transaction costs) explanation and suggesting that there are less costly 
alternatives for competition.
129 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 4, at p. 168, arguing that “patent rights are exclusive rights 
that fi t the classic formulation of a “property rule”; however clarifying that this was due to the 
prevailing judicial practice of granting injunctions aft er any infringement case and predicting 
that such course of matter could change as it had already happened with preliminary 
injunctions and with copyright cases.
130 See Donald Chisum supra note 43, explaining that “a patent gives an inventor the right to 
exclude. A patent does not give the inventor the positive right to make, use, or sell the 
invention.”). See also Adam Mossoff , Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009 (George Mason Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 08–49, August 19, 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1239182.
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of the logic and legal conceptions of property in land to the patent realm131, 
which has nevertheless been criticized.132 Th e quarrel originates from a 
disagreement about the nature of the patent right and hence, of the remedies 
used to protect the underlying right. In spite of the controversy, even the most 
representative critics against assimilation of patents to property in land have 
recognized the importance of property rules to protect patent entitlements as 
well as argued for the use of liability rules clearly defi ned and effi  ciently 
administered.133
Hence, even if patents are widely discussed by both legal and economic scholars 
as exclusive rights, liability rules have been used since the inception of patent 
law, mostly in the form of compulsory licensing regimes. Nonetheless, the use of 
liability rules through the laws of remedies, i.e. when injunctive relief is denied 
for an infringed patent, had not received enough attention until recently – aft er 
the eBay case.
For these reasons, the most widely discussed regime of liability rules, namely 
compulsory licenses has been justifi ed by law and economics scholars upon the 
presence of high transaction costs.134 However, compulsory licenses are neither 
the only type of liability rules used in IP law nor are transaction costs their 
distinctive explanation. Transaction costs serve also to explain other doctrines 
such as fair use in copyright law135 or prior user rights in patent law, two 
mechanisms that have been described as zero price liability rules.136 Compulsory 
licenses, on the other hand, have been in place for a long period of time, justifi ed 
on multiple grounds such as static effi  ciency, fairness, free trade and protectionist 
measures for national industries.
As a result of the prevailing practice of U.S. courts favoring property rules for a 
long period of time as well as the absence of equivalent compulsory licensing 
mechanisms, a signifi cant part of the patent literature has been biased against 
131 See Epstein, Richard, Th e Disintegration of Intellectual Property (August 29, 2008). U of 
Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 423, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1236273.
132 See Lemley & Weiser supra note 72.
133 Ibid.
134 See Robert Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase and intellectual Property, p. 2669, 94 Colum. L. 
Rev., 2655, 2667 (1994), stating that “Th e conventional justifi cation (for) compulsory licensing 
provisions (relies) on the basis of transaction costs”.
135 Th e fair use doctrine in copyright law allows the use of a fair quantity of copyrighted material 
without infringing copyright (17 U.S.C. §107).
136 See Burk, supra note 65, at p. 12, mentioning the equivalence of prior user rights to 
compulsory licenses at “zero” price. See also Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, Columbia Law 
Review 82:1600–1655 (1982); explaining fair use as the answer to signifi cant transaction 
costs.
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the use of liability rules for patents. Such bias is not even confi ned to the 
convenience – on effi  ciency or other terms – of liability rules in patent law, but 
has furthermore produced a mainstream view that suggest the absence and 
irrelevance of liability rules systems in patent law.137
4.1. THE CASE AGAINST LIABILITY RULES FOR PATENT 
RIGHTS
Th e majority of studies criticizing the use of liability rules for patents are based 
upon arguments similar to those described for the general IP case. Th e fi rst main 
critic is that optimal compensation is too diffi  cult to assess due to information 
costs and the likelihood that courts and agencies would systematically err in 
their appreciation of the patent’s value.138
As a consequence of these errors and because courts would allegedly under-
compensate right holders, incentives to innovate would be undermined. 
However, it is not completely clear whether courts systematically under or over-
reward in actual patent cases.139
Secondly, a branch of literature argues against the use of liability rules for patents 
from the perspective of bargaining incentives. For these authors, patents have a 
value for the commercialization of innovations which would be dissipated if the 
patent is subject to a liability rule140 Although authors arguing for strong 
property rules in order to allow effi  cient negotiation of patents and the emergence 
of privately negotiated schemes such as patent pools and clearinghouses tend to 
acknowledge the diffi  culties and transaction costs in diverse industrial sectors, 
they commonly consider that such problems are less frequent than other pro-
liability rules authors tend to describe.
In this sense, it could be argued that scholars in favor and against the use of 
liability rules in patent cases hold controversial views with regard to the 
importance of transaction costs and the frequency of bargaining breakdowns as 
137 See U.S. decision in the case of Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., supra note 1.
138 See Epstein supra note 131.
139 See Henkel, Joachim and Reitzig, Markus G., Patent Sharks and the Sustainability of Value 
Destruction Strategies (September 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985602, 
claiming that the patent system systematically over-rewards patent owners creating an 
incentive for patent trolls to proliferate. But see Shankerman and Scotchmer, supra note 122, 
fi nding that the lost profi t/reasonable royalty rule can be too low that the threat of injunction 
can improve the fi rst innovator’s bargaining position and thus his incentives to develop 
research tools (their main assumption is that licensing takes place frictionless and thus IP 
will not stifl e development of downstream products).
140 See Kieff  infra note 124 and Smith supra notes 90 and 92.
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well as about the costs associated with administering a liability rule – mainly 
information and error costs – relative to the costs of property rights, especially 
under uncertain boundaries.
Th e following sections attempt to address some gaps of the existing literature. 
Firstly, a more complete picture of the use and relative importance of liability 
rules in patent law emerges by putting together the literature on ex-post and 
ex-ante liability rules used to address high transaction costs, strategic behavior 
and hold-ups in patent cases. Secondly, the costs of property rules, which have 
been largely neglected until quite recently in comparison to the purported costs 
of a liability rules system are also analyzed.
4.2. THE CASE FOR PATENT LIABILITY RULES: 
TRANSACTION COSTS
Even though the classic law-and-economics justifi cation for the use of liability 
rules is based upon transaction costs141 the concept of transaction costs is not 
unanimous. Furthermore, the market for patented technologies and hence its 
inherent costs, have particular features that deserve discussion. In fact, a 
functioning market is a necessary prerequisite for the effi  cient use of patented 
technologies, especially with regard to the cases of complementary, sequential 
and incremental innovations. Conversely, empirical studies have pointed towards 
unrealized benefi ts in several technology markets and identifi ed transaction 
costs as a signifi cant obstacle for their development.142
To understand the importance and complexity of bargaining in the context of 
patent law, it is useful to refer to the diff erent role of sequential and incremental 
141 For the defi nition of transaction costs see supra notes 43, 44 and 45, pointing out how 
diff erent costs of fulfi lling an arrangement encompass the cost of searching the parties with 
whom to bargain, the costs of bargaining and the costs of monitoring and enforcing any 
achieved bargain.
142 See E.U. Commission, D.G. Internal Market Study on evaluating the knowledge economy: 
What are patents actually worth? Pat-Val EU survey: Th e value of patents for today’s economy 
and society, Tender n° MARKT/2004/09/E, Lot 2, Final Report, (23rd July, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/fi nal_report_lot2_en.pdf, 
referring that “that the willing-to-but-not-licensed patents are not less valuable than the 
actually licensed patents. Th is rules out that they are minor patents that were not licensed 
because they were less important or less usable. Th e main alternative hypothesis is that 
transaction costs in technology trade have impeded the technology transfer, a hypothesis 
consistent with other studies on the matter”. See also the Gower’s Report, at p. arguing that 
While big fi rms seem to be better able to cope with the transactional obstacles to license they 
are less likely to do so; whereas smaller fi rms can be better able to license-out but have more 
diffi  culty in bargaining over and actually license their technologies. Licensing can also be 
costly and diffi  cult due to the signifi cant asymmetries between fi rms, as it is the case, for 
instance, in the biotech sector.
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innovation within diverse industries. Economic analysis of patents has 
distinguished between the cases of (1) stand-alone innovations which have a 
value in spite of follow-on developments or improvements and (2) cumulative 
innovation, where innovations also have a value as inputs of further progress and 
innovations. In both cases, economic analysis centers on investigating a mix of 
policy levers, including their actual application by courts and hence, the 
enforcement dimension, in order to determine the profi ts granted to innovators 
by the IP system, which subject to the demand for the innovative product would 
set the incentives for innovators. In addition to designing laws that grant the 
optimal profi ts for innovators, when it comes to sequential innovation, policy-
levers also have the daunting task of balancing the incentives of fi rst and second 
innovators.143
Studies show the complexity of tailoring patent policy under sequential 
innovation. Moreover, some studies focusing on certain features of patent law 
produce results that might either be unrealistic or cannot be adjusted by policy-
makers, as for instance, the duration of patents.144 Furthermore, the assumptions 
about licensing are crucial for almost all economic models and scholars are 
largely divided over their view on the likelihood that licensing will take place 
smoothly.145 Although some studies assume that bargaining will take place in 
many instances, some empirical studies point towards the limitations of 
143 Th e results of diff erent economic studies are ambiguous as to which is the most effi  cient 
solution for problem of setting optimal incentives to innovate. See Robert Hahn, An Overview 
of Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, in Intellectual property rights in frontier 
industries. Economics of Intellectual Property protection, at p. 17–20 comparing 
Scotchmer who argues that whereas a broad patent solves this fi rst problem it could lead to 
incentive problems for sequential innovators; Gallini who suggests that patent length and 
scope could be used to prevent duplicative research (while longer patents encourage imitation, 
broad patents of fi nite duration might discourage imitation and encourage pioneering 
research); Green and Scotchmer who argue that patents should last longer when sequential 
research is not concentrated in one fi rm; and Shapiro who highlights the problem of 
overlapping patents (thickets) and hold-ups and while he argues that the problem of 
complements could be solved through cooperation, policy is needed to solve the problem of 
hold-ups, problems that are especially relevant for new industries such as information 
technology and biotechnology.
144 For instance, the duration of patent protection, which is fi xed under the TRIPS Agreement 
and most national laws in 20 years, and the possibility of varying the scope of patent 
protection, which imposes multiple and contradictory eff ects. See Nelson and Merges, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, at p. 840, making the claim – in 
1990 – that “most theoretical writing on patents is directed toward issues that as a practical 
matter are considered largely settled. For example, several economists have explored the 
question of optimal patent duration”.
145 See for instance Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 36, at p. 26, arguing that “the literature 
draws widely diff ering conclusions about the optimal way to organize the rights of sequential 
innovations, largely because authors make diff erent assumptions about when and whether 
licenses will be made, and who can be party to the negotiation”.
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assuming effi  cient ex ante bargaining in a signifi cant number of cases so as to 
rule out problems related with the negotiation processes.146
Although economic studies have signifi cantly advanced towards a better 
understanding of the complex interaction of legal doctrines in setting the 
incentives for innovation as well as the specifi cities of sequential innovation, 
divergent views subsist on the economics of incremental innovation, which have 
largely produced confl icting policy recommendations for the use of liability or 
property rules.147
4.2.1. Strategic behavior and patent hold-ups
A variant of the general problems of strategic behavior, hold-outs and hold-ups 
described above for the general case of any right protected through a property 
rule can occur in the specifi c context of modern technologies. Several scholars 
have increasingly expressed concerns about the growing magnitude of strategic 
behavior by fi rms who fi le patents and litigate them in a strategic way and the 
impact of such strategies in the adequate functioning of the patent system.148 
Similarly, the eBay decision by the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the potential 
impact of the strategic use of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.149
Strategic behavior refers to the idea that a fi rm will take a decision according to 
the belief that the fi rm has about how the other fi rms would behave. Th is broad 
concept encompasses all kind of strategies that fi rms might adopt with regards 
to whether, how, and how much to patent; and how to use their patent(s), 
including decisions regarding the fi ling of applications, licensing and 
litigation.150
Both the literature and policy discussions have described the strategies of fi rms 
patenting technologies for “defensive” or “off ensive” purposes. In these cases 
fi rms respond to – unintended – incentives created by patent law, e.g. to keep 
competitors out of their market or to permit the fi rm’s survival in a market. 
146 See the EU PAtVal in footnote 34.
147 See for instance, Cotter, supra note 38, 2008, arguing that the divergent opinions about hold-
ups can be explained through divergent beliefs on the economics of patent improvement and 
how incremental innovation functions and suggesting that the question whether patent hold-
ups should be considered or not as a market failure should be based on the insights of the 
economics of patent improvements.
148 See James Bessen, Patent Th ickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies (March 2003), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=327760 and Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, and Nicolas Van Zeebroeck, Filing Strategies and Patent Value (May 2008), Vol., pp. 
2008, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143184, describing patent fi ling strategies.
149 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 1.
150 See Bessen, supra note 148.
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Whereas it is arguable that in such cases patent law is performing its role of 
fostering innovation incentives, both strategies create specifi c problems.
Th e fi rst problem is that of negotiating through patent “thickets” or “clusters”151 
which arises when each fi rm engages in an arms-race in technological area.152 As 
a result, fi rms fi le patents not because they foresee any actual reward for any 
investment but rather to use them as “bargaining chips” with other fi rms. In 
these cases, a fi rm might fi le many patents while not exploiting them, because it 
needs to hold a certain number of patents in order to negotiate cross-licenses 
with other fi rms.
In many cases, fi rms might engage in cross-licensing schemes allowing others to 
use their technologies as long as other fi rms allow them to do the same, a 
cooperative solution that would avoid any bargaining problem. However, it is 
dubious that such situation is preferable to the absence of defensive patenting. 
Although the burden to society of having too many patents protecting a great 
number of technologies might be diffi  cult to measure, it is easy to see that in 
such scenario, some fi rms might be refrained from using technologies in order to 
improve them or to come up with new products because of the presence of 
“patent thickets”.
Secondly, the defensive strategy might be transformed into an off ensive strategy 
due to several reasons. For instance, a fi rm might be exposed to the ex post risk 
of hold ups by a patent on a technology.153 Th is could happen under a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ scenario that arises when many fi rms pursue patents under a defensive 
151 According to Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Th icket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting. in Jaff e, A., Lerner, J., Stern, S. (Eds), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy, MIT Press for the NBER, Cambridge, MA, 1; 119–50, a patent thicket is: “a dense 
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in 
order to actually commercialize a new technology”. See also EU Communication from the 
Commission, infra note 655, explaining that “one commonly applied strategy is fi ling 
numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called “patent clusters” or “patent 
thickets”)”.
152 See Barr R., Testimony at the US Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Hearings on 
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, 
University of California at Berkeley, (28 February 2002) at pp. 675–7, referring that: 
“Patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco… Everything we 
have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents 
on the innovations and inventions contained in these products… Th e only practical response 
to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to fi le 
hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to bring to the table 
in cross-licensing negotiations”.
153 See Barr, ibid, at pp. 679–80, arguing that “If we are accused of infringement by a patent 
holder who does not make and sell products, or who sells in much smaller volume than we do, 
our patents do not have suffi  cient value to the other party to deter a lawsuit or reduce the 
amount of money demanded by the other company”.
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rationale and, due to several reasons, bargaining collapses.154 Whereas all fi rms 
would be better off  if they did not pursue any patent, cooperation might fail and 
fi rms might end up trapped in a patent thicket, hence under a prisoner’s dilemma 
picture. Moreover, the equilibrium of licensing-in and licensing-out of any 
system based upon cross-licenses could break due to the participation of fi rms 
that own patents but are not interested in licensing-in any other patented 
technology. Th is is the case of the so-called “patent trolls”, but could also be the 
case of owners of patents on another technological area.155
What we can suggest is that social losses can arise, not only when bargaining 
fails because some parties in the “game” do not have anything to lose by adopting 
a litigation strategy but also and more generally whenever the patent system gives 
– unintended – incentives by permitting frivolous patenting and diff erent fi lling 
strategies.156
4.2.2. Patent hold-ups
Th e problem of patent hold-up typically arises when a patent is only one out of 
many components in a technology and the patentee takes advantage of the fact 
that the alleged infringer has already made some costs – which are hence sunk 
costs – asking for a payment that is higher than the value of her patent. Th is case 
has been characterized as a patent hold-up, a variant of the more general hold-up 
referred by the law and economics literature. However, the defi nition and impact 
of hold-ups in the classic law and economics literature is highly debated157 and 
as it should be expected, its application to the patent fi eld is also controversial:
154 See Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, supra note 21 at p. 28, referring that probably the “patent 
portfolio races observed in these industries refl ect excessive patenting from a social welfare 
perspective (as would typify a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situation), and are thus raising the 
cost of innovation unduly”.
155 See infra note 676, patent trolls have been oft en defi ned as patentees that do not only abstain 
from using their patents but rather wait until someone “infringes” and use litigation and the 
threat of litigation and injunctions to actively enforce their patents.
156 See chapter IV infra, analysing the incentives for patent strategic behaviour and hold-ups.
157 See the previous section discussing the general hold-up problem and in particular see Oliver 
E. Williamson, Th e Economic Institutions Of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting 52–56 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Th e Costs and Benefi ts of 
Ownership: A Th eory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 692, 716–18 
(1986), arguing that the risk of ex post opportunism, along with bounded rationality and asset 
specifi city, may produce that suppliers ask for higher prices, in the absence of mechanisms 
suitable to reduce opportunism. For critics on the application of liability rules for the problem 
of hold-ups see Kieff  supra note 124, arguing for strong property rights which facilitate the 
coordination between parties effi  cient bargaining and Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property 
as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742 (2007), arguing that 
the optimal tradeoff  between coordination benefi ts and access costs is a question for empirical 
research. See also Cotter, supra note 38, citing and discussing the above mentioned studies 
and arguing that liability rules should play a role in overcoming holdout problems, even if 
subject to numerous caveats.
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“Th e hold-up problem pertains to problems of relationship-specifi c investment, 
whereas the hold-up contemplated here pertains to standards specifi c investment. 
Th e hold-up problem indicates the prospect of under-investment in collaborations in 
which parties must sink investments that are specifi c to the collaboration, investments 
that may be costly to redeploy or have a signifi cantly lower value if redeployed outside 
of the collaboration. Th e potential for one party to hold up another party that has 
sunk investments specifi c to the relationship may discourage that other party from 
investing effi  ciently in the collaboration in the fi rst place”158
In these cases we can argue that the patent is being used strategically to extract a 
surplus that goes beyond its value. Th is can happen under the threat to shutdown 
a manufacturing system for a product by a court’ injunction and is fostered by 
the presence of fi rms ‘specializing’ in pursuing or buying patents to engage in 
such “rent seeking”, a situation also described by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
eBay decision. A recent work analyzing patent hold-ups in the context of patent 
and antitrust cases claims that hold-ups impose static effi  ciency losses that are 
not justifi ed by increases in dynamic and moreover, dynamic effi  ciency losses 
might emerge because of the reduction in the incentives to develop follow-on 
innovation giving rise to a potential market failure.159
In the typical model studied by economic scholars, the infringer develops a 
product which uses a patented technology. Whereas the case is similar across all 
studies, there are important assumptions with regard to whether the invention 
can be easily invented around, whether infringement happens inadvertently, 
willfully or in between, and how costly is to redesign a non-infringing 
alternative.160
Whether hold-ups are indeed a market failure, which is the impact of such 
practices and whether any regulatory response should follow, are however, 
contentious issues undergoing wide debate. First, there is disagreement about 
whether holdups constitute a market failure.161 Secondly, the incidence of 
158 See U.S. Department Of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Enforcement And Intellectual Property Rights (April 2007), available at: www.ft c.gov/
reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf at footnote 11, 
p. 35 defi ning hold-ups in the context of SSO’s and patent standards.
159 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 12, defi ning holdups with respect to static and dynamic 
effi  ciency losses and arguing that in both cases, losses might be enhanced by the Cournot 
complements or double marginalization.
160 Vincenzo Denicolo et al., Revisiting injunctive relief: Interpreting eBay in high-tech industries 
with non-practicing patent holders, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4 (3), 
571–608. See also discussion in chapter IV below.
161 See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking. Texas Law 
Review, Vol. 85, 2007, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005727, arguing that 
“holdup is recognized as a form of market failure that leads to ineffi  ciency, primarily by 
discouraging what would otherwise be socially desirable investments. An enormous literature 
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holdups and their practical signifi cance is also object of controversy.162 Finally, 
another important controversy surrounds the estimation of the royalty 
benchmark that can determine when a patentee is “extracting” a quantity above 
the true value of its technology by means of a holdup163 and hence, whether 
patentees engaging in such strategy are over-rewarded.164
5. THE MODERN PATENT LANDSCAPE
Th e natural question that follows is whether any of these problems are new or 
special in the patent fi eld, or whether the traditionally conceived rules, with a 
strong preference for property rule protection might suffi  ce to cope with such 
explores holdup as a market dysfunction, typically emphasizing the ways in which private 
fi rms can manage their aff airs to avoid holdup or mitigate its eff ects”.
162 Compare for instance Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
Tex. L. Rev. 1991, (2007) at p. 1996–99 with Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking and the 
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 
Minn.L.Rev. 714 (2008) and Damien Gerardin, Anne Layne-Farrar, & A. Jorge Padilla, Th e 
Complements Problem within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 
Boston Univ. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 144 (2008).
163 See Lemley and Shapiro, ibid, at p. 1996–99; arguing that such benchmark is βθv, with β 
representing the patentee s´ bargaining power with respect to the user; θ the probability that 
the patent is valid and infringed and v the per-unit value of the patent in comparison to the 
next best alternative, with the possibility that an “automatic right to injunctive relief” 
systematically over-rewards patentees of component technologies. But see Elhauge, supra note 
38, referring that the correct benchmark should be θv and as a consequence, over-reward 
would only ensue in the case of “strong surprise patents”, and when “the fi xed costs of a 
redesign exceed the expected value of the patent, taking into account the odds that the patent 
claim will be found invalid” whereas for “weak surprise patents” only when “lost profi ts from 
the lag time to redesign plus the fi xed cost of a redesign exceed the value of the patent without 
any discount for its possible invalidity”; and with non-surprise patents only if β>θ. See also 
discussion in chapter IV below.
164 See Cottter, supra note 38, referring that Elhauge fi nds that there is asymmetry of information 
because patent validity related information is publicly available while information about the 
infringer’s expected profi t from the use of the patented technology is not and as a consequence 
of this asymmetry the Lemley & Shapiro model estimates too high a royalty that would be 
agreed in the shadow of injunctions. Elhauge also argues that the model L&S model 
“understates the true optimal benchmark for royalties” and “overstates predicted royalties 
from the threat of injunctive relief” while posing that most realistically, a study should 
assume “(1) that fi rms negotiate a series of patents when they make a multi-component 
product, (2) that fi rms using the patents have information about their operations that patent 
holders lack; or (3) that demand is not constant”. Furthermore, he argues that the model by 
Lemley and Shapiro “mistakenly concludes that measuring damages using past negotiated 
royalties increases overcompensation, when in fact it increases under-compensation” and 
shows also that “royalties are even more likely to be undercompensatory to the extent juries 
are inaccurate in measuring damages, whether their inaccuracies are systematic or balanced, 
which is another important reason not to shift  from injunctive relief to damages” adding that 
“even if their holdup model were correct when there is both an upstream patent monopoly 
and a downstream product monopoly, it does not apply when either market level is 
competitive. See also discussion in chapter IV below.
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problems. In this sense, it is oft en said that new technological sectors such as 
information technologies and biotechnologies diverge in important ways from 
innovative industries in the past.165 Whereas the paradigmatic patent at the time 
of the Paris Convention was granted for a mechanical innovation, new 
technologies have important new features. Probably the most important change 
for our discussion is that most patent nowadays construct over numerous 
previous patents and products involve many patented technologies.166
Th e debate about whether and to what extent is the law able to adapt to changes 
in technology has accompanied patent law since its inception. Th is idea has 
permeated the debate about patent hold-ups and the justifi cation for “new types” 
of liability rules, although it is not necessarily shared by the majority.167 While 
economic theory suggests diff erent solutions according to the patents’ value and 
market structure, the patent system is usually described as “one-size-fi ts all”. 
Moreover, the burden of creating specially-tailored statutes for each industry 
could probably outweigh any gains and give rise to rent-seeking behavior. While 
law is constructed in this rather uniform way, legal doctrines, courts and 
antitrust agencies’ interpretations have in fact made patent law more in tune with 
165 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 72, at p. 797 arguing that “the patent system is designed with 
a paradigm invention in mind – a new device or machine covered by a single patent. 
Historically, this paradigm was a fairly accurate portrayal of the typical patent” and citing 
also from John R. Allison & Mark Lemley, Th e Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 B.U.L. Rev. 77,93, tbl. 1, 2002, that argues that most patents in the U.S. were 
granted until quite recently for mechanical innovations. But see John Golden, Patent Trolls’ 
and Patent Remedies. 85 Texas Law Review, p. 2111 (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=991698, arguing that “As John Duff y points out, approval of the application of 
patent law to mere “improvements” of overall devices or processes – inventions whose “point 
of novelty” in Lemley and Shapiro’s terms presumably involves something less than the 
creation of a whole new product or process – had been explicit since at least the late eighteenth 
century”. Here it is probably important to point out the diff erence between mechanical 
innovations, which have in fact existed since long ago and more abstract technologies 
including soft ware and business method patents. Whereas cumulative innovation has indeed 
existed since long ago, component and “complex industries” are a new feature of today’s 
patent system. See also Harhoff  et al., Final Report, Th e Strategic Use of Patents and its 
Implications for Enterprise and Competition Policies, Tender for no. ENTR/05/82 (July 8, 
2007), available at: www.en.inno-tec.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/research/proj/laufendeprojekte/
patents/stratpat2007.pdf.
166 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 70, at p. 797, citing from Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology 
Innovation and the Patent Th icket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth? 15 Alb. L. J. Sci. & 
Tech. 477, 495–503, 2005 and referring the problem that arose in the 1920’s during the 
emergence of the radio industry while posing that nevertheless, such problems are more 
frequent in our days. See also chapter IV below referring to data from diff erent industries 
including the pharmaceutical sector.
167 See Richard Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (U Chicago Law 
& Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 152, March 2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=317101; arguing that all-or-nothing regimes – in this case either “full patent 
protection” under a strong property rule or the absence of patents – can accomplish fi rst best 
solutions.
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these diff erences.168 One possibility of achieving a diff erentiated application is 
precisely the use of property and liability rules and especially from a remedies-
based perspective, which would permit courts to balance distorted incentives, 
especially in extreme cases.
In fact, the issue of property and liability rules has emerged in several inter-
related discussions that either extend or overlap with the discussion about 
transaction costs, strategic behavior and hold-ups, which are here proposed as 
the economic justifi cation for liability rules in patent law. Th e following section 
describes these discussions while relating them to the general research question 
of this Th esis on the effi  ciency of diff erent protection rules for patents.
5.1. MULTIPARTIES NEGOTIATION: THE ANTICOMMONS
Mainstream studies on the economics of property rights pose that private 
property rights emerge due to changes in technology that make the benefi ts from 
having new rights surpass the cost of delineating and enforcing such rights.169 
Th is view oft en serves to explain the extension of patent rights over new subject 
matter, and in their several dimensions of duration, scope and enforcement.170 
However, the economics of property rights have also highlighted the benefi ts and 
costs of using alternative institutions to regulate the use of property. Property 
can actually be held in common with everyone having access to the resource and 
although rival goods held in common might give rise to a tragedy, public goods 
such as knowledge and information are non rival in consumption.171
168 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 52.
169 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Th eory of Property Rights, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 57, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association. (May, 1967), pp. 347–359.
170 While Demsetz is said to propose an optimistic reading that explains the emergence of any 
new property right in terms of cost-minimization, the “pessimistic” school usually relies on a 
public choice explanation based upon interest groups lobbying for favorable legislation and 
the resulting potential for rent-seeking.
171 See Garret Hardin, Th e Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162, 1243 (1968), available at: www.
sciencemag.org/sciext/sotp/pdfs/162–3859–1243.pdf, describing the problem of the commons, 
which arises where many agents have a right to use a resource but none has a right to exclude. 
As a consequence each agent will use that resource to maximize its private utility and the 
level of use chosen by each agent will be greater than the social optimum, thus creating a 
negative externality. See also Paul David, A tragedy of the Public Knowledge ‘Commons’? 
Global Science, Intellectual Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang, 
available at: http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/00–02.pdf, explaining several purported 
solutions to the underuse of IP protected assets include the “open source” and its application 
to the biotech sector under a commons usage. However, the open source movement that has 
balanced the exclusiveness of IP protection in the soft ware fi eld is based on specifi c 
circumstances of this latter. While open source holds a fundamental role in preserving the 
knowledge commons it has important shortcomings given the great amount of investment 
that fi rms must undertake to develop an end-use product. See Th e Economist, Open, but not 
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It has been recently argued that the increasing privatization of IP rights, and the 
increasing trend of patenting several technologies, also related to basic research 
has led to an over-fragmentation of rights. Th e tragedy of the anti-commons – 
which has found special applications in the patent biotechnology fi eld –172 arises 
when many agents hold a right to exclude but none has a privilege to use. As a 
result, the resource will be under-used and the excessive proliferation of rights – 
probably due to a low threshold for patentability – might lead to over-
investment.173 When technologies are complementary to each other, that means, 
that they yield a higher value when used together or when many complementary 
inputs are necessary to develop a product, precisely as it happens with many 
modern technologies.
Th e empirical evidence on the emergence of anti-commons property is 
controversial174, although studies suggest that there is a potential and growing 
risk, especially in fi elds such as genetic testing.175 Th us, there are indications of 
as usual (Mar 16th 2006), stating that “as open-source models move beyond soft ware into 
other businesses, their limitations are becoming apparent” and see Suzanne Scotchmer, Open 
Source Soft ware: the new Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006), NBER Working Paper 
Series. P. 27–30, arguing that the importance of an “open” and “commons” paradigm might 
be greater in areas where IP incentives are weak; such as neglected diseases where potential 
buyers are too poor, when ease of copying decreases the value of protection or when licensing 
is precluded by high transaction costs.
172 For the general theory of anti commons see Michael Heller Th e Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets (1998), Harvard Law Rev, N. 3, 111, 621–
688; for an application to the biomedical sector and patenting see Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? Th e anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science 
280, 5364 (1 May 1998); both explaining how the tragedy of anti commons results in resources 
being prone to underuse because multiple owners on upstream technologies have a right to 
exclude use by others and none has a privilege to use the resources.
173 Over-rewarding might give raise to rent-seeking activities where an agent engaging in 
patenting of certain technologies is not socially benefi cial.
174 Compare Scott Stern and Fiona Murray, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the 
Free Flow of Scientifi c Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, NBER 
Working Paper Series, Vol. w11465, 2005, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701, 
fi nding an anti-commons eff ect in citation rates aft er a patent is granted, with Walsh, Arora 
and Cohen, Working Th rough the Patent Problem, Science: Vol. 299. no. 5609, (14 February 
2003), at p. 1021 performed a survey among researchers and found that the IP system doesn’t 
preclude sequential innovation (researchers use interpret the research exemption in a broader 
way or simply infringe). See David, supra note 171, criticizing the methodological grounds of 
the Walsh study, among other reasons because of the ways in which the questions are posed 
that do not allow much room for researchers to express results otherwise. Furthermore, the 
Walsh study highlights severe problems related to patentability of research tools while 
distinguishing them from the anti-commons concept whereas Heller and Eisenberg refer to 
both problems under an anti-commons label.
175 Several institutions have undertaken eff orts to study and tackle this issue; the OECD has issued 
guidelines on licensing of genetic technologies. See OECD. Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Genetic Inventions (2006), available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf, 
referring that in a 2002 workshop the conclusion was that the IP system applied to genetic 
inventions did not have a systematic breakdown in licensing, although specifi c concerns were 
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an under-use problem, sometimes described as anti-commons and other times 
used in slightly diff erent meanings that might nevertheless get worse as the 
biotechnology industry evolves.
Th e problems of under-use under the anti-commons theory, suggest that some 
type of middle-ground solution might deserve attention. In this context, 
limitations to exclusive rights that go beyond the traditional limits for all 
property rights such as public interest and necessity might be justifi ed. Whereas 
patent rights are given in spite of the fact that they will produce some under-use 
– which is still deemed to be socially effi  cient when balanced with the benefi ts of 
encouraging more innovation – exclusionary rights on products that have 
potential applications can lead to more under-use than optimal. Moreover, 
excessive fragmentation of property – the core of the anti-commons concept – is 
usually described as an irreversible process due to the surmounting transaction 
costs of re-uniting such dispersed assets.176
Th e anti-commons literature has also described the problem of royalty stacking, 
which refers to multiple right holders in a complex technology each asking for a 
payment (royalty) probably in the light of a holdout power and the result that 
holds when such royalties must be aggregated. In the end, royalty stacking as 
well as holdouts preclude use because it would not be profi table to pay such an 
amount to use the associated technologies.177
Although authors have used diff erent frameworks to describe similar and inter-
related phenomena – anti-commons, hold-outs, hold-ups and royalty stacking – 
a noteworthy fact is that under any of these cases, the changing landscape of 
innovation has lead to question the current patent system. Moreover, under such 
special situations, courts can hardly assume an optimal design of the substantive 
IP or patent law. Th erefore, the question is noticeably asked ex-post, usually by 
antitrust authorities or courts about to what extent it is desirable to intervene 
and fi xed that substantive law.
made, especially regarding access to diagnostic tests. See also the Guidelines by the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Research Council, (similarly 
acknowledging these problems and recommending non-exclusive licensing, trusting however 
in market-based solutions.
176 See Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
50, No. 3, pp. 595–632.
177 Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process, U Chicago Law and 
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 292 (2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=902646 (arguing that: “some resources actually come into effi  cient use precisely 
because there are so many patent holders who each can plausibly veto a particular party’s 
use”). See also Elhauge, supra note 38, arguing that Lemley and Shapiro fail to demonstrate 
that royalty stacking causes royalties above an effi  cient level and that instead, it tends to 
produce royalties that are at or below the optimal rate.
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5.2 NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
Network externalities arise in markets where the use of a product by one 
consumer increases the value that other users obtain from the product.178 Th e 
illustrative example is communication networks, in which the user can establish 
contact with other users of the network and adding an additional user increases 
the value that others might derive. Externalities can occur directly, as in the fi rst 
case described, or indirectly, when the utility of the users of a network, for 
instance, an operating system, increases because the developers of application 
programs will produce more soft ware for the operating systems that are most 
vastly used.
With the development of information and communication technologies, network 
externalities have increasingly acquired a major role in current economies. Th e 
presence of network externalities has various important economic consequences. 
One question relates to the desirability of setting up standards that enable 
products “to speak with each other”, i.e. compatible standards.179 Th e other 
question, directly related to this study refers to the eff ects of patent protection in 
industries featuring network externalities.180 Some authors argue for a stronger 
standard for patent protection in order to give incentives to the adoption of 
standardized interfaces.181 However, compulsory licenses may be justifi ed in 
particular circumstances to enable the full realization of network externalities 
and to solve the problems of lock-in.182
178 See Menell supra note 28, at p. 141–142, citing and explaining the main studies with regard to 
network externalities and IP rights.
179 See ibid, at p. 142, citing Katz and Shapiro, 1985a, who argue that a new entrant to a market 
might adopt a noncompatible product standard even though their adoption of a compatible 
standard would increase social welfare. Th is behavior is driven by possible strategic 
advantages of not enhancing the desirability of the rivals’ products to consumers valuing 
standardization; but also Farrell and Saloner, 1985 showing a countervailing dynamic 
whereby the developers of improved standards may be unable to attract consumers  because 
of the high switching costs to shift  to the new standard.
180 Ibid, at p. 142, citing previous work by Menell that shows how intellectual property protection 
has important implications for the dynamics of network externalities by aff ecting the extent 
to which competitors can establish proprietary standards.
181 Ibid, citing from Menell, 1987, who argued that “in markets featuring strong network 
externalities, the threshold for intellectual property protection should be higher than in 
traditional market settings so as to foster the adoption of standardized interfaces.”
182 Ibid at p. 142. See also Dreyfuss, Rochelle, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the 
Intellectual Property/Competition Law Interface. European Competition Law Annual 
2005 – The Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law, 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, eds. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), 
analyzing the problem that emerges when products are “unique” either because they 
“naturally” as it occurs with segments of DNA which must be used in order to develop further 
technologies and might not be substituted by any other such product, or because they have 
become “de facto” standards, as it happens when there are lock-in and network eff ects.
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5.3. UNCERTAINTY OVER RIGHTS
Most scholars assume that property rights are clearly defi ned. However, when 
the property right’s boundaries are unclear, the costs of protecting a right with a 
property rule might be as high as protecting it through a liability rule. Th is is 
because the property rule should be designed to cover only the right and to avoid 
enjoining non-infringing uses. Such possibility exists in real property but is 
much more prevalent in the IP fi eld, especially in patent law, where boundaries 
are frequently unclear.
Whereas the examination of property rights in land is a well functioning system 
– “the process of examining property rights to land is routinely provided by a 
robust market that combines title examination with title insurance” – the same 
process is cumbersome for patents:
“typically, the risk of infringement that remains aft er a competent patent review is so 
unpredictable that it is virtually uninsurable. Similarly, uncertainty about scope and 
validity undermine the market for patent enforcement insurance”.183
Th is result is due to the combination of fuzzy and unpredictable boundaries; a 
failure in the system of public access to boundary information; lack of use of a 
requirement of possession and the scope of rights and the patent fl ood:
“if we use a broader defi nition of “troll” that includes al shorts of patentees who 
opportunistically take advantage of poor patent notice to assert patents against 
unsuspecting fi rms, then troll-like behavior might be a more important 
explanation. Indeed, if patent notice is poor, then all sorts of patent owners might 
quite reasonably assert patents more broadly than they deserve. But then it is 
more appropriate to attribute the surge in litigation to poor patent notice, not to 
trolls per se”.184
5.4. PATENT QUALITY PROBLEMS
Poor quality patents may result from inadequate review of prior art during 
examination, poorly draft ed claims, or lax standards (the height of the non-
obviousness threshold). Th ey may undermine economic effi  ciency185 by 
restraining competition, raising transaction costs, and increasing litigation 
without promoting innovation.
183 See Bessen and Meurer, note 14, at p. 51.
184 See Bessen and Meurer, ibid, at p. 17. See also Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72.
185 See Menell and Scotchmer supra note 36 at p. 35.
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A proliferation of poor quality patents can choke entry and cumulative 
innovation. Ensuring quality patents, however, comes at a cost and hence, it is 
important to consider the relation between problems of patent notice and patent 
quality with the strategic use of patents and whether an ex ante or an ex post 
solution is to be preferred, especially from an effi  ciency standpoint. With this 
regard, several studies have addressed the problems related to the costs of patent 
examination from the perspective of the administrative costs as well as the social 
and private costs and benefi ts involved in such activity.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Th e literature on entitlements has greatly contributed to the understanding of 
the interaction between rights and remedies. From an effi  ciency-based 
perspective the choice of an entitlement protection rule is based on multiple 
considerations, including the diffi  culty or easiness of bargaining in the market 
and the incidence of transaction costs. In this sense, this chapter set up the 
framework for analyzing the use of liability rules in patent law by bringing 
together the insights of the entitlement literature and the economic analysis of IP 
and patent law.
Modern patent law is facing severe challenges due to the overly complexity of 
innovations, especially in sequential and cumulative settings. It is oft en argued 
that fi rms are increasingly using patents for strategic purposes and engaging in 
costly litigation with the consequent risk of diminishing innovation incentives, 
especially for sequential innovators.
Within this changing landscape, the controversy between property and liability 
rules has been addressed as a possible way out of some specifi c problems, 
especially due to strategic behavior of patentees and patent hold-ups. Th is chapter 
sought to review the literature regarding these problems in order to highlight 
possible misunderstandings. Among the fi ndings are some interpretations on the 
use of property and liability rules in IP and patent law – mostly refl ecting a view 
where the nature of the right dictates the nature of the remedy – which are in 
contrast with the conception of property and liability rules as alternative rules 
advanced by the entitlement literature.
In addition, authors arguing for the use or maintenance of strong property rules 
for patents have tended to apply an incomplete picture of the existing liability 
rules for patent law, mostly due to a limited focus on U.S. law. Th is restricted 
view could be enriched with a comparative analysis of other systems outside the 
U.S. and by bringing together insights from the literature constructing on 
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
64 Intersentia
substantive law with the most recent literature discussing remedies-based 
liability rules, which is the object of the next chapter. Whereas this chapter 
sought to analyze the economic arguments advanced by the law and economics 
literature for and against the use of liability rules in patent law, the following 
chapters will assess the main insights from economic studies against historical 
evidence and the legal context, including the most recent decisions addressing 
similar problems.
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CHAPTER II
EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: 
A HISTORICAL VIEW
“Law wants inventions to be worked… It is only
through working that inventions are indeed
turned into advantages for the public, lack of
working would only cause protection to retard 
its general use and to preclude the progress 
that could derive from them”.186
1. INTRODUCTION
Th is chapter examines the historical evolution of patent liability rules, including 
compulsory licensing provisions and other forms of non-authorized access to 
patented inventions, e.g. when the award of injunctive relief is subject to equity 
considerations. Whereas the next chapter focuses on the legal aspects of these 
types of patent liability rules, the limits between the two chapters, as the limits 
between historical and legal analysis are arbitrary. In eff ect, many historical 
arguments will directly be refl ected in the legal provisions examined in next 
chapter whereas the historical overview of this chapter will certainly touch upon 
important insights from the legal perspective. A further arbitrary choice was to 
focus this chapter on the overview of ex-post liability rules from an international 
perspective whereas the next chapter analyzes the particularities of each country 
under study.
Th e chapter proceeds as follows. Th e second section briefl y describes early patent 
times as they refl ect diff erent justifi cations for patent protection – economic and 
non-economic – as well as a search for balance between diff erent policy goals. 
Th e section particularly reviews the origin of compulsory licensing during the 
186 Tulio Ascarelli, Teoria dei Beni Immateriali (1960, Dott. A. Giuff re Editore, Milano), 
p. 619, free translation: (“Il diritto vuole che l’invenzione venga attuata… E solo attraverso la 
sua attuazione che l’invenzione invero si risolve in vantaggio per la comunità, ché se essa 
potesse non venire attuata, la tutela concessa servirebbe solo a ritardarne la generale 
utilizzazione e allora proprio a precludere quel progresso che potrebbe derivare dall’attuazione 
dell’invenzione …”).
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patent abolitionist movement during the XIX century which culminated in 
patent harmonization processes and specifi cally on the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property. Th e third section reviews the antecedents and 
the process of patent harmonization that lead to the TRIPS Agreement and also 
discusses the main provisions regarding ex-post liability rules for patents there 
contained. Th e fourth section discusses the post-TRIPS landscape and some of 
the multiple controversies generated by the adoption of substantive and 
enforcement patent law standards as they refer to patent liability rules. Th e fi ft h 
section reviews the landscape of patent remedies outside patent law with the aim 
of searching for spaces aff ecting or permitting the use of patent liability rules in 
civil law and common law countries. A brief overview of the European patent 
landscape is separately provided in order to discuss the specifi c context of 
European harmonization with respect to patent substantive and enforcement 
standards.
2. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN INTERNATIONAL 
HISTORY
2.1. EARLY PATENT TIMES
Since their inception, IP laws have attempted to pursue a balance between diverse 
driving forces. Industries were fl ourishing and innovators rewarded by means 
other than patents, at least until the 1400’s, when the use of patents extended 
across the mining and maritime districts of Venice and Germany.187 However, 
the growing abuses of patents and privileges granted by governors prompted the 
need for statutes or decrees restricting the issuance of patents, primary to new 
inventions. Statutes soon started to establish other limits and requirements with 
regards to the duration of the patent as well as with respect to examination, 
granting and in general, the protection of inventions.188 However, these fi rst 
187 See Frank Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, The 
American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 5, p. 309–310. See also Fritz Machlup and Edith 
Penrose, Th e Patent controversy in the Nineteenth Century, The Journal of Economic 
History, Volume X and supplement, May 1950, N° I, at p. 2, explaining that: (“apart from 
its expression in statute form, the patent system is not chiefl y an English creation. It was 
developing simultaneously in several countries at about the same time, though not at the 
same rate”).
188 Ibid, p. 310. See also Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System, 
Johns Hopkins University studies in historical and political science, 1951, at p. 4–6, explaining 
how the failure of James I to regulate monopoly grants according to the common law made it 
necessary to enact 1623 Statute of Monopolies, since: “the granting of patents for the 
encouragement of industry and the public welfare was a recognized part of the royal 
prerogative; the creation of monopolies in opposition to the public interest and without any 
“consideration passing to the public” was in violation of the common law”. Hence, many 
patents granted by the Queen were illegal because they violated common law, which caused a 
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statutes were limited in scope and patents were more directly recognized by 
customary or common law.189 Th is situation soon lead to the important question 
– still refl ected in contemporary research – of whether patents could be justifi ed 
as an inherently owned reward to inventors or as an incentive to encourage the 
science and arts. Closely related was the problem of whether patent rights were 
equitable in nature or could be assimilated to “property”.190
Hence, in their origin, patent statutes were an attempt to control the excesses of 
arbitrary privileges, i.e. they acted as competition law.191 In fact, the English 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623, allowed the granting of patents “to the true and 
fi rst inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of 
making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities 
at home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient” (emphasis added).192
Th e mismatch between the origin of patent rights and their mainstream 
justifi cation has important consequences with regards to how patent rights 
“should” be protected and yet, it is oft en ignored. Th e history of IP shows an early 
and widespread use of several tools to curb the possibility of abuses and over-
extensions of monopolies. For instance, a mandatory remuneration system was 
used in the privilege granted in 1460 by the Venetian Senate to German national 
Jacobus de Valperga on a water pump invention, which extended for all his life 
but was subject to an obligation of licensing to whoever off ered “reasonable 
tension between the Crown and the Commons, also refl ected in the case of Darcy v. Allin, 
deciding in 1602 that “under the common law exclusive grants to exercise a trade for private 
gain are against the “liberty and benefi t of the subjects” and against the common law”.
189 Ibid, p. 313.
190 See Ibid, at p. 314, arguing that “In various parts of the world, notably including for instance 
France, society gave increasing approval, during the eighteenth century, to the view that the 
rights of authors and inventors rest on customary law, the continent equivalent of common 
law –not basically on statutes or codes (a creation of later times), and certainly not on royal 
grants (in spite of surviving formalities)” and arguing that “a common law right is likely to be 
implemented and interpreted more liberally”…
191 See Machlup and Penrose, supra note 178, p. 2, arguing that “If some conclusion might be 
inferred is not, at least not only, that the patent system evolved in order to provide exclusive 
rights to inventors but rather that it did in order to contain and rationalize the grant of 
previously abused privileges”. See also Taubman, supra note 97, arguing that “the roots of 
patent law lie in the law of competition and protection of the freedom to ply one’s trade. Th e 
English Statute of Monopolies, frequently cited as a foundational patent statute, is in essence 
competition law, aimed at harmful monopolies and illegitimate restraints on trade based 
‘upon misinformation and untrue pretences of public good’ while identifying patents of 
invention as legitimate exceptions to a general rule against monopolies”.
192 See Penrose, supra note 179, at p. 7, arguing that “Th is Statute of Monopolies has been called 
the Magna Charta of the rights of inventors, not because it originated patent protection of 
inventors but because it was the fi rst general law of a modern state lo lay down the principle 
that only a “fi rst and true inventor” should be granted a monopoly patent”.
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royalties”. Although this practice remained largely isolated193, patent statutes 
around the world tended to preserve certain rights to the State in as an attempt 
to balance incentives to innovate and access to new knowledge, especially by 
local inventors.194
2.2. THE FIRST COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS
Allowing nationals to use and adapt new technologies developed by foreigners 
was a primordial concern of early patent statutes.195 In fact, since their inception, 
diff erent national patent systems included obligations to “work” the invention, 
which were understood as compelling patentees to produce nationally or 
locally.196 Aft erwards, such requirements were more generally used in order to 
support the development of national industries.197 However, compulsory licenses 
were a latecomer in the arsenal of tools used to balance the public and private 
193 Erich Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent System, Harwood Academic Publishers 
GmbH, V. 30, 1989, at p. 4.
194 See Penrose, supra note 179, at p. 162 arguing that “in order to ensure that any confl ict 
between the private interest of the patentee and the “public” in whose interest the laws were 
allegedly established is not always resolved in favor of the former, most governments have 
reserved the right under certain circumstances either to revoke the patent or to permit others 
to use the invention patented, this altering the right granted from that of an exclusive 
monopoly in the use of the invention to a right to receive royalties for its use”. Th e case of 
Britain is mentioned since “early letters patent contained provisions for the cancellation of 
the grant if it was found to be “prejudicial or inconvenient to the realm”, ibid at p. 163.
195 See also Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from 
American and European History, Study Paper 1a, Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, available at: at p. 11, arguing that interpretation of the “fi rst and true inventor” 
included individuals importing inventions created abroad, which probes that “the primary 
emphasis of this feature of the patent grant was on diff usion, rather than on incentives for 
creativity”.
196 See Penrose, supra note 179 at p. 137–138 arguing that “the theory that all patent should be 
worked within the country that granted them arose when the encouragement of 
industrialization was the chief aim of the patent system. Patents were granted because 
countries wished to develop their natural resources, and to increase their supply of technicians 
and skilled labor, and the number and variety of their manufacturing concerns. Th e purpose 
was the immediate establishment of a new industry. Th e question was not one of “rights of 
inventors” but of industrial development, and so long as each grant was in fact a special act of 
grace of the sovereign, there was usually a direct understanding that the obligation of the 
patentee was to put a specifi c innovation into eff ect (…) Hulme shows that in England “the 
undertaking to work the grant constituted the essential consideration of the early monopoly 
system”. Ibid at p. 139 “Th e idea that the patent was granted on consideration that a new 
industry be established or a new art put into practice was for all practical purposes abandoned 
without statutory change and was not to become important again until the beginning of the 
20th century”.
197 See Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements And 
Compulsory Licences At International Law, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 35 NO. 2 at p. 
referring how working provisions were already incorporated for instance in the Venetian 
Patent Act of 1474, the English Statute of Monopolies in 1623, U.S. and French statutes.
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benefi ts of patents.198 Although the origin of compulsory licenses is debated and 
generally linked to the patent controversy of the nineteenth century; an earlier 
antecedent actually arose during the discussion of a proposal for amendment to 
the U.S. patent law of 1790 by the U.S. Senate:
“And be it further enacted, that whenever the grantee of such patent shall neglect to 
off er for sale within the United States a suffi  cient number of any such Manufacture, 
Engine, Machine, Art or Device, or any improvement therein or shall sell the same at 
a price beyond what may be judged an adequate compensation, the Supreme Court of 
the U.S. or any two justices thereof … on complaint made to them in writing … are 
… authorized to inquire … into the justness of the said complaint; and if the same be 
found to be true, to take suffi  cient recognizance and security of the grantee … that he 
… within such reasonable time as the Court of Justices shall prescribe, off er for sale 
within the U.S. a suffi  cient number of such Manufacture, Engine, Machine, Art, or 
Device or Improvement therein, at such reasonable prices as the said Court or Justices 
shall on due consideration affi  x; and if the grantee … shall neglect or refuse to give 
security as aforesaid, the said Court of Justices are hereby authorized to grant to the 
complainant a full and ample license to make, construct and vend such Manufacture, 
Engine, Machine, Art, or Device, or improvement…”199 (emphasis added).
Whereas such proposal was rejected, it can still be considered the fi rst reference 
to compulsory licenses of patents which supposedly borrowed from the copyright 
laws of some of the States of the Union. But compulsory licensing was actually 
incorporated in several national patent laws only aft er the controversy of the XIX 
century. Th e anti-patent or abolitionist movement emerged in Europe during the 
1800’s, following the free trade thoughts inspired by Adam Smith, which opposed 
tariff s and privileges including patents. At that time, patents were seen by many 
as barriers to free trade.200 Patent abolitionism was especially infl uential in 
198 See Penrose, supra note 179 at p. 163, arguing that “while the right to revoke the patent has 
always been a recognized right of the state, the power to issue a compulsory license is 
apparently of relatively recent origin”.
199 See Penrose, supra note 179 at p. 166, quoting the proposed amendment which was reproduced 
in Record of the Proceedings in congress Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 
printed by the Patent Offi  ce Society, 1940, with an introductory note by P.J. Federico.
200 See Kaufer, supra note 184 at p. 8, explaining how in Austria and in Prussia, “monopoly 
privileges had been established in many trades as the nineteenth century dawned. Th ere, as in 
the western European lands, they were widely disliked as misuses of royal prerogative. Th is 
association between patents and monopoly privileges gave birth to an energetic anti-patent 
movement”. Ibid at p. 9 arguing that “Tension rose as Prussia began to dominate policy 
among the German territories. In 1806, aft er its defeat by Napolean, Prussia instituted 
reforms under which a new kind of civil servant, nourished inter alia on the ideas of Adam 
Smith, gained power. Th e Prussian government pushed for free trade among the German 
territories, and as remnants of mercantilist policy, patents were seen as a barrier to free trade. 
By 1862, all tariff s had been abolished inside Germany. In that same year, a free trade treaty 
with France marked the high point of the free trade movement’s infl uence. Th e Prussian 
government argued concurrently that all patent laws in the German territories should be 
abolished”. But see Menell, supra note 22, noticing that Adam Smith “while generally critical 
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Austria, Prussia and the U.K. while it similarly prevented the adoption of patent 
legislation in the Netherlands and Switzerland.201
Nevertheless, it could be argued that similar economic thoughts were used to 
support both countries adopting patent protection as well as those opposing 
patents. Th e ultimate goal of most countries was in any case to protect their 
national industries, although this was done through diff erent means. For 
instance, Britain made use of compulsory working provisions to protect its 
industries from foreign competitors202 and many countries limited the possibility 
that foreigners could obtain patents in the same way as nationals or conditioned 
their patents to national or local working provisions. In fact, it is argued that 
both protectionist and free traders welcomed the new compulsory licensing 
provisions: while “protectionists” interpreted the move as a “great protectionist 
idea”; “free traders” found that the introduction of “compulsory licensing” as a 
measure aiming at enhancing free trade”.203
Hence, it could be argued that free trade and protectionism were walking side by 
side with regard to compulsory licensing and that such mechanism was viewed 
either as a way to promote or to react against protectionist measures.204 Several 
circumstances related with the oscillation of countries between protectionist and 
free trade measures are pointed out as having converged to originate compulsory 
licensing provisions. Firstly, the rapid evolution of the German territories and 
especially of Prussia, from agricultural states to industrialized nations during 
the 1850 and 1870.205 Secondly, the increasing importance of world exhibitions, 
which created the need to protect the inventions to be exhibited and the 
compromise achieved in the light of the 1873 Vienna exhibition, where the patent 
of monopoly power as detrimental to the operation of the ‘invisible hand’, nonetheless 
justifi ed the need for limited monopolies to promote innovation and commerce requiring 
substantial up-front investments and risk”.
201 See Khan, supra note 186, at p. 29, explaining how the abolitionist movement was, for a short 
period of time “strong enough to obtain support in favour of dismantling the patent system in 
countries such as England, and in 1863 the Congress of German Economists declared “patents 
of invention are injurious to common welfare.” Th e movement achieved its greatest victory in 
Holland, which repealed its patent legislation in 1869.”
202 See Penrose, supra note 179, at p. 140, referring that: “Even Britain, the home of the free 
traders, became alarmed at the use of foreign patents and inserted a compulsory working 
provision in her patent law. Th e industry most aff ected was the chemical industry and the 
competition most feared was German; but other industries joined the chemical industry in 
requesting compulsory working. It was pointed out that nearly half the patents granted in 
Britain were granted to foreigners and it was alleged that these patents had “completely wiped 
out” many British industries”.
203 See Penrose, supra note 179, at p. 140.
204 See Kaufer, supra note 184 at p. 9 explaining how Austria adopted a development policy in 
order to favor its national industry but that also the adoption of a free trade area was a tactic 
used by Prussia to exclude Austria from the German union.
205 Ibid at p. 9.
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congress proposed to introduce compulsory licensing principles in national 
patent laws, hence undermining the objection that patents were to be considered 
only as “mercantilist monopoly privileges.206 Th irdly, the lack of consistency in 
the free trade movement in Prussia.207 And fi nally, the fact that 1873 set also the 
beginning of a worldwide depression that facilitated a movement against free 
trade and embracing protectionist movements where tariff s and patents played 
an important role.
Th e increasing participation of the – then – developing countries in world 
exhibitions, and especially the pressure of American inventors willing to go to 
the Vienna exhibition of 1873 only if protection for their technologies was 
assured by the German authorities, were among the reasons that prompted the 
need for harmonized patent standards. Following negotiations, patent protection 
was given to foreign patents under strict compulsory licensing provisions, a 
compromise that protected national industries while providing some fl exibility 
to allow the use of patented technologies by local inventors.208 Aft er 1873, and 
also as a result of the world economic depression, which reinforced protectionist 
trends, patents were largely used together with tariff s in order to protect national 
industries. Still it is worth recalling that, at least for some scholars, the absence 
of patent protection was essential for the successful development of some 
national industries.209 More in general, the adoption of compulsory licensing 
provisions is viewed as a compromise between no protection of patents and full 
protection through a right to exclude.210
Th ese trends evidence the importance of national self-interest, along with – and 
probably even more important than – the desire to protect the rights of inventors 
or to foster scientifi c progress as motivations for enacting and curbing patent 
protection. Th e reaction against and the fi nal defeat of the abolitionist movement 
206 Ibid at p. 9.
207 Ibid at p. 9, explaining the creation of a German free trade area as a political tactic used by 
Prussia for excluding Austria from the German union, given that Austria had adopted a 
strongly protectionist development policy under the Habsburg monarchy. Th is also explains 
that aft er achieving the goal of excluding Austria, the free trade movement lost momentum.
208 Ibid. p. 8–9.
209 Th is is for example the case of Switzerland, which excluded protection for the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries during the years when these were developing. See Khan, supra note, 
at p.29 “it was only in response to international pressures that Switzerland adopted measures 
to recognize patent rights”.
210 See Penrose, supra note 179 at p. 167, explaining that such compromise arose “between the 
patent advocates and the anti-patent, free trade group who opposed the entire patent system 
because of the restrictions it placed on the freedom of trade”; and also quoting the work of R. 
Beck von Managetta, Das neue osterreichische-Patent-Recht (Wien, 1897) at p. 17, that 
attributed “the defeat of the anti-patent movement in Germany to the compromise on the 
idea of compulsory licensing”. See also Penrose, supra note 188, at p. 164 explaining that “the 
continental writers for the most part traced its origin to the controversy about patents in the 
middle of the 19th century”.
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was followed by pressures to adopt an international patent regime that could also 
control for excesses such as the automatic forfeiture or revocation of patents in 
cases of failure to work inventions locally. Th is was an important incentive for 
endorsing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, 
which fi nally prohibited the automatic forfeiture of patents in case of lack of 
working, although it affi  rmed the obligation of patentees to work their patents 
locally where such requirement existed in national law.
Nonetheless, compulsory licensing211 was not included in the 1883 Paris 
Convention but only introduced in the 1925 Hague Revision as a means to 
restrict the use of patent forfeiture in the cases of failure to work or other “abuses 
which might result from the exclusive rights conferred by the patent”. Th is 
reform prohibited countries from imposing forfeiture unless they had fi rst 
attempted to remedy the “abuse” through the grant of a compulsory license, 
hence recognizing failure to work as an “abuse” of international patent law but 
introducing a less harsh measure as compulsory licensing.
Following the Convention, countries identifi ed other abuses that justifi ed 
compulsory licensing and also included in their national laws other grounds 
diff erent than abuse. Th is was the case with compulsory licensing provisions 
motivated by the “public interest” and their specifi c variants of “national 
emergency” or “public health” issues212 as well as compulsory licenses for 
dependent patents. A particular provision was adopted for instance in Germany, 
which allowed for the use of compulsory licenses, subject to the condition that 
the “public interest” necessitated such measure.213 In the period preceding the 
TRIPS Agreement, the enactment of national laws was subject to wide discretion 
as the interpretation of possible abuses and the same notions of public interest, 
211 For the general concept and categories of compulsory licenses, see Section 3.1.1.1 of 
Chapter I.
212 See Georg Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property as revised at Stockholm in 1967, BIRPI (WIPO 
Publication no. 611 (E), Geneva: 1968), at p. 70, arguing that: “Th e member States are therefore 
free to provide analogous or diff erent measures, for example, compulsory licenses on 
conditions other than those indicated in paragraph (4), in other cases where the public 
interest is deemed to require such measures. Th is may be the case when patents concern vital 
interests of the country in the fi elds of military security or public health or in the case of 
so-called ‘dependent patents’”.
213 See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: Th e Rationales and the 
Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 349 (1993), citing provisions previous to the TRIPS Agreement 
and Haracoglou Irina, Competition Law And Patents: A Follow-On Innovation 
Perspective In The Biopharmaceutical Industry, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), at 
p. 66, Table 3.2, citing “European National Provisions for compulsory licensing and on the 
experimental use exemption”. See also Compulsory licensing provisions in Latin American 
countries at: www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1321873.
Chapter II. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Historical View
Intersentia 73
as well as other grounds for the use of compulsory licenses was left  wide opened 
in the words of the Paris Convention.
A glimpse into history shows that failure to work has been considered a potential 
“abuse” of patent protection while local or national working had been deemed as 
a requirement for patentees during a long period of patent history and at least 
until the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, until the early 1990s, almost every country 
in the world (except for the U.S.) had local working requirements and the desire 
of achieving a compromise with this regard was an important reason of the 
adoption of compulsory licensing. Whereas one of the most important principles 
laid down by the Paris Convention was non-discrimination between nationals 
from members of the Union, provisions requiring local working could 
discriminate against foreign patents which are the most likely to be worked 
abroad, hence giving rise to a de facto discrimination.214 Economists soon 
recognized that a compulsory license provision for working failure might also 
create such de facto discrimination resembling the rough eff ects of compulsory 
working215 while being an ineffi  cient and incomplete way of dealing with the 
general problem of the costs of patenting.216 In addition, many criticisms against 
compulsory licenses were soon centered on the problem of calculating a 
reasonable royalty payment that we will discuss below.
2.3. ORIGINS OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT 
SYSTEMS
2.3.1. U.K.
As it was described above, the UK patent system had an early origin in the fi rst 
common law developments which latter ended in the enactment of the 1624 
Statute of Monopolies. Several features of the UK patent system were soon object 
of debate such as the high cost and limited access to patent protection217 as well 
214 See Penrose, at p. 169.
215 Th e welfare eff ects of either a face or a de facto discrimination have been analyzed for long. 
See for instance, Penrose, at p. 170 explaining that “this sound like a compulsory working 
requirement, which we found in the last chapter was an early, and indeed primitive, approach 
to the problem of reducing the costs to an economy of granting foreign patents. Compulsory 
working is not only ineff ective but does not directly attack the real source of the cost of 
foreign patents to an economy – the restrictions placed on the use of new techniques…”.
216 Ibid at p. 170, “But if the sole criterion for revocation or compulsory licensing is whether the 
patent is worked domestically, the provision is too wide and at the same time, too narrow. It is 
too wide because, in itself, the working of a patent in the country granting it is not necessarily 
desirable; it is too narrow because the patentee’s failure to work is only one-and probably the 
least – of the costs of granting foreign patents”.
217 Th e signifi cant barriers in terms of costs to apply for patents have been discussed by scholars 
and even refl ected in more general literature work (Charles Dickens in “A poor’s man tale of a 
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as the uncertain application of patent doctrines which lead to the belief that 
patents could not be considered as “settled unless the patent had been contested 
in court with a favourable outcome”.218 Such uncertain landscape along with 
unclear rules with regard to licenses and assignments was probably the cause of a 
limited commercialization of patents during that period219 and also gave rise to 
various attempts at reforming the system.220
In fact, one of the fi rst patent “reform movements” occurred in England “chiefl y 
because of complaints that the procedure for obtaining a patent was expensive, 
clumsy and uncertain”.221 Such reasons responded to concerns by interest groups 
of inventors. However, patent reform ignited a counter-movement that rapidly 
spread throughout England and abroad and in fact, the UK was particularly 
receptive and active in the patent controversy that took place during the XIX 
century.
By the year 1870, innovation in Britain lagged behind the U.S. in terms of 
innovation and number of patents and a number of factors converged to make 
possible a major patent reform in 1883. Th e reform simplifi ed certain procedures, 
introduced the possibility of opposition to patents and importantly, it also 
enshrined compulsory licensing provisions for the fi rst time.
As already discussed above, patents were conceived as a due reward for inventors 
which was however to be limited in a way that it did not harm trade or become 
an unreasonable monopoly. In this sense, the 1883 Act conceived compulsory 
licensing as a “limitation of the patent right to safeguard its reasonableness”.222 
Compulsory licenses were established for the following situations in which the 
patentee was considered to have “defaulted” the patent system (i) when the patent 
was not worked in the United Kingdom; (ii) when reasonable requirements of the 
patent”). See Khan, supra note 186 at p. 11. See also Works of Jeremy Bentham, cited in 
Moureen Coulter, Property in Ideas, p. 76, describing the costly process that an inventor 
should face to obtain patent protection as “a tax levied upon ingenuity”.
218 See Khan, supra note 186, at p. 12. A similar argument has been recently the object of modern 
critics in studies considering patents as probabilistic rights, that is, rights which value 
depends on the probabilities that it will survive challenges of validity, see for instance, Lemley 
and Shapiro, infra note 608. However, the claim made during the 1800s in the UK referred 
most directly to the fact that many patent doctrines were oft en interpreted in arbitrary ways.
219 See Khan, supra note 186 at p. 13, arguing that “it is therefore not surprising that the market 
for patent rights seems to have been somewhat limited, and even in the year aft er the 1852 
reforms only 273 assignments and licences were recorded as the law required”.
220 See Khan, supra note 186, at p. 13. In 1852 the patent reform bill included an examination 
system that was aft erwards eliminated. Th e 1883 patent act included a limited examination to 
ensure the invention was patentable and described whereas only in 1950, the UK system 
included an examination of novelty.
221 See Machlup and Penrose, supra note at p. 3.
222 See Oliver Brand, Th e Dawn of Compulsory Licensing, I.P.Q. 2007, 2, 216–235.
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public could not be supplied; (iii) when someone was prevented from using an 
invention to the best advantage; and (iv) in cases of Crown use, that is, use by the 
Crown and its agents without the authorization of the patentee.223
Compulsory licenses for non-working were included to substitute earlier working 
provisions as well as to attain a compromise between the anti-patent movement 
as well as pro-patent interests.224 Moreover, this substitution refl ected a gradual 
change that took place with regards to the consideration in exchange for patent 
protection. At the beginning of the patent statute, it was widely understood that 
patents were monopolies granted in order to encourage new inventions and thus, 
the written disclosure of the invention was not required, a quid pro quo of the 
granting of patent rights was the working of the invention.225
Later on, the specifi cation or written disclosure of inventions was imposed as the 
consideration in exchange for the grant of patent rights, a change that was also 
facilitated by the perception that compulsory working was an ineffi  cient 
measure.226 Th is change of consideration for patent rights was accompanied by 
the gradual transformation in the conception of patents from privileges to 
property rights.227 As a consequence of conceiving patents as a property rights, 
courts were increasingly hesitant in compelling patentees to work their 
inventions.228 By 1829, it was debated whether to sanction non-working with the 
revocation of patents, as it happened in other countries or whether to compel 
223 Ibid at p. 218.
224 Ibid, at p. 219, arguing that: “the adoption of compulsory licensing of patents for non-working 
in subs.(a) of s.22 of the 1883 Act has to be seen against a wider background as a climax of 
three interwoven developments: the decline of compulsory working, the need for a 
compromise with the anti-patent free trade movement, and a sudden call for protectionism in 
late Victorian Britain”.
225 Ibid at p. 219 “In the early seventeenth century, the Crown granted monopolies for inventions 
by favour to encourage the introduction of new methods of manufacture within the realm. 
Neither a specifi cation nor a written disclosure of the invention was required as 
“consideration” of the patentee for obtaining his or her grant. Instead, as we learn from Darcy 
v Allyn and Th e Clothworkers of Ipswich case, the patentee had to “work” the new invention 
within the country – alternatively to employ and educate native artisans in the working of the 
invention (“apprenticeship clauses”). Th is was common practice in Europe at the time. In 
England, the patentee bound himself to work his invention in the recitals of his grant. 
Breaching such a promise – as he would know – was deceiving the monarch, which would 
render the grant void”.
226 Ibid at p. 220–221.
227 See ibid, at p. 221, arguing that: “Th e eff ect of this “change of consideration” was compounded 
by the second event. In the late eighteenth century the patent grant transformed from a 
privilege to a property right”, See also Arkwright v Nigthingale [CP 1785] Dav. Pat. Cas. 37.
228 Ibid, explaining that both a change in consideration of patents as well as a change in their 
own conception as property, made courts to be “increasingly reluctant to require a patentee to 
work his or her invention, especially when aft er the Napoleonic Wars the rules of patent law 
became obscured by confusion. Witnesses before the 1829 Select Committee were uncertain 
whether English law compelled patentees to work their inventions”.
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patentees that did not work their inventions to license them.229 But compulsory 
licensing was still not accepted at that time. It is interesting to recall the pressure 
exercised by engineer John Farey in favor of using the equitable nature of 
injunctions in order to deny this remedy and limit relief to nominal damages in 
cases in which the patentee did not worked her invention.230
In addition to these changes, the infl uence of copyright provisions on compulsory 
licenses was possible due to the gradual disappearance of compulsory working 
provisions as well as the growing importance of the free trade movement that 
was soon used by patent abolitionists to argue against patent protection. Th e 
victory of patent supporters was however negotiated, upon the arousal of 
compulsory licensing provisions. According to scholars on patent history, it was 
the confl uence of “the decline of compulsory working in Britain”, “the rise of 
compulsory licensing as an alternative” but also of the diminishing trust in 
“common law and equity for non-working”231 that made the introduction of 
compulsory licensing provisions by the 1883 Act possible. However, compulsory 
licenses in the 1883 Act were very limited, only to be applied for patents granted 
aft er that year and the Act was soon repealed in 1902.232
So, at the time of the negotiations of the Congress of Vienna in 1873, the 
possibility of enshrining compulsory licensing provisions had already been 
discussed by the U.K. Parliament. Th e Vienna Congress, which is considered to 
have settled the dispute between abolitionists and supporters of patent protection 
229 Ibid at p. 221, explaining that: “the 1829 committee contemplated nullity as remedy for non-
working of the invention, fi nding support in the patent laws of the leading countries of the 
age – including France, England’s principal economic and military rival but remained 
inconclusive. As a complementary scheme, the committee suggested to compel patentees, 
who granted licences at all, to license the public without distinction”.
230 Ibid, at p. 221, referring how John Farey, an infl uential engineer pp. 557–559: “gave extensive 
evidence, in common with other witnesses recommended relying on the effi  ciency of the 
existing practice of the courts rather than compelling the patentee to work or to license. Th e 
courts would – up to the enactment of the 1883 Act award only nominal damages for the 
violation of a patent that was not being worked and would not award the equitable remedy of 
an injunction, because the non-working or refusal to license others would render the 
patentees hands “unclean” ”.
231 Ibid at p. 225 “Th at changed shortly thereaft er, when the courts did not exercise their 
discretion concerning injunctions and damages any longer and the free trade movement rose 
to dominance”, especially aft er Hopkinson v St James [1893] 10 R.P.C. 46 at 62.
232 Ibid referring only two cases accounted with respect to non-working: Continental Gas 
Glühlicht, etc., Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 727; Levinstein’s Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 732 (742) 
and two other cases that were based on the ground that the reasonable requirements of the 
public were not being met: Hulton & Bleakley’s Petition [1898] 15 R.P.C. 749; Barlett’s Patent 
[1899] 16 R.P.C. 641.
Chapter II. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Historical View
Intersentia 77
during the XIX century patent controversy, adopted an indefi nite resolution 
authorizing the use of compulsory licenses233:
“… it is advisable to establish regulations, according to which the patentee should be 
compelled, in cases in which the public interest may require it, to allow the use of his 
invention to all responsible applicants, for an adequate compensation.”234
Although the origins of compulsory licensing provisions been largely associated 
with the anti patent movement, as it was discussed in the previous section, some 
scholars argue that it was protectionism, supported also by British Delegates, 
which rather pressure for the adoption of this measure:
“Ironically, it was not the free trade movement that had called so vocally for 
compulsory licensing in case of non-working, which fi nally brought it into the British 
statute books, but rather the exact opposite. Th e British delegates to the Vienna 
Congress secretly admitted that it was the growing domestic call for protectionism, 
which convinced them to support compulsory licensing for non-working”.235
Compulsory licenses were latter strengthened under the introduction of licenses 
of right in 1919. Th e reason was allegedly the “fear that foreign inventors might 
injure British industry by refusing to grant other manufacturers the right to use 
their patent”.236 However, it is also important to add that patent protection was 
excluded for chemical products, during the period from 1919 to 1949, purportedly 
to “counter the threat posed by the superior German chemical industry” and 
meanwhile, “licenses of right enabled British manufacturers to compel foreign 
patentees to permit the use of their patents on pharmaceuticals and food 
products”, until the next reform in 1977.
2.3.2. U.S.
Th e U.S. has probably one of the most successful and infl uential patent systems 
in the world not only in terms of numbers of patents issued but also in terms of 
achieving to an important degree – at least until quite recently – proper 
233 Ibid, at p. 225, explaining that “Th e proponents carried the day with compulsory licensing 
playing a vital role: two German academics, Klostermann and Langen – well aware of the 
British refl ections on compulsory licensing as well as the corresponding ones of the German 
lobby group “Patentschutzverein” – led the congress against some initial resistance of the 
American delegation”.
234 Ibid, at footnote 83, quoting from Hildebrandt, The International Patent Congress in 
Vienna, 1873 (Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1875), p.41.
235 See Brand, supra note 223, at p. 226.
236 See Khan, supra note 186, explaining that in 1907, patentees manufacturing outside the 
country were required also to produce nationally.
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incentives for inventiveness.237 Th e U.S. fi rstly established a Patent Act in 1790 
based upon the Constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of the science 
and the arts. Although the justifi cation for granting patents was based upon 
similar goals to the U.K., the U.S. system diff ered in the important concept of the 
consideration given in exchange of patent grants. It was implied that in 
consideration for patents, the benefi t received by the public followed from the 
disclosure of the innovation and hence, the justifi cation of creating exclusive 
rights was to allow inventors to profi t from their inventions.238 Th e system has 
been considered by many scholars as modern and diff ering in many important 
respects from other previously existing system as well as supported by a judicial 
system that endeavored to solve complex questions under an economically 
oriented approach and with the goals of promoting economic growth and social 
welfare.239
One of the most important and distinguishing characteristics of the system was 
the early presence of examination of patents with a policy of checks and balances 
as well as mechanisms to constraint the ability of examiners to act arbitrarily, 
including the prohibition for them to apply for patents. Th e U.S. patent law 
allowed the possibility to apply for a patent for the “fi rst and true inventor”, but 
the requirement of novelty was interpreted in the sense of requiring inventions 
237 See Ibid, supra note 186, at p. 20. See also A Patent System for the 21st Century, Stephen 
Merrill, Richard Levin, and Mark Myers, Eds., (Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy, National Research Council: 2004) at p. 8, explaining that 
“Since its creation more than 200 years ago, the U.S. patent system has played an important 
role in stimulating technological innovation by providing legal protection to inventions of 
every description and by disseminating useful technical information about them”.
238 See Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 29 F. Cas. 1074; 1831 “With the constitution, the English 
statute and the adjudication upon it before them, Congress have declared the intention of the 
law to be to promote the progress of the useful arts by the benefi ts granted to inventors; not by 
those accruing to the public, aft er the patent had expired, as in England. Th is is most evident 
from their imposing as conditions, that the invention must be new to all the world, and the 
patentee be a citizen of the United States. If public benefi t had been the sole object, it was 
immaterial where the invention originated, or by whom invented; but being for the benefi t of 
the patentee, the meritorious cause was invention, not importation, and the benefi t was not 
extended to foreigners, in which respects the law had been otherwise settled in England”. See 
also Khan, supra note 186 at p. 22–23 “Th e American patent system was based on the 
presumption that social welfare coincided with the individual welfare of inventors. 
Accordingly, legislators emphatically rejected restrictions on the rights of American 
inventors. However, the 1832 and 1836 laws stipulated that foreigners had to exploit their 
patented invention within eighteen months. Th ese clauses seem to have been interpreted by 
the courts in a fairly liberal fashion, since alien patentees “need not prove that they hawked 
the patented improvement to obtain a market for it, or that they endeavored to sell it to any 
person, but that it rested upon those who sought to defeat the patent to prove that the plaintiff s 
neglected or refused to sell the patented invention for reasonable prices when application was 
made to them to purchase.”
239 Ibid, at p. 20–21.
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to be original in the entire world and not only in the U.S.240 During a period that 
extended until 1861, patent rights were available for U.S. citizens and foreigners 
upon diff erent fees and hence the treatment was at times discriminatory but it 
was early replaced by the 1861 which declared patent rights available to all 
applicants on the same basis without regard to their nationality.241
Another important feature of the U.S. patent system was its low patent fees and 
hence the desire that inventors could apply for patents at reasonable prices. Th ese 
features are said to produced a system that was “transparent and predictable”.242 
Accompanied with the publication of annual lists of granted patents, the system 
was characterized by the diff usion of information.243
Finally, and as it will be oft en highlighted in this Th esis, the U.S. patent system 
has only rarely used working requirements or compulsory licensing provisions 
for the failure to exploit a patented invention. For instance, between 1932 and 
1836, U.S. laws required foreign patentees to exploit their patented inventions 
within eighteen months. Nonetheless, these provisions seemed to have been 
interpreted quite narrowly by courts and then to have disappeared from latter 
patent law reforms. Th is narrow exceptions to the rights of patent owners have 
been explained as responding to a view of social welfare that coincides with the 
private welfare of inventors, in the sense that the benefi t from inventors will 
translate in the progress of the science and the arts, which would warned against 
establishing restrictions upon the private rights of inventors.244
2.3.3. France
Th is brief account of the main features of the French patent system responds to 
the need of referring to several distinguishing characteristics of this system 
which were also transplanted in other jurisdictions. In general terms, and 
comparing it with the U.S. system, the French patent system preceding the 
French revolution co-existed with a large variety of other rewards and incentives 
beyond patents.245 With respect to the patent grants and their scope, the system 
relied on a case-by-case approach that undermining predictability and certainty 
oft en responded to other non-economic reasons. Th is permitted on the one hand 
to apply equity considerations for the patent grants and the fees asked for patents, 
240 Ibid, at p. 22, explaining how: “unlike in England, the phrase was used literally, to grant 
patents for inventions that were original in the world, not simply within U.S. borders”.
241 Ibid at p. 22–23.
242 Ibid, at p. 23.
243 Ibid at p. 22.
244 Ibid at p. 24.
245 Ibid at p. 14.
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for instance, if an inventor was poor, but on the other hand it also allowed 
arbitrary decisions with respect to such grants.
Aft er the French Revolution, the patent laws of 1791, amended in 1800 and 1844 
were aimed at abolishing the prerogatives under the old regime and declared “the 
natural right of the inventor to obtain property rights in patents”. Nonetheless, 
patent scholars have highlighted that the recognition of a natural right to 
inventors did not necessarily mean a complete break with mercantilist policies 
used in the past.246 For instance, French patent legislation prohibited until 1844 
that an inventor could attempt to obtain a patent on the same invention abroad. 
However, the system allowed for the existence of patents of importation, which 
gave the possibility that the fi rst to introduce an invention patented abroad could 
enjoy a similar natural right as if it were the patentee of such invention. In 
addition, fees continued to be relatively high even aft er the 1791 legislation and 
case-by-case reasoning as well as arbitrary decisions have been also accounted 
aft er such reform.
With regard to the specifi cation of the patents, the French system was also based 
upon the belief of a bargain happening between the State that grants the patent 
and the patentee having to disclose her invention in a way that allows another 
person skilled in the art to replicate that invention. Nonetheless, in the absence 
of provisions for the publication of the description of patents, it is said that such 
statutory clause was dead letter.247
Finally, and of great importance for this analysis, the French patent system 
established working requirements on the basis that “it would be injurious to 
society at large, to allow any one individual to cramp the eff orts and attempts of 
more industrious inventors by obtaining a patent upon which he did not intend 
to work”.248
2.3.4. Germany
As it was previously referred, the German Empire was importantly involved in 
the controversy of the XIX century about patents. Such debates refl ected an 
internal tension between the Empire, whereby for instance, Alsace-Lorraine 
favored the French patent system and other states such as Hamburg and Bremen 
did not provide for any patent protection at all. In 1877, a national patent act 
246 Ibid at p. 16.
247 Ibid at p. 17.
248 Ibid at p. 16, quoting from Antoine Perpigna, Th e French Law and Practice of Patents for 
Inventions, Improvements and Importations (1852), at p. 29.
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unifi ed the patent system, creating a centralized procedure for the grant of 
patents.249
Th e German patent policy is said to have given incentives for economic growth 
and innovation, targeting such eff ects within specifi c industries and mixing a 
policy of granting patent rights for some inventions and for instance, avoiding 
patent protection for food, pharmaceutical and chemical products while 
providing for the possibility of process patents in such areas. Th e publication of 
patent information, including the claims and specifi cations of patent documents 
was an important feature that contributed to the diff usion of knowledge. Th e 
German patent fees were high in order to avoid incentives for patenting trivial 
inventions. In general, it is argued that the German patent system diff erentiate 
from the U.S. system in that, on average, there were fewer patent grants of higher 
quality.250
Finally, and with respect to this analysis, the German patent system provided for 
the possibility of working requirements. Th is meant that a patent could be 
revoked aft er three years elapsed, if such patent was not being worked or if the 
owner refused to grant licenses for the use of the patented invention that was 
considered in the public interest and also in the case where the invention was 
mainly used outside Germany, although in most cases a compulsory license was 
deemed as suffi  cient to remedy the above mentioned circumstances.
Table 3. Comparative historical overview
US UK France Germany
Patent policies Incentives to 
inventors
Th e public 
benefi ts when 
patent expires
Justice and 
natural rights
1877 Diff usion 
and innovation of 
specifi c industries
Who could patent? U.S. citizens 
(up to 1861)
N/A N/A N/A
Patents of 
importation
No Yes Yes N/A
Novelty Global National N/A N/A
Fees Moderate, only to 
cover 
administrative 
expenses, 
consideration for 
patents is 
disclosure
High High High to prevent 
trivial inventions
249 Ibid at p. 19.
250 Ibid at p. 19–20.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
82 Intersentia
US UK France Germany
Working 
requirements
No;
Only on 
foreigners 
(1832–1836)
Yes Yes Yes
Compulsory 
Licenses for 
non-working
No Yes
1883
Yes
Patent Notice Clear Not clear Statutory but 
dead letter
Publish claims and 
specifi cation 
before granting
Patent Examination A primary feature 
since 1790
Not properly 
until 1905
Not until late Initially examined 
by consultants; 
examiners became 
permanent 
employees of the 
Patent Offi  ce in 
1891
Commercialization More than 9000 
per year (1870s)
Only 273 aft er 
1852 Reform
Cumbersome 
due to 
uncertain 
rights
Source: Zorina Khan and own elaboration.
3. EX POST LIABILITY RULES IN THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT
Th e Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is 
the outcome of multilateral negotiations that took place during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade 
(GATT).251 In 1994, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which complemented the 1947 GATT and created an 
institutional body, the WTO as well as achieved liberalization in other areas 
251 Th e GATT is a trade liberalization Agreement coming into force in 1947 and signed by 23 
countries, which contained tariff  concessions and rules aiming to prevent the frustration of 
such concessions by means of restrictive trade measures. Th e contracting parties were 
involved in the eff orts by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to agreed 
upon an International Trade Organization (ITO) that would work along with the other post-
War economic agencies (International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction – later the World Bank). See World Trade OrganizationFift ieth Anniversary 
Of Th e Multilateral Trading System-Press Brief ”. www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/
min96_e/chrono.htm, retrieved on 15–12–2009. On January 1, 1995, the World Trade 
Organization Agreement entered into force, complementing the 1947 GATT with further 
trade concessions as wells as with new areas of trade liberalization, namely trade in services 
covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) and the TRIPS Agreement.
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apart from trade in goods. Before the entry into force of the Marrakech 
Agreement and its important Annexes, to which the TRIPS Agreement is part as 
Annex 1C, the GATT system did not establish IP provision with the narrow 
exceptions explained below. Th e most important international instruments 
before the TRIPS, were the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, administered 
by the International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (known 
for its acronym in French BIRPI) and which was substituted by the WIPO.
As the result of long and controversial negotiations, the TRIPS Agreement laid 
down minimum substantive and enforcement standards for the multilateral 
harmonization of IP rights. Nonetheless, the Agreement left  the possibility for 
countries to use several exceptions and limitations to the standards there 
established as well as provisions open for the interpretation of each national law. 
Th ese spaces where multilateral harmonization was not completely achieved and 
which are oft en mentioned as a potential fl exibility for the implementation of the 
Agreement include the possibility of using ex post liability rules. Th is possibility 
derives either from the highly debated framework of Articles 30 and 31 or from 
the spaces left  by the enforcement section and especially by Article 44, which 
deals with injunctive relief. Th e following section examines the reasons that 
motivated the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement and its fi nal design with a 
focus on these provisions.
Besides attempting to set up a comprehensive set of global minimum standards 
of protection for all IP rights, one of the most fundamental changes introduced 
by the TRIPS Agreement was bringing IP into the Dispute Settlement of the 
WTO, as this latter was perceived as a “more eff ective” forum for the protection 
and enforcement of rights.252 Before the TRIPS Agreement, the GATT did not 
directly regulate IP and the few references to IP actually addressed the clash 
between free trade which was GATT’s main guiding principle on the one hand, 
and IP as exclusive rights that restrict competition but are justifi ed on a dynamic 
252 See Daniel Gervais. The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis. (1998, 
Sweet & Maxwell), explaining that the process bringing IP to the WTO framework has been 
described as an example of forum shift ing, a strategy put forward to substitute the WIPO 
with the WTO, due to this latter’s enhanced probabilities of enforcement through the 
mechanisms of dispute settlement and retaliation. Another –complementary – explanation of 
the occurrence of the TRIPS was the possibility that arose during the negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round, of combining diff erent areas for trade concessions. Th is strategy, known as 
“trade linkage” is said to have facilitated reaching consensus among countries with widely 
divergent views on IP due to concessions obtained in exchange in other negotiation areas. For 
a concept of trade linkage see Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Th eory of International 
Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002).
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or long run perspective on the other hand.253 A few relevant provisions with this 
respect were Article IX which was limited to marks of origin; a general exception 
to the GATT principle of free trade in place for patents, trademarks, copyrights 
and prevention of deceptive practices in Article XX (d)254 and other general 
provisions applied to diff erent fi elds as well as to IP.255 In the words of TRIPS 
and IP expert, Daniel Gervais:
“By and large, however, intellectual property was basically considered in the GATT 
context as an “acceptable obstacle to free trade, at least until the Tokio Round. During 
that Round, held between 1973 and 1979, trade in counterfeit (trademark) goods had 
started to emerge as a serious issue. Attempts to agree common rules to stop trade in 
counterfeit goods failed at the end of that Round but eff orts to include a specifi c 
discipline within the GATT framework continued. Invoking their right to protect 
intellectual property under Article XX(d), a number of contracting parties prepared 
an “Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods”, a 
draft  of which was circulated in 1979 and 1984”.256
A decision of the Ministerial Declaration on November 29, 1982 set up 
consultations with the WIPO in order to analyze the trade related aspects of 
trade in counterfeit goods. In this decision, the GATT Council received a 
mandate to analyze such questions, decide on the appropriateness of measures in 
the context of the GATT and if judged appropriate, to propose the modalities of 
such action. During 1984, a group of trade experts was set up with the intention 
to examine the consolidated Secretariat documentation, assisted by an expert 
nominated to the WIPO Governing Bodies.257 At that time, negotiations still 
focused on an initial proposal which only mentioned international trade related 
253 For instance, Article XX(d) of the GATT allowed parties to adopt and enforce measures 
aiming at ensuring compliance with its own laws, provided they were not inconsistent with 
the Agreement, and “including those relating to the protection of patents, trademarks, 
copyrights and the prevention of deceptive practices.”
254 See Gervais, supra note 225, arguing that this “‘general exception`  to the GATT principle of 
promoting free trade was invoked in two disputes brought before GATT panels. Th e exception 
was used in the case of United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, the 
fi rst patent infringement case in GATT history. Th e panel concluded that patent protection 
was an area in which contracting parties could take measures which otherwise would not be 
in conformity with their GATT obligations.”
255 Article III requiring national treatment and protection of domestic production was arguably 
applicable to IP before the TRIPS. See Gervais, supra note 225, arguing that this Article applied 
to products, not to persons; articles XXII and XXIII related to consultations and dispute 
settlement, and XII(3)(c)(iii) and XVIII(10) which could be applied when import restrictions 
prevent a trademark owner from meeting the use requirement to maintain its right.
256 Ibid at p.
257 Ibid, explaining that at the fortieth Session in November of 1984, such group of experts was 
set up, marking the intention of seriously negotiate an IP Agreement. Th e group of Experts on 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods met on six occasions in 1985 and presented its report on October 
9, 1995. See documents L/5878 and the Secretariat note dated January 10, 1985, MDF/W/19.
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aspects of IP.258 Indeed, the document that launched the Uruguay negotiations 
stated:
“Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles rules and 
disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account 
work already undertaken in GATT”.259
Such a restricted mandate was in line with the notion of international trade 
related aspects of IP. However, the same document expressed that “negotiations 
shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and 
disciplines”. It was indeed the second part of this phrase, which allowed the 
entrance of a thorough and elaborated set of IP rules within the GATT – now the 
WTO – framework. As Daniel Gervais has explained:
“One could thus say that the entire TRIPS Agreement, with the possible exception of 
enforcement provisions destined to curb trade in illicit goods (which had been 
previously envisaged in GATT) rests on the fi nal words on the fi rst paragraph: “and 
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines”. Even there, a limitation was 
added, by using the words “as appropriate” although, upon refl ection, appropriateness 
was such a subjective criterion in this context that it was not a real restriction to the 
negotiators’ brief”.
During the contentious process of negotiations that followed, several clashing 
issues emerged. Among them, compulsory licenses, one out of the available 
mechanisms to balance the growing protection to IP rights with other national 
and economic interests posed a challenge for the fi nal Agreement. Many 
controversial issues were of a North-South nature, although confl ict was also 
present due to the diff erent legal traditions, for instance, between the U.S. and 
countries of continental Europe.260
258 Th e process of negotiations during the Uruguay Round is available through several 
documents, starting from the draft s of “an Agreement on Measures to Discourage the 
Importation of Counterfeit Goods” referred as L/4817 and L/5382 and draft  which circulated 
between 1979 and 1984 following a failure to agree on common rules to address these issues 
during the Tokyo Round.
259 Document MIN.DEC of September 20, 1986, pp. 7–8.
260 See Gervais, supra note 225, arguing that: “Compulsory licensing of patents was already at 
centre stage. Brazil and Korea argued in favour of compulsory licensing while Austria and 
Hong Kong pleaded for restrictions, arguing that procedures should include judicial review 
and provide for a limitation to the domestic market (limiting exports of material produced 
under a compulsory license), non-exclusivity (allowing other licenses to be granted) and 
appropriate compensation for the right holder whose industrial property right was subject to 
the compulsory license”.
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3.1. ARTICLE 31 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Th e title of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which refers to “other use without 
the authorization of the right holder” already refl ects its debated nature and the 
intent of diff erentiating the use of compulsory licenses from other exceptions 
established by Article 30.261 Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the use of compulsory 
licenses was regulated at the international level by the Paris Convention. Yet, the 
controversy generated by the use of compulsory licenses was allegedly one of the 
main reasons that triggered discussions on the TRIPS Agreement, given the 
existent divergences between countries and the pressure of developing countries 
to revise the Paris Convention.262
Th e fi nal text of Article 31 established several important requirements for 
compulsory licensing provisions, including the need to give adequate 
compensation for the patent owner, that prior eff orts to obtain a license on 
reasonable commercial terms take place before any compulsory license is issued 
and that the use of licenses be limited predominantly to the domestic market.263 
Th e last two requirements might be waived by member states when compulsory 
261 See UNCTAD-ICSTD, supra note 41 at p. 462, indicating that the title refl ects “the eff ort by 
the draft ers to distinguish between “limited exceptions” that are authorized under Article 30, 
and compulsory licensing authorized under Article 31. Article 31 (compulsory licensing) 
addresses the interests of patent holders in particular cases – a compulsory licence is directed 
to an identifi ed patent and authorized party – while Article 30 exceptions may involve 
legislation of more general eff ect on patent holders and authorized parties”. Still, many 
scholars are of the opinion that a compulsory licensing system should comply both with 
Article 30 and 31. Conversely, the case-by-case nature and other limitations put forward by 
Article 31 to compulsory licensing would make it redundant to subject any such regime also 
to the discipline of Article 30.
262 Ibid, explaining the pressure put forward by developing countries during negotiations on the 
revision of the Paris Convention and their demand for a “new International Economic Order” 
which included greater access to technology; “Th ese negotiations broke down in 1982, in 
signifi cant part because of competing demands concerning compulsory licensing. Th e failure 
of these negotiations convinced industry interests that they would not succeed in solving 
what they viewed as the “intellectual property problem” at WIPO. Th is led to a refocusing of 
IPR eff orts towards the GATT”.
263 Th e complete requirements of Article 31 that: non-authorized uses should be considered on 
their individual merits; the proposed user should have made prior eff orts to obtain 
authorization in reasonable commercial terms; the scope and duration of authorization is 
limited for the purposes authorized; the license is non-exclusive and non-assignable; the 
license is predominantly for the supply of the domestic market; the license is conditioned to 
be terminated when the circumstances that originated the authorization cease; adequate 
remuneration is paid; and decisions regarding the legality of authorization and the 
remuneration are subject to judicial or independent review. In addition, for compulsory 
licenses granted in order to allow the exploitation of a patent which is dependent upon a 
previous innovation: the second innovation must involve an important technical advance of 
considerable economic importance; the owner of the fi rst (dominant) patent shall be entitled 
to a cross-license on reasonable terms and uses authorized with respect to the fi rst patent 
shall be non-assignable except if assigned with the second patent.
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licenses are applied as a remedy to correct anti-competitive practices which have 
been determined aft er judicial or administrative procedures. Th e need to engage 
into prior eff orts to obtain authorization might also be waived in the case of 
national emergencies or circumstances of extreme urgency or cases of public 
non-commercial use.
As discussed below, the grounds for granting compulsory licenses as well the 
interpretation with regard to the requirements of Article 31 is far from settled 
and their application in practice continues to raise great controversy. Moreover, 
with the coming into force of the TRIPS Agreement, it could be argued that 
discrimination is now defi nitely banned and working requirements could only 
be imposed at a global level, meaning that a patent suffi  ciently worked in one 
member country of the WTO shall be deemed to be suffi  ciently worked in any 
country.264 However, it is important to recall that the Paris Convention still 
remains in force and has also been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement265, 
hence amplifying the number of signatory countries while maintaining the 
possibility of having working requirements and compulsory licenses to remedy 
non-working, as long as national laws provide for these measures.266
Furthermore, non-working as a ground for compulsory licensing remains 
important for several reasons. Although it is only one out of many possible 
grounds, this form of patent abuse has exercised an enormous infl uence in other 
compulsory licensing regimes as well as being the object of much criticism. 
Secondly, and as we mentioned, non-working could now be evaluated in global 
terms and hence, represent a case of patent abuse similar to patent suppression. 
In fact, one relevant aspect discussed in the eBay as well as other cases was 
precisely whether patentees should ever be obliged to work their patents. In a 
post-TRIPS world, the value of a compulsory licensing for non-working cases 
264 Th is interpretation in based upon Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, establishing that 
patents “shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place 
of invention, the fi eld of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced”. 
See also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
265 Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes that “In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this 
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris 
Convention (1967).”
266 On May 30, 2000, the U.S. requested consultations with regard to provisions in Brazil’s patent 
law, which established working requirements conducive to the possible application of 
compulsory licenses and it was aft erwards joined by the EC. Th e U.S. requested a Panel to be 
established on January 9, 2001. See Brazil, Measures Aff ecting Patent Protection, Request for 
the Establishment of a Panel by the U.S., WT/DS199/3, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen_home.asp. Nonetheless, the U.S. withdraw its request and notifi ed that a mutually agreed 
solution had been reached on July 19, 2001. See also Attaran and Champ, supra note 105.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
88 Intersentia
could be precisely to impede that patented technologies remain idle, whereas it 
could hardly be supportive of national in discrimination of foreign fi rms267:
“A major issue in a case such as that brought by the United States against Brazil is 
whether Article 27.1 was intended to prohibit WTO Members from adopting and 
implementing local working requirements, and eff ectively to supersede the Paris 
Convention rule. Th e negotiating history of TRIPS indicates that Members diff ered 
strongly on the issue of local working. Several delegations favoured a direct 
prohibition of local working requirements, but TRIPS did not incorporate a direct 
prohibition. Instead, it says that patent rights shall be enjoyable without 
discrimination as to whether goods are locally produced or imported. Under the 
jurisprudence of EC-Canada, this leaves room for local working requirements 
adopted for bona fi de (i.e., non-discriminatory) purposes.”268
Although no case has so far directly addressed Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, in the EC-Canada, a panel addressed the scope of a limited exception 
under Article 30 fi nding that while such article recognized that the extent of 
patent rights would need to be balanced, the limiting conditions forth by the 
article signifi ed that the intention was not “to bring about what would be 
equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the Agreement.269
3.2. ARTICLE 44 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Enforcement provisions were almost nonexistent in internationally harmonized 
IP before the TRIPS Agreement and still, the standards achieved by the TRIPS 
are comparatively few in comparison with substantive law. Th e fact that 
enforcement rules, including remedies, widely diverge among countries, created 
some diffi  culty during the Uruguay Round of Negotiations that settled the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, it is said that diffi  culties were relatively easier to overcome 
in comparison with the obstacles faced during negotiations of substantive 
267 Arguable exceptions are the provisions admitting compulsory licenses when national or 
domestic needs are not met, however, this case could be considered as preserving the interest 
of the public rather than as a protectionist measure.
268 The WTO Dispute Settlement System: 1995–2003, Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petermann Eds., (Kluwer Law International, 2004) at p. 440.
269 See Canada – Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 
(EC-Canada) case, at paragraph 7.26. See also Ibid at p. 7.45, addressing the interpretation of 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and concluding, among other things, that the exception 
contained in the Canadian law, which included the activities of seeking product approval in 
foreign countries could be considered as a “limited exception”: “the exception is ‘limited’ 
because of the narrow scope of its curtailment of Article 28.1 rights. As long as the exception 
is confi ned to conduct needed to comply with the requirements of the regulatory approval 
process, the extent of the acts unauthorized by the right holder that are permitted by it will be 
small and narrowly bounded”.
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standards.270 Th is was a predictable outcome as the TRIPS, in spite of setting for 
the fi rst time multilateral rules dealing with enforcement has maintained a vague 
language that favors open standards over rigid rules.271 Th is, however, does not 
necessarily mean that harmonization of enforcement IP and patent law will not 
continue as it is part of an undergoing process.272
Remedies are a fundamental piece of enforcement law and the TRIPS Agreement 
provides that member states shall make injunctions and damages available, 
among others measures for patent infringement cases.273 Although the title of 
Article 44 refers to injunctions, this concept does not have a uniform meaning 
across diff erent legal traditions, as it will be explained with greater detail in the 
sections examining national practices. Hence, negotiators preferred to defi ne the 
scope of the measure in Article 44(1) as “an order to desist from an infringement”. 
Article 44 establishes the obligation to provide the judiciary with authority to 
award injunctions, inter alia, to prevent the entrance “into the channels of 
commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement 
of an intellectual property right, immediately aft er customs clearance of such 
270 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 41, at p. 579 referring: “Th e comparatively uncontroversial 
nature of the negotiations stood in contrast to the fact that signifi cant diff erences in 
enforcement rules existed amongst legal systems and national laws, and that many developing 
countries participating in the negotiations actually lacked the infrastructure and resources to 
apply higher standards for the enforcement of IPRs”. See also Gervais, supra note 225 (2008), 
op. cit, at p. 440–441, referring that “the two principal stumbling blocks during the TRIPS 
discussions were the ironing out of diff erences amongst legal systems and the need to take 
account of many developing countries’ availability of resources”. Article 41(5) is said to 
address this latter concern by establishing that “this part does not create any obligation to put 
in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that 
of the enforcement of law in general…” whereas the concern about maintaining the own legal 
traditions embedded in procedural rules, including remedies, was tackled through the 
avoidance of specifi c remedies in particular cases.
271 See Gervais, supra note 225 (2008), at p. 441, highlighting the use of open-standards in the 
TRIPS section on remedies that he defi nes as “empowerment norms” requiring authorities to 
have the authority of ordering certain remedies, including damages and injunctions.
272 See section 4 below. See also infra note 287 and accompanying text with regards to the 
proposal of ACTA.
273 Articles 41 to 61 contain the enforcement rules that countries shall implement in the context 
of remedies, including the obligation to provide for expeditious remedies to prevent 
infringement and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements (Article 41); 
among others, injunctions (Article 44) and damages (Article 45). A balance with the general 
objectives of the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement is embedded in the provision that 
enforcement procedures should avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and provide 
safeguards against such abuse (Article 41.1) without forcing countries into “any obligation to 
put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from 
that for the enforcement of law in general”. Likewise, the preamble of the TRIPS mentions 
that countries recognize the need for new rules concerning “c) the provision of eff ective and 
appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking 
into account diff erences in national legal systems” (emphasis added).
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goods”.274 Th e TRIPS provisions on enforcement are generally applicable rules, 
in spite of the fact that the original motivation of the Agreement was to solve 
specifi c IP problems related to international exchanges.275 Hence, the phrase 
“inter alia” used in Article 44 serves to highlight that importation of infringing 
goods is only one out of many cases in which injunctive relief could be granted.
Th e article applies to infringing activities that have started, since otherwise the 
infringer could not desist, and hence it does not refer to provisional or 
preliminary injunctions, which are found in Article 50(1) and aim at preventing 
further damage by infringing activities but rather to fi nal or permanent 
injunctions. Th e article also provides that for “innocent infringement”, such 
measure should not necessarily be available.
Th roughout the TRIPS negotiations, the availability of injunctive relief was 
highlighted as an important tool to deter infringement.276 Due to the fact that the 
TRIPS Agreement does not require countries to award punitive damages and has 
a relatively fl exible approach towards criminal sanctions, scholars have largely 
considered that the deterrent eff ect of injunctions plays a central role in patent 
enforcement.277 However, Article 44 states only that “judicial authorities shall 
have the authority” to grant injunctive relief. Th e question remains in which cases 
and under which circumstances could judicial authorities deny such remedy.278
Beyond this minimum level, there is a wide scope for implementation of the 
article and hence, for the discretionary grant of injunctions by courts. Article 44 
(2), moreover, introduces the possibility of denying injunctions and links this case 
to the more classic framework of compulsory licenses established in Article 31:
“(2) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the 
provisions of Part II specifi cally addressing use by governments, or by third parties 
authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right holder are 
complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against such use to 
payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other 
cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are 
inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation 
shall be available”.
274 Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement makes reference to “injunctions” in the title of the Article 
and then refers to an “order” for a party “to desist from an infringement”.
275 See Gervais, supra note 225 (2008), at p. 450.
276 See Heath, infra note 396.
277 Ibid.
278 See Gervais, supra note 225 (2008), arguing that this phrase “sets the level of the obligation 
imposed on WTO Members: judicial authorities must have the power to order the measures 
specifi ed”.
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Th is paragraph was the result of discussion between developing and developed 
countries. Th e most salient feature it presents is the use of the word “adequate” 
remuneration, which is not common within the IP fi eld and is only used in 
Article 48 and 45 (adequate damages) and distinct from the standards of 
“reasonable” and “just” or “appropriate” compensation”.279 However neither of 
these standards would necessarily be simpler to interpret.280
4. A POSTTRIPS LANDSCAPE
Th e ratifi cation of the TRIPS Agreement was followed by widespread discussions 
about the scope for compulsory licenses, principally with respect to the problems 
faced by developing and least developed countries, which had to adapt their IP 
laws to the minimum – yet higher to previously existing – standards developed 
by the Agreement. Closely related to this discussion was the possible use of the 
“fl exibility” left  by the same Agreement in order to incorporate limitations and 
exceptions into national laws that could guarantee a national implementation 
suitable to each country’s level of development.281 Th e debate specially focused 
on whether compulsory licenses could still be used aft er the TRIPS Agreement 
and in which term. A matter of particular concern was that some developing and 
least developed countries lacked the manufacture capabilities to produce 
nationally, so that in case they resort to compulsory licenses, the limitation of 
paragraph (f) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishing that “(f) any 
such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member authorizing such use” could in fact hinder the use of 
compulsory licensing. Th is is because in case these countries authorize the use of 
a patented technology under a compulsory license, they would not be able to 
manufacture the product(s).
Th ese concerns and the lack of understanding about whether compulsory 
licensing could still be used are of special importance with respect to 
279 See Gervais, supra note 225 (2008), p. 205–206 and accompanying footnotes, arguing that: 
“While it is used in many articles of the GATT, only once it refers to appropriate compensation 
(Article XXVIII(4) (d), where the expression “adequate compensatory adjustment”, is used in 
relation to balance of payments (BOPS).
280 See Taubman, supra note 97, analyzing the diff erent standards for remuneration and 
compensation of right holders as provided for by various International Law fi elds.
281 With regard to the problem of implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing and least 
developed countries as well as the eff ects of IP protection on economic development see 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy, Final Report, UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, London 
(2002), available at: www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/fi nal_report.htm. See also 
Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research, 
Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus Eds. (World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2005).
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pharmaceutical patents which oft en clash with public health debates. In fact it 
was in this fi eld that a crisis originated with the enactment of a patent law in 
South Africa in 1997, entitling the government to issue compulsory licenses and 
allowing parallel imports in order to face the health crisis related with the spread 
of AIDS and the high cost of patented drugs used for the treatment of this 
disease.282 On February 1998, a group of 39 pharmaceutical companies initiated 
a lawsuit against the government of South Africa challenging its “Medicines and 
Related Substances Act”, which in its Amendment 15(c) allowed for such 
compulsory licensing and parallel import provisions to be applied to 
pharmaceuticals. However, in 2001, an aft er an intense international campaign 
on the issue of patents and public health, the pharmaceuticals companies 
abandoned their cases. Th e surmounting pressure generated by this case, created 
momentum for the claims of developing and least developed countries, which 
led to a Declaration during the Doha Ministerial Conference with respect to the 
issue of public health and IP regulation.
A paradox has taken place aft er the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement with 
regards to the interpretation of exceptions, grounds and limits for using 
compulsory licenses and especially with respect to the uncertain and diverging 
views as to their potential use to protect public interest. In fact, whereas at the 
multilateral level, this controversy has been increasingly addressed in multiple 
forums, such as the WTO283, the World Health Organization284, the WIPO285, 
and other international organizations along with the participation of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs); at the bilateral and regional level, TRIPS-
plus standards have been approved through presumably non-transparent 
negotiations.286 An important but still uncertain part of this movement is the 
282 See Carlos Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: 
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 331, 333 (2004), at p. 13.
283 See the Doha Declaration, available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm and the Cancun Declaration, available at: www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.html.
284 See the World Health Organization Commission on Innovation, Intellectual 
Property and Public Health, Final Report (2007) Available at: www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/report/en/index.html.
285 See discussions related with the Proposal for a Development Agenda within the WIPO, 2004. 
Available at www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda.
286 See David Vivas-Eugui, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: Th e Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (July 2003), available at: www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/
economic/Issues/FTAs-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf, at p. 6, defi ning TRIPS-plus Agreements as 
“commitments that go beyond what is already included or consolidated in the TRIPS 
Agreement” and explaining that such commitments may consist on: (1) the protection of a 
new area of IPRs; (2) the implementation of a more extensive standard; and (3) the elimination 
of an option for Members under the TRIPS Agreement by which such member could provided 
for a lower level of protection. See also ibid at p. 15 referring to the problem of undemocratic 
and non-transparent negotiations of the prospected FTAA and the U.S.-Chile FTA.
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increase in number of investment agreements addressing IP through TRIPS-plus 
standards as well as the application of investment protection to IP rights. Th is 
trend could contradict the eff orts taking place in multilateral organizations and 
in various other forums to facilitate the involvement of civil society in IP-related 
decision-making to thereby address such issues from a multifaceted viewpoint 
and thus create a more balanced IP rights system.
Th is paradox is also illustrated by the developments subsequent to the Doha 
Declaration, which created a transitory exception for compulsory licenses issued 
by countries lacking manufacture capabilities that was later incorporated in the 
fi rst amendment – still to be enacted – of the TRIPS Agreement.287 However, the 
system, which still exists on a transitory way, and which could be widely used by 
developing and least developed countries, has only been used once. Th e only 
notifi cation on the use of the TRIPS exception mechanism has been made by 
Rwanda, a country that was however, not obliged to notify since it is a least 
developed country.288
Th e defi cient use of such a complicated and controversial system might be 
interpreted on the one hand as a failure, based upon arguments similar to those 
raised with respect to the lack of use of compulsory licenses in general. Th e 
counter argument oft en made is that any such system has important bargaining 
eff ects. For instance, countries such as Brazil have reiteratively used threats to 
issue compulsory licenses for diff erent drugs and then they have negotiated for 
better prices with the involved pharmaceutical companies. However it would 
seem that only a few privileged countries could benefi t of such bargaining 
position that allows them to make a credible threat. It is in this sense that the 
exception for countries lacking manufacturing capacity should improve their 
position. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to have an exporting country willing 
to use the system, in some cases at the cost of amending their own laws.289
287 See decision WT/L/641, on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 6 December 2005, 
available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
288 See the text of the notifi cation of importing country Rwanda, available at: www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm. See also the text of the 
notifi cation by exporter country Canada, the solely to have given such communication so far, 
available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_export_e.htm.
289 A threat needs to be serious and credible in order to trigger a process of negotiation, which 
would probably be the case when the country has a large market and the capacity to 
manufacture. Examples include the controversial move of Th ailand when it issued compulsory 
licenses on various drugs, including one for a heart disease (arguably not an emergency case), 
giving rise to a wide discussion on many legal subtleties of the interpretation of Article 31 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. On precedent occasions, Brazil has also issued compulsory licenses 
and threats of issuing compulsory licenses that have subsequently led to renegotiations of the 
prices of medicines for AIDS treatment, showing a potentially welfare-enhancing eff ect of a 
credible threat to apply a liability rule. For an overview of these and other compulsory licenses 
see James Love, Recent examples of Compulsory licenses on patents. KEI Research Note 
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In parallel, and although most patent enforcement issues remain subject to 
national law, there is a surmounting pressure to agree on more harmonized and 
rigid standards.290 While recent proposals might suggest that a global or a 
multilateral treaty could be achieved soon, the desirability of higher harmonized 
standards is uncertain – especially in the light of the problems that the eBay case 
in the U.S. and other discussions have evidenced. In Europe, a similar controversy 
as to whether it would be desirable to agree upon higher harmonized standards 
for IP and patent enforcement surrounded the negotiations of the European 
Enforcement Directive and it has also been raised with respect to the negotiations 
on a community patent and the EPLA.291
In brief, discussions on the use of compulsory licenses on the one hand and 
enforcement on the other have continued to occupy a central place even aft er the 
enactment of the TRIPS Agreement. Yet discussions have largely focused on a 
public interest dimension narrowly conceived as protecting public health in 
emergency cases. Public interest might be also aff ected through the blocking of 
innovation by patent strategic behavior, with some cases refl ecting anti-
competitive pursuits while some others directly off ending the balances 
entrenched in patent law.
5. REMEDIES FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Remedies are part of procedural law, and in many cases pertain to general 
procedural laws rather than to IP or patent statutes. Nevertheless, a “special” 
treatment has oft en been off ered to IP rights, with ambiguous consequences, at 
least from an effi  ciency viewpoint. In opposition to the history of compulsory 
licensing, patent remedies and hence, the possibility that courts choose between 
a property and a liability rule in patent infringement cases, has predominantly 
remained subject to national law, even aft er the TRIPS Agreement. Th is section 
briefl y discusses the common origin of the rule for equitable relief in the U.K. 
2007:2, available at www.keionline.org. Th e examples of Brazil and Th ailand could show that 
a serious threat in the international context is regrettably linked to the manufacturing 
capacity of the country and other factors which might not induce such countries that are 
probably most in need to use this system.
290 See the recent eff orts on the negotiation of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ACTA by 
the G-8 members. Th is move has, however been criticized, among other reasons for the lack 
of transparency in negotiations. Although there are not available offi  cial texts, several 
organizations have published presumptive draft s. See http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/ACTA-discussion-paper-1.pdf.
291 See Marco Ricolfi , Th e Proposed IP Enforcement Directive: Tough on Legitimate Competitors, 
Weak Against Pirates, Italian Intellectual Property, Giuff rè, 2004/1 arguing that the 
proposed Directive “fails to draw the most crucial of the distinctions relevant for designing 
optimal deterrence in the fi eld of IP infringements, the distinction between pirates and 
legitimate competitors”. See also Cornish et al., infra note 367.
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and the U.S. that permits to substitute injunctions – the quintessential property 
rule remedy – with damages. Th en, the historical origins of the legal equivalents 
to property rules remedies in civil law countries, taking the example of Italy, 
which is shared – with some diff erences – by countries with a similar law 
tradition are described. A description of the most important historical 
developments of the law of remedies is however, only possible by making 
reference to the specifi c legal systems of diff erent countries, something that is 
developed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
Th e goal of remedies and enforcement law are fundamentally alike throughout 
countries, i.e., to provide for a relief in case of infringement and to enforce or to 
act the principles expressed in substantive law. Th is apparently simple goal can 
be nevertheless achieved through rather diff erent ways. Another question that 
emerges several times along this study is whether and to which extent can the 
“law of remedies” alter or attempt to re-adjust any balance pursued in substantive 
– patent – law. Th ese aspects also imply the question of whether patent remedies 
should be diff erent and in which sense they should diff er from ordinary 
procedural law. As stated by a legal scholar from the U.S. that accounts for the 
history of remedies in order to fi nd a modern proposition of this body of law:
“Th e law of remedies is trans substantive, meaning that it cuts across other areas of 
substantive law. Remedies must be adjusted as necessary to take account of 
substantive policy goals, but remedies scholars start from a base of broadly applicable 
remedial principles. Th ere is no reason to have a diff erent law of damages, or a 
diff erent law of injunctions, for each cause of action, as though we had never 
abandoned the writ system”.292
5.1. COMMON LAW COUNTRIES
Common law countries have a particular approach toward remedies that allows 
wider discretion to choose between a property and a liability rule. In fact, the 
most recent developments towards the use of liability rules for patents have taken 
place in the U.S. where injunctions are considered an equitable remedy due to 
the historical division between common law and equity courts.293 In their origin, 
common law courts were only competent to award damages providing 
292 Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: a History, 27 Review of Litigation 161 
(Winter 2008), 161–267, at p. 165.
293 See Francis Hilliard, The Law of Injunctions, (Law Publications of Kay and Brothers: 1852), 
at p. 1, defi ning an injunction “as a prohibitory writ, specially prayed for by a bill in which the 
plaintiff ’s title is set forth, restraining a person from committing or doing an act…which 
appears to be against equity and conscience”. See also Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 2 All ER 189, 
Court of Appeal, 18 July 1994 at p. 1, classifying injunctions as mandatory which “require the 
defendant to observe a legal obligation or undo the eff ects of a past breach of legal obligation” 
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retrospective compensation for past wrongs. Consequently, cases involving 
continuing wrongs posed the need for additional relief. It was precisely this 
restriction of common law courts that created the necessity for courts of equity. 
Conversely, courts of equity were able to give prospective relief through the grant 
of injunctions or specifi c performance but they could not award damages.294
Such contradiction, however, ended with the enactment of the Common Law 
Procedure Act in 1854, which gave courts of common law a limited power to 
grant equitable relief as well as damages and fi nally with the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 – also known as Lord Cairns’ Act – which empowered the 
Court of Chancery, and by extension, other similar courts, to award damages:
“In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for an injunction against a breach of any covenant, contract, or agreement, 
or against the commission or continuance of any wrongful act, or for the specifi c 
performance of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be lawful for the same 
Court, if it shall think fi t, to award damages to the party injured, either in addition to 
or in substitution for such injunction or specifi c performance; and such damages may 
be assessed in such manner as the Court shall direct”295 (emphasis added)
Th us, the wording of Section 2 of Lord Cairns’ Act not only enabled courts to 
award damages as a retrospective remedy and injunctions to restrain unlawful 
conduct in the future but also allowed them to award damages instead of an 
injunction, i.e., granting courts the discretionary power to award or deny 
injunctive relief.296 Th e most important reason that courts initially considered to 
award of permanent injunctions was the inadequacy of other remedies available 
at law.297 Whereas injunctions were fi rstly directed towards the protection of 
property, the concept of property rights rapidly evolved to encompass business 
interests and rights including personal and business reputation. Since it was a 
remedy of equity, judges had extensive discretion to award injunctive relief but 
or negative which “would restrain a defendant from committing breaches of legal obligation 
in future”.
294 Ibid.
295 See the Chancery Amendment Act 1858. Whereas the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 gave 
common law courts some power to award equitable remedies, the Chancery Amendment Act 
1858 gave the Chancellor the power to grant damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an 
injunction or a decree of specifi c performance.
296 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, quoting from Jolowicz, Damages in Equity – A Study of 
Lord Cairns’ Act CLJ 224, 1975, who argued that “Despite the repeal of Lord Cairns’ Act, it 
has never been doubted that the jurisdiction thereby conferred on the Court of Chancery is 
exercisable by the High Court and by county courts”.
297 See London and Blackwall Ry. C. Cross (1886), 31 Ch. D. 354 at 369, where Judge Lindley 
affi  rmed that “the very fi rst principle of injunction laws is that prima facie you do not obtain 
injunctions to restrain actionable wrongs, for which damages are the proper remedy”, quoted 
in Aldo Frignani, L’injunction nella Common Law e l’inibitoria nel diritto italiano, 
Milano, Giuff rè (1974), at p. 145.
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limits were soon established through the development of –binding – precedents 
in order to avoid abuse of discretion.298
Th e U.S. transposed these principles from the U.K. in a sequential process with 
the intervention of the Constitution, the Congress and the Courts.299 Th e 
Constitution gave Congress the authority to create Federal Courts and the 
Congress then enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created Federal Courts 
granting them original jurisdiction in common law or equity suits although 
limiting the use of equity to those cases where there was no “plain, adequate and 
complete remedy”.300 In parallel, the U.S. Congress also enacted the Patent Act 
of 1790, which granted to “petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs, 
administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and 
exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others 
to be used, the said invention or discovery”301 as well as remedies for patent 
infringement.302
Th e current U.S. Patent Act establishes a general requirement that patentees shall 
have remedies for patent infringement.303 According to the Patent Act, damages 
should be “adequate to compensate for the infringement” at least corresponding 
to a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer and 
may, in appropriate cases, be multiplied up to three times.304 Injunctions were 
298 See Doherty v. Allman (1878), 3 App. Cas. 309, p. 728–729, quoted in Frignani supra note 297, 
at p. 156.
299 See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 3 Wheat. 212 (1818), available at: http://supreme.justia.com/
us/16/212/case.html, which ruled that “the remedies in the courts of the United States at 
common law and in equity are to be not according to the practice of state courts, but according 
to the principles of common law and, equity, as distinguished and defi ned in that country 
from which we derive our knowledge of those principles”.
300 See Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent 
and Copyright Cases, Fordham Law Review Vol. 78. (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1355464.
301 See the U.S. Patent Act of 1790, available at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Patent_Act_
of_1790. See also the current 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(1); U.S. Patent Act as modifi ed in 1952 and 
granting patentees the “right to exclude others from making, using, off ering for sale, or selling 
the invention throughout the United States”.
302 Section 4 of the 1790 U.S. Patent Act established that “if any person or persons shall devise, 
make, construct, use, employ, or vend within these United States, any art, manufacture, 
engine, machine or device, or any invention or improvement upon (…) without the consent of 
the patentee or patentees (…) every person so off ending, shall forfeit and pay to the said 
patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages as 
shall be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or 
things so devised, made, constructed, used, employed or vended, contrary to the true intent 
of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act”.
303 35 U.S.C. 281.
304 35 U.S.C. 284. Moreover, successful plaintiff s are entitled to recover their costs and “in 
exceptional cases,” may recover reasonable attorney fees, 35 U.S.C. 285.
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enshrined as a remedy for patent infringement since 1819.305 However, initially 
injunctions were unavailable if the parties in litigation were from the same 
State.306 Since then, U.S. law has reiteratively empowered courts with the 
possibility to grant injunctions.307
With time, U.S. courts granted injunctions in patent infringement cases upon 
varying grounds, e.g. the necessity of avoiding repeated actions for each 
infringement308, the conception of rights and remedies as intrinsically linked 
and the “exclusive”309 and “property” nature of patents.310 A more “economically 
based” justifi cation based upon the error and information costs that courts 
would have to face were they to attempt substituting market bargaining outcomes 
in the calculation of damages has been more recently adopted.311
305 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (providing that the federal courts adjudicating patent 
disputes “shall have authority to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of 
courts of equity.”). Injunctions were included as a possible remedy for patent infringement in 
Th e Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §17, 5 Stat. 117 (“courts shall have power, upon bill in equity 
fi led by any party aggrieved…to grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of 
courts of equity”); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §55, 16 Stat. 206 (“the court shall have power, 
upon bill in equity fi led by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions according to the course 
and principles of courts of equity”); Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, §6, 29 Stat. 694 (“Th e several 
courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent laws shall have power to grant 
injunctions according to the course and principles of equity, to prevent the violation of any 
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable.”); Patent Act of 
1922, ch. 58, §8, 42 Stat. 392 (same); Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778. See U.S. Brief 
eBay vs. MercExchange, op cit, at p. But see U.S. Brief for respondent in eBay vs. MercExchange 
at p. 22, explaining that “Although the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 did not explicitly 
authorize federal courts to issue injunctions in cases where they exercised subject matter 
jurisdiction arising under the patent laws, state equity courts could hear and issue injunctions 
in patent cases (until 1870), as could federal courts, sitting in diversity, on the “equity (…) 
side.”
306 See Chisum supra note 43, quoting from William C. Robinson, Th e Law of Patents for Useful 
Inventions, §1082–83 (1890).
307 Currently, the Patent Act 1952 (35 U.S.C. 283) establishes that: “Th e several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles 
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable”.
308 See Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 910–11 (C.C. D.S.C. 1849), ruling that (“the inventor…
might be ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a fi nal 
establishment of his rights”).
309 See Continental Paper Bag co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–25, 430 (1908), “the 
inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may 
withhold a knowledge from the public…From the character of the right of the patentee we 
may judge of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its 
attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation…” (emphasis added).
310 Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831, F. Supp. 1354, 
1397 (N.D. III. 1993), aff ’d, 71; “the injunction creates a property right and leads to 
negotiations between the parties”. – substitute with a court decision –.
311 Ibid, asserting that: “A private outcome of these negotiations whether they end in a license at 
a particular royalty or in the exclusion of an infringer from the market – is much preferable to 
a judicial guesstimate about what a royalty should be.”
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In spite of the varied interpretations with respect to the aims of injunctive relief, 
courts converged in a rather uniform reading of the adequacy of issuing 
injunctions aft er fi nal determinations of infringement.312 Such view continually 
narrowed the factual considerations of traditional equity courts into the assertion 
that injunctions should follow any fi nding of infringement which threatens to 
continue, a criterion similar to that applied in Italy and the UK, as described 
below. Such convergence in the application and interpretation of patent standards 
and the increasingly protective interpretation seems to have especially followed 
the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.313 It is in 
this context that we might include the practice of automatic grant of injunctions, 
which was in place until 2006 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided on the eBay 
case.314
5.2. CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES
Th e historical path of IP rights protection and of civil remedies in general, diff ers 
widely in civil law countries such as Italy with respect to common law countries. 
312 See Chisum et al., supra note, chapter 10 “Remedies”.
313 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: Th e Federal Circuit Comes of Age 
(August 14, 2008). Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol 23, 787 (2008), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1226432, explaining the reasons that lead to the institution 
of the CAFC, among others, the perceived need for a specialized and more exactly a 
centralized court that could manage and improve the quality of decisions in the patent area 
and quoting also the opinions raised during the discussions preceding the establishment of 
the CAFC in Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 42–43 (1981).
314 Ibid, at p. 765, referring to a “reversing trend” that has occurred during the last few years 
where several important decisions of the US Supreme Court have signalled a disagreement 
with the position of the CAFC: “Perhaps most damning, the Supreme Court’s unprecedented 
activity in the patent arena indicates that it too is concerned about the Federal Circuit’s 
performance”. Among such decisions are: MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 
(2007), KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefl ex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), Microsoft  Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) and KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefl ex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) reversing the 
CAFC decision; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Illinois Tool Works, 
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193 (2005) vacating the CAFC decision; Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 
U.S. 124 (2006), with a writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted and a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Breyer; and Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 555 U.S., 128 S. Ct. 
2109 (2008), reversing the CAFC decision and expanding the application of the exhaustion or 
fi rst sale doctrine. Probably the most important and widely discussed decisions have been 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefl ex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) at p. 1730, where the Supreme Court 
rejected the rigid approach of the CAFC in interpreting the non-obviousness standard as be 
“inconsistent with §103 and this Court’s precedents”; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 764 (2007) where the Supreme Court also reversed the position adopted by the CAFC, 
which denied standing for declaratory actions to patent licensee’s and the eBay decision which 
is thoroughly throughout this Th esis.
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Even the linguistic terms use to describe the rights, their content and nature, 
remedies and actions are hardly equivalent. For instance, scholars of civil law 
countries have largely focused on the concept of diritti soggettivi – a concept that 
could be hardly translated as individual or subjective rights, or roughly 
approximated to the concept of “entitlements”315 – in order to determine the 
remedies available to diff erent rights. Furthermore, the independent study of 
rights and remedies and the pre-eminence of the former over the latter, has 
allegedly lead to comprise under the label of diritti soggettivi, such rights 
protected either by property rules, liability rules and even rights lacking any type 
of protection.316 Likewise, the term inibitoria – understood as a remedy or a 
decision that bans or puts an end to infringing activities317 – diff ers in important 
315 A fi rst diffi  culty in this comparative analysis regards the term “diritto soggettivo”, which is 
oft en translated either as subjective, individual or absolute right but might be more exactly 
described as the facultas agendi, which is the right, as opposed to the “diritto oggettivo” or 
norma agendi, which consist on the law. Th is is because, conversely to what happens in other 
languages where both terms tend to coincide (Italian “diritto”, Spanish “derecho”, German 
“recht” and Latin “ius”), both terms (right and law) are separate in English. Nonetheless, none 
of these terms completely grasps the meaning of the term, which is also complicated by the 
fact that there are several diff erent meanings of “diritto soggettivo” and for this reason the 
term will be oft en referred to in Italian. Moreover, the enormous discussion surrounding the 
concept of “diritti soggettivi” falls out of the scope of this Th esis, especially when we take into 
account that the property and liability rules categories do not need the underlying right to be 
defi ned as a subjective right in order to apply. In one of its multiple meanings, a subjective 
right is understood as a right granting the owner the possibility of obtaining an order to stop 
the interference or infringement of her right, for others it is equivalent to the entitlement to a 
right. See Ugo Mattei, supra note 52, at p. 248 on the concept of subjective rights and at p. 253, 
disagreeing on the equivalence between “diritto soggettivo” and entitlement: a “subjective 
right” is in fact, in the European tradition, a paradigm of two diff erent reactions of the legal 
system, as “tutela reale” (with the consequent application of a property rule) and “tutela 
aquiliana (with the consequential application of a liability rule). For these reasons, the concept 
of subjective right cannot be usefully applied to study confl icts between diff erent property 
rights owners, given that in these cases, all property right owners are obviously entitled to 
such “subjective right” (free translation of the original text: “il diritto soggettivo e, infatti, 
nella tradizione europea, paradigma di due reazioni dell’ordinamento assai diff erenti fra loro 
come la tutela reale (conseguenza: property rule) e la tutela aquiliana (conseguenza: liability 
rule), cosa che non lo rende utilizzabile nello studio del confl itto fra proprietari contrapposti 
entrambi, ovviamente, titolari di diritti soggettivi”).
316 See Ugo Mattei, supra note 52 at p. 252 arguing that the reiterative use of the concept of diritti 
soggettivi has led to neglect the concrete method of protection for such rights and as a result 
the entitlement of rights is considered as irrelevant, due to the fact that in many cases no 
specifi c advantage follows from the ownership of rights (free translation of the original text: 
“Per molto tempo l’aver descritto il sistema come fondato sull’ascrizione di diritti soggettivi 
ha comportato la disattenzione per il concreto modello di tutela, cosa che ha reso del tutto 
irrilevante per un soggetto sapersi titolare o meno di un diritto, visto che alla qualifi cazione 
non consegue, in molti casi, alcuno specifi co vantaggio”); and at p 247 arguing that the 
concept of absolute rights, characteristic of Continental Law countries, does not permit to 
diff erentiate between property rules (tutela reale) and liability rules (tutela aquiliana), given 
that it does not devote any attention for the remedy.
317 See Frignani supra note 297 at p. 242, mentioning the interchangeable use of the terms “azione 
inibitoria”, “inibitoria”, “interdizione” and “azione in cessazione” and defi ning all of them as 
a fi nal decision aiming at stopping an activity or a situation that violates another’s right, or 
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ways from its common law counterpart, the injunction, mainly because it does 
not encompass all the possible orders that a common law judge might act through 
an injunctive order.318
Th erefore, legal analysis in civil law countries has focused much more on the 
study of rights rather than on remedies.319 Remedies have instead occupied a 
central role in common law countries, probably due to the direct infl uence of 
Roman law that was perpetuated in countries that did not go through a process 
of codifi cation.320 Several scholars have highlighted how Roman Law was much 
more focused on the actions and remedies rather than on creating individual 
stopping the continuation or even the beggining of such situation; (free translation of the 
original text: “l’inibitoria che noi studiamo e una sentenza di condanna, mirante e far cessare 
un’attivita o uno stato lesivo del diritto altrui, o a inibire la continuazione o anche solo la 
commissione di tali atti”).
318 See Ugo Mattei, supra note 52 at p. 257, arguing that even though the inibitoria could be 
negative or mandatory, an injunction has a variable content which is able to adapt to the 
particolar circumstance, hence covering a more varied set of potential cases, which in the 
Italian system, are instead tackled through diff erent legal institutions or doctrines. As a 
result, whereas it is easy to recognize a property rule in the injunction, this cannot be done 
with regard to the “inibitoria” (free translation of the original text: “(l’injunction) si sostanzia 
in un ordine dal contenuto variabile secondo lo scopo che e necessario raggiungere. In tal 
modo e idonea a coprire situazioni cui, nel sistema italiano, presiedono una pluralita di diversi 
istituti. Mentre quindi era possibile sostenere che il paradigma positivo della property rule si 
riscontra nell’injunction, altrettanto non sarebbe corretto fare riguardo all’inibitoria nella 
indagine sul sistema italiano”). However, the inibitoria, which we is oft en translated as 
injunction, should not to be confused with the term “ingiunzione”, which is a special 
procedure used to execute a debt and established by Articles 633 ss. of the Italian Civil 
Procedure Code or with the “inibitoria processuale”, which is used to suspend the provisory 
execution and established by Article 351 of the Italian Procedural Code.
319 See Ugo Mattei, supra note 52 at p. 251, arguing that such attention for the remedy was 
conversely absent from the European legal tradition, whereby the “diritti soggettivi” were 
never conceived as a decentralized instrument for decisions and consequently, the concrete 
content of the rights has been never grasped, (free translation of the original text: (“L’ 
attenzione per il remedy e viceversa mancata nella tradizione europea. I diritti soggettivi non 
sono mai stati pensati come strumento di decentramento per le decisioni, e conseguentemente, 
non si e mai giunti ad un contenuto concreto dei diritti stessi”).
320 See Adolfo Di Majo, La tutela Civile dei Diritti, (2nd Ed. Giuff re, 1993), at p. 64, 
explaining that the Roman Law tradition was perpetuated in the Common Law system, which 
did not experience the phenomenon of codifi cation. Until the nineteenth century, English law 
was characterized by a rigid system of typical actions (forms of action), which were almost 
real “molds” within which the claims of individuals (each action) had to fi t, and whereby each 
action was characterized by a its own discipline and procedure (eg. the real action in defense 
of real property as well as the action of debt which occurs whenever someone had a sum of 
money to other one, (free translation of the original text: “L’impianto del sistema Romanistico 
si e perpetuato com’e noto, nei sistemi di Common Law ossia in quei sistemi che non hanno 
conosciuto il fenomeno della codifi cazione. Fino al diciannovesimo secolo il diritto inglese 
era contraddistinto da un sistema rigido di azioni tipiche (forms of action), quasi dei veri e 
propri ‘stampi’ entro i quali dovevano essere ‘calate’ le pretese dei soggetti, ciascuna (azione) 
caratterizzata da una sua propria disciplina e procedura (ad es. la real action a difesa della real 
property cosi come l’action of Debt che ricorreva ogni qualvolta taluno doveva una somma di 
danaro ad altri…)”.
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rights321 and how common law was especially infl uenced by the establishment of 
a rigid number of forms of actions, each one following its own procedures and 
formalities.322 With time, such formalities were soft ened but their eff ect still 
endures on a legal reasoning that conceives rights as the result and not the 
premise of remedies.323
Conversely, countries with a civil law tradition lived an early process of 
transformation, especially with the work of the glossators that gave precedence 
to rights and little attention to remedies.324 Th e glossators interpreted the 
categories of actions in rem and actions in personam as deriving the categories of 
diritti reali e diritti di credito so that diff erent actions to protect rights transmuted 
321 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 64 explaining that the well-known maxim “ubi jus ibi 
remedium” might be easily transformed in that of “ubi jus ibi remedium” … in old legal 
systems (eg. Roman Law), individual rights were laid down from the various remedies (…) 
For instance, the property concept in Roman Law, whereby an individual could be recognized 
as the owner of a property was deducted from the typical remedy of legis actio sacraments 
(…) In this sense, Roman law did not recognized a protection for property rights in abstract, 
(free translation of the original text: “Il brocardo notissimo “ubi jus ibi remedium potrebbe 
essere con facilita capovolto in quello “ubi remedium ibi jus”…In ordinamenti del passato (ad 
es. In quello romanistico), la enunciazione dei diritti del singolo si e andata formando in via 
di derivazione dai vari rimedi, prima privati e poi giudiziali, previsti a tutela di determinati 
interessi. Nel diritto romano ad es. La tutela dell’interesse del singolo ad essere riconosciuto 
quale dominus di un bene veniva desunto da quel rimedio tipico di tutela che era la legis 
actio sacramenti…Il diritto romano non conosceva una enunciazione della proprieta in 
astratto”).
322 See ibid, at p. 70, applying the same arguments to the process of codifi cation in France.
323 Ibid at p. 65, arguing that even though the forms of action disappeared from substantive 
English Law, the system kept an important track of them. In this system, the confi guration of 
abstract claims, that is, of “diritti soggettivi”, is the result and not the premise of the diff erent 
type of typical and atypical remedies that the system provides; (free translation of the original 
text: “the remedies for protection, and typical or atypical, which administers the system and 
widening or “anche con la scomparsa del sistema delle forms of action il diritto sostanziale 
inglese ha mantenuto tracce non indiff erenti di esso. In esso la confi gurazione di astratte 
pretese ossia di diritti soggettivi e il risultato, non la premessa, dei rimedi di tutele, tipici e/o 
atipici, che il sistema somministra”).
324 See Ugo Mattei, Tutela Inibitoria e Tutela Risarcitoria, Contributo alla Teoria dei 
Diritti sui Beni, Giuff re, 1987, at p. 250 quoting from Lawson-Markesinis, Tortious 
liability for unintentional harm in the common law and in the civil law, 
Cambridge, 1982, at p. 37 which puts forward the argument that the evolution from an 
approach based upon the remedies (legis actions) to a substantial approach had initiated in 
the Civil Law system in the historical period which coincided with the work of the post-
glossators and which was completed by the work of the Natural Law school, (free translation 
of the original text: “l’evoluzione da un approccio remediale (legis actions) ad uno sostanziale 
sarebbe iniziato nei sistemi di civil law nel periodo coincidente con l’opera dei post glossatori 
e sarebbe stato complete con la classifi cazione dei giusnaturalisti”. See also Di Majo, supra 
note 321, arguing that the right and the remedy lost contact in the Civil Law tradition and as a 
consequence a trend emerged that focused on the right. Conversely, this trend is absent from 
the Common Law tradition, (free translation of the original text: “perso il contatto fra right e 
remedy e fi orita una tendenza a declamare sui rights; tale tendenza e assente nella tradizione 
del common law”).
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into categories of rights325 and in fact, the categories of tutela reale and tutela 
personale are more directly related to the type of right – reale or personale – 
rather than the type of remedy granted.
Nevertheless, the remedy of inibitoria has a remote antecedent in the actio 
negatoria of Roman law, through which the owner could obtain protection 
against disturbances on her possession. In fact, the term negatoria is still used to 
refer to the inibitoria in order to highlight its origin rooted in Roman law and 
probably also the equivalence between negatoria and inibitoria.326 In addition to 
the negatoria, which served to protect a property right from disturbances, its 
counterpart within Roman Law, the actio confessoria, allowed the owner of an 
easement to assert her right against the owner.327
5.2.1. Creation of rights and choice of remedies
Except for the abovementioned diff erences with the common law injunction, the 
inibitoria still confers protection through a property rule. Hence, some scholars 
have justifi ed the use of the inibitoria as the proper remedy for absolute rights 
that is, for rights valid erga omnes and granting their owner a ius excludendi 
alios.328 In more general terms it is also argued that such vision would a priori 
325 See Ibid, at p. 73.
326 See Frignani, supra note 297, at p. 242. See also Cristina Rapisarda Sasoon, Profi li della tutela 
inibitoria atipica nell’esperienza germanica, Rivista di diritto processuale, Vol. 38 
(1983), p. 93–129, at p. 101, explaining that this confi guration is highly correlated to the azione 
negatoria against the violation of a property right as it was extended throughout the 
experience of the Common Law, where, as it is well-known, distance was taken from the 
Roman Law tradition of the negatoria servitutis in order to embrace with this action, any 
interference against a property right that would not fall under the rivendica. Th is correlation 
is mainly due to the fact that the negatoria was codifi ed in this ample aception in §1004 del 
B.G.B., (free translation of the original text “questa confi gurazione e strettamente correlata 
alla azione negatoria contro la violazione del diritto di proprieta cosi come era venuta 
estendendosi nel corso dell’esperienza del diritto comune, ove come, noto, ci si era allontanati 
dal modello romanistico tradizionale della negatoria servitutis, per abbracciare, con questa 
azione, ogni interferenza al diritto di proprieta, che non trovasse gia sulla sua strada la 
reazione della rivendica. Tale correlazione e da imputarsi in maniera principale al fatto che la 
negatoria venne codifi cata in questa ampia estensione al §1004 del B.G.B”. Ibid, concluding 
that, a historical consequence of these developments, is that the requirement of damage was 
not necessary when the holder is protected through a property rule and conversely, only prove 
of the infringing behavior is enough to obtain such protection.
327 Th is aspect resembles the bi-directional nature of disturbances highlighted in Coase and 
C&M reasoning, which refers to the fact that any situation can be analyzed both from the 
perspective of the plaintiff  and from that of the defendant and hence the right that would be 
protected through a liability or a property rule can be allocated to either one of the parties. 
Roman Law already provided for a remedy suitable for either party to protect her right.
328 See Cristina Rapisarda Sassoon, Voce Inibitoria, Digesto delle Discipline Privatistiche, 
Sezione Civile, IX, UTET, Quarta Edizione, at p. 484 arguing that the link between the 
protection through the “inibitoria” and absolute rights was already affi  rmed implicity under 
the 1865 Civil Code. Faced with the absense of legal provisions on the admissibility of the 
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set the remedy according to the right ascribing to remedies only a secondary and 
instrumental role with respect to the right itself.329 Finally, it has been also 
pointed out that such rigid conception could thwart the adaptation of remedies 
to emergent needs.330
Th e current Italian Civil Code provides for actions as rivendicazione and 
negatoria that, in the absence of unifi ed principles, have to be interpreted by the 
judges always by reference to the underlying rights.331 In addition, the provisional 
measures established by Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure, present a 
particular case, since the categorization of rights as absolute or relative can in 
principle only be given by law332 whereas such provisional measures applicable 
actio negatoria for the property right holder, the majority of legal scholars were in favor of 
granting it on the basis of art. 439 of the Civil Code, even though this latter refer explicitly 
only to the action of rivendica, based upon the exclusive nature of property rights. In this 
way, the conception of the inibitoria as the protection of the ius excludendi, which is implicit 
in the structure of absolute rights made its way, (free translation of the original text: “Il 
collegamento tra la tutela inibitoria e i diritti assoluti era gia stato implicitamente aff ermato 
sotto il vigore del codice civile del 1865. Di fronte al silenzio della legge sull’ammissibilita di 
un’actio negatoria del proprietario, la maggioranza degli interpreti si mostro infatti favorevole 
a concederla sul fondamento dell’art 439 c.c., che pur si riferiva espressamente alla sola azione 
di revindica, sul presupposto del carattere esclusivo del diritto di proprietà. Si era gia fatta 
strada, in questo modo, la concezione dell’inibitoria come proiezione processuale dello ius 
excludendi implicito nella struttura del diritto assoluto…”.
329 See Rapisarda, supra note at p. 485, arguing that this approach is on the one hand outdated, 
given that it assigns a secondary and instrumental role to the protection of the right and on 
the other hand it is methodologically wrong since it theoretically deduces the protection from 
an apriori defi nition of the right, (free translation of the original text: “(…) da un lato 
storicamente superato, poiche attribuisce alla tutela un ruolo secondario e strumentale 
rispetto alla titolarita del diritto protetto, e dall’altro lato metodologicamente scorretto, 
poiche desume astrattamente la tutela da una defi nizione aprioristica delle situazioni 
giuridiche protette”).
330 See Rapisarda, supra note p. 485 arguing that the conception of the inibitoria as the protection 
for absolute rights hardly allows the remedy to be adapted to the demands of protection that 
progressively emerge with time, (free translation of the original text: “la concezione 
dell’inibitoria come tutela dei diritti assoluti rende diffi  cilmente adattabile il rimedio alle 
esigenze di tutela progressivamente emergenti”).
331 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 66, arguing that diff erently than in the past, this discipline 
is currently interpreted by judges in a case-by-case basis giving rise to atypical remedies 
created by the method known as “diritto pretorio”.
332 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 12, arguing that in Common Law countries, remedis are 
chosen by judicial decisions whereas in Civil Law countries, this decisioni s made by the 
legislative branch, which is in charge of attributing rights, a fact that helps explaining why the 
protection of rights in Common Law countries is espresse through remedies and nto through 
rights, (free translation of the original text: “Nel sistema di Common Law il giudizio di 
rilevanza degli interessi che si intendono proteggere e dato dai giudici e cio in occasione della 
concessione del rimedio mentre, nel sistema di Civil Law, questo giudizio promana dal 
legislatore ed ha la veste, si e detto, della norma attributiva di diritti. Il che dovrebbe spiegare 
la ragione per cui, nel sistema di Common Law, la forma di protezione dell’interesse e espressa 
in termini di rimedi e non di diritti”).
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to all civil law litigation have been widely extended by judicial interpretation.333 
In fact, the provisional measures of Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
have been considered by scholars as an equivalent to common law injunctions.334 
Th e importance of this legal provision has surpassed the initial intention of the 
legislator and has – perhaps improperly – been extended to cases in which a 
petition for a preliminary measure hides the need for a prompt fi nal decision.335
Likewise, the use of fi nal orders of inibitoria in the industrial property336 realm 
has followed both legislative action and judicial interpretation.337 Scholars have 
provided, among others, two explanations for the supremacy of the azione 
inibitoria for industrial property rights that seem compatible to one another. Th e 
fi rst is the need of protection which is said to be particularly important in this 
fi eld due to the nature of the rights, that is, a rights-centered explanation and a 
333 See Ibid at p. 67, arguing that judges have oft en come up with rights and the qualifi cation as 
diritti soggettivi in order to guarantee a protection for certain rights, as it happened for 
instance with the right to a personal identity.
334 See Ugo Mattei, supra note 324 at p. 260, referring to Article 700 of the Civil Procedural Code, 
which has been recently examined by judges and scholars and has progressively assumed a 
role in practice that can make it assimilable to the Common Law injunction.
335 See Ugo Mattei, supra note 324 at p. 261, referring the use of this Article even outside of the 
context of provisional measures and with the aim of obtaining a property rule precisely in 
those cases where it is most doutbful that this would be convenient, (free translation of the 
original text: “E ormai notorio che quest’articolo viene utilizzato sempre piu al di fuori dallo 
schema interlocutorio, allo scopo di ottenere la formalizzazione di un property right proprio 
in quei casi in cui l’assetto e piu dubbio”); and at p. 264, concluding that from a functional 
point of view – which oft en prevails in comparative law studies – it is legittimate to draw 
analogies between the injunction and the action provided by art. 700 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, (free translation of the original text: “da un punto di vista funzionale, appare piu 
che legittimo, in un’analisi comparativa, evidenziare, come e stato fatto, l’analogia fra la 
injunction e l’azione ex art. 700 c.p.c.”. See also Aiello, Giacobbe, Preden, Guida ai 
provvedimenti di urgenza, Milano, 1982, at p. 299 ss, arguing that it is well-known 
between practitioners of the industrial law fi eld that, hiding behind the scheme of provisory 
measures, plaintiff s are really seeking a fi nal measure or remedy for the protection of their 
rights, (free translation of the original text: “chiunque abbia un minimo di esperienza del 
sistema di relazioni industriali sa benissimo che qui, occultandosi dietro lo schema formale di 
un sistema cautelare in via di anticipazione, il ricorrente cerca in realta di soddisfare 
un’esigenza di tutela defi nitiva”).
336 Th e reference to industrial property follows the choice of the Italian Legislator which grouped 
all intellectual property rights with the exception of copyrights and related rights into a sole 
Code of Industrial Property in 2005. Th is choice has been criticized especially because it does 
not follow the latest trend marked by the TRIPS Agreement of including all intellectual 
property rights categories together.
337 Previous laws also provided for this remedy, including Article 83 of the (R.D. 29 giugno 1939, 
n. 1127, Testo delle disposizioni legislative in materia di brevetti per invenzioni industriali for 
patents; and Article 66 of the Regio decreto 21 giugno 1942, n. 929, Testo delle disposizioni 
legislative in materia di marchi registrati for trademarks.
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second explanation is based upon the infl uence of foreign laws where similar 
rules have fl ourished.338
5.2.2. Th e inibitoria in the industrial property context
Since the availability of the inibitoria has been mostly decided from the 
perspective of the category of right protected it is important to point out that IP 
rights including patents, have been mostly considered among continental Europe 
countries as absolute rights.339 Th is conception corresponds to the prevailing 
justifi cation of IP rights proposed from diff erent perspectives that combine 
economic as well as well as non-economic rationales.340 In fact, the industrial 
laws of continental Europe were infl uenced by theories justifying the granting of 
IP rights as a means to appropriate the fruits of one’s labor341 as well as those 
based upon the necessity of giving incentives for the progress of the science and 
the arts. Probably as a consequence, rights have been largely conceived as 
absolute and at the same time limited under an apparent contradiction that is 
however understandable in the light of the public interest.342 Th e public interest 
338 See Frignani supra note 297, at p. 300, referring that the debated nature of industrial property 
rights and quoting authoritative authors such as: Franceschelli, Struttura monopolística degli 
istituti di diritto industriale, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1956, I, p. 137 (as monopoly rights); Ascarelli, 
Teoria della concorrenza (developing a competition based theory); Rotondi, Diritto 
Industriale, pp. 95, 112 ss., 194 ss. 311 (denying the autonomy of trademarks and considering 
these as accessories to the rights of the fi rm’owner). Frignani argues that such scholarly debate do 
not seem to lead to any practical consequence with respect to the means of protection for which 
it is necessary to refer to the law and quoting as supportive the decisions of several courts which 
basically base their arguments on the conception of intellectual creations as intangible rights.
339 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 317.
340 See Ascarelli, supra note 186 at p. 305, arguing that it is necessary to identify the right over 
the intangible good with the patrimonial or economic right whereas the moral rights belong 
to the general protection belonging to each individual and also existing with respect to 
intellectual creations, (free translation of the original text: “ritengo invece necessario 
identifi care il diritto sul bene immateriale in quello patrimoniale, mentre la generale tutela 
morale di ogni soggetto per ogni sua azione e poi invocabile anche per gli atti di creazione 
intellettuale (…)E appunto questa speciale disciplina (che poi segna, a mio aviso, una sicura 
superiorita della tradizione dell’Europa continentale, rispetto a quella angloamericana) che, 
in sostanza, si vuole indicare facendo capo all’esistenza di un diritto morale”).
341 See ibid, p. 305 ss, referring to the theory developed by Locke and which can also be found in 
the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. A critique of Lockes’ theories is found in Ascarelli, 
supra note 186, p. 305, arguing that Locke only presents a iusnaturalist point of view, which 
apart from its historical value with respect to abolishing a system of arbitrary privileges has 
the defect of defending a natural right, which is out of historical context, (free translation of 
the original text: “non fa che presentare un’istanza giusnaturalista che – a parte il grandissimo 
valore che le si deve riconoscere sul terreno storico quale arma che venne usata per far venir 
meno un sistema di privilegi discrezionalmente concessi dall’autorita – ha il vizio di ogni 
istanza giusnaturalista e cioe quello di postulare un diritto fuori della storia del quale quello 
storicamente attuato non sarebbe che uno specchio”).
342 Ibid, at p. 307, arguing that the ultimate justifi cation of any type of protection is always the 
public interest, which serve sto justify the existence of an absolute right to use these 
intellectual creations.
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requires that incentives are in place for progress yet at the same time calls for 
limiting the exclusive rights not only in terms of duration but also and 
importantly through requirements such as the actual working of inventions and 
the remedies granted in cases of infringement of such rights.343
Th e interest that the legislator seems to protect in creating such absolute rights is 
the public interest to foster innovation and progress which might benefi t from 
the fact that the inventor profi ts from her invention.344 Th is vision of rights over 
intellectual creations as absolute is at the same time a limited approach, which is 
compatible with the view that IP rights might be substituted or complemented 
with other reward mechanisms as prizes and public fi nancing and also 
transformed into a right to receive remuneration as it happens precisely under 
compulsory licensing provisions.345 In particular, compulsory licensing has been 
considered as an important policy tool to handle the accumulation of protected 
inventions that can interfere with a competitive structure of the market and 
retard progress.346 Th is “balanced” view on the interface between competition 
and IP rights refl ects indeed an early attempt to balance the confl icting interests 
involved in these two legal disciplines.347
343 Ascarelli, supra note 186 at p. 308 the problem that legislators have with regard to absolute 
rights to use intellectual creations shall always refer on the one hand to the need of protection 
and on the other hand to the limits that should be given to that protection, in order to attain 
the goals of fostering progress, which justifi es such protection, and precisely the remedies 
granted against the infringement of such rights, (free translation of the original text: “il problema 
legislativo in temi di diritti assoluti all’utilizzazione di creazioni intellettuali deve far sempre 
capo, da un lato a una tutela e dall’altro pero ai limiti che a questa devono porsi, perchè venga 
raggiunta quella fi nalita di progresso che poi giustifi ca la tutela, onde appunto le sanzioni poi a 
volte dettate per la mancata attuazione della creazione intellettuale” (emphasis added).
344 See Ascarelli, supra note 186 p. 309, describing the content of this absolute right as entitling 
the owner with probability of profi t from the use of the intellectual creation.
345 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 311, arguing that defi ning the interest protected by the 
absolute right to use intangible goods in the probability of profi t from the use of the intangible 
goods explains how the exclusive right of use can sometimes substitute a prize by the state 
(…) or how the absolute right could consist on remuneration obtained from the users (…) In 
the above mentioned considerations we can also fi nd an explanation for the recognition of an 
absolute right reconciled with a compulsory licensing for use, (free translation of the original 
text: “L’identifi cazione dell’interesse tutelato dal diritto assoluto di utilizzazione dei beni 
immateriali in quello della probabilita di guadagno realizzabile nell’utilizzazione della 
creazione tutelata, spiega poi come al diritto esclusivo di utilizzazione possa a volte sostituirsi 
un premio da parte dello stato (…) o come il diritto assoluto possa concernere, anziche 
l’utilizzazione, un compenso da parte degli utenti (…) Egualmente ritroviamo nelle 
considerazione anteriore la spiegazione del come il riconoscimento di un diritto assoluto 
possa essere conciliato con l’obbligatorieta di licenze per l’utilizzazione”).
346 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 312 highlighting how the concentration intellectual 
property rights, especially in the hands of a few, can accentuate the problem of monopolies 
and how such problem might risk to block progress precisely in a discipline that is supposed 
to foster it; whereas the problem might necessitate solutions as the use of compulsory licenses 
to any interested party.
347 It is indeed interesting to highlight how this view coincides with current explanations based 
upon dynamic effi  ciency that seek to approximate the goals of competition law and IP law.
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Th e absoluteness of IP rights and especially of patents – even within the above 
described limits – and their exclusive nature – ius excludendi alios –, naturally 
led to their conceptual approximation with the legal theory of property348, 
under a view that departed from the English and U.S. traditions of considering 
IP as monopolies or privileges.349 Under a property conception of the 
intellectual creations, the infringement is actually banned with respect to the 
right itself, that is as a good, which can be the object of property rights and not 
with respect to the activities that are pursued by infringers.350 At the same time, 
however, scholars recognized how the conception of property could allow a level 
of protection higher than necessary351 and hence warned against any attempt to 
disregard the underlying – and ultimate – public interest purpose of IP right 
protection.352 In a sense, it is however, contradictory, how the “property” thesis 
has been defended on grounds similar than the critics now posed against it.353 
348 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 318, explaining how rights over intellectual creations had 
been approximated to property rights since the intangibile goods were identifi ed as the good 
over which the owner could enjoy ownership.
349 Ibid at p. 318–319, arguing that this was indeed the argument advanced by the same historical 
claim on continental Europe of a discipline of absolute rights to use of intellectual creations, 
overcoming on the French tradition (…) the ambiguity still present in the law of the United 
States. Th is framework has been indeed affi  rmed, precisely in contrast to a system of 
monopolies and privileges claiming the freedom for to market access and competition and 
against which the absolute right of authors of intellectual creations was precisely based on 
objective grounds namely on the existence of an independent and individualized good (free 
translation of the original text, (free translation of the original text: “E stata questa invero la 
tesi avanzata con la stessa aff ermazione storica sul continente europeo di una disciplina dei 
diritti assolutti all’utilizzazione di creazioni intellettuali, superandosi, nella tradizione 
francese (e in connessione, noteremo trattando del diritto d’autore, con la formazione di una 
intellettualita laica percio rivendicante la ‘sua proprieta’) l’ambiguita tutt’ora presente nel 
diritto degli Stati Uniti. Questa disciplina si e invero aff ermata appunto in contrasto con un 
sistema di monopoli e privilegi rivendicando la liberta d’accesso al mercato e di concorrenza, 
liberta nei cui confronti il diritto assoluto degli autori di creazioni intellettuali veniva 
fondato appunto su presupposti oggettivi e cioe sull’esistenza di un bene autonomo e 
individualizzato”).
350 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 320, arguing the object of a monopoly right is an activity 
whereas an absolute right over intellectual creations is always referred to the intangible good.
351 Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 322, arguing that this transformation is characterized on the 
one hand by a higher protection of the right holder who will be protected against any use of 
the good by anyone else regardless of the subjective possibility of having suff ered any damage, 
and on the other hand by the identifi cation of a safe criterion of delimitation of the right, (free 
translation of the original text: “Questo passaggio si traduce da un lato in una maggiore tutela 
del titolare del diritto che sara cosi protetto in relazione a qualsiasi utilizzazione del bene, a 
chiunque altro preclusa e indipendentemente da esame di requisiti soggettivi dell’altrui 
comportamento o di possibilita di danno, dall’altro nell’identifi cazione di un sicuro criterio 
di delimitazione del diritto stesso”).
352 Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 323, defending the theory of property as an important evolution 
in the justifi cation of this discipline but nevertheless highlighting that an important 
distinguishing feature of the angloamerican system is the ultimate justifi cation upon the 
progress of the sciences and the arts.
353 Ascarelli, supra note 186, p. 323, this feature demonstrates the inappropriateness of making 
use of the monopoly to explain these rights. In fact, the reference to monopoly entails a 
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It would seem that defi ning the right as a monopoly or as property might be 
irrelevant and what matters are the consequences deriving from either 
proposition in terms of patent design.354 In fact, Italian scholar Ascarelli, while 
defending the “property” approach nevertheless recognized that defi ning IP 
rights as property would not necessarily mean the absence of limits given that it 
is the structure of IP that resembles property whereas its function is inherently 
conditioned to the attainment of public interest purposes.355 Moreover, the 
recognition that the object of IP protection diff ers from tangible property356 
and that excesses might derive from the “property” logic applied to IP rights, is 
sensible to modern patent controversies. Two important consequences were in 
fact put forward early on, by Italian scholars. Th e fi rst is that IP can be also 
general prohibition of carrying out activities with respect to such monopoly whereas the 
theory of intangible rights accentuates the general freedom to exercise any economic activity 
and with an exceptional prohibition with carrying out the activities with regard to the owner 
of a right (…) the theory of monopoly emphasizes an exceptional right to use instead of an 
exceptional prohibition, something that is explained by the origin of the discipline which 
aimed at abolishing a general system of monopolies instead than affi  rming a general principle 
of freedom, but it is currently improper, (free translation of the original text: “Questo aspetto 
(…) torna tuttavia proprio a dimostrare l’infelicità del ricorso allo schema del monopolio (…). 
Invero il richiamo al monopolio presuppone un generale divieto di esercizio di una attività 
nei cui confronti allora si pone una eccezionale libertà della stessa; la disciplina dei beni 
immateriali si coordina invece con una generale libertà di esercizio di attività (…) e con un 
eccezionale divieto di detto esercizio in casi determinati nei confronti di chi non sia il titolare 
del diritto (…) parlando di monopolio si fi nisce per porre l’accento su una eccezionale facoltà, 
anziche su un eccezionale divieto, ciò che riesce spiegabile tenendo presente l’origine 
dell’istituto (sorto piuttosto in connessione con l’abolizione di un generale sistema di 
monopolio, anzichè con l’aff ermazione di un generale principio di libertà), ma attualmente 
invece incongruo”.
354 But see Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 325, criticizing the property theory advanced by French 
scholars on the grounds that in spite of using the logic of property it makes reference to the a 
right over the market, hence reproducing the rationale of IP as monopolies, (free translation 
of the original text: “E il rimprovero che, a mio avviso, puo muoversi alla dottrina francese 
ora dominante che, nel conciliare il tradizionale ricorso francese alla proprieta con gli aspetti 
funzionali della disciplina, fa poi capo alla confi gurazione dei diritti sui beni immateriali 
come diritti alla clientela (…) In sostanza la tesi del diritto alla clientela non fa che riprodurre, 
in termini di proprieta, quella del diritto di monopolio”).
355 Ascarelli, supra note 186, p. 324, distinguishing between the functional and structural 
aspects, whereby the legal discipline of intangible goods legal belongs to competition law and 
hence is functionally related to the protection of the probability of profi t from the market; 
whereas structurally, such exclusive rights can be framed under the discipline of property 
rights understood as absolute rights over a good.
356 Ibid, at p. 325 ss., highlighting the important diff erence between tangible and intangibile 
goods, which is rightly grasped in the concept of economic “public goods”. In this sense, 
Ascarelli already sustained that the conception of absolute rights over intangibile goods is an 
indication of the formal characteristics of the right but should lead to neglect the diff erences 
between tangible goods and intellectual creations, (free translation of the original text: “Il 
ricorso alla proprieta nella confi gurazione del diritto assoluto di utilizzazione sui beni 
immateriali (…) al quale si e fatto capo in queste pagine vuole invero indicare solo le 
caratteristiche formali del diritto; non deve far dimenticare la diff erenza e anzi la 
contrapposizione tra cose materiali (e energie) da un lato e creazioni intellettuali dall’altro”).
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protected through appropriate compensation357 and the second is that even 
under the label “absolute”, IP rights are limited in various important ways.358 
Scholars such as Ascarelli warned on the perils of identifying IP rights with 
“property” and forget about the intrinsic nature of intellectual creations, which 
diff erently to tangible property, can be the object of simultaneous enjoyment359, 
as it is now the standard argument with respect to IP rights as public goods in 
the economic sense.
357 See Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 331, explaining how these absolute rights to exclude could 
be substituted by a compensation whereby such right to receive a compensation would be 
nevertheless an absolute right.
358 Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 333, explaining that the law protects only certain types of 
intellectual creations; and then it grants a right only over such intellectual creation in an 
specifi ed and individualized manner, in contrast with property rights over tangible goods 
which are appropriable by nature and such individual character that tangible goods is taken 
into account by the law rather than created by the law, (free translation of the original text: “il 
diritto cioe si preocuppa da un lato della tutelabilita di alcuni tipi (e solo alcuni tipi) di 
creazioni intellettuali; si preocuppa poi dell’individuazione di quel bene specifi cato che solo 
puo essere oggetto di diritto assoluto (non potendo il diritto assoluto avere per oggetto che un 
bene individualizzato, specifi cato) e cio in contrasto con quanto avviene per cose materiali 
(…) nei cui confronti da un lato il diritto parte da una generale appropriabilita (…) dall’altro 
prende atto della individuazione naturalistica della cosa, anziche disciplinare normativamente 
lo stesso procedimento di individualizzazione del bene singolo”).
359 Ascarelli, supra note 186, at p. 334–335: (“Il pericolo della formulazione corrente circa 
l’identifi cazione del diritto sui beni immateriali con la ‘proprietà’ … cosi come quello del 
ricorso alla tutela del lavoro quale giustifi cazione della disciplina o quello dell’identifi cazione 
della disciplina dei beni immateriali con una tutela della clientela, e sempre quello di 
dimenticare la natura delle creazioni intellettuali, creazioni dell’uomo suscettibile di 
solidale godimento come strumento di un’attività e non cose preesistenti e godibili sono in 
funzione di una ripartizione; di dimenticar cosi anche come non sia la semplice sussistenza 
di una creazione intellettuale che ne giustifi ca la tutela”). See ibid at p. 335, arguing that 
neither the mere existence of intellectual creations (as postulated by the property theory) 
nor an absolute right over the fruits of one’s labor (as postulated by the labor theory), can 
justify the creation of exclusive rights (…) it is only on the public interest that such exclusive 
rights might be ultimately justifi ed and it is precisely because of the public interest that 
none absolute right could be recognized because otherwise the cultural and technical 
progress could be blocked, (free translation of the original text: “Non e infatti la semplice 
esistenza della creazione intellettuale che ne giustifi ca un diritto di esclusiva utilizzazione 
(come fi nisce per postulare nella formulazione corente la teoria della proprieta), o un diritto 
assoluto a compenso verso chiunque la utilizzi (come fi nisce per postulare la teoria che fa 
capo al lavoro)…e solo in quanto il diritto assoluto trovi una sua giustifi cazione ultima nel 
pubblico interesse che esso puo essere riconosciuto, e nei riguardi delle creazioni 
intellettuali il pubblico interesse esclude appunto il riconoscimento di un diritto assolutto 
su qualunque creazione intellettuale (…) perche nell’uno e nell’altro caso verrebe 
pericolosamente irrigidita la struttura economica e frenato il progresso culturale e 
tecnico”). Th is reasoning is similar to the arguments recently developed for instance by 
Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72.
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5.3. THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE WITH RESPECT TO IP 
REMEDIES
Th is section provides a brief overview of the European landscape with regard to 
the enforcement of IP rights, focusing on patents and on hence, on the few 
harmonized standards with regard to the enforcement of patents at the European 
level. In spite of the entry into force of the European Patent Convention360 and 
the existence of a European Patent Offi  ce, the patent landscape in Europe 
remains primordially national and fragmented.361 Th e EU Enforcement Directive 
harmonized various aspects of IP rights enforcement within the European 
Member States362 and was justifi ed upon the need to ensure the eff ective 
application of substantive IP rights, which were at the same time viewed as 
having paramount importance for the development of the internal market.363 
Among the pointed reasons were, that in spite of the TRIPS Agreement, 
considerable diff erences in enforcement subsisted between Member States:
“It emerges from the consultations held by the Commission on this question that, in 
the Member States, and despite the TRIPS Agreement, there are still major disparities 
as regards the means of enforcing intellectual property rights. For instance, the 
arrangements for applying provisional measures, which are used in particular to 
preserve evidence, the calculation of damages, or the arrangements for applying 
injunctions, vary widely from one Member State to another”.364
Th e recitals of the Directive pointed out that disparity in IP enforcement in 
diff erent member states weakens substantive IP rights and prejudices the 
achievement of the internal market by causing a loss of confi dence in the market 
and decreasing investments in innovation and creativity. In addition, the 
presence of organized crime and the impact of piracy and counterfeiting were 
deemed as a potential threat to the internal market. Th e Directive thus, set up 
the goal of approximating the laws of member states in order to ensure “a high, 
equivalent and homogeneous” level of IP rights protection in the internal 
360 See the European Patent Convention, 13th edition entered into force on the 13th of 
December, 2007, available at: www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html.
361 For an overview of the IP harmonization at the European level with respect to Industrial 
Property Rights, see Communication From Th e Commission To Th e European Parliament, 
Th e Council And Th e European Economic And Social Committee, An Industrial Property 
Rights Strategy For Europe”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/
rights/communication_en.pdf.
362 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April of 2004, on 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, offi  cial text available at: http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_195/l_19520040602en00160025.pdf, hereinaft er the Enforcement 
Directive.
363 See the Directive 2004/48/EC, at L 195–16 paragraphs 1 to 5.
364 Directive 2004/48/EC, Ibid, at L 195–17, recital 7.
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market.365 However, critics have pointed out that the rules should have better 
tackled piracy and counterfeiting activities while providing less harsh remedies 
for instance, in the cases of unintentional infringement.366
Nevertheless, the Directive acknowledged the need to take into due account the 
specifi c characteristics of each case, with regard to the measures, procedures and 
remedies to be applied, therefore recognizing exceptions for the application of 
remedies in cases of unintentional or non-commercial scale infringement367 as 
well as the application of rules of competition and in particular, articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty.368 In particular, the Directive cites the possibility for 
Member States to provide for pecuniary compensation as an alternative remedy 
to injunctions and other corrective remedies in cases of unintentional 
infringement.369 Hence, the general spirit of the Directive was to encompass all 
IP rights and to ensure an eff ective IP rights substantive protection in spite of the 
recognized diff erences among member states.370
Among other features, the Directive requires EU Member States to provide the 
courts with the possibility of issuing injunctions.371 Th e wording of the Directive 
is similar to Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement in that it mandates countries to 
make injunctive relief available but does not make such choice mandatory in all 
instances.372 As a consequence, the important diff erences that exist in the 
365 See recital 10 at p. L 195–17.
366 See William Cornish et al., Procedures and remedies for enforcing IPRs: the European 
commission’s proposed Directive (2003), E.I.P.R. 2003, 25(10), 447–449, criticizing the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Measures and Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights: COM (2003) 46 final, January 30, 2003 because it unduly established special rules 
for all type of infringements, even if the proposal was initially justifi ed upon the fi ght against 
piracy and counterfeiting and doubting about the eff ectiveness of introducing procedural 
measures while warning about the increasing fragmentation that could result from 
establishing a specifi c body of IP-specifi c rules. See also Ricolfi , supra note 292.
367 See recitals 13 and 17 at p. L 195–17.
368 See recital 12 at p. L 195–17.
369 See recital 25 at p. L 195–18 adding however, that such possibility shall not apply when the 
infringing activities also (“constitute an infringement of law other than intellectual property 
law or would be likely to harm consumers”).
370 See recital 13 at p. L195–17 “It is necessary to defi ne the scope of this Directive as widely as 
possible in order to encompass all the intellectual property rights covered by Community 
provisions in this fi eld and/or by the national law of the Member State concerned. 
Nevertheless, that requirement does not aff ect the possibility, on the part of those Member 
States which so wish, to extend, for internal purposes, the provisions of this Directive to 
include acts involving unfair competition, including parasitic copies, or similar activities.”
371 Directive 2004/48/EC, Ibid, at L 195–23, Article 11, ruling that “Member States shall ensure 
that, where a judicial decision is taken fi nding an infringement of an intellectual property 
right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting 
the continuation of the infringement” (emphasis added).
372 Article 44 of the TRIPS establishes that the “judicial authorities shall have the authority to 
order a party to desist from an infringement…”
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national legislation of member states with regard to the use of permanent 
injunctions seem compatible with both the TRIPS Agreement and the European 
Enforcement Directive.
Even though the Enforcement Directive applies to all IP rights, the general 
landscape of substantive and enforcement law remains highly fragmented 
according to the divergent degrees of harmonization of each right. For instance, 
community regulations are in place in the fi elds of trademarks and industrial 
designs, which create a uniform regime. Th e situation is in contrast with the 
patent area, where harmonization is still to come.
Hence, in order to fully interpret the current European harmonized rules with 
respect to IP rights enforcement, it is necessary to distinguish between 
community rights and, as it is the case with patents, national rights. It is in this 
light that a recent decision taken by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, concerning a community trademark, should be read.373 Th e Court 
tilted in favor of injunctive relief, based upon the interpretation of Article 98(1) 
of the Community Trade mark Regulation374, which regulates the issuance of 
injunctions by establishing that:
“1. Where a Community trade mark court fi nds that the defendant has infringed or 
threatened to infringe a Community trade mark, it shall, unless there are special 
reasons for not doing so, issue an order prohibiting the defendant from proceeding 
with the acts which infringed or would infringe the Community trade mark. It shall 
also take such measures in accordance with its national law as are aimed at ensuring 
that this prohibition is complied with” (emphasis added).
Th e court, in considering the interpretation of “special reasons”, ruled that:
“the mere fact that the risk of further infringement or threatened infringement of a 
Community trade mark is not obvious or is otherwise merely limited does not 
constitute a special reason for a Community trade mark court not to issue an order 
prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with those acts”.
Th e court likewise considered that the general prohibition of infringement 
activity and the possibility that further infringement is penalized, does not 
amount to special reasons in the sense required by Article 98(1) in order to deny 
an injunctive order. Such decision affi  rming the pre-eminence of injunctive 
orders, by limiting the interpretation of the special circumstances in which these 
prohibitory orders might be denied, could also be considered as compatible with 
373 See Nokia Corp. v. Wärdell, 14 December 2006, C-316/05, available at: http://oami.europa.eu/
en/mark/aspects/pdf/JJ050316.pdf.
374 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993.
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the words of Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement, which precludes the possibility 
of compulsory licenses for trademarks.375 Nevertheless, the possibility of fi nding 
special circumstances in which an injunction could be denied, without the need 
to issue a compulsory license, still exists.376
Th is decision interprets a rule that pertains only to the community trade mark 
fi eld and could not possibly be extended to the patent realm, at least, in the 
absence of further harmonization377, which has for a long time stagnated. 
However, the intention to re-launch negotiations about the community patent 
and a European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA)378 was expressly mentioned 
in a recent communication of the European Commission.379 Still, the latest EPLA 
draft  establishes a similarly vague language for injunctions in Article 62.380 
375 See Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement: “Members may determine conditions on the licensing 
and assignment of trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory licensing of 
trademarks shall not be permitted and that the owner of a registered trademark shall have the 
right to assign the trademark with or without the transfer of the business to which the 
trademark belongs” (emphasis added).
376 See Nokia Corp. v. Wärdell, ibid, at paragraph 35, adding that the circumstances given by the 
Court, (“obviously do not preclude a Community trade mark court from not issuing such a 
prohibition were it to fi nd that further infringement or threatened infringement on the part 
of the defendant was no longer possible. Th at would apply in particular if, aft er the 
commission of the acts in question, an action were brought against the proprietor of the mark 
infringed which culminated in a revocation of his rights”).
377 See Von Muhlendahl, Alexander. “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights-Is Injunctive 
relief mandatory?”, in IIC, nº 4/2007 – Verlag, Munich, arguing that: “As far as community-
wide rights are concerned, the ECJ clearly favors a general rule which obliges the courts to 
grant injunctive relief unless there are circumstances specifi c to the case which would allow a 
conclusion that further infringements will not occur. Th e enforcement Directive is obscure as 
regards its mandatory nature, but one can have the hope that the ECJ will interpret Art. 11 of 
the Directive similarly broadly. As for the United States, it is unfortunately once again going 
its separate ways in an important fi eld of intellectual property protection”.
378 See the Proposal for a community patent, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
indprop/patent/index_en.htm and the last Draft  Agreement on the establishment of a 
European patent litigation system (December 2005) is available at: www.epo.org/patents/law/
legislative-initiatives/epla.html). Both projects are still under discussion.
379 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
– Enhancing the patent system in Europe – (COM (2007) 29–03–07), available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm, setting patent harmonization as a 
key objective for Europe in the light of the renewed Lisbon agenda (“Many stakeholders 
continue to support the Community Patent as the approach which will yield most added-
value for European industry under the Lisbon strategy…As to reforms of the existing 
European patent system within the framework of the European Patent Convention (EPC), 
numerous stakeholders support a rapid ratifi cation of the London Agreement and adoption of 
the European Patent Litigation Agreement…)”.
380 “Th e European Patent Court may order a party infringing or threatening to infringe a 
European patent to cease and desist from any act infringing the patent under Articles 33 or 
34” (emphasis added). In the opinion of the German, French, MC and Dutch delegations, 
included in the draft , it was important to further discuss whether the right to request an 
injunction should expire aft er a certain time period, a limitation to possible over-extension of 
patent rights in time.
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Probably the most impacting change if the EPLA is agreed upon would be the 
introduction of a European Patent Judiciary dealing with infringement and 
validity of patents. A common judiciary would presumably help to fulfi ll the 
goals of the agreement, inter alia, to improve the enforcement of European 
patents, enhance legal certainty and promote the uniform application and 
interpretation of European patent law.381
In fact, injunctions have been described as particularly prone to problems of 
forum shift ing between member states, which was refl ected in the controversy 
about the possibility of awarding cross-border injunctions382 and also in the use 
of delaying strategies such as torpedoes legislations.383 However, it is probably 
important to recall how similar arguments were put forward during the debate 
preceding the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982.384 Aft er some decades, the salutary eff ects of a unique Court of Appeals 
with competence in patent cases are subject to controversy.385 Th e debate then 
381 See Dietmar Harhoff , Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated 
European Patent Litigation System, Final Report, Tender No. MARKT/2008/06/D 
(26 February 2009), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/
studies/litigation_system_en.pdf.
382 See Dietmar Harhoff , ibid at p. 17–18, explaining how cross border injunctions were initially 
granted by Dutch and then adopted by other courts. Patentees could start infringement 
proceedings in a Dutch court, even for other national patents derived from the same European 
patent and –Dutch – court assumed jurisdiction when the infringer was domiciled in the 
Netherlands or the Dutch patent was being infringed, applying then the law of the country 
where the patent was in force and where the plaintiff  sought to obtain an injunction and oft en 
granting a cross-border injunction based upon Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(currently Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters). Th e practice came to an end by two decisions of 
the European Court of Justice; GAT v. LuK (case C-04/03, ECJ Report 2006, I, 6509) where 
the ECJ declared that national courts of the State of registration of a patent have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the validity of that patent and Roche v. Primus 
and Goldberg (case C-539/03, ECJ Report 2006, I, 6535) that fi nally ended the granting by 
national courts of cross-border injunctive relief for the infringement of European patents.
383 See Dietmar Harhoff , ibid at p. 18, defi ning torpedoes as “actions for declaration of non-
infringement in court systems which are known or alleged to work very slowly”. Th is strategy 
s based upon Article 27 of Regulation 44/2001 which establishes that any court not fi st seized 
with an action must decline jurisdiction or stay the proceedings and in these cases, hence, 
while a declaratory statement is pending in the “slow” court, an infringement action in other 
courts is blocked.
384 See Fanelli et al., Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 821, April, 
2008, citing also the S. Rep. No. 97–275, at 5 (1981) (arguing that the uniformity of the Federal 
Circuit could prevent forum shift ing in litigation). See also Frank Cihlar, The Court 
American Business Wanted and Got: The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit 11 (1982), at p. 11 (highlighting eff ects of uncertainty and forum shopping 
to patent law, where stability and predictability provide the basis for reasoned business 
judgments).
385 See Dreyfuss, supra note 313, analysing the reasons that justifi ed the creation of the CAFC as 
well as the most recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court reversing many important 
interpretations of the CAFC with regard to patent law.
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should really focus on estimating whether the advantages of having a specialized 
court might have been off set by their costs while avoiding that the move towards 
a unifi ed approach in patent substantive law (community patent) and patent 
litigation (EPLA) aff ects the balances between the interest of patentees and 
society that should be incorporated in patent law.
In addition, the Communication from the Commission has already warned 
about the problems related to the dubious quality and increasing number of 
granted patents but concludes without applying these warns into the proposals:
“… concerns have been raised that a spiralling demand for patents could result in 
increased granting of low quality patents. Th is is one of the reasons that could lead to 
the emergence of “patent thickets” and “patent trolls” in Europe. A high quality 
patent regime in the EU is an essential instrument to prevent such innovation 
hampering and to avoid destructive behaviour in Europe” (footnotes omitted).386
Until more substantive harmonization is accomplished within the EU, national 
practices continue to be widely diff erent in member states. In the following 
chapters, a comparative landscape about the approach towards ex-post liability 
rules within the U.K. and Italy is presented and contrasted with the U.S. case.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Th is chapter aimed at identifying the evolution of ex-post liability rules in 
history. Th e chapter examined the main compulsory licensing provisions in a 
historical context, focusing on the international context of patent law and then 
described the main features of remedies in the IP fi eld in the context of common 
law countries and civil law countries. Th ere are several observations that emerge 
from the historical account of the provisions under analysis. Th e fi rst sections 
highlighted the early appearance of compulsory licensing provisions, that in 
spite of originating on dissimilar intentions, could be considered as an attempt 
to balance the exclusive nature of IP rights with their social function. Th e 
evolution of compulsory licensing provisions in history ends with the analysis of 
the TRIPS Agreement and the post-TRIPS landscape, which has largely 
constraint the use of compulsory licensing although there are still important 
spaces for their use.
Diff erent than substantive patent law harmonization, enforcement is a late comer 
in the international context and remains mostly a national issue that depends on 
each country’s legal system and traditions. In particular, the possibility of 
386 See the Enhancing the patent system in Europe, supra note 380, at p. 13.
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denying injunctions, subjecting them to equitable considerations that vary 
case-by case is rooted in the common law distinction of courts of equity and 
courts of common law. Th e chapter briefl y discussed the historical origins of 
such rule while leaving the particular developments of the rule for the following 
sections that analyze the cases of U.S. and U.K. and contrast them to the case of 
a civil law country as Italy.
Th e fi rst observation that emerges is that common law countries have historically 
conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and have hence subjected the 
award of this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a balance between the 
particular circumstances of the case. Th e situation is, in appearance, 
outstandingly diff erent in civil law countries, due to a diverse conception over 
both rights and remedies. Injunctions are not considered an equitable remedy 
and patent statutes as well as procedural laws do not condition their award to a 
factual inquiry.
Understanding the dynamics of remedies is not only important and diffi  cult in 
the light of the remarkable diff erences between diff erent countries, but also with 
regard to its theoretical treatment, where remedies are oft en categorized either as 
a procedural matter or as part of substantive law:
“Part of the diffi  culty with conceptualizing remedies as a fi eld has been that remedies 
fi ts uneasily between the categories of substance and procedure. Remedies are central 
to litigation, but except for details at the edges, like the procedural rules for 
preliminary relief, remedies in the modern idea are not part of the law of procedure. 
Th e Supreme Court has correctly held that the measure of damages is substantive for 
Erie purposes. Th e same should be true of the standards for granting injunctions, 
although that question appears not to have been litigated. What or how much a 
plaintiff  recovers is part of plaintiff ’s substantive entitlement and not simply a rule 
for processing disputes”387
A second observation regards the importance of taking into consideration the 
interface between rights and remedies in order to understand this enhanced 
concept of compulsory licenses. A remarkable diff erence between civil law and 
common law countries with regard to the legal treatment of rights and remedies 
is precisely whether it is the remedy or the right that sets the starting point for 
such analysis. In spite of such marked diff erence, none form of reasoning –either 
one focusing on remedies or one focusing on rights – could be a priori judged as 
more effi  cient. As it has been already noticed, it would be rather the context in 
which the rule is applied – in the case of patent law the dynamic evolution of 
science and technology dramatically aff ects such context – that could determine 
387 Douglas Laycock, supra note 293, at p. 166 (footnotes omitted).
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whether a system that focuses on the remedy or one that focuses on the right is 
better able to cope with such new necessities.388 A similar argument could be 
made with regard to the choice of each country of having one or another type of 
compulsory licenses or both, as in the U.K. case.
388 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 15, arguing that a reasoning starting from the remedy does 
not necessarily lead to a better solution than a reasoning starting from the rights (…) Th e 
results rather depend on the capacity of adaptation that the legal system has in order to 
qualify the rights and grant the appropriate remedies, (free translation of the original text: 
“Non e detto, ad esempio, che ragionare per rimedi porti, in punto di tutela, a maggiori 
progressi rispetto al ragionare per diritti (…) Tutto sta nel vedere con quale capacita di 
adattamento l’ordinamento dato e disposto a qualifi care diritto un determinato interesse 
oppure ad apprestare per esso un rimedio adeguato di tutela”).
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CHAPTER III
EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: 
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL VIEW
“From the character of the right of the patentee 
we may judge of his remedies”
U.S. Supreme Court, Continental Paper Bag Co. 
V. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908)
“Th e existence of a right to exclude does not 
dictate the remedy for a violation of that right”
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Breyer, 
concurring opinion in eBay v. MercExchange, 
547 U. S.05–130 (2006)
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been recently argued that some modern patent systems have “failed”, are 
“broken” or have somehow lost their underlying balance by providing incentives 
for strategic patenting and litigation.389 Th ese assertions have been specifi cally 
applied to the preference for property rules manifested in the automatic use of 
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases. Th e questions of whether and how 
injunctions might be denied in specifi c circumstances have generated increasing 
scholarly and policy interest, evidenced in cases involving the BlackBerry device390 
389 For critics on the U.S. patent system see among others, Federal Trade Commission, supra note 
5; National Academies of Science, supra note 5; Adam B. Jaff e and Josh Lerner, Innovation 
and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation 
and Progress, and What to Do About It, Chapters 1 and 2 (2004). See also Bessen and 
Meurer, supra note 14, at p. 2, claiming that the patent system has failed mainly because of a 
defi ciency in the notice system with the consequence that “a defective property system 
discourages trade and investment not just by property owners, but also by those who 
inadvertently face the threat of property related lawsuits”.
390 See NTP, Inc. V. Research In Motion, ltd., 03–1615, US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, 418 F.3d 1282; (2005).
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and the eBay website391 as well as prior discussions.392 Th ese discussions have been 
also growingly recognized outside of the U.S.393
Indeed, to protect a patent through a property rule means – in procedural terms 
– granting an injunction and other measures that aim at preventing infringement 
to continue. While damages are most of the times awarded in tandem with 
injunctions to compensate for past losses; economic reasons call in certain 
instances for switching to a liability rule and substituting a permanent injunction 
with damages.394 A similar outcome arises, when a compulsory license is put in 
place through specifi c provisions of substantive patent law.
Th is chapter aims at examining the use of ex post liability rules administered by 
courts by analyzing law provisions and case law allowing the switch from a 
property to a liability rule ex-post.395 Th e chapter proceeds as follows. Th e fi rst 
section explains the concept of ex-post liability rules. Th e second, third and 
fourth sections briefl y describe ex post liability rules in the U.S., U.K. and Italy, 
respectively while discussing aspects of particular importance for each country. 
391 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 1.
392 See FTC, supra note 5, at p. 38–39 (Oct. 2003), available at www.ft c.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf.
393 See for instance Dietmar Harhoff , Patent Quantity and Quality in Europe – Trends and Policy 
Implications, in Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy, MIT Press (B. 
Kahin and D. Foray eds., 2006), p.331–350, arguing that “the stability of the European patent 
systems may be threatened by a strong increase in the number of patent applications, 
increased patent complexity and lower patent quality”. See also Christian Le Stanc, Les 
malfaisants lutins de la forêt des brevets, à propos des ‘patent trolls’, Revue Propriété 
industrielle, éd. Lexisnexis, févr. 2008, Etude 3, arguing that it is expected that this practice 
can be exported on the old continent and especially in France, even if the patents are said to 
be more seriously issued by the European Patent Offi  ce, even if the judges, specialized, may be 
more vigilant on the patentability of inventions and scope of the patents and even if the costs 
of litigation may be more modest. We will observe without doubt, today or tomorrow, some 
patent troll, acclimatized in our countries and pledging patents in force in France, (free 
translation of the original text: “Il est à prévoir cependant que ladite pratique puisse s’exporter 
sur le vieux continent et spécialement en FranceNote 20, même si les brevets sont, dit-on, plus 
sérieusement délivrés à l’Offi  ce européen des brevets; même si les juges, spécialisés, peuvent 
être plus vigilants sur la brevetabilité des inventions et la portée des titres; même si les coûts 
des contentieux peuvent être plus modestes. On observera sans doute, aujourd’hui ou demain, 
quelque patent troll, acclimaté dans nos contrées et nanti de brevets en vigueur en France…).”
394 See discussion on Chapter 1.
395 Th e term ex-post refers to the application of a liability rule ex-post with respect to the decisions 
taken by the patent owner, including that of investing in R&D and fi ling a patent. An 
alternative would be ex-post with regard to the infringement, which would include the cases 
analysed within the U.S. precedent of eBay. However, in this case we would leave aside the 
cases of compulsory licenses for dependent patents and lack of working where infringers are 
usually forbidden to use these provisions, so that the liability rule is only applied ex-post with 
respect to the above mentioned decisions of investing and fi ling a patent. See section 5 below, 
discussing a recent reform in Italian legislation, allowing good faith infringers to apply for 
compulsory licenses.
Chapter III. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Comparative Legal View
Intersentia 121
Th e chapter concludes by highlighting the similarities and diff erences between 
the systems under study.
2. EXPOST LIABILITY RULES
Th e preferential use of property rules to protect patent rights has oft en been 
advanced by arguing that patent rights grant a right to exclude others, rather 
than any direct right to use an invention.396 In addition, injunctions, which 
consist in a judicial order to stop an infringing activity, have been oft en identifi ed 
as the prime or solely appropriate remedy for patent infringement.397 Th is 
predominant view across several jurisdictions has been accompanied by an 
absence – of statutory patent provisions in the U.S. case – or an increasing 
limitation – in the international system – on the use of patent compulsory 
licenses that has largely permeated law and economics analysis.
Such preference for property rules might actually respond to either one or both 
of the following explanations. A fi rst explanation could be based upon the 
growing assimilation of IP rights to traditional property, for which injunctive 
relief is the standard remedy.398 Th is argument, hence, concentrates on the 
396 Th e argument is typically explained by patent scholars, as supported by three facts. First, a 
patent right entitles the patentee to exclude others but not necessarily to use her invention, 
since use might be subject to diff erent requirements, for instance in the case of previous 
marketing authorization for chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Secondly, it is highlighted that 
an inventor using a previously patented technology, would require authorization from the 
fi rst patentee and the second patent does not grant any direct right to use the fi rst innovation. 
Th irdly, it is said that any inventor can use her invention even without a patent.
397 See Christopher Heath, Comparative Overview and the TRIPS Enforcement provisions, in 
Patent Enforcement Worldwide: A survey of 15 countries, IIC Studies, Writings in Honour 
of Dieter Stauder, Hart Publishing (2004) at p. 6–7; (observing that of all remedies, 
injunctions were the most commonly sought and arguing that the importance of injunctions 
stems out of 1) the need to avoid market confusion or erosion of the owner’s competitive 
position in trademarks and unfair competition cases; 2) the need to preserve the owner’s 
exclusive right and 3) the diffi  culty to prove damages). See also Marshall, Th e enforcement of 
patent rights in Germany, Same Volume at p. 135 claiming that in Germany (“the most 
important remedy in a patent infringement case is the claim for cessation of further 
infringement (injunctive relief)”). Similarly, see Brinkhof, Th e Enforcement of Patent Rights in 
the Netherlands, p. 185, Same Volume, highlighting that in the Netherlands “in almost all 
cases, the patentee requests an injunction against the infringer” which is accompanied by a 
judicially imposed sum in case of contempt (“dwangsom” corresponding to the French 
“astraintes”) and as a consequence “an injunction is an eff ective means for stopping 
infringement”; and Blumer, Th e Enforcement of Patent Rights in Switzerland, Same Volume, at 
p. 227 claims that “in practice, injunctive relief is more relevant than damages”.
398 See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989); holding that the 
“right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property”. 
Compare with Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 193 N.E. 726, ruling in a case of 
encroachment upon land property that: “Th e general rule is that the owner of land is entitled 
to an injunction for the removal of trespassing structures”.
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nature of the right. Th e second explanation might be based upon the economic 
view, that has exercised an important infl uence among law and economic 
scholars and which sustains that injunctive relief is less costly to administer than 
damages, principally due to the diffi  culty of calculating the optimal amount of 
damage awards.399 Hence, this explanation is predominantly focused on the 
remedy. Effi  ciency reasons can nevertheless suggest that in some cases a patent 
should be protected through a liability rule either under a rights’ or a remedies’ 
perspective.400
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the eBay case, most law and economic 
analysis – constructing on U.S. law – assumed that an injunction will always 
follow any judicial decision asserting validity and infringement. In fact, 
permanent injunctive relief had received far less attention in studies about patent 
enforcement, compared for instance, to the study of damage compensation or 
preliminary measures.401 Moreover, studies on patent compulsory licensing 
oft en referred the absence of such provisions in U.S. patent law, concluding also 
that it was neither possible nor desirable to compel patentees to work their 
inventions.
Th e 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of eBay v. MercExchange402 
declared that the four-factor test to guide the award of injunctions was also 
applicable to patent cases and hence admitted the possibility that district courts 
could deny this remedy under certain circumstances. Th is decision opened the 
door for the use of ex-post liability rules imposed by courts in patent infringement 
cases, which were possible in other countries under diff erent compulsory 
licensing systems. Conversely, liability rules were practically absent from U.S. 
patent law and confi ned to antitrust cases. Th is decision therefore marks an 
important policy change in a country that had for a long time opposed the use of 
liability rules both in judicial decisions and proposals for patent law reform.
Ex post liability rules are judicially-administered and taken on a case-by-case 
basis regardless of whether they are included in law provisions or case law. Th us, 
the probability that a patentee obtains injunctive relief in a case in which the 
patent is found to be valid and infringed will be lower than one. As a consequence, 
399 See above, section 3.1.2 Critics against IP Liability Rules and section 4.1.Th e case against 
liability rules for patent rights, Chapter 1.
400 See Chapter 1, section 4.2. Th e case for patent liability rules: transaction costs.
401 See Blair and Cotter, supra note 91, at p. 2 noticing that “even within the burgeoning literature 
on the law and economics of Intellectual Property Rights (IP rights), there is, still relatively 
little discussion of the appropriate remedies for the infringement” while concentrating in the 
study of damage rules and claiming that there is consensus about the use of injunctions, 
“there is, to be sure, a fairly widespread consensus that an injunction – an order to cease 
infringement – is the appropriate remedy in most cases”.
402 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 1, at footnote 3.
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courts will face similar obstacles when determining through a case by case 
reasoning if damages can substitute the injunctive order or whether the 
requirements for a compulsory license are satisfi ed, in spite of deciding such 
diff erent cases. In doing so, courts shall assess whether the specifi c case calls for 
this switch by analyzing both the legal basis and – when a balance between the 
interests of the parties is allowed – by incorporating such examination. 
Additionally, Courts will face the diffi  cult task of fi xing the amount of 
compensation.
Ex-post liability rules, as described here, hence resemble much more accurately 
the type of liability rules used in the entitlement literature, in comparison, for 
instance with ex ante compulsory licenses.403 Th is latter type of compulsory 
licenses is oft en grounded on transaction costs due to the presence of multiple 
owners and many rights, each having a relatively low value.404 Patent ex-post 
liability rules would be instead justifi ed on the need to avoid strategic behavior 
and bargaining collapse.
403 Legal scholars however, disagree about whether denial of injunctions in fact amounts to a 
compulsory license. See Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and 
Analysis, (3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at p. 450, arguing that “the systematic 
impossibility to obtain an injunction and to obtain only actual damages could amount to a 
compulsory license”. See also Christopher Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and 
the Supreme Court of the United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, Patent Law: a 
Handbook of Contemporary Research, Toshiko Takenaka & Rainer Moufang, eds., 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086142, arguing that 
“while eBay speaks to patent remedies, the de facto eff ect of an injunction denial is, by 
defi nition, a government allowed compulsory license” but making the claim that while 
damages establishing a high royalty rate are antithetical to the aims of compulsory licenses, 
the use of reasonable royalties “brings eBay in line with the defi nition of a compulsory 
license”. But see Paice LL.C, v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al. CV-211-DF., 16, August 2006, 
arguably wrongly explaining that: “We use the term ongoing royalty to distinguish this 
equitable remedy from a compulsory license. Th e term “compulsory license” implies that 
anyone who meets certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed”.
404 Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 17:1–84 (2003), at p. 25, arguing that: “a 
proliferation of copyright holders’ proprietary rights can also make it prohibitively expensive 
for prospective licensees to obtain all the permissions needed to use, modify, or distribute 
creative expression. Transaction costs are especially high with respect to motion pictures, 
sound recordings, and other expression that comprises a number of copyrighted works, each 
of which must be licensed (…)”. See also Merges, supra note 114, comparing the case of 
compulsory licensing for blocking patents and compulsory licenses for copyrights (statutory 
compulsory licenses and arguing that: “…the costs of strategic bargaining are far diff erent 
from the costs of transactions in markets where multiple IPRs are needed as inputs. Input 
markets are notable especially for the repeated costs of locating right holders and negotiating 
individual licenses. And, with respect to these negotiations, the single most diffi  cult issue – 
and hence the most costly to resolve – is the valuation of each unique IPR”.
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For the purposes of examining and comparing ex-post liability rules in diff erent 
jurisdictions, three particular cases will be examined.405 A fi rst type of ex-post 
liability rule is applied when a court denies injunctive relief for infringed patents 
with the clearest example found in common law countries which deem 
injunctions as an equitable remedy, hence allowing judges to substitute 
injunctions with damage awards in accordance with the equities of the case. 
Although no equivalent rule considers the granting or denial of injunctions to 
fall plainly within the discretion of the judges; there are several spaces left  for a 
fl exible use of property rules also in civil law countries. In order to compare this 
type of liability rule with countries from such dissimilar law traditions, the 
following analysis centers on the reasons for denying injunctions in common law 
countries – most of them discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court eBay decision and 
follow-on cases and commentary – and examines the scope for judicial discretion 
with regard to remedies in patent infringement cases in the other countries.406
A second type of ex-post liability rule applied by courts are compulsory licenses 
addressing similar situations to the fi rst case and contained in the patent laws of 
405 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, (3rd revised 
ed., Oxford, Clarendon press, 1998), at p. 34, explaining that: “the basic methodological 
principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From this basic principle stem all the 
other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the 
creation of a system of comparative law, and so on…the only things which are comparable are 
those which fulfi ll the same function”. In this sense, Law and Economics adds to the 
Comparative Law method by clarifying on the underlying purposes of certain rules, even if 
they pertain to diff erent legal areas, as it is the case with the rules regulating patent remedies 
and compulsory licenses. In all cases, liability rules can be though as aiming to cope with the 
problem of effi  cient bargaining in the presence of high transaction costs, by “forcing” a 
transaction that would otherwise not occur.
406 Th e analysis that follows mostly focus on a – typical – case where a plaintiff  claims that her 
patented invention is infringed by a product or process used by a defendant either in an 
infringement case or as a defense during an invalidity procedure or a declaration of non-
infringement. For the purposes of this debate it does not matter whether infringement is 
literal or through the application of the doctrine of equivalents, which allows courts to declare 
infringement even when the infringing device or process does not literally fall upon the literal 
scope of claims but nevertheless is equivalent to said claim or claims. Th e reverse doctrine of 
equivalents could play a closely related role to that of denying an injunction in the sense of 
allowing the use of a patented invention, however denying any relief for the patentee. 
Nonetheless, its use remains limited in practice. See Roche Palo Alto v. Apotex Inc, (CAFC), 
2008–1021, available at: www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/08–1021.pdf explaining how the 
doctrine of reverse equivalents “is an equitable doctrine designed “to prevent unwarranted 
extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee’s invention” citing the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–
609 (1950), holding that “Where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented Article 
that it performs the same or similar function in a substantially diff erent way, but nevertheless 
falls within the literal words of the claim, the [reverse] doctrine of equivalents may be used to 
restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement”. Th e CAFC held the 
doctrine is rarely applied and that the CAFC itself has never applied it and highlighting that 
defendants have to clearly meet their burden of proof in asserting whether the device “has so 
far changed in principle”, not being possible to prove such fact only through experts’ 
declarations but through the specifi cation, prosecution history and prior art.
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several countries. In this sense, there are compulsory licensing provisions 
addressing subservient or dependent patents and aiming at avoiding a potential 
“bargaining breakdown”, a situation clearly under the C&M framework of high 
transaction costs. Another type of compulsory license applies for patents that 
have not being worked, a provision which is historically rooted in industrial 
policies favoring national industries407 but that has been recently raised during 
the debate surrounding the eBay decision in spite of the fact that the U.S. had 
largely opposed patent compulsory licensing and specially non-working 
provisions. Although, the fi nal decision of the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
explicitly address the issue, it clearly departed from any categorical rule, hence 
denying that either non-working would be a compelling reason to deny 
injunctions in all cases or that it will not be a compelling reason in some cases. 
Moreover, non-working or insuffi  ciently working a patent could arguably fall 
under the concept of strategic use of a patent, with the consequence that the 
insights developed by the property and liability rules framework could also be 
applied to this case.
Bringing together these apparently dissimilar cases can contribute to the 
understanding on the use of liability rules in patent law as some important 
insights in this area were indeed developed with a shortsighted view that 
considered most compulsory licensing provisions as not applicable or not 
advisable for application within patent law. Similarly, studies on compulsory 
licensing can shed light on the relatively “new” issue brought forward by the eBay 
case, which however, has already been faced by patent law at diff erent times of 
history. Th e legal systems examined here are compared under two diff erent 
perspectives with regard to the interface between rights and remedies. Under the 
fi rst perspective, it is the right that determines the remedy whereas under a 
second perspective, it is the remedy that leads the treatment of the legal right. In 
the analysis that follows, both a “rights’” and a “remedies’” approach to the study 
of ex post liability rules will be used.
3. U.S. EXPOST LIABILITY RULES
It is commonly argued that courts applying the factual test to grant injunctions 
rapidly arrived to the conclusion that when a fi nal decision on an infringement is 
407 Under the requirements of the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, a non-working provision 
might currently apply only if a patent is not being worked in any member country of the 
WTO, which is almost equivalent to say if the patent is not-worked or insuffi  ciently worked in 
absolute terms. Hence, in our view, this provision might also encompass cases similar to eBay 
in the U.S. with the caveats explained below, principally the fact that many patent laws forbid 
infringers to apply for a compulsory license.
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taken, an injunction would always be necessary.408 U.S. courts oft en reasoned 
that exclusive rights such as patents and copyrights would be deprived of their 
signifi cance if the owner’s right to exclude was not protected through an 
injunctive order but limited to a monetary award; and that this will create a need 
for continuous litigation in the absence of a meaningful mechanism of 
deterrence.409
As a result, U.S. courts developed a strong presumption in favor of property rules 
for patents, in spite of the traditional equitable nature of injunctions. Moreover, 
the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982 is usually associated with the 
development of an “automatic injunction rule”.410 Th e CAFC reiteratively 
interpreted that injunctions should be automatically granted and that a 
presumption of irreparable harm held in any case of patent infringement of a 
valid patent. Th is interpretation furthermore refl ected a patent policy 
transcending court remedies. In fact, the U.S. patent law and case law oft en 
rejected compulsory licenses for cases on non-use, and such view also prevailed 
at international IP rights negotiations:
“Patent laws outside the United States depart from the all-or-nothing principle by 
providing compulsory licenses in prescribed categories of cases, eff ectively depriving 
patent owners of injunctive relief and remitting them instead to court-ordered 
reasonable royalties. (Courts rarely have to order these payments because patent 
owners, knowing that only such limited relief is in prospect, will negotiate for 
reasonable rates).”411
408 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, 
and Automatic Injunctions, (U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 182), Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222 at p. 49. See also Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive 
Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1041–42 (1964) (arguing that by 
the mid-nineteenth century, a permanent injunction was considered to be the only remedy 
adequate to protect a patent owner’s right to exclude, and thus courts oft en granted injunctive 
relief “as a matter of course”) quoted by Elizabeth Millard, Injunctive Relief In Patent 
Infringement Cases: Should Courts Apply A Rebuttable Presumption Of Irreparable Harm 
Aft er eBay Inc. V. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 985.
409 Ibid at p. 49, quoting from 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on equity Jurisprudence: As 
administered in England and America 612 (14th ed. 1918); explaining how (“it is quite 
plain that if no remedy could be given in cases of patents and copyrights than an action at law 
for damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, 
without ever being able to have a fi nal establishment of his rights”).
410 See Balganesh, supra note 409, at p. 51. See also the CAFC decisions: Richardson v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 
1573, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Windmere Prods. Inc., 433 F. Supp. 710, 
741 (S.D. Fla. 1977) and Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 460 F. Supp. 812, 825 (D.N.J. 1978), 
on the practice or presuming irreparable harm and hence, automatically awarding injunctive 
relief.
411 Paul Goldstein, Intellectual Property: The Tough New Realities That Could Make 
Or Break Your Business, (New York Portfolio, 2007) at p. 59–60.
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3.1. THE EBAY CASE
During the last few years, scholars and policy makers have increasingly debated 
about the consequences of the strategic use of litigation and specifi cally about 
the possibility that patent holders might use permanent injunctions to hold 
infringers up.412 Th e matter is contentious, and still, part of the literature 
continues to defend and highlight the importance of strong property rules to 
protect patents.413
Th e debate progressively focused on the adequacy of a strong property rule in 
the form of an “automatic right” to injunctive relief. Some key patent cases 
increasingly echoed these concerns calling the attention of scholars, policymakers 
and the public opinion.414 In 2006, NTP Inc, the owner of patents on the 
BlackBerry wireless device threatened the manufacturer Research In Motion 
Ltd. (RIM) that it would shut down the production and commercialization of 
this system by asking the court an injunctive relief order.415 Th is threat was based 
upon the fact that RIM used some of the patents held and not commercialized by 
NTP Inc. Under the automatic award of injunctive relief and especially, the 
presumption of irreparable harm that was interpreted by the CAFC as following 
any fi nding of validity and infringement, it was possible for a non-manufacturing 
company to threaten another company with stopping all production related with 
the patent or patents under controversy. However, the case ended with a 
settlement in which supposedly NTP Inc. received $612.5 million, an amount 
that is said to have refl ected the potential disruption that an injunction could 
412 See Burk and Lemley, supra note 52, at p. 168–174. arguing that the baseline remedy for 
patents should remain a general property rule given that IP assets are very hard to valuate 
while highlighting that certain instances such as antitrust issues and holdups are preferably 
dealt by liability rules. For instance, they argue that compulsory licenses are more important 
within industries characterized by anti-commons problems where patentees may hold out for 
a disproportionately high royalty and obstruct downstream production and for patents that 
important products for society (pharmaceuticals and food products) that should be available 
at lower prices through the use of subsidized compulsory licenses. See also Shapiro, supra 
note 5, at p. 1, stating that the: “patent system systematically over-rewards the owners of 
patents in the information technology sector who license rather than practice their patents. 
Th ese over-rewards are greatest for the owners of weak patents that cover minor features of 
complex products sold at prices well above marginal cost. Holders of such patents are over-
rewarded relative to a natural normative benchmark primarily because of their ability to 
obtain injunctions in the event they prevail in patent litigation” (emphasis added).
413 See, among others, Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p 571–608; Epstein, supra note 131 and 
Kieff , supra note 124.
414 See Dolak & Blaine Bettinger, eBay and the Blackberry®: A Media Coverage Case Study 
(December 11, 2007), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082220, analyzing the public 
attention granted to these cases and also noticing that the main arguments put forward by the 
media were expressed in the concurring opinion of Judge Kennedy in the eBay decision, supra 
note 425.
415 See NTP, Inc. V. Research In Motion, ltd, supra note 391, at footnote 2.
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have caused. Nevertheless, the Blackberry controversy ended without a court 
decision addressing the convenience of using permanent injunctions in similar 
cases.
Shortly aft er, in the case of eBay vs. MercExchange, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
asked to analyze the conditions under which district courts should grant 
injunctions against infringers. Th e case involved the company eBay which 
operates an Internet website that allows private sellers to list goods they want to 
sell, and MercExchange, the holder of patents over a business method patent to 
facilitate the online sale of goods. Aft er unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a 
licensing agreement, MercExchange sued eBay and obtained a decision that 
declared the patent valid and infringed. Th e jury awarded damages, but the 
district court denied MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunctive relief. In 
addition to the automatic granting of injunctions under the emerging practice of 
the CAFC, at the time of the eBay controversy, a ruling from 1908 suggested that 
injunctions were always an appropriate remedy for patent infringement even if a 
patentee did not work his patent, and judges followed this precedent almost 
invariably.416 Th e CAFC applied such precedent and reversed the ruling of the 
district court, under the principle that “courts will issue permanent injunctions 
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances”. In eff ect, such 
exceptional circumstances had been interpreted in a narrow way, – especially by 
the same CAFC – covering cases that involved public interest, and more precisely 
when health or environmental issues were at stake.417 Only a few decisions had 
denied injunctive relief upon circumstances diff erent than these.418
416 Continental Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–430 (1908), actually rejected the contention that 
a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has 
unreasonably declined to use the patent. Compare with decisions at infra footnote 29.
417 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1987), where it was held that 
the public interest in the availability of medical test kits justifi ed a denial of a preliminary 
injunction), aff ’d, 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. 
Alumni Research Found., 64 U.S.P.Q. 285 (9th Cir. 1945), deciding that the public interest 
warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of oleomargarine; City of Milwaukee v. 
Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934), denying an injunction that would have 
required the city to close a sewage plant, “leaving the entire community without any means 
for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its 
waters and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining communities”; 
Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994), deciding 
to decline an injunction that would have created “a serious disruptive eff ect on surgical 
practice” because doctors distinctly preferred the endoscopic surgical cutters at issue and had 
trained with them extensively.
418 See Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936), denying a permanent 
injunction to a railroad company where it was “recognized that the only real advantage to a 
plaintiff  in granting the injunction would be to strengthen its position in negotiating a 
settlement.” See also Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co. 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 
1974) denying a permanent injunction to a non-manufacturing company because such 
“injunction to protect a patent against infringement, like any other injunction, is an equitable 
remedy to be determined by the circumstances. It is not intended as a club to be wielded by a 
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Th e U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide about the appropriateness 
of that general rule and decided that consistent with principles of equity, in the 
U.S., a plaintiff  seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test 
demonstrating: (1) that it has suff ered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff  
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.419 Th e Supreme Court 
reiterated that the decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act 
of equitable discretion of the district court, subject to appeal for abuse of 
discretion since the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions “may” be 
issued “in accordance with the principles of equity”.420 Likewise, the Copyright 
Act gives the right holder a “right to exclude others from using his property”421 
while it provides that courts “may,” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it 
may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright”.422
In the fi nal decision on the eBay case, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a middle 
ground position. On the one hand it did not rule that lack of use of its patents by 
the right holder would necessarily preclude her right to an injunction, clarifying 
that patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, whom 
oft en license rather than work their patents may be able to satisfy the four-factor 
test. But on the other hand, the Court sustained that an injunction will not 
necessarily follow the fi nding of patent infringement and that either the 
patentee to enhance his negotiating stance. Here, as the District Court noted, the [defendant] 
manufactures a product; the [plaintiff ] does not. In the assessment of relative equities, the 
court could properly conclude that to impose irreparable hardship on the infringer by 
injunction, without any concomitant benefi t to the patentee, would be inequitable”. See also 
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985) where 
the CAFC upheld a 5% court-ordered royalty, based on sales, “for continuing operations.” Th e 
parties contested the amount of the royalty, styled a “compulsory license” by the court but 
there was no dispute as to the district court’s authority to issue such remedy. See also United 
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59, 93 S. Ct. 861, 35 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1973), granting 
“mandatory sales and reasonable-royalty licensing” of relevant patents for an antitrust 
violation and describing remedies as “well-established forms of relief when necessary to an 
eff ective remedy, particularly where patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed 
to the antitrust violation adjudicated”.
419 But see Douglas Laycock supra note 293, at footnote 13, arguing that the Supreme Court 
confused the tests for permanent and preliminary injunctions while “announcing a “familiar” 
four-part test that the Court had never before applied”. See also Douglas Laycock, Modern 
American Remedies: Cases and Materials 52–53 (Supp. 2007), discussing the case and the 
confusion of the Court with regard to the “traditional” test.
420 Section 283 of the U.S. Patent Act, which is found in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (hereinaft er 
U.S.C.), provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any 
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”
421 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
422 17 U.S.C. §502(a).
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categorical denial or grant of such relief by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals were erroneous applications of the law. Th e Supreme Court hence 
rejected the use of categorical rules and tilted towards the use of standards to 
appropriately decide the grant or denial of injunctions for infringed patents.423
Th e standard governing injunctions is expressed in the four-factor test. Yet, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay contained two concurring opinions off ering 
contradictory views on how to read such test. Justice Robert’s opinion424 
highlighted that injunctive relief was the remedy in the majority of patent cases 
“from at least the early 19th century”, and justifi ed this choice as correct due to 
the “diffi  culty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that 
allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s wishes”.
Contrary to this approach, three important reasons were given to support a move 
towards a more discretional use of injunctive relief by courts, all based upon the 
fact that the nature and economic function of patents has evolved.425 Hence, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion argues that injunctions were the preferred choice not 
primarily because of intrinsic valuation problems associated with the use of 
liability rules, but rather due to the prevailing historical context, which has 
greatly changed over the last years, at least within the U.S. patent system.
A fi rst concern expressed in this opinion, regarded the increasing risk of holdups 
by owners of patent rights on small components of a product given that these 
players can use the threat of enjoining the whole product as a bargaining tool. 
Th is case stems out of the increasing number of products reading on multiple 
423 An important number of law and economics scholars have discussed the relative costs and 
benefi ts of adopting rules v. the adoption of standards, including the costs regarding norm-
specifi cation, case adjudication and the costs of compliance with legal norms. Th e rules v. 
standards debate might also be referred to the balance of competences between the legislator 
and the judiciary. See for instance, Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards, An Economic 
Analysis, Duke Law Journal, pp. 557–629; Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 
Stanford Law Review, 1998 pp. 577–610 and, Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Legal Rules and 
Standards, German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Vol. 2002, No. 2, 2002, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999860. Hence, whereas the analysis done here refers 
mainly to the question of property or liability rules for patent protection, it also regards a 
choice between rules or open standards. In this discussion, a basic trade-off  exists between 
the legal certainty that follows from the use of rules and the potential for adapting to changing 
(technological) circumstances that is possible with the use of standars.
424 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, supra note 1, at p. 1841–42, (Roberts, C.J., concurring), a 
concurring opinion by Justices Roberts, Scalia and Ginsburg that clearly favors the use of 
rules and privileges legal certainty as well as it considers that property rules are in the vast 
majority of cases (with the exception of extreme circumstances) the best way to protect patent 
entitlements, a fact, the concurring Judges argue, evidenced by history.
425 Ibid at supra note 2, p. 1842–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring), a concurring opinion by Justices 
Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Breyer. Conversely, this opinion highlights the ability of legal 
standars to cope with the challenges of adapting to new technologies and evolving business 
practices.
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patents as opposed to the traditional pattern of one-patent one-product. In such 
cases, damage awards may be suffi  cient to compensate and more in tune with 
public interest.
Secondly, the opinion warned about the emergence of a business strategy in 
which fi rms use their patents for obtaining licensing fees, rather than for 
marketing innovative products or services. Th e emergence of such business 
entities (e.g. patent trolls) was acknowledged as a problematic outcome of the 
automatic grant of injunctions in patent cases:
“For these fi rms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”.426
Finally, the opinion emphasized the fact that patent quality has decreased, 
leading to a growing number of vague and suspiciously valid patents. Th is was 
mentioned in the opinion as an aggravating fact that could also weight against a 
strong property rule or against its “automatic” use in patent cases.
Th e Kennedy’s opinion importantly stressed that “equitable discretion over 
injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to 
the rapid technological and legal developments in the patent system”.427 By 
interpreting that judges have more discretion, the Court in fact allowed district 
courts to switch to a liability rule. In this sense, the opinion can be read a under 
the classic C&M framework where liability rules are more effi  cient in the 
presence of high transaction costs, especially the likelihood of strategic 
bargaining, since it acknowledged that a new set of fi rms devoted to hold patents, 
use them as: “bargaining tools to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek 
to buy licenses to practice the patent”.
Commentators echoing the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts (with Scalia 
and Ginsburg) in eBay have warned against the expansion of ex post liability 
rules as suitable remedies for patent infringement cases. In favor of maintaining 
injunctive relief as the paramount remedy in patent infringement cases is the 
need to provide patent holders with strong protection, which is oft en seen as the 
only way to suffi  ciently encourage welfare-enhancing investment in R&D.428 
Critics also highlight the drawbacks of switching to a liability rule because of the 
426 Ibid at p. 1843, also quoting from the report by the Federal Trade Commission: FTC, To 
Promote Innovation: the proper balance of competition and patent law and 
policy, supra note 5.
427 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, at p. 1843.
428 See among others, supra note 160 and Golden, supra note 148.
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implied valuation and error costs429 as well as point to district courts decisions 
aft er eBay, which have purportedly put non-practicing entities at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis would-be licensees and granting an unintended competitive advantage 
to large companies over smaller research-based companies.430 On the other 
hand, several commentators have argued that the primacy of injunctive relief in 
IP infringement cases should be relaxed, especially in modern knowledge-based 
industries, where IP rights oft en overlap and mingle into a “thicket”431 and where 
purported trolls have enhanced chances to act strategically and secure appealing 
settlement terms. As rational investors would anticipate a leakage of profi ts due 
to strategic suit and settlement, incentives to invest in R&D would be signifi cantly 
reduced. In this context, patent holders should also be worried about excessive 
protection, especially when inventors are inadvertent or there are innocent 
infringers.432
3.2. POST EBAY INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURFACTOR 
TEST
Discretion over the grant or denial of injunctions was said to be governed by an 
equitable test that is applicable to all disputes, including those involving patent 
law.433 Th e test is composed of the above mentioned four-factors.434 Out of these 
four-factors, the fi rst and the second directly refer to whether the right to exclude 
should be limited or not, in the sense of whether it should be protected by 
injunctive relief or not in a particular case. In fact, aft er the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, the district court deciding on the remanded case of MercExchange v. 
429 See also Kieff , supra note 124 and Epstein, supra note 131.
430 See Denicolo et al., 2008, supra note 160 and Golden supra note 219, analyzing this case for 
non-practicing entities which are research centers. See also James McDonough, Th e Myth of 
the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy. 
Emory Law Journal, Vol. 56, p. 189 (2006) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959945, 
pointing to the effi  ciency brought by patent dealers.
431 See Shapiro, supra note 5, and Weiser and Lemley, supra note 72.
432 See Christopher Cotropia and Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, Stanford Public Law 
Working Paper No. 1270160, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160, fi nding a small 
percentage of patent infringement cases involving an allegation of copying and an even lower 
percentage fi nding a proof of copying. See also Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14, arguing 
that inadvertent infringement is an important component of the failure of the U.S. patent 
system due to the malfunction of the patent notice mechanisms.
433 But see Laycock supra note 293, arguing that the test in fact did not exist before the eBay 
decision.
434 A plaintiff  that wishes to obtain a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test in 
order to show: (1) that it has suff ered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering 
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff  and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
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eBay, emphasized this close relationship and almost identical meaning of the 
fi rst and second factors:
“Th e irreparable harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of 
the same coin; however, the court will address them separately in order to conform 
with the four-factor test as outlined by the Supreme Court”.435
Th e third factor performs a balancing test, similar to the “balance of convenience” 
that is described below with respect to the U.K. system. Conversely, the fourth 
factors was already incorporated in earlier court decisions which had denied 
injunctive relief for public interest purposes, because an injunction would impose 
a disproportional burden on society. Decisions denying injunctive relief upon 
this factor are hence, similar to diff erent patent law provisions such as compulsory 
licenses granted for public interest reasons. Th e following sections describe these 
four-factor test in more detail and according to the interpretation of several 
district courts and the CAFC, aft er the U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay.436
3.2.1. Irreparable harm
Under this factor, courts are called to examine whether the harm suff ered by 
patentees is reparable or not in monetary terms and, as mentioned above, this 
fi rst factor, along with the second factor, directly address whether the IP right to 
exclude should be protected by injunctive relief.437 Until the 2006 eBay decision, 
the CAFC and district courts tended to apply an almost non-rebuttable 
presumption that harm would be irreparable if a valid patent was infringed. As a 
consequence, absent exceptional circumstances, courts always found irreparable 
harm in patent infringement cases. Although most post-eBay decisions seem to 
refl ect that the presumption not longer exists, some decisions have not even 
attempted to analyze the issue and have reasoned that the loss of a right to 
exclude always imposes an irreparable harm.438
District courts have vacillated in interpreting this fi rst prong, holding in some 
cases that the eBay decision should not be read as stating that losing the right to 
exclude could not per se constitute an irreparable harm.439 In this view, the 
435 See MercExchange, LLC v., v. eBay Inc., 2007 WL 2172587, No. 01–736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2007), 
at footnote 11, p. 16.
436 For a summary of the cases analyzed here, see Appendix Chapter III.
437 Ibid, at p. 16, footnote 11.
438 See Millard, supra note, 409, discussing the presumption of irreparable harm and arguing 
that eBay should be read as allowing a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm, which 
could be precisely rebutted in cases of holdups.
439 See Novozymes v. Genencor, No. 05-cv-160-KAJ (D. Del. 2007), available at: http://patentdocs.
typepad.com/patent_docs/fi les/Nozozymes.pdf, granting an injunction in favor of 
Novozymes.
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Supreme Court in eBay basically rejected the judicial practice that the patentee’s 
right to exclude should always lead to injunctive relief:
“Prior to applying the facts of the instant matter to the four-factor test, the court must 
consider whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a fi nding of validity and 
infringement survives the Supreme Court’s opinion remanding this case. Although 
the parties did not perform extensive briefi ng on such issue and the Supreme Court’s 
opinion does not squarely address it, a review of relevant caselaw, as well as the 
language of the Supreme Court’s decision, supports defendants’ position that such 
presumption no longer exists”.440
Other courts have noticed how the right to exclude is generally inadequately 
protected by damages but have asked plaintiff s to meet a burden to off er specifi c 
reasons why infringement cannot be compensated for with a monetary award, 
including such reasons as losing market share or opportunities or the diffi  culty 
of calculating damages, the most important arguments given for the award of 
injunctions.441 By so doing, some courts seem to be moving away from 
categorical rules and conclusive presumptions towards a factual and evidence-
based consideration of each particular case.
3.2.2. Inadequate remedies
Th e second factor of the test considers whether other remedies, mostly monetary 
awards, would be adequate or not to compensate for the infringement. Courts 
have again fl uctuated in their view about the correct interpretation of this factor 
aft er the eBay case. Some courts have gone as far as to acknowledge that any 
harm from future infringement could be compensated through a reasonable 
royalty given that the right to exclude alone is not suffi  cient and cannot lead to 
conclude that remedies other than an injunction cannot adequately compensate 
a patent holder.442
440 MercExchange, LLC v., v. eBay Inc., 2007 WL 2172587, No. 01–736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2007), 
available at www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/MercExchange.pdf.pdf.
441 See Praxair, Inc, and Praxair Technology Inc, v. ATMI, Inc. and Advanced Technology 
Materials, Inc. Civ. No. 03–1158-SLR (D.C. Delaware, Mar 27, 2007), where the court ruled 
that Praxair failed to prove why it would have diffi  culties calculating damages going forward 
and how money damages could not adequately compensate for “lost market share” or any 
“lost research opportunities”.
442 See z4 Technologies Inc., vs. Microsoft  Corporation and Autodesk, Inc, U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas, 6:06-CV-142, available at: www.patentlyo.com/patent/
injunctionDenied.pdf, where z4 had argued that monetary damages for future infringement 
were not an adequate remedy because they could not compensate z4 for the loss of “its right to 
exclude Microsoft ” whereas the Court emphasized that z4’s argument implied “that a violation 
of the right to exclude under the patent act can never be remedied through money”.
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However, most courts have given weight to cases involving loss of market share, 
goodwill or reputation of patentees443 in order to establish whether other 
remedies would be inadequate. Th e majority of decisions have granted 
injunctions to competitors of the infringer by reasoning that competitors are 
likely to suff er irreparable harm, in the form of losses in market shares, 
commercial reputation and the like.444
In addition, courts have identifi ed as problematic, cases in which damages are 
diffi  cult to prove or when, for instance, the measure of lost profi ts is not available 
to plaintiff s.445 As in the case of the irreparable harm prong, a relevant 
consideration for some courts is the evidence needed to show the inadequacy of 
legal remedies.446 Any loss of market share, reputation or goodwill should be 
documented by patentees in order to successfully argue that damages are 
inadequate; however, the standard of proof remains largely variable from court 
to court.
443 See z4 v. Microsoft  ibid, identifying such cases where damages were to be held inadequate 
when “an infringer saturates the market for a patented invention with an infringing product 
or damages the patent holder’s good will or brand name recognition by selling infringing 
product or damages”.
444 See Douglas Ellis et al, Th e Economic Implications (And Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent 
Injunctive Relief Aft er eBay V. Mercexchange 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 437, 442 (2008), accounting that 
district court have referred to these losses in terms of: “market share,” (Novozymes, Smith, 
Tivo and Wald) “sales,” (Verizon, Litecubes and Wald) “customers,” (Market Biosciences) 
“profi ts,” (Smith) “opportunities,” (Verizon and O2) “reputation” (MPT, Black & Decker and 
Robert Bosch) and “brand name.” (Smith). See also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research 
Organisation v. Buff alo Tech. Inc., granting injunction to a non-competitor (Australian 
research center). A noticeable exception is Praxair v. ATMI, where a direct competitor was 
denied injunctive relief and the court also required proof that losses might not in fact be 
suffi  ciently compensated with money awards, evidencing the application of a diff erent 
interpretation with regard to the burden of proof that falls on patentees.
445 In the Novozymes case, supra note 440, the court specifi cally considered that legal remedies 
were not adequate to compensate the patent owner for infringement because lost profi ts was 
unavailable (given that the patentee had licensed its rights to a subsidiary) and the right to 
exclude could not, under these circumstances be equated to its monetary equivalent.
446 See Praxair v. ATMI, supra note 442, where the court denied an injunction in favor of Praxair 
because company “has not provided or described any specifi c sales or market data to assist 
the court, nor has it identifi ed precisely what market share, revenues, and customers Praxair 
has lost to ATMI” and comparing to Novozymes, where “evidence demonstrated that plaintiff  
originally secured an 80% market share with its patented product, which fell to approximately 
50% aft er infringing competitor’s market entry”. See also Transocean Off shore Deepwater 
Drilling Inc. v. Globalsantafe Corp., No Civ. A. 03–2910, 2006 WL 3813778, *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 
27, 2006), granting a permanent injunction where the customer base is small and the 
defendant has not only used the infringing technology to compete for the same customers 
and contracts as plaintiff  but also to win contracts over competing bids from plaintiff ; Tivo 
Inc. V. EchoStar Communications Corp., 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669–70 (E.D. Tex. 2006), 
arguing that the burden of proof could be met by showing that plaintiff  was “a relatively new 
company with only one primary product” and the parties agreed that customers tend to stick 
to the company from which they obtained their fi rst DVR recorder, “shaping the market to 
plaintiff ’s disadvantage and resulting in long-term customer loss”.
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Overall, the analysis of the fi rst two factors centers on the questions of how much 
reward is needed to encourage innovation and whether should patentees’ 
sometimes be limited to monetary awards without damaging such incentives.447 
Th e most interesting change in policy aft er the eBay decision is that the question 
can be addressed according to the circumstances of each case whereas before 
eBay, categorical considerations prevailed, by equating the character of patents 
as exclusive rights with the fact that they cannot be protected if they are not fully 
enjoined against non-authorized use. In this sense, aft er the eBay decision, the 
interface between rights and remedies is more clearly delineated.
3.2.3. Balance of hardships
Under the “balance of hardships” test, courts are called to consider any reasons 
that might impose greater burdens on infringers than on patentees such as to 
turn the balance in favor of denying injunctive relief. Courts are thus called to 
assess and balance the expected costs and expected benefi ts of a permanent 
injunction, a diffi  cult task for which they usually rely on other considerations 
related to the fi rst and second factors. In fact, one fi nding in the examination of 
the cases here described is that courts have oft en inclined towards denying or 
granting injunctive relief on the basis of the fi rst and second factors while giving 
only secondary consideration to the balancing of the interests of infringers and 
patentees.
Courts have also evaluated under this test the importance of the patented 
technology in relation to infringing products, and especially the question 
whether products are of a multi-component nature and if the patent covers only 
a small part of them.448 Th is was one of the important considerations given by 
Kennedy’s opinion in the eBay case which refl ects economic insights about the 
447 Praxair stated “that it spends $75 million per year inR&D and that denying protection to its 
rights to exclude through injunctions it would have “no incentive to innovate” and its patents 
“would be eff ectively meaningless”. Th e court however reasoned that “Praxair does not 
explain why money damages could not suffi  ce to compensate for any lost opportunities to 
conduct research due to budgetary constraints”.
448 In the z4 case, the court discussed how “product activation” (the z4 patent) is a very small 
component of the soft ware products that infringe upon this patent. Given this condition, the 
court went on to explain that the allegedly damage hardship that z4 will suff er should be 
balanced with the harms caused to the infringer, in this case, Microsoft . Th e court found that 
“the potential hardships Microsoft  could suff er if the injunction were granted outweigh any 
limited and reparable hardships that z4 would suff er in the absence of an injunction”. See also 
Amado v. Microsoft  Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008), concerning a patent that 
covered a very small component of the infringing products (claim 21 was infringed which 
covers a single feature linking Access and Excel) and Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 
F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007), concerning patents on part of the hybrid transmission system 
incorporated in cars manufactured by Toyota.
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optimal reward to innovators. Nevertheless, courts have recognized the 
“speculative” nature of such balancing test449:
“With the future so speculative in this continually-developing, complex scenario, the 
court cannot confi dently determine in which party’s favor the balance of hardships 
tips”.450
As we will see in the comparative section (Italy and UK), similar tests are present 
in other legislations, even in diff erent legal areas and with regard to other 
compulsory measures supporting injunctive relief, as destruction or confi scation.
3.2.4. Public interest
Th e interest of public has been traditionally considered as an important limit to 
the exclusive nature of patents and even before the eBay decision in 2006; several 
district courts had denied injunctions upon considerations of public interest.451 
Th ere is a wide contradiction however, in the interpretation of public interest, as 
some courts continue to plainly affi  rm that public interest is always better served 
by issuing an injunction and thus, maintaining the correct functioning of the 
patent system.452
Such view would again end-up in a categorical rule that denies courts the 
possible, yet diffi  cult exercise of balancing the interest of the public in a healthy 
patent system. With this regard, the district court in MercExchange v. eBay, 
concluded that:
“However, while preserving the integrity of the patent system will always be a 
consideration in the public interest analysis, it cannot be allowed to dominate such 
analysis lest a presumption results. Accordingly, the court considers the type of 
patent involved, the impact on the market, the impact on the patent system, and any 
449 See MercExchange v. eBay case, supra note 436, where the court considered fi rstly that 
potential hardships for MercExchange were likely to be low because the company was willing 
to license its patents and was not competing with eBay. It also ascertained that the harm of a 
dubious patent (still the process before the U.S.P.T.O. is ongoing) would impose on the 
defendant was important. Nevertheless, the court recognized that the third prong did not 
clearly favor any party because of the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the patent, 
whether they had been designed around and whether the plaintiff  could, in association with 
other companies, start competing with eBay as well.
450 Ibid at p. 39.
451 See supra note 418.
452 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’n Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d, 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) at 670, 
expressing that “the public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent system” and also 
concluding that in that specifi c case, “public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction” as “the infringing products are not related to any issue of public health or any 
other equally key interest; they are used for entertainment”.
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other factor that may impact the public at large and concludes that, on these facts, the 
public interest weighs against the entry of an injunction”.453
Nevertheless, it has been widely acknowledged that attempting to strike a balance 
with public interest concerns by assessing the expected outcomes with or without 
an injunction is indeed a diffi  cult task for courts. Hence, several courts have 
attempted again to speculate on the probabilities that a given outcome would 
result and the expected costs and benefi ts from this probable outcome in order to 
examine the potential impact that an injunction or the lack of one, would have 
on the interest of the public:
“Although it is impossible to determine the actual events that would follow the 
deactivation of Microsoft ’s product activation serves, it is likely that the market would 
see an increase in pirate versions of the soft ware”.454
3.3. THE POST EBAY DECISION LANDSCAPE
Th e aft ermath of eBay has been characterized by astonishing legal uncertainty. 
In spite of a great controversy generated both in legal and economic terms, most 
commentators however, agree on some points. First, that eBay has represented 
an important transformation on the way patent remedies were routinely awarded 
and conceived and overall an important patent policy change in the U.S.455 
Secondly, however, the decision did not provide enough guidance for district 
courts relative to the daunting task imposed upon them, which has given rise to 
uncertainty and confl icting decisions.456 Moreover, the concurring opinions 
gave some contradictory suggestions, which have in practice been followed by 
district courts, producing a number of inconsistent decisions.457 However, a 
453 See MercExchange v. eBay, supra note 436, at p. 39.
454 See z4 v. Microsoft , supra note 443, where the Court balanced the potential costs and benefi ts, 
concluding that an injunction could have increased the risks that some public users suff er 
negative eff ects whereas no eff ects might befall the public in the absence of an injunction. 
Although these eff ects were somewhat speculative, they weighted against granting an injunction.
455 See Kieff , supra note 124, arguing that eBay the long-standing practice that made injunctions 
a credible threat available to patentees. See also Amado v. Microsoft , supra note 449, holding 
that “because eBay represents an intervening change in law, the Court fi nds it appropriate to 
revisit the propriety of the injunction in this case”).
456 See Millard, supra note 409, highlighting the contradictory decisions by diff erent district 
courts with regards to the presumption of irreparable harm that follows from a fi nding of 
validity and infringement.
457 See Benjamin Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: Th e Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition 
Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 305, 311, 
arguing that district courts have followed a “market competition requirement”, precluding 
injunctive relief for non-competitors. As we described below, courts have mostly based their 
decisions on whether patentee competes with infringer with some outliers but important 
cases at the margin.
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number of interesting features can be identifi ed in the set of cases following the 
eBay decision.458 Th ese features are briefl y described in this section.459
A fi rst observation is that the majority of decisions aft er eBay, have granted 
injunctions to competitors of the infringer. Th e reasoning is that competitors are 
likely to suff er irreparable harm, in the form of losses of market shares, 
commercial reputation, business goodwill and similar business values. In spite of 
this pattern, a noticeable exception is Praxair v. ATMI, where a direct competitor 
was denied injunctive relief. In this case, the court also required proof that such 
losses might not in fact be suffi  ciently compensated with money awards. Th is 
evidences the application of a diff erent interpretation with regard to the burden 
of proof that falls on patentees if they seek injunctive relief. In fact, if the Supreme 
Court decision on eBay is read as imposing the use of a standard to decide upon 
the award of injunctions, it would not be suffi  cient to prove that a patent owner 
competes in order to ask for injunctive relief. Nonetheless, the existence of such a 
standard does not preclude the emergence of rules of interpretation and 
presumptions such as the one that holds that a competitor would be presumably 
suff er an irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. A further 
complication however, is to determine which type of competitor the patent owner 
should be in order to suff er such irreparable harm.460
A second trend that emerges is that most cases denying injunctions concerned a 
non-practicing entity. Most non-practicing entities cannot in fact compete with 
the infringer, a reason used by district courts to hold that harm was not 
irreparable and that other remedies available at law could be adequate. An 
exception was the case of Commonwealth Sci. & Ind. Research Org. v. Buff alo 
Tech Inc.461, where a non-practicing entity obtained an injunction. In this case 
the court highlighted the importance of granting injunctive relief to a research 
institution, which fi nances its R&D activity through the commercialization of its 
patents and how obtaining an injunction would help it to continue a successful 
licensing program. Th is case is exceptional in the sense that a national 
458 Th e set of cases corresponds to the result of an automatic search on West Law performed 
during January 2008 until December 2008. Th e cases were subsequently revised and 
confronted with other articles reviewing post-eBay cases. See for instance, Ellis et al, supra 
note 445.
459 For an overview of the cases under analysis see Chapter III Appendix.
460 For instance, should the patent owner compete in the same market or markets, be a current or 
a former competitor and to what extent should the patent owner and infringer compete in 
order for there to be a presumption of irreparable harm. Moreover, if a “market competition” 
requirement emerges in order for patent owners to obtain injunctive relief, some patent 
owners might initiate commercial activities only aiming at obtaining injunctive relief within 
their infringement cases, giving rise to potentially ineffi  cient commercial activities.
461 See Commonwealth Scientifi c & Indus. Research Organisation v. Buff alo Tech. Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 600, 600–02 (E.D. Tex. 2007), granting injunction to a non-competitor (Australian 
research center).
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(Australian) research center was involved and comity implications might have 
also played a role.
A rather expansive reading of the possibility to substitute injunctions with damage 
compensation was given in the CAFC decision on the case of Innogenetics v. Abbot 
Labs.462 Whereas the district court had granted an injunction463, on appeal the 
CAFC reversed, based upon the argument that when a jury awards damage 
compensation that includes a market-fee entry plus ongoing royalty, this might be 
considered to be suffi  cient to ensure the plaintiff ’s relief. In this case, the CAFC 
admitted that forward-looking damages are a good substitute for injunctive relief.
Th e cases analyzed here, show that district courts (and the CAFC) have applied 
diff erent reasoning while deciding cases especially upon the fact of whether the 
patentee is a direct competitor of the defendant. Additionally, some cases have 
denied injunctions when the patent concerned a small component of the 
infringing product.464
Nonetheless, the prevailing uncertainty in the interpretation of the four-factor 
test is manifested in its dissimilar application by District Courts. For instance, in 
interpreting the irreparable harm prong, even though courts have ascertained 
factual considerations such as whether the plaintiff  would face losses of market 
share or reputation, they have made general and contradictory statements. Some 
courts have argued that a patentee has suff ered irreparable harm solely because 
of the infringement of her right to exclude others from practicing its patent465,that 
is, still confusing the right with the remedy awarded.
Other courts interpreting the inadequacy of available remedies have expressed 
that “the statutory right to exclude represents a benefi t that, under these 
circumstances, cannot be equated by an award of cash”466 or that “the statutory 
right to exclude represents a tangential benefi t associated with patent rights that 
cannot be quantifi ed in monetary damages”. Such cases underline how a multi-
criteria test might benefi t from economic analysis, which is absent in virtually 
every post-eBay case.467
462 See Innogenetics v. Abbot Labs 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008), available at: www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/opinions/07–1145.pdf.
463 See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C (W.D. Wis.).
464 See for instance, Amado v. Microsoft , supra note 449, which concerned a patent covering a 
very small component of the infringing products (claim 21 was infringed covers a single 
feature linking Access and Excel). Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp, concerned patents on 
part of the hybrid transmission system incorporated in cars manufactured by Toyota. z4 
Techs. v. Microsoft  Corp. concerned a patent on a product activation /anti piracy soft ware.
465 See Novozymes v. Genencor, supra note 440.
466 Ibid.
467 Chapter IV.
Chapter III. Ex-Post Liability Rules: A Comparative Legal View
Intersentia 141
3.4. WILLFUL V. INADVERTENT INFRINGEMENT
When infringement happens intentionally or willfully, it implies the possibility 
of having to pay enhanced damages.468 Accordingly, a court has to fi rstly 
determine whether the infringer is guilty, by proving that he or she acted in bad 
faith, either by engaging in vexatious litigation or willful infringement. 
Subsequently, the court discretionally establishes whether to increase damages 
and how much, in a decision that must take into account all the 
circumstances.469
An important object of critique about the denial of injunctive relief for some 
patentees is the possibility that such denial could give incentives to infringe as 
potential infringers would anticipate that in case the court decides that the patent 
was infringed, it might nevertheless limit relief to the payment of reasonable 
royalties. With this respect, however, other scholars argue that inadvertent or 
innocent infringement happens in an important number of cases.470 Some 
proposals to cope with this problem refer the possibility of establishing an 
independent inventor-defense in order to avoid inadvertent infringers to become 
victims of patent troll-behavior.
Rules on willful infringement aim at deterring wrongful behavior. However, it 
has been posed that such rules, as interpreted by the courts have actually 
provided incentives for avoiding a proper search before infringement occurs.471 
468 See U.S.C. 35 §284, establishing that: “the court may increase the damages up to three times 
the amount found or assessed”. Enhanced damages are punitive and not merely compensatory. 
Hence, they are only awarded upon a fi nding of culpability of the infringer. See also Jurgens v. 
CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
469 See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) arguing that the most 
important factor to determine willfulness is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct 
based on all the facts and circumstances, although providing an illustrative set of factors to 
take into consideration “(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas of another; (2) 
whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good faith belief that 
it was invalid or not infringed; (3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) the 
defendant’s size and fi nancial condition; (5) the closeness of the case; (6) the duration of the 
defendant’s misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; and (8) the defendant’s 
motivation for willfully infringing.
470 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 14, warning about the risks of inadvertent infringement and 
the possibility of its prevalence due to decreasing quality of patents, uncertain borders and an 
overall failure of the patent notice system in the U.S. See also Chapter IV below, on the law 
and economic analysis of inadvertent infringement within the choice between property and 
liability rules.
471 See Note, Th e Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Th ereof), 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
2007 (2005), available at: www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/118/April05/Notes/Disclosure_
FunctionFTX.pdf, arguing that: “Th e Federal Circuit’s will-ful infringement rules, for 
example, encourage innovators to protect themselves from treble damages by remaining 
“willfully ignorant” of the patents in their fi eld.”
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Th e recent decision in Re Seagate472, changed the way in which the CAFC 
interprets the standard for willfulness, now requiring a much higher standard to 
prove that an infringement was in eff ect willful. Whereas the standard previous 
to Seagate only required a proof akin to negligence, the court raised such 
threshold:
“Accordingly, we overrule the standard set out in Underwater Devices and hold that 
proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a 
showing of objective recklessness. Because we abandon the affi  rmative duty of due 
care, we also reemphasize that there is no affi  rmative obligation to obtain opinion of 
counsel”473
A question posed aft er the eBay case and which still has not received any defi nite 
answer is whether injunctions should be denied in cases of willful infringement. 
Although the threat of enhanced damages in the U.S. might suffi  ce as a deterrent 
for infringement, this question is still subject to controversy. Th e U.S. Supreme 
Court did not give any guidance with regard to this question, but at least one 
court has found willful infringement yet denied injunctive relief for the 
owner.474
3.5. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
In the U.S., preliminary injunctions are subject to a test considering whether the 
plaintiff  might prove the following conditions: (1) a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) the balance of hardships; and (4)
the public interest.475
Although the eBay ruling directly refers to permanent injunctions, it raised 
doubts about whether the insights of the decision might be applied to preliminary 
injunctions. Some district courts have ruled in this sense, by not holding a 
472 See Seagate Technology, LLC, 2007 WL 2358677 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007).
473 Ibid at p. 5.
474 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corporation, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., 2006 WL 2385139, 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), vacated and remanded, where the District Court of Texas found 
that Toyota willfully infringed Paice’s patent but it deemed an injunction was not an 
appropriate remedy because Paice did not compete with Toyota. Th e court ordered that each 
future sale of a vehicle by Toyota be subject to a $25 per vehicle royalty to Paice, based on a 
hypothetical bargain approach. Th e decision of Toyota to continue the infringement would 
probably be taken into account in the calculation of royalties – Add the appellate decision 
which revised only the ongoing royalty issue, not the denial of injunctive relief –.
475 See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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presumption of irreparable harm upon a considerable likelihood of validity and 
infringement.476
3.6. OTHER LIABILITY RULES IN THE U.S.
It has been widely suggested that compulsory licenses for patents are highly 
exceptional or completely absent from U.S. patent law. A precedent from 1908 
held that even if competitors are excluded from the use of the new patent, such 
exclusion is on the very essence of the right conferred in the patent act and that it 
is the privilege of any owner, to use or not to use her property.477
In addition, several antitrust cases have expressed the U.S. view on compulsory 
licensing as opposing such provisions either in the context of debates for potential 
reforms of the Patent Act as well in the context of international negotiations. In 
eff ect, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in 1945 that:
“A patent owner is not in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or under any 
obligation to see that the public acquires the free right to use the invention. He has no 
obligation either to use it or to grant its use to others (…) Congress has repeatedly 
been asked and has refused to change a statutory policy by imposing a forfeiture or 
by a provision for compulsory licensing if the patent is not used within a specifi ed 
time. Statutory compulsory licenses are only provided for in the US in the Atomic 
Energy Act (42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2184) and the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1857 h-6), 
i.e., in cases where there is a particular public interest”.478
However, it is oft en acknowledged that compulsory licenses have been widely 
used by antitrust authorities as a remedy against violations of antitrust law, 
especially during the 1940s.479 Th ese cases however, mainly concerned patents 
476 John M. Griem Jr. and Anna Brook, ‘Ebay’ and Preliminary Injunctions Feature, Special to 
Th e National Law Journal, Th e National Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 35, May 12, 2008.
477 Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag.
478 See Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980); where the Court held that: “although compulsory 
licensing provisions were considered for possible incorporation into the 1952 revision of the 
patent laws, they were dropped before the fi nal bill was circulated.” Id. at 215 n. 21, citing 
House Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision and Amendment of the Patent Laws: 
Preliminary Draft , 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 91 (Comm. Print 1950). Th e Court characterized 
antitrust law and patent law as equivalents in importance: “Th e policy of free competition 
runs deep in our law… But the policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent 
system runs no less deep.” See Ibid at p. 221.
479 See Frederic Scherer, Th e Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 
(October 2007). KSG Working Paper No. RWP07–042, available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=963136, referring that: “between 1941 and the late 1950s, compulsory licensing 
decrees had been issued in settlement of more than 100 antitrust complaints, covering inter 
alia AT&T’s transistor and other telecommunications apparatus patents, IBM’s computer 
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abused by cartels or for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining a monopoly 
position which had been attained for other reasons. Th ese cases, however, mainly 
concerned patents abused by cartels or for the purpose of obtaining or 
maintaining a monopoly position which had been attained for reasons other 
than the “mere failure to work or refusal to license a patent”. Moreover, under 
the evolving and confl icting view about the interface between patents and 
antitrust law, such cases of antitrust compulsory licenses have diminished during 
the recent decades.480
4. U.K.
4.1. INJUNCTIONS AS AN EQUITABLE REMEDY
As an equitable remedy, an injunction is subject to the discretion of courts481, 
which may award damages as a substitute of an injunction based upon the 50 
Supreme Court Act of 1981. In practice, U.K. courts have only denied injunctions 
under unusual circumstances.482 Further exceptions are however provided by 
the same Patent Act, for instance, when a license of right has been fi lled.483
patents, and DuPont’s nylon and other synthetic fi ber patents. Th e cumulative number of 
patents aff ected is estimated to have been between 40,000 and 50,000”.
480 See Friedrich-Karl Beier, Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in 
Patent and Utility Model Law, IIC 1999, Heft 3, at p. 264–265 and accompanying footnotes; 
discussing the absence of obligations to work or license a patent both in U.S. and German 
Law, and citing, among others, section 24(1) of the 1981 German Patent Act which established 
that “a compulsory license may only be granted if the use of the invention is indispensable in 
the public interest” and “the patent owner refuses to permit the party seeking a license to use 
the invention against payment of a reasonable license fee and security”; acknowledging also 
the opinions of several scholars, according to which: “failure to work or insuffi  cient working 
of the invention, just as mere dependency, will not justify the grant of a compulsory license if 
there is no public interest in the invention being used”. See also Makan Delrahim, Forcing 
Firms To Share Th e Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing Of Intellectual Property Rights And 
Antitrust, Presented at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 
England, May 10, 2004, available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm, 
analyzing compulsory licenses in the context of antitrust remedies and arguing that they 
should be draft  as narrowly as possible but can be nevertheless useful for merger cases as a 
complement or alternative to divesture, or in non-merger cases when other, less restrictive 
remedies would most likely fail to address anticompetitive conduct by a defendant.
481 See David Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, (Pearson Education Limited, Sixth edition. 
2006), p. 460–461.
482 See Banks v. EMI Songs Ltd (No.2), [1996] EMLR 452, a musical copyright case described by 
its own trial judge as “wholly exceptional”.
483 See Bainbridge, supra note 482, at p. 463, describing how an injunction will not be granted 
against a defendant that had applied for such license and the amount of damages will also be 
limited recoverable against him is limited to a maximum of double the amount that he would 
have paid had the infringing acts all been done under the license. However, if the infringer 
did not have a license and failed to undertake to apply for a license of right an injunction 
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Injunctions are generally awarded when two conditions are met484: 1) that 
invasion of a property right is demonstrated and 2) that repetition is 
threatened.485 Nonetheless, courts have considered that even if such conditions 
are met, injunctions should not be granted if their eff ect would be oppressive486, 
but they have been precautious in fi nding “oppressive” eff ects and have usually 
avoided a test to balance the convenience of an injunctive order.487
Nevertheless, nothing prevents judges to discretionally balance the interest of 
the parties and the public interest.488 Courts also enjoy signifi cant discretion to 
grant a stay of any injunction where there is an appeal.489
could be imposed and damages would not be limited but set at the actual amount caused to 
the plaintiff .
484 See Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co. Ltd. (No. 2), [2006] RPC 4, where judges concluded 
that because the copyright infringement only related to minor aspects of the soft ware, an 
injunctive order was too extreme: “Generally, an injunction will be granted where the 
invasion of a property right is demonstrated, and where repetition is threatened.
485 Such requirements are similar to the Italian test for granting injunctive relief and also present 
in certain U.S. decisions For instance, in Mershon v. O’Neill (1934, CA2 NY) 73 F2d. 68, it was 
held that absent threat of further infringement, there was no basis for injunction. Compare 
with Crier v. Innes (1909, CA2 Vt) 170 F 324 (superseded by statute and American Medical Sys. 
v. Medical Eng’g. Corp. (1993, CA FC 6 F3d 1523, 28 USPQ2d 1321) holding that an injunction 
would not necessarily be prevented if defendant had ceased to infringe and promised not to 
infringe in the future. For more cases see also LEXSTAT 35 USC 283, at lexis; p. 26–27 US 
Decisions; fi nd Italian decisions on the matter.
486 See Navitaire v. Easyjet; supra note 485, quoting from Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, which 
cites the working rule laid by A.L. Smith in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. 
(1895), and arguing that: “an exception to the general rule is that an injunction will not be 
granted where the eff ect of the grant of the injunction is oppressive”.
487 Ibid, stating that: “…my understanding of the word “oppressive” in this context is that the 
eff ect of the grant of the injunction would be grossly disproportionate to the right protected. 
Th e word “grossly” avoids any suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance of 
convenience”. A working test to evaluate the circumstances of the case was developed in 
Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co l (1895, 1, Ch. 287), by Smith LJ and re-affi  rmed 
by Aldous J. Th e working rule states: “If the injury to plaintiff ’s legal rights is small; and is one 
which is capable of being estimated in money; and is one which can adequately be 
compensated by a small money payment; and the case is one in which it would be oppressive 
to the defendant to grant an injunction”.
488 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 10), 1995, FSR 325, arguing that “However the 
Court’s discretion under the section is not limited. Th erefore the court should in appropriate 
circumstances take into account the interests of persons who would be aff ected by the grant 
of the injunction. Th at may involve considering the interests of the public”.
489 See the opinion by Buckley LJ in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. V. Johnson & 
Johnson Ltd. (1976, RPC 72), stating that consideration should be given to whether the appeal 
was made in good faith, the likelihood of the appeal being successful, damage caused to the 
parties in each case and more in general, the particular facts of the case.
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4.2. DISCRETION TO AWARD DAMAGES IN LIEU OF 
INJUNCTIONS
U.K. courts hence enjoy ample discretion to award damages instead of 
injunctions, that is, the possibility of awarding ex-post liability rules in the sense 
used here of switching from a property to a liability rule. A working test to 
identify cases in which damages could substitute an injunction was developed in 
the Shelfer case:
“If the injury to plaintiff ’s legal rights is small; and is one which is capable of being 
estimated in money; and is one which can adequately be compensated by a small 
money payment; and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant 
to grant an injunction”.490
However, the Shelfer case included three separate judgments; two of which 
expressing rather divergent views. Th e verdict by Lindley warned that injunctions 
should not be denied in order to grant infringers the possibility to buy-out their 
infringement but only under exceptional circumstances. In citing such 
exceptional circumstances, Justice Lindley included trivial and occasional 
nuisances, cases in which the claimant has shown that he only wants money, 
vexatious and oppressive cases and cases where the claimant has so conducted 
himself as to render it unjust to give him more than pecuniary relief, thus 
describing a broader set of cases in which injunctions could be denied in order to 
avoid patentee’s strategic behavior.491
In contrast, the opinion by Judge Smith’s laid down a narrow and cumulative set 
of standards, which has been however read as being non-exhaustive. In general, 
it is argued that when the criterion of Smith’s test is met, U.K. courts are very 
likely to refuse an injunction whereas if it is not met, courts would refuse 
injunctions only in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, such circumstances 
have encompassed cases when “the claimant may have no real objection to the 
defendant’s use of the work other than the fact that it is not licensed”; “the 
claimant’s main aim may be to prevent competition by putting the defendant out 
of business”; where “the claimant has only off ered a license at an unreasonably 
high fee” or when the infringer acted in “good faith and in ignorance of the 
rights (of the claimant), and thereby inadvertently placed himself in a position 
where the grant of an injunction would either force him to yield to the 
(claimant’s) extortionate demands or expose him to substantial loss”.492
490 See Judge Smith’s opinion in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895, 1, Ch. 287).
491 See Gwilym Harbottle, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Cases: When Will Th ey Be 
Refused. European Intellectual Property Review, 23(3), 2001.
492 See Isenberg v. East India House Estate Co. Ltd, (1863) 3 De G. J. & S. 263 at 273, cited by 
Millett L.J. in Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, at p. 207 and stating that “it is the duty of the 
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However, it is widely understood that the mere fact that the defendant is willing 
to pay damages does not free him from the threat of an injunction, since that 
would simply grant the infringer a license legalizing the misconduct:
“Accordingly the grant or refusal of a fi nal injunction is not merely a matter of the 
balance of convenience. Justice requires that the court observe the principles 
enunciated in Shelfer’s case and remembers that if the eff ect of the grant of an 
injunction is not oppressive the defendant cannot buy his way out of it, even if the 
price, objectively ascertained, would be modest. My understanding of the word 
“oppressive” in this context is that the eff ect of the grant of the injunction would be 
grossly disproportionate to the right protected. Th e word “grossly” avoids any 
suggestion that all that has to be done is to strike a balance of convenience”493 
(emphasis added)
In a recent case concerning a copyright infringement on computer soft ware and 
databases, and involving Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co., a U.K. court found 
that the balance tilted against a permanent injunction.494 Whereas the claimant 
owned the copyright in various works embedded in the source code of a ticketless 
airline booking system called “OperRes”, Easyjet had taken a license of the 
OperRes system. Aft er two years of the licensing agreement, Easyjet decided to 
develop its own booking system given that the claimant could not or was unable 
to modify the module giving access to the world-wide-web. Th e copyright owners 
were successful only in establishing infringement in minor aspects of the 
soft ware and hence, the remedy was deemed to be too extreme. Mr. Justice 
Pumfrey expressed:
“Generally, an injunction will be granted where the invasion of a property right is 
demonstrated, and where repetition is threatened. An exception to the general rule is 
that an injunction will not be granted where the eff ect of the grant of the injunction 
is oppressive”495
court not to deliver over the defendant to the claimant bound hand and foot in order that the 
defendant may be made subject to any extortionate demand that the claimant may seek to 
make. If the court granted injunctions in such circumstances it would eff ectively make itself 
an instrument of oppression”. See also the decision in Jaggard, Ibid, arguing that a defendant 
may have acted in good faith or inadvertently and “the grant of an injunction would either 
force him to yield to the [claimant]’s extortionate demands or expose him to substantial loss”. 
Similarly, the decision in Banks cited as one of the reasons why the court refused an injunction 
when “the claimant had made it plain that what she really wanted was money”.
493 See Navitaire Inc v. Easyjet Airline Co., supra note 485 citing and following the precedent of 
Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch 287.
494 Ibid.
495 Ibid following Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, and also citing the working rule laid by 
Justice A.L. Smith in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895).
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Injunctions have also been denied in cases regarding confi dential information 
under the application of a balance of convenience.496 In one of these decisions, 
Judge Megarry J’s discerned a number of circumstances according to which it 
might be appropriate to make the defendant pay only for what he had taken: (1) 
When defendant was copying only subconsciously or for some innocent reason; (2) 
According to the gratuitous manner of plaintiff ’s communication; (3) When the 
defendant was not himself using the idea but pursuing an alternative in 
collaboration with another producer; (4) Th e extent of defendant’s own contribution 
to the design of successful product; (5) Whether information was economic or 
personal; (6) Th e relatively mundane or subsidiary character of the information 
that was copied and (7) Th e fact that the information had become public.497
Such working rule might be complemented by third parties or the public 
concerns. Courts also enjoy signifi cant discretion to grant a stay of any injunction 
where there is an appeal.498 Considerable discretion also surrounds the granting 
of injunctive relief and the design of injunctions; meaning not only that 
injunctions might be limited or denied but also they might be awarded in cases 
where other jurisdictions do not. Th e High Court in the Patents Court interpreted 
that Section 37 of the U.K. Supreme Court Act 1981 gave the court the 
jurisdiction, inter alia to grant post-expiry injunctions, especially when an 
infringer holds an advantage over its competitors, case in which the court 
deemed that forbidding use for further 12 months would put the patentee in the 
position it would have been, had her patents rights been respected.499
In addition, designing the appropriate scope for an injunction might be an 
important policy lever for cases in which a patent covers minor parts of a 
complex product and thus, injunctions might give raise to holdups.500
496 See William Cornish and David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Allied Rights, London Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edition, (2003), at p. 329, 
fi ft h edition, citing Seager v Copydex N° 1, 1967 2, All E.R., 415 at 418 where the court of 
appeal refused injunction and left  defendant to relief in damages and Coco v. Clark, 1964, 
R.P.C. 41 at 50, idem.
497 See Judgment of Megarry J’s in Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers), 1964, R.P.C. 41 at 50, cited in 
Cornish and Llewelyn, supra note 497, at p. 329–330.
498 See supra note 490.
499 See Crossley v. Derby Gas Light Co., 1834, 4LT Ch 25 and confi rmed by Dyson Appliances Ltd. 
V. Hoover Ltd N° 2., in Bainbridge, supra note 482at p. 454. In this case, a large quantity of 
infringing vacuum cleaners was sold and stocked and the High Court in the Patents Court 
interpreted s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to give jurisdiction, inter alia, to grant post-
expiry injunctions. See also Kirin-Amgem Inc. v. Transkaryotic Th erapies Inc. (N° 2) 1998, FSR 
1. Compare with other countries that reject the award of post-expiry injunctions. But see also 
Ibid, at p. 458, arguing that “if secondary damages were recoverable, an injunction was 
unnecessary, providing these damages could be assessed” Th is reasoning is similar to those of 
some U.S. Courts, such as that of Innogenetics v. Abbott, supra note 463.
500 See Cofl exip SA v Stolt Comex Seaway MS Ltd which changed the judicial practice of granting 
broad injunctions that basically repeat the terms of the patent’s claims. Compare with U.S. 
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4.3. THE RATIONALE OF EXPOST LIABILITY RULES IN 
THE U.K.
U.K. courts have tended to limit the circumstances in which damages might 
substitute injunctions, however recognizing the possibility that plaintiff s might 
use an injunction to extract a royalty fee greater than the value of the right, or to 
extort the defendant. In the Shelfer case, the decision by Lindley L.J., emphasized 
the attention that should be paid during the exercise of discretion to well-settled 
principles, in particular the principle that the court will not “allow a wrong to 
continue simply because the wrongdoer is able and willing to pay for the injury 
he may infl ict”.501
Scholars have also described how several cases refl ect the principles of Shelter 
while other cases have denied injunctions in a broader set of circumstances.502 
Th is latter group of cases refl ects the importance of discretion to encompass new 
situations where injunctive relief might result too costly or give raise to strategic 
behavior.503 As Millett L.J. pointed out in Jaggard, this does involve the court 
scholars F. Scott Kieff , Richard A. Epstein, and R. Polk Wagner, Various Law & Economics 
Professors as Amicus Curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court Docket # 05–130, eBay v. MercExchange, 
arguing that: “No court should issue an injunction unless it is possible for the enjoined party 
to know what conduct is prohibited and what is not. Overbroad injunctions improperly 
curtail the defendant’s right to conduct its own business as it sees fi t, so any system of 
discretion must necessarily see that the remedy in question is tailored to the underlying 
wrong” and citing Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), where the court of appeals held that: “Th e district court determined that Fuji’s 
proposed injunction lacked specifi city and reasonable detail as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
65(d)”.
501 Such exceptional cases in which an injunction could be denied would be the following: when 
the infringement consist on a trivial and occasional nuisance; when the claimant has shown 
that he only wants money; in vexatious and oppressive cases; and in such cases where the 
claimant’s behavior has been such as to render it unjust to give him more than pecuniary 
relief.
502 See Harbottle, supra note 492, at p. 154–155.
503 Ibid, referring the hypothesis that would likely be considered by courts in order to 
(exceptionally) deny injunctive relief: 1) cases where the claimant does not have a bona fi de 
exception against the defendants’ use of its work “as in Ludlow or Banks, the claimant may 
have no real objection to the defendant’s use of the work other than the fact that it is not 
licensed or, as in Ocular Sciences, the claimant’s main aim may be to prevent competition by 
putting the defendant out of business. In such circumstances the court will lean against the 
grant of an injunction; 2) Where “the claimant has only off ered a licence at an unreasonably 
high fee, the court may decide merely to award damages, provided of course the defendant is 
solvent and willing to pay a reasonable fee (…); 3) As Millett L.J. made clear in Jaggard v 
Sawyer, supra note 294, it may be that the defendant acted “openly and in good faith and in 
ignorance of the [claimant]’s rights, and thereby inadvertently placed himself in a position 
where the grant of an injunction would either force him to yield to the [claimant]’s 
extortionate demands or expose him to substantial loss”; 4) In Banks, “Th e claimant’s 
copyright in the lyrics of a song performed by the band UB40 had been infringed. Jacob J. 
refused an injunction and ordered damages to be assessed. He gave two reasons. One was 
that the claimant had made it plain that what she really wanted was money…”
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giving its sanction to the expropriation of the claimant’s rights.504 On the other 
hand, courts have also acknowledge the perils of strategic behavior, which could 
allow a claimant to extort a defendant:
“it is the duty of the court not to deliver over the defendant to the claimant bound 
hand and foot in order that the defendant may be made subject to any extortionate 
demand that the claimant may seek to make”.505 Th is set of cases resembles factual 
considerations in eBay and related cases506 in the sense of preventing extortionist 
behavior and the use of patents as bargaining chips instead than as mechanism to 
provide innovation incentives.
Moreover, given the fact that injunctions are equitable in nature, innocent 
infringers could, according to the circumstances of the case, fall into an 
exceptional denial of injunctions. For instance, whereas the standard remedies 
in cases of infringement were provided for in the old section 18(1) of the UK 
Copyright Act 1956507, however, such remedy was considered as “being grossly 
unfair in many cases, treating the infringing articles as having belonged to the 
plaintiff ”.508 Th e Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 limited such remedy 
in subsection (2) such that “damages for conversion are not to be awarded if the 
defendants believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that the articles so 
made or intended to be made were not or (as the case may be) would not be, 
infringing copies”.509
4.4. OTHER EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: COMPULSORY 
LICENSES
Most commentators agree that, amidst considerable discretion to deny 
injunctions, this happens only in few cases, mainly upon public interest and 
especially public health reasons.510 A possible explanation as to why courts do 
504 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294.
505 See the opinion by Lord Westbury in Isenberg v. East India House Estate Co. Ltd.
506 See Harbottle, supra note 492 at p. 155–156.
507 Th e copyright Act established that “Subject to the provisions of this Act, the owner of any 
copyright shall be entitled to all such rights and remedies, in respect of the conversion or 
detention by any person of any infringing copy… as he would be entitled to if he were the 
owner of every such copy or plate and had been the owner thereof since the time when it was 
made…”
508 See Banks v. EMI Songs Limited (Formerly CBS Songs Limited) and Others (No. 2), [1996] 
E.M.L.R. 452, at p. 2.
509 Ibid at p. 2–3.
510 In Biogen Inc v. Medeva plc (1992, Chancery Division), the defendant claimed that the grant of 
an injunction would lead to loss of human life and/or avoidable damage to human health. Th e 
patent related to a vaccine for Hepatitis B. In Rousell-Uclaf v. G D Searle & Co Ltd, 1977, FSR 
125 at 131, it was held that “a life saving drug is in an exceptional position…it is at the least 
very doubtful if the court in its discretion even ought to grant an injunction”. In Chiron Corp 
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not oft en substitute injunctions, and which is also plausible for other countries, 
was provided by the decision of Chiron v. Organon.511 Th e judge referred to the 
exceptions and limitations established in the Patent statutes, including license of 
rights and other compulsory licenses, highlighting how public interest might be 
better served through these means:
“For instance, the Crown can authorise the use of the patent in certain circumstances. 
Th at suggests that the interests of the public will normally be protected by the 
provisions of the Patents Act 1977 and an injunction should normally be granted 
restraining infringement unless the contrary is indicated in the Act. Th us it is a good 
working rule that an injunction will be granted to prevent continued infringement of 
a patent, even though that would have the eff ect of enforcing a monopoly, thereby 
restricting competition and maintaining prices. Something more should be 
established before the Court will depart from the good working rule suggested in the 
Shelfer case”.512
Such view is nonetheless in contradiction to a previous case, which held that 
injunctions should be rarely given for a life-saving drug:
“A life-saving drug is in an exceptional position. Th ere are oft en cases where a number 
of drugs exist alongside each other and are in general all equally effi  cacious for a 
particular ailment or disease. If the evidence shows it to be the fact that there may 
well be cases where it would make little, if any, diff erence to the public, apart from 
satisfying personal preference, whether a particular drug was no longer available or 
not, then in such a case it may well be proper to grant an injunction. At the other end 
of the scale, however, there is the unique life-saving drug where, in my judgment, it is 
at least very doubtful if the court in its discretion ever ought to grant an injunction 
and I cannot at present think of any circumstances where it should. Th ere are infi nite 
variations between these two limits”.513
Nonetheless, the U.K. Patent Act establishes several compulsory licensing 
provisions. Firstly, for the case of lack of working or inadequate working of a 
v. Organon Teknika Ltd., supra note 489, the defendant argued that an injunction would be 
contrary to the public interest. Th e patent in question related prevent the public having access 
to the kits and would hinder research and development.
511 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd, supra note 489.
512 See Chiron Corp v. Organon Teknika Ltd., supra note 489. Conversely, a previous case held 
that injunctions should be rarely given for a life-saving drug, at least when there are no 
substitutes (Roussel-Uclcaf v. GD Searle Co Ltd, 1977 FSR 125 at 131): “A life-saving drug is in 
an exceptional position. Th ere are oft en cases where a number of drugs exist alongside each 
other and are in general all equally effi  cacious for a particular ailment or disease… At the 
other end of the scale, however, there is the unique life-saving drug where, in my judgment, it 
is at least very doubtful if the court in its discretion ever ought to grant an injunction and I 
cannot at present think of any circumstances where it should. Th ere are infi nite variations 
between these two limits”.
513 See Roussel-Uclcaf v. GD Searle Co Ltd, 1977 FSR 125 at 131.
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patent, it is possible to ask for a compulsory license aft er three years have elapsed 
from the patent grant.514 In addition, U.K. law also provides for compulsory 
licensing to be used in the case of a dependent patent. Th is provision might be 
used aft er three years from the patent grant, and it allows any interested person 
to obtain a compulsory license if the working of an invention which makes a 
substantial contribution to the art is hindered and if the patentee refuses to 
license the required patent. Both compulsory licensing provisions as well as other 
provisions were reformed to adapt to the standards established by the TRIPS 
Agreement.515
In addition, among the possible remedies for anticompetitive behavior, there is 
the possibility of using compulsory licenses. Th e legal basis for the application of 
Antitrust or Competition Law to patent cases is found on Article 82 of the EC 
Agreement. In fact, a compulsory license might constitute a remedy for diff erent 
types of anti-competitive behavior, including, a unilateral refusal to deal deals 
with the duty to provide access that might in some cases relate to a patent. In 
eff ect, Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty, provides that behavior consisting on 
“limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers” might be considered as an abuse of a dominant position. A 
Discussion Paper on Article 82, authored by the DG Competition and which 
opened a wide discussion on these matters, expressed that “a refusal to supply 
may be classifi ed as an exclusionary abuse”.516
In the framework of Article 82 of the EC Agreement, a U.K. court ordered in a 
relatively recent case517 that the competition aspects were to be treated separately 
from the patent law issues.518 Aft er failed negotiations between the parties, the 
514 See Section 48B of the U.K. Patents Act.
515 See the U.K. Patents Act 1977 (as amended), comparing new provisions introduced aft er the 
enactment of the TRIPS Agreement, expanding the countries assimilated to the domestic 
markets, available at: www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf.
516 See DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty 
to exclusionary abuses, 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
art82/discpaper2005.pdf, at paragraph 210, and opened for public consultation, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html.
517 See Intel Corporation v. Via Technologies Inc. and HC 01 C 04136 Intel Corporation v. Via 
Technologies Inc. [2002] EWHC 1159, where “Jacob J. ordered that the competition law aspects 
of both infringement actions should be tried together, but separately from the patent law 
issues. Trial on the competition law aspects was therefore set down in the Patents Court list 
for May 2003, following trial on infringement and validity which was set down for December 
2002 (chipset action) and February 2003 (CPU)”. Th e case is currently under appeal.
518 See ibid, supra note, arguing that: “Th e same practice was adopted in the earlier case of Philips 
v. Ingman, where Laddie J. ordered that the competition issues should be tried only aft er 
liability for patent infringement had been established. Th is approach has the virtue that the 
signifi cant costs of disclosure and trial of the competition law defences are avoided in cases 
where the patent is invalid or the acts of the defendant do not fall within the scope of the 
claims”.
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patentee refused to grant a license519 and as a consequence, the defendant argued 
that this decision would force consumers to adopt a more expensive standard.520 
According to UK case law such compulsory licenses have been interpreted as 
confi ned to exceptional circumstances and as a consequence:
“any defendant that seeks a compulsory licence under a patent on the grounds that 
the situation is exceptional will have to plead explicitly the essential facts that 
comprise the exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the defence will be disposed of 
summarily”.521
Many open questions in fact surround the application of Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to patents, especially in the context of patent infringement cases. Th e 
approach is variable from country to country, as it has also varied along the time 
in the decisions of the same European Court of Justice. In Volvo/Renault, the 
Court of Justice applied a cautious approach to the possibility of using a 
compulsory license for design rights.522 While the court ruled that IP right 
owners are free to refuse a license as this constitutes a core part of their right to 
exclude, the court also acknowledged that the exercise of an exclusive IP right 
can still be abusive when particular circumstances are in place.523
In a subsequent case, however, a more aggressive application of Article 82 took 
place when the court decided to uphold a duty to license an IP right. Th e case 
concerned precisely broadcasters of the UK and Ireland that separately published 
519 Ibid at p. “Th e details of the allegations of breach of Article 82 were diff erent in the two 
actions. However, Via essentially relied on Intel’s refusal to grant a patent licence. In the CPU 
action, Via complained that Intel refused to continue to license its CPU patents covering the 
Socket 370 features on the microprocessor. As a result, micro-processors that could be 
inserted into the Socket 370 on existing motherboards would be removed from the market 
even though there was still demand for them.
520 Th is would hinder existing owners of PCs from upgrading their processors and would force 
them to adopt the more expensive Pentium 4 technology. In the Chipset action, Via 
complained about Intel’s refusal to license the Intel patents covering the interconnect between 
the Pentium 4 processor and the chipset, which was a de facto industry standard. Th is meant 
that Via could not sell chipsets compatible with the Pentium 4 microprocessor. Via was 
willing to pay substantial royalties for the compulsory licences that it sought from the court. 
Intel in fact off ered Via a limited licence to manufacture chipsets compatible with the Pentium 
4 processor, but only on terms that would have prevented Viafrom off ering the most advanced 
products in this class. Via declined the off er.
521 See Brand supra note 223, at p. 5, citing judgments of Laddie J. in Philips v. Ingman, n. 6 above, 
at para. 63; and Neuberger J. in Sandvik v. Pfi ff ner, n. 8 above.
522 See AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd (1988) ECR 6211 and Case 53/87, Consorzio Italiano della 
componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli and Maxicar v. Regie nationale des usines Renault 
(1988) ECR 6039, both decided on similar substantial reasons. Th e main issue in this case was 
that the exclusiveness of design rights over components of a complex product, such as 
automobiles might preclude the production and commercialization of such spare-parts by 
other manufacturers. Such exclusiveness can originate or extend a monopoly over the 
aft ermarket for spare parts. See also infra note 108 on the problem of aft ermarkets.
523 Cite.
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weekly television guides.524 Magill was interested in publishing a comprehensive 
weekly guide that included all broadcasters but the information necessary to 
develop such product was denied by each broadcaster. Th e Commission decided 
to accord a duty to license and the Court of First Instance also upheld the 
decision. Th e Court of Justice fi nally held that the refusal to license an IP could 
not be considered as a general abuse although it could constitute such abuse in 
“exceptional circumstances”. Th ree reasons were argued for such decision: (1) 
that a new product for which there is consumer demand is prevented; (2) that the 
IP holders kept the secondary market for themselves and excluded all competition 
and (3) that there was no objective justifi cation for such refusal. Th ese brief 
overview only shows the controversial and still open debate that surrounds the 
use of compulsory licenses for patent rights as the application of antitrust law.525
5. ITALY
Italian patent law has recently undergone several reforms including the coming 
into force of the Code of Industrial Property (hereinaft er CPI).526 Th e draft ing of 
a unique Code was justifi ed by the increasing and dispersed amount of IP laws 
and hence the necessity to simplify rules and procedures527 as well as a political 
determination to protect private investment and market competition.528 Th e CPI 
set aside copyrights and related rights, a choice that was criticized especially 
524 See Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, OJ 1989 L 78/43, case T-69/89, Radio Telefi s Eireann 
(RTE) v. Commission (1991) ECR II-485, confi rming the case on appeal.
525 Th e literature on this matter is profuse and characterized by wide divergences. Nonetheless, 
the focus of this thesis is on patent law provisions that allow the switch from a property to a 
liability rule, hence the brief reference to the application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which 
would require further consideration.
526 See the Legislative Decree N. 30 of February 10, 2005 (hereinaft er Industrial Property Code) 
and Legislative Decree, March 16, 2006, n.140, implementing Directive 2004/48/CE on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights introducing some modifi cations, especially with 
regard to remedies.
527 See for instance, Alessandro Albini, in www.ubertazzi.it/it/censnorme/censimentobrevetti.
pdf, quoted by Ubertazzi (ed.), Commentario breve alle leggi su proprietà 
intellettuale e concorrenza, 4 ed., (Cedam, Padova, 2007), pp. 3037, accounting for 360 
diff erent sources of law applicable to patents, and fi nding at least 205 provisions from 1859 to 
2001. See also Ubertazzi at p. 166–167, providing as a second motivation for the CPI the 
heterogeneous character of IP provisions, and how the interpretation of rules was oft en 
diffi  cult due to the coexistence of diff erent regulations conceived in diff erent historical times 
as well as the international and European laws also applicable to these matters; a third 
explanation provided by this author is regulatory competition which produces deregulation 
and at the same time a trend of simplifi cation of applicable laws accompanied by the political 
will of the Italian government at the time of discussion of the CPI in subjects related to the 
regulation of the market, competition and industrial property rights.
528 See Ubertazzi 528, at p. 167, arguing that the Legislative Decree 273/2002, gave priority to the 
protection of private rights, enterprises and market competition, responding to political 
objectives of the government (free translation).
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because it was in contrast with the model set for by the TRIPS Agreement which 
regulates all IP fi elds.529
In terms of procedural law, including remedies, the CPI did not introduce as 
many changes as the subsequent reform pursuant to the EU Directive on 
Enforcement.530 With regard to remedies, the CPI explicitly sets up the possibility 
for courts to issue preliminary and fi nal injunctions, delivery up, seizure and 
other corrective measures. As a consequence, remedies that were previously 
available only for certain rights, are now also applicable to IP rights in general.531 
However, such extended application of remedies to all IP rights had also prevailed 
before the enactment of the CPI although with some contrary decisions and 
scholarly debate.532
Nevertheless, when small procedural changes such as making injunctions and 
other corrective measures available for all categories of IP rights are integrated 
with the entire reform of substantial IP law, they could be arguably understood 
as following an expansionist view over IP rights as well as the evidence of an 
increasing IP protectionist trend. Th is trend seems to respond to the view of IP 
rights as property over intangible rights that deserve all the remedies available 
for real property and in general, to the view – shared by other countries as the 
case of U.S. – that since IP fosters innovation, more IP protection would always 
foster more innovation.
In fact, a clearly related question that emerges is whether procedural rules in IP 
and patent law are – and whether they should be – autonomous with respect to 
general – civil – procedural rules.533 Th is is part of the broader debate about 
529 See Ubertazzi 528, at p. 168–169, criticizing the decision of leaving copyrights and related 
rights out of the CPI; “Anzitutto la scelta di escludere dal codice i diritti d’autore e connessi 
non e condivisibile sul piano sistematico (…) in secondo luogo l’esclusione dei diritti di autore 
e connessi dal progetto di codice comporta una serie di inconvenienti sui diversi piani del 
diritto materiale e di quello processuale (…).”
530 See Marco Spolidoro, Profi li Processuali del Codice della Proprieta’ Industriale, Diritto 
Industriale, 2008, 2, 174, arguing that few changes were introduced at the procedural level 
by either the CPI and the Enforcement Directive; (free translation of the original text: “se si 
eccettua infatti l’estensione alle materie di competenza delle sezioni specializzate del c.d. 
processo societario (estensione poi caduta sotto la scure della Corte costituzionale, con 
generale soddisfazione dei pratici), si può anzi dire che le novità di maggiore importanza sono 
arrivate dopo l’emanazione del codice, con l’attuazione della Direttiva 2004/48/CE sul rispetto 
dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale”).
531 See Adriano Vanzetti, Rivista di Diritto Industriale 04, I (2007), 102 sustaining that 
Article 124 of the CPI extends the possibility of obtaining fi nal injunctions for all industrial 
property rights, which would strengthen protection for IP rights for “diritti non titolati” or 
atypical rights, in particular the “ditta” and “insegna “.
532 See infra note 536.
533 See Spolidoro, supra note 531, arguing in favor of the autonomy of procedural IP rules; (“Le 
conclusioni cui siamo pervenuti partendo dal concetto dell’autonomia del diritto processuale 
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whether the treatment of IP shall or not be diff erent than that granted to other 
property rights, and if the answer is affi  rmative, whether such treatment shall be 
more or less protective.
With respect to compulsory licensing provisions, the CPI did not introduce 
major reforms as these were mainly incorporated at the time of implementing 
the TRIPS Agreement. A minor reform was introduced with respect to the 
prohibition for infringers to opt for a compulsory license in the sense of 
reaffi  rming the prohibition unless infringers are in good faith. Although the 
possible practical impact of such reform might be minimal, it is discussed in 
more detail below.
5.1. PROPERTY RULES: FINAL INJUNCTIONS
Th e Italian CPI establishes that the decision ascertaining the infringement of an 
industrial property right might include an order known as inibitoria to prohibit 
the fabrication, commercialization and use of infringing goods and also a 
permanent order to withdraw the infringing goods from the channels of 
commerce.534 Before the CPI, Italian law only explicitly regulated preliminary 
injunctions, although judges and scholars in general admitted the use of 
permanent injunctions.535 Hence, for a long time scholarly discussions centered 
industriale sono dunque due: – inammissibilità del ricorso agli istituti del diritto processuale 
civile comune dove esistano istituti del diritto processuale della proprietà industriale e 
intellettuale che, anche in senso lato, adempiano la stessa funzione; – impossibilità di una 
commistione (o contaminazione) della disciplina delle misure di tutela proprie del diritto 
industriale e del diritto della proprietà intellettuale con la disciplina delle (omologhe) misure 
del diritto processuale civile”); however recognizing that procedural IP rules are not complete 
and hence might be supported by the general procedural rules; (“L’asprezza di queste 
conclusioni deve essere tuttavia mitigata dall’ovvia considerazione che il diritto processuale 
della proprietà industriale e intellettuale è sì un sistema, ma non è completo: esso si appoggia, 
per così dire, sul tronco del diritto comune, che gli fornisce sostanza e forma”) and moreover, 
making a distinction between the infl uence of general procedural rules on IP procedural rules 
at the legislative level, which he judges as harmful whereas at the level of application – and 
interpretation – of the rules such infl uence is deemed as less harmful. (“In eff etti, come già 
detto, se le norme processuali ora dettate dal Codice della Proprietà Industriale (e dalla legge 
sul diritto d’autore) costituiscono un sistema autonomo, esse non sono tuttavia complete. 
Perciò, se l’interpretazione, condotta sulla base del microsistema del diritto industriale, non 
conduce a risultati certi, è legittimo, anzi doveroso, rivolgersi al diritto comune”).
534 See Codice della Proprieta Industriale, Article 124: “Con la sentenza che accerta la 
violazione di un diritto di proprieta industriale possono essere disposti l’inibitoria della 
fabricazione, del commercio e dell’uso delle cose costituenti violazione del diritto e l’ordine di 
ritiro defi nitvo dal commercio delle medesime cose nei confronti di chi ne sea proprietario o 
ne abbia comunque disponibilita…”.
535 See Ubertazzi 528, at p. 606, referring that previous laws did not explicitly provide for 
permanent injunctions – although Article 2599 of the civil code on unfair competition was 
applicable to non registered marks. Ubertazzi also refers how scholars had for long accepted 
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on whether judges could grant permanent injunctions in patent cases, given that 
they were not explicitly established in the industrial property laws.
Within this debate, scholars also disagreed about the nature of inibitoria and 
specifi cally about whether this measure should be considered a mere declaration 
of infringement or susceptible of being executed as a judicial decision. Th e 
principal result of considering injunctions as a judicial decision is that non-
compliance would constitute an off ense – one potentially giving rise to 
administrative sanctions equivalent to the contempt of court of common law 
countries – with the additional obligation to pay a monetary sanction or penalita 
di mora, equivalent to the astraintes of French Law. Some authors have even also 
sustained that non-compliance could give rise to criminal sanctions established 
by Article 388, c. 1, of the criminal code.536
Judicial decisions frequently cite as requirements for granting injunctions the 
repeated violation of a right and the risk of continuous repetition of such 
violation.537 However, the majority of scholars and decisions have held that it is 
not necessary to prove any objective harm or any subjective element or intention 
in order to obtain an injunction, requirements that would only be necessary in 
order to obtain an award of damages.538 Injunctions have been hence denied in 
cases lacking the abovementioned requirements – as considered by judicial 
decisions and scholar’s work. An ulterior case of denial regards patents or other 
IP right that are about to expire. In this way, an extension of protection over IP 
rights beyond their statutory duration is avoided. Similar decisions can be found 
in the U.S. and the U.K.
the jurisdiction of judges to grant permanent injunctions and citing Frignani supra note 297, 
at p. 309; Marco Spolidoro, Le misure di prevenzione nel diritto industriale, Milano 1982, at 
p. 111; and judicial decisions by Trib. Vicenza 6–10–1990, in GADI 91, 295 (“la misura della 
destruzione ha carattere restitutorio, mirando ad eliminare lo stato di fatto contrario al 
diritto venutosi a creare per eff etto della contraff azione”); App. Catania 12–9–1984 ivi 84, 
606. Decisions against this position are few and isolated, for instance, Trib. Bari 10–6–1974 
ivi 74, 815.
536 But see decision by the Cass. pen. Sez. VI, 19/03/1997, n. 4298, holding that such criminal 
sanctions are just explicitly used for a permanent decision (sentenza di condanna) and not for 
an interim measure (misura cautelar). Th e decision also interpreted the old provision of 
art. 83 r.d. 29 giugno 1939 n. 1127 (inibitoria sui brevetti per invenzioni industriali) as an 
interim measure. See Adriano Vanzettti. Brevi considerazioni in tema di inibitoria. Diritto 
industriale, 2007, N. 4/5, p. 167.
537 Some authors criticize the CPI for not having included any reference to such conditions, 
losing the opportunity to clarify when should injunctions be granted; see Marco Spolidoro, 
Le sanzioni civil nella bozza del Codice della proprieta industriale, in Ubertazzi II, p. 131; 
contra, Ubertazzi 528, p. 607.
538 See Frignani supra note 297, at p. 308. “In sostanza, la giurisprudenza distingue chiaramente 
l’azione inibitoria da quella di risarcimento del danno, richiedendo per la prima solo l’idonieta 
degli atti a produrre l’efetto dannoso, con esplicita esclusione sia dell’elemento intenzionale 
(dolo o colpa) che di quello material (danno)”.
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5.2. JUDICIAL DISCRETION: HOW MUCH SPACE?
A general tenet of comparative law studies is that judicial discretion is limited to 
the legislative framework and that judges are confi ned to the “interpretation” of 
the law in Civil Law countries whereas Common Law judges “create” law. 
Nevertheless, the wording of Article 124 of the Industrial Property Code 
establishes that judges “may” grant injunctive relief, thus indicating that judges 
have the power to grant injunctions while not requiring them to do so in all cases 
and hence subjecting the matter to an important degree of discretion.
In spite of the language used by the CPI, which is similar to that used by previous 
laws, it is commonly argued that a permanent injunction is a legal right for 
owners and that judges could not deny an injunction in a fi nal case fi nding 
infringement.539 Still, some authors recognize that the judge has also discretion 
to grant or deny injunctions.540 Moreover, scholars also recognize that judges in 
civil law countries enjoy certain discretion which might be created by the statutes 
themselves.541
539 See Spolidoro, supra note 531, arguing that at least under the Directive, Article 10.3 does not 
apply to the inibitoria and hence, Judges could not discretionally decide upon such measure; 
(free translation of the original text: “Posto che, almeno nel sistema della Direttiva, il precetto 
dell’art. 10.3 non riguarda l’inibitoria, il Giudice non dovrebbe poter graduare quest’ultima 
ad libitum”).
540 See for instance Scuffi  , Franzosi e Fittante, Codice della Proprietà Industriale: 
Commento per articoli coordinato, (Padova: Cedam, 2005) at p. 564–565, arguing that 
both the inibitoria and the destruction of infringing objects are subject to the discretion of 
Judges, who “may” accord such measures at the request of the interested parties, and due to 
the disruptive eff ects that might follow from such measures and especially when the 
controversy regards patents, it is advisablle that such measures are used as “extrema ratio” in 
order to avoid extending over non-infringing products, (free translation of the original text: 
“Gli eff etti dirompenti della distruzione – che resta (come l’inibitoria) facoltativa in quanto 
“può” essere disposta dal giudice e sempre ad istanza di parte secondo il principio della 
domanda (art. 112 c.p.c.) – dovrebbero poi consigliarne l’adozione – specie nel campo delle 
invenzioni – come “extrema ratio”, considerato che l’istituto è stato sempre utilizzato dalla 
giurisprudenza con moderazione e cautela anche per evitare che ordini troppo estesi ed 
indeterminati fi nissero per conglobare oggetti estranei alla repressione dell’illecito”.
541 See Frignani supra note 297, at p. 521 and corresponding footnotes. In particular, Article 844 
of the civil code permits judges to choose between the least oppressive remedy for the party 
and also to choose whether to give an injunction or other remedy. According to Frignani, 
this is an application of the German doctrine of “Interessenabwagung”, or balancing the 
interest of the parties. In these cases, especially with regard to nuisances, judges can exert 
their discretion and balance the interest of the parties and reasonableness (Zumutbarkeit) 
with respect to certain commercial activities such as boycott and discrimination. Frignani 
argues that the reasons why we cannot talk about discretional granting or denying of 
injunctions in the same way as in common law are historic and systematic but he highlights 
the role of judges in designing the content of injunctions and deciding between this and other 
remedies, in order to fi nd the least oppressive.
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A specifi c example pertaining to nuisances is established in Article 844 of the 
Italian Civil Code542 and evidences the possible space for judges’ discretion that 
subsists despite the underlying logic of Civil Law countries. Article 844 
establishes that a land owner cannot prevent the emission of smoke, heat, fumes, 
noises, vibrations or similar propagation originating from the land of a neighbour 
unless such emissions exceed a normal tolerability, with regard to the condition 
particular conditions of the place. In applying this rule, the court shall reconcile 
the requirements of production with rights of ownership and can also take 
account of the priority of a given use.543 In fact, discretion is allowed to judges 
both with respect to the decision of whether the limit of tolerability has been 
reached; and in cases that surpass such limit the judge is also able to decide 
whether or not to grant injunctive relief.544
Moreover, Article 844, by allowing judges to balance the interests of property 
rights and production, inclines the balance towards a wider judicial discretion 
with regard to the protection of property when a public interest is aff ected. For 
our purposes, this rule can be considered to be guided by effi  ciency reasons that 
542 See Frignani supra note 297, discussing the implications of Article 844 of the Italian Civil 
Code. See also Roberto Pardolesi and Bruno Tassone, Guido Calabresi on Torts: Italian Courts 
and the Cheapest Cost Avoider, Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2008, available at: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1498358, analyzing the application of Article 844 in the context of the 
property and liability rules debate and referring to a decision by an Italian court, where the 
Judge considered an ample space for its application: “before determining that the nuisances 
exceeded the limit of what is ordinarily bearable and that no precautions can be taken to 
bring them below the threshold, the judge observed that Article 844c.c. can be seen as a tool 
to protect not only rights on real estate but even the person who lives in it and his health”. See 
also Ugo Mattei, Effi  ciency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 
International Review of Law and Economics, March, 1994, available at: http://works.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=ugo_mattei, discussing Article 844 
and arguing that civil law countries have also reached “effi  cient” legal solutions, sometimes 
long before than its common law counterparts: “seventy years before the Boomer decision, 
German law reached the liability rule solution by applying Art. 906 BGB. It has done so by 
following the balancing theory of the great nineteenth-century jurist Rudolph von Jhering. 
Th is rule has been reproduced in Art. 844 of the Italian Civil Code and has long since been 
the law in Austria and Switzerland as well. In the civil law tradition, therefore, the law has 
long since reached the effi  cient result” (footnotes omitted).
543 Article 844 of the Italian Civil Code (free translation of the original text: “Immissioni. Il 
proprietario di un fondo non può impedire le immissioni di fumo o di calore, le esalazioni, i 
rumori, gli scuotimenti e simili propagazioni derivanti dal fondo del vicino, se non superano 
la normale tollerabilità, avuto anche riguardo alla condizione dei luoghi. Nell’applicare questa 
norma l’autorità giudiziaria deve contemperare le esigenze della produzione con le ragioni 
della proprietà. Può tener conto della priorità di un determinato uso”).
544 See decision Cass. 12 giugno 1964, n. 1483), highlighting the discretion of judges also with 
respect to the remedy to be provided when emmissions are deemed intolerable: (free 
translation of the original text: “Il che val quanto dire, a ben capire, che il giudice e ‘signore’ 
della regola anche in relazione alle soluzioni da adottare ove le immissioni siano giudicate 
‘intollerabili’ (inibitoria e/o indennizzo))”.
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have allowed judges to substitute a property rule with a liability rule.545 
Nevertheless, scholars have acknowledged that these doctrines can hardly be 
transposed to property rights, given their absolute nature546, even if one could 
question whether IP fi ts this “absolute” defi nition of property.
In addition and with regard to patent injunctions, judges have discretionary 
powers to tailor the scope of the injunction and courts might exercise their 
discretion in determining the boundaries of an injunctive order. In the case of 
Chiron vs. Sorin, for instance, the controversy gravitated around the infringement 
of a patent on the virus of HCV. Th e preliminary injunction was directed at the 
diagnostic kits produced by Sorin. However, the scope of the order was debated 
since in part, Sorin had found new sequences of nucleotides not originally 
disclosed in the patent by Chiron. In cases where a broad injunction might 
prohibit infringing and non-infringing activity with the potential risk of 
precluding certain innovation and technical development, the choice between 
substituting a property rule with a liability rule might also be complemented by 
the choice of issuing a narrower injunction. A narrower injunction would have 
the eff ect of allowing certain uses of a technology for free, a solution that is both 
fair and effi  cient where such uses are non-infringing but that of course, provides 
an incomplete answer for problematic injunctions and problematic 
technologies.547
Italian judges also enjoy reasonable discretion to grant or deny measures as 
destruction of infringing goods, the delivery-up and removal from the channels 
of commerce of infringing goods as well as tailoring such measures to the 
particular case.548 Th ese measures are closely related to, and might strengthen 
545 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 94; describing this rule as modern since it allows the choice 
between remedies both ex ante and ex post with regard to the demands of activities and 
interests of third parties, (free translation of the original text: “Essa e dunque una regola 
profondamente moderna, giacche, nella misura in cui si consente che gia all’interno di essa 
possa esservi conversione di rimedi (da quello inibitorio a quello indennizatorio e infi ne a 
quello risarcitorio) da un settore all’altro nonche ‘travasi’ di disciplina, non solo vengono a 
regolarsi ex ante diritti di proprieta contrapposti (secondo il modulo dei rapporti di vicinato) 
ma si provvede anche a diversamente redistribuirli ex post in relazione alle esigenze di altri 
attivita od interessi. Salvo a dire che, ove il rimedio dell’indennizzo dovesse veramente godere 
di assoluta prevalenza su quello inibitorio (accentuandosi di esso la componente risarcitoria, 
v. Cass. 15 gennaio 1986, n. 184), come sembra stia avvenendo con la prassi giudiziale, si 
assisterebbe ad un mutamento di natura e carattere della stessa regola qui discussa, da regola 
di proprieta a regola di responsabilita”).
546 See Frignani, supra note 297, quoting from a decision by the App. Ancona, 16-V-1962, 
Ribighini c. Novelli ed altri, in Riv. Giur. Umbro-abruzz., 1963, at p. 160.
547 See Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72, discussing several cases, mostly in the area of 
information and communication technologies, where modern technologies make it diffi  cult 
to separate infringing from non-infringing technologies.
548 See Frignani, supra note 297, at p. 334 and current Article 124 of the CPI.
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the eff ects of, a property rule549 and in fact an injunction order is oft en 
accompanied by orders of removal and destruction of infringing goods and 
means to infringe. Th ose measures are even more directly under the discretion 
of the court. Given the particularly disruptive and potentially harmful eff ects of 
delivery up measures, an order to destroy infringing goods and machinery 
cannot be ordered when it might cause harm to the national economy, in which 
case only damages might be available.550
5.3. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Although preliminary injunctions diff er in rationale and scope from permanent 
injunctions, they occupy a privileged position within Italian patent litigation. 
Th e practical importance of preliminary measures in Italy, follows from the long 
duration of trials which makes preliminary injunctions (as well as other interim 
measures) usually the most important decisions and oft en the fi nal turning point 
for a settlement.551 Th is not only makes them comparable to permanent 
549 See Frignani supra note 297, at p. 334, arguing that these measures fall even more directly 
under the discretion of the court and its frequent use along with or in close relationship with 
injunctions expands the scope of discretion over injunctive relief: “Non si deve inoltre 
dimenticare un altro fenomeno, e cioe la discrezionalità del giudice in rapporto alla 
concessione di altri rimedi, che molto spesso accompagnano l’inibitoria…In realta, a causa 
degli stretti rapporti esistenti tra le azioni suaccennate e l’azione inibitoria, e facile 
comprenderé che la discrezionalita del giudice esistente per quelle si ripercuotera anche su 
questa”. See also La Tutela della Varietà Vegetale: Inibitoria e Distruzione; Trib. Di Bari, 26 
Marzo 2003, Est. Monteleone-Zanzi Fruitgrowing Equipment s.r.l. c. Susca, ordering the 
inibitoria and destruction of the involved plant varieties; and Caterina Quaranta, Commento, 
in Il Diritto Industriale N° 2, 1004 citing the following decisions denying destruction 
orders: 1786; App. Bologna 29 settembre 1981, in GADI, 1981, 1431; App. Milano 8 aprile 1977, 
in GADI 1977, 937; Trib. Milano 11 marzo 1996, in GADI, 1996, 3474. See also Marco 
Lamandini, La restitutio in Integrum nel Diritto della Proprietà Intellettuale: la Rimozione e la 
Distruzione, in AIDA, 2000, 70, discussing these measures.
550 See Parere del Consiglio di Stato, available at: www.ubertazzi.it/it/codiceip/indice.html; 
considering that this provision contains the general limit to destruction measures contained 
in Article 2933 of the civil code and that in this case only damage compensation would be 
available.
551 See Giorgio Floridia, La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti di proprieta immateriale in Auteri et 
al., Diritto Industriale, Proprieta Intellettuale e Concorrenza, Second edition, 
2005, at p. 630, referring a progressive substitution of the normal procedure by an abbreviated 
procedure, given that parties usually abide by the outcome of the decision with regard that 
either accords or denies the provisional measure: “L’attore speso non ha interesse ad attendere 
il tempo lungo ocorrente per la cognizione ordinaria se non abbia ottenuto i provedimenti 
urgenti richiesti e il convenuto spesso non ha piu interesse a resistere una volta che la 
situazione si sia modifi cata per eff etto del provvedimento urgente concesso. In questo senso 
pertanto puo dirsi che si verifi chi una progressiva sostituzione della cognizione sommaria 
rispetto alla cognizione ordinaria”.
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injunctions but also determines that decisions by courts about the adequacy of 
remedies are oft en taken in preliminary measures, especially injunctions.552
Preliminary injunctions are regulated by Article 131 of the Civil Code of 
Procedure. Plaintiff s are required to prove two necessary conditions in order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction: 1) the strength of the legal right, manifested 
both in the likelihood of success in the merits of the case in terms validity and 
infringement (fumus boni iuris); and 2) the urgency of the requested remedy, 
which is based upon the fact that during the time needed to reach the fi nal 
decision, an irreparable harm might be generated (periculum in mora).
Italian courts have reiteratively considered that with regard to industrial property 
rights the periculum in mora should be considered in re ipsa, and also that such 
peril of irreparable harm goes beyond the danger that a defendant might be 
insolvent at the end of the trial. Th e reason usually given by courts is that 
damages are more diffi  cult to calculate in this area and that the plaintiff  might 
suff er losses in terms of market share, reputation and goodwill, which are 
irreparable. Several courts have even asserted that irreparability subsists even in 
cases where any subsequent damages for patentees might be easily calculated, as 
it happens when the infringed product is sold to public health institutions.553
552 See also supra notes 335 and 336, discussing the application of provisional measures provided 
by Article 700 of the Italian Civil Procedural Code and the result that follows from the 
practice of using such provisional measures as fi nal measures.
553 See Sorin Biomedica s.p.a. c. Chiron Corporation e Ortho Diagnostic; Tribunale di Milano, 
Sez. I, 22 marzo 2007, in Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 1998, Parte II, at p. 313 ruling 
that excludsive rights allow owners to achieve a position within the market, which creates 
advantages that might be irreparably harmed by infringing activities, (free translation of the 
original text: “Il diritto di esclusiva, comportando l’incompatibilita di attivita di produzione 
e commercializzazione da parte di concorrenti, consente al titolare di raggiungere risultati di 
penetrazione e di consolidamento della propria posizione di mercato…tale situazione, di 
indubbio vantaggio concorrenziale…verrebbe irreparabilmente svuotata di contenuto nel 
consentire il permanere, per il tempo necessario alla defi nizione del giudizio, di attivita 
–illegittime – da parte di concorrenti i quali neppure debbono scontare gli oneri per l’attivita di 
ricerca svolta dal brevettante, cosi potendo, addirittura, praticare politiche di prezzo piu 
appetibili per i potenziali clienti”). See also Teva v. Ist. Gentili, Trib. Genova, in Rassegna di 
diritto farmaceutico, 2007, 605, deciding that the factor of irreparable harm, is not to be 
excluded when the harm caused by the launch of the generic can be easily calculated by 
comparing the market share of the originator before and aft er launching the generic, specially 
when there are available sale records of pharmaceutical products and especially of those 
reimbursed by the National Health Service. Th e court argued that damages are always 
extremely diffi  cult to calculate with precision ex post and that this fact makes a preliminary 
injunction order preferable. See also European Generics Medicines Association, Kristof 
Roox Ed., Patent-related barriersto Market Entry for Generic Medicines inthe 
European Union, available at: www.marcasepatentes.pt/fi les/collections/pt_PT/1/178/
EGA%20Report%20IP%20Barriers%20Generic%20Medicines.pdf, accounting for this and 
other similar cases across Europe.
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With this reasoning, courts have also granted injunctions, even as late as three 
months before the expiry of the patent by interpreting that the exclusive rights of 
patent holders include a right “to prepare itself for the loss, when the patent 
expires, of the monopoly granted by the patent, in the absence of promotional 
campaigns – which may include the taking of orders by wholesalers and 
pharmacists – on which generics may embark when the expiry date is 
approaching”.554 Although probably an outlier decision, at least in one case, a 
court has held that not only should the requirement of periculum in mora not be 
presumed, but that it cannot be proved in cases in which the patentee does not 
have any product in the market working the patented technology555
However, some scholars and courts seem to disagree with the presumption in 
favor of irreparable harm which holds that harm should be considered “in re 
ipsa”; a condition that facilitates or substitutes any proof of the periculum in 
mora requirement.556
554 Ibid.
555 See Chiron Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham s.p.a., Tribunale di Milano, 27–01–98, in GADI, 
XXVIII, 1999, Tomo unico 3900, at p. 294–304, where the defendant argued that lack of 
commercialization of any product by the patentee would preclude the possibility of obtaining 
preliminary relief. Th e court held that even though lack of working of a patent is not to be 
considered as a precondition for preliminary relief, such fact makes it diffi  cult for the patentee 
to prove the priority and in any case the impossibility of calculating the harm, which is mostly 
imminent and irreparable due to its eff ects precisely on the business activities which are 
directly or indirectly referred to the subject: “va sottolineato come lo scrivente non ritenga 
–in se – l’eff ettiva (diretta o indiretta) attuazione del brevetto quale presupposto della tutela 
cautelare, la legge non ponendo limiti al riguardo; tuttavia, l’assenza di quel dato fattuale 
rende assai disagevole per il titolare della privativa la possibilita di comprovare la priorita e 
–comunque – la impossible determinabilita del danno, di regola imminente ed irreparabile 
proprio in relazione agli eff etti sull’attivita imprenditoriale direttamente od indirettamente 
riferibile al soggetto”. Ibid, ruling that the requirement of periculum in mora cannot be 
deemed to exist, in particular, when the patentee asks for a preliminary measure aft er several 
years of infringement have been tolerated; “e certamente singolare che Chiron agisca in via 
d’urgenza onder reprimere una contraff azione brevettuale tolerata da svariati anni: il 
periculum in re ipsa in materia di privative industriali non puo giungere a svalutare detto 
presupposto dell’azione cautelare riportandolo all’esistenza stessa della contraff azione, 
potendo – comunque – (quantomeno) l’asserito contraff atore dedurre (e provare) specifi che 
circostanze che escludano l’urgenza della repression della (asserita) lesion ed imponendo 
–dunque – al titolare del brevetto di far previamente accertare il proprio buon diritto in un 
giudizio ordinario, fuori delle strettoie cognitive proprie della sommarieta del 
procedimento”.
556 See Ubertazzi supra note, 528, at p. 630–631, explaining how some court cases sustain that 
the requirement of periculum in mora subsists in all cases because 1) infringement always 
creates a real danger of losing market share (sviamento di clientele tendenzialmente 
irreversibile) and 2) because damages are diffi  cult to calculate, whereas some scholars, among 
which Spolidoro, and other court decisions sustain that there should be a specifi c assessment 
of the requirement of periculum in mora.
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5.4. WILLFUL AND INADVERTENT INFRINGEMENT
Th e state of mind of the infringer has a limited infl uence on the availability of 
injunctions which are generally awarded in spite of whether the infringement 
was or not willful.557 Conversely, the state of mind is important for the purposes 
of obtaining damage compensation although the public character of the patent 
documents gives raise to strong presumptions of the culpability of 
infringement.558
Moreover, as it will be discussed in the next section, the current text of Article 71 
of the CPI makes compulsory licenses also available for infringers in good faith, 
a provision that opens the possibility of either applying for a compulsory license 
aft er infringement or to oppose against an infringement suit in both cases by 
arguing that infringement was in good faith.
Th e possibility of defending from an infringement suit by arguing the 
independent invention of the same patented technology is generally banned in 
patent law, although some laws provide for prior rights for those using the 
invention prior to the concession of a patent. For instance, Article 68 of the CPI 
establishes prior rights for anyone that has been using the invention during the 
12 months previous to the date of patent fi lling or priority date, that is, the 
possibility of continuing to use the invention, but limited to the scope of such 
prior use, which in practices limits the use of such exception.559
557 See Ubertazzi supra note 528, at p. 613 comparing articles 125 that requires culpability and 
Article 124 which does not: “la condanna al risarcimento dei danni patrimoniali del 
convenuto per contraff azione presuppone il dolo o la colpa (in dottirna cfr. Da ultimo Sarti, 
AIDA 00, 226) a diff erenza delle sanzioni ex art. 124 cpi che non sono impedite dall’assenza 
dell’elemento psicologico (Vanzetti-Di Catlado, 510)”.
558 See Ubertazzi supra note 528, at p. 613: referring that the the public nature of patent (and 
other IP) documents in the corresponding offi  ces has been interpreted as creating a 
presumption or at least a burden to search which does not allow infringers to argue innocent 
infringement, at least with the aim of excluding intentional conduct (colpa): (free translation 
of the original text: “Secondo la tesi maggiormente seguita dalla giurisprudenza, l’esistenza di 
un regime di pubblicita dei diritti titolati i) implica, se non una vera e propria presunzione di 
coplpa da parte di chi ha violato la privativa (come aff erma ad esemplio App. Milano 13–12–
1977, GADI 77, 844), almeno l’onere di consultare i registri di pubblicità (Trib. Milano 22–2–
1993, ivi 93, 463; Trib. Milano 26–9–1974, ivi 74, 1108); e ii) non consente al convenuto di 
allegare l’ignoranza dei titoli di proprietà industriale per escludere la colpa (da ultimo v. Trib. 
Roma 15–11–1988, GADI 88, 838”). Ibid at p. 613: Certain isolated decisions holding that such 
presumption was not rebuttable or that it only could stand if the infringing conduct was also 
categorized as unfair competition have now been superseded, (free translation of the original 
text: “isolate sono rimaste le sentenze secondo cui la presunzione di colpa sussiste solo se nella 
condotta del violatore sono ravvisabili gli estremi della concorrenza sleale (Trib. Reggio 
Emilia 3–2–1972, ivi 72, 434) o secondo cui, all’opposto, sarebbe esistente una presunzione 
juris et de jure de conoscenza delle altrui esclusive (App. Milano 7–12–1976, ivi 76, 779))”.
559 See Article 68 of the CPI providing that whomever has made use of the patented invention 
within the twelve months prior to the patent application or the priority date, can continue to 
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5.5. OTHER EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: COMPULSORY 
LICENSES
With few changes, the CPI has preserved the existing provisions on compulsory 
licensing for patents which were already adapted to the TRIPS Agreement. Th e 
Italian previous patent laws had incorporated compulsory licenses provisions by 
the d.p.r. 26 febbraio 1968, n. 849, which implemented Article 5-A of the Paris 
Convention and hence substituted the forfeiture of patents with compulsory 
licensing provisions for non working. Th e most important changes with respect 
to compulsory licenses operated in fact aft er the enactment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which introduced the requirements of Article 31.
Italian legislation includes provisions for compulsory licensing pursuant to the 
CPI in the following cases 1) non-working of invention560; 2) inventions 
dependent upon prior patented inventions561; 3) special provisions for plant 
varieties562; 4) licenses of right563; 5) special provisions for a “voluntary license” 
mediated by the Ministry with regards to active ingredients covered by 
Supplementary Certifi cates of Protection.564 In addition to these provisions of 
the CPI, there is the possibility of applying Article 82 and national antitrust 
legislation for granting compulsory licenses of patents.565
However, and as it is the case in the international setting and in other countries, 
Italian compulsory licensing provisions have seldom been used.566 Th is is oft en 
interpreted either as a proof of their undesirability or of the irrelevance of their 
actual use – especially in the law and economics literature where emphasis is 
given to the role that compulsory licensing provisions play on setting the terms 
of bargaining between the parties – given that the threat of using a compulsory 
use such invention within the limits of the prior use: (free translation of the original text: 
“Chiunque, nel corso dei dodici mesi anteriori alla data di deposito della domanda di brevetto 
o alla data di priorità, abbia fatto uso nella propria azienda dell’invenzione può continuare ad 
usarne nei limiti del preuso”).
560 See Article 70 of the CPI.
561 See Article 71 of the CPI. See also Article 72 on common provisions with regard to compulsory 
licenses and Article 199 on the procedure to issue a compulsory license.
562 See Article 115 of the CPI.
563 See Article 80 of the CPI.
564 See Article 81 of the CPI and also Article 200 on the procedure for this license.
565 See also supra note 481 on the application of Article 82 EC to a patent dispute in the U.K.
566 See for instance Scuffi, Franzosi and Fittante, supra note 541, at p. 376 ss., referring only 
9 cases in which a compulsory license was issued, 2 of them with regards to a temporary 
regime applicable when the duration of patents was extended from 15 to 20 years and 7 under 
the case of non-working within the 3 years aft er the issuance of the patent and none case for 
dependent patents. See also Paola Frassi, Innovazione Derivata, Brevetto Dipendente e Licenza 
Obbligatoria, Riv. Dir. Ind. 2006, 06, 212, at footnote 12, citing only two cases of compulsory 
licenses for dependent patents analyzed by the administrative authority; Tar Lazio, 
30 Novembre 1981, GADI, 1718 and Tar Lazio, 7 gennaio 1985, GADI, 1881.
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license would induce parties to negotiate.567 Nonetheless, this argument would 
only be valid insofar as compulsory licensing provisions could eff ectively enable 
a would-be-licensee to launch a credible threat to opt for a compulsory license, 
which is dubious in the Italian case for the reasons we will provide. Less oft en, 
however, scholars recognize that such failure to use the provisions could be just a 
consequence of their inappropriate design.568
Among the problems with the design of compulsory licensing provisions in Italy 
it is probably the ban for infringers to apply for a compulsory license.569 Such 
prohibition importantly limits the use of compulsory licensing, in the light of 
the diffi  culties associated with careful previous patent search and especially in 
such industries where patent thickets are important and inadvertent infringement 
is likely to occur. By eff ect of the CPI, it is now permitted that infringers opt for a 
compulsory license when infringement happened in good faith.570 However, the 
567 See Ann Christoph, Patent Trolls – Menace or Myth?, in Patents and Technological 
Progress in a Globalized World, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law, no. 6, at p. 361, arguing that “compulsory licenses are the only 
exception to this rule. Amounting to an expropriation, which requires extreme circumstances, 
compulsory licenses are however rarely granted”. Th is argument was above described in 
similar terms for the TRIPS controversy. See infra notes 771 and 772 and accompanying text.
568 See Paola Frassi, supra note 567, arguing that conversely, the reasons why compulsory 
licensing provisions have failed to deliver can be better found in the requirements for applying 
to such compulsory licenses as well as the complicated procedures which do not make this 
option appealing for potential applicants; (free translation of the original text: “Diversamente, 
credo che le ragioni dell’insuccesso dell’istituto vadano ricercate principalmente in due 
direzioni: la prima, risiede nelle condizioni per la concessione della licenza e la seconda nella 
farraginosità del procedimento di concessione della medesima. Per usare un’espressione 
effi  cace anche se non rigorosa, direi che il procedimento di concessione della licenza 
obbligatoria, formalmente devoluto al Ministero dell’Industria ma in sostanza amministrato 
dall’ Uffi  cio Italiano Brevetti e Marchi, e decisamente poco attraente”). See also, Julian-
Arnold, supra note 213, referring to compulsory licenses for dependent patents and arguing 
that: “partially due to safeguards implemented by various countries, this type of compulsory 
license is rarely granted”.
569 See Giorgia Floridia, Il Codice Della Proprietà Industriale Fra Riassetto E Demolizione, Dir. 
Industriale, 2008, 2, 105, arguing that one of the main obstacles against the use of 
compulsory licensing provisions is the prohibition for infringers to apply for one, which is 
now attenuated with the possibility that good faith infringers could apply, (free translation of 
the original text: “Nella materia delle licenze obbligatorie il diritto vivente ha messo in 
evidenza che l’istituto resta sostanzialmente inapplicabile se viene considerata ostativa in 
modo assoluto la condizione che il richiedente la licenza non sia contraff attore del brevetto 
che viene chiesto in licenza dovendosi intendere per tale quello che, prima della presentazione 
della domanda di licenza, abbia fabbricato e/o venduto il prodotto oppure abbia attuato il 
procedimento brevettato. Per rendere questa condizione meno preclusiva, e per restituire 
quindi eff ettività all’istituto, si è disposto che la licenza possa essere concessa a chi abbia agito 
in buona fede”).
570 See T.A.R. Roma Lazio sez. III, 11 marzo 1998, n. 606, a decision prior to the coming into 
force of the CPI which interpreted that infringers could not apply to compulsory licensing 
provisions for lack of working and dependent inventions: “La contraff azione, cioè la 
riproduzione e l’imitazione degli elementi essenziali e caratteristici dell’idea coperta da 
brevetto, è dunque presupposto ostativo al rilascio di qualsiasi licenza obbligatoria, compresa 
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interpretation of “good faith” in the context of infringement would be a 
particularly diffi  cult one.571 No case has so far analyzed a request for compulsory 
licensing where infringement occurred in good faith.572
Th e Italian legislation also establishes the possibility to opt for a license of rights, 
established by Article 80 of the CPI.573 Finally, there is an important provision 
for voluntary licenses over active ingredients, subject to the mediation of the 
Ministry of Production, which is established in Article 81 of the CPI that 
probably aimed at putting end to a confl ict between particularly contrasting and 
primordial interests: those that sustained that an exclusive right over the active 
ingredients and those who retained that none right existed over such 
quella per le c.d. invenzioni dipendenti. Il citato art. 54 bis non opera nessuna distinzione al 
riguardo: l’ipotesi di licenza per mancato utilizzo viene disciplinata dal primo comma solo 
come fattispecie speciale, in relazione alla quale viene prevista una specifi ca causa ostativa al 
rilascio della licenza, costituita dalla non imputabilità della mancata o insuffi  ciente attuazione 
del brevetto. Il contraff attore, pertanto, è sfornito in ogni caso di una legittima pretesa a 
sfruttare l’invenzione. Lo spirito della legislazione sui brevetti non consente concessioni al 
contraff attore. In questo senso si è già espressa chiaramente la sentenza n. 149/1994 della IV 
Sezione del Consiglio di Stato…”. See Article 72, n. 3 of the CPI, providing that compulsory 
licenses cannot be asked by infringers unless they prove they infringed in good faith. 
Compare with Michael Meller, International Patent Litigation: A country by country analysis, 
Bureau of National Aff airs, BNA Books (2004), at p. DK-15, commenting the Danish Patent 
Act (Sections 45–50) where “the claim for a compulsory license is available for a defendant in 
an infringement case concerning the same patent for which a compulsory license is claimed. 
However, a court decision giving the infringer a compulsory license has no eff ect for the 
period of time before the infringer claimed such license”. Th is results in a middle-ground 
solution whereby an infringer can opt for applying for a compulsory license but is subject to 
liability for infringement for the time before such application.
571 See Ubertazzi 528, at p. 462, quoting from Sena, Rivista Diritto Industriale, 05, 300, who 
sustains that good faith should be understood as a reasonable doubt with respect to the 
validity and scope of the patent and not to the unawareness of the existence of a patent: “la 
possibilita di concedere licenze obbligatorie al contraff attore in buona fede va riferita non 
all’eventualita di un’ignoranza (che sarebbe comunque colpevole) del brevetto anteriore, ma 
all’esistenza di un ragionevole dubbio circa la validita e l’ambito di protezione del brevetto”.
572 Based upon a research on the following databases: Guritel, De Agostini and De Jure, last 
accessed on July, 2009, and using the following search criteria (contraff azione OR 
contraff attore AND “buona fede”).
573 Th is provision was originally introduced by the Novella 1979, on the basis of Article 44 of the 
CBC, See Giorgio Floridia and Paola Cavallaro, Marchi, Invenzioni e Modelli, Codice e 
Commento delle Riforme Nazionali (D.L. 4 dicembre, 1992, N. 420), Giuff rè Ed. 1993, at 
p. 220. Similar provisions exist in several countries, including the U.K., see supra note 484. 
While this provision could be defi ned as a “put” option in law and economics terms, its eff ects 
in practice remain negligible, probably due to an insuffi  cient incentive for patent owners to 
off er a license for their patented invention instead of retaining the right to opt for a “property 
rule” and thus, a “right” to hold-up potential infringers in exchange for a reduction of the 
patent fees amounting to a 50%. Hence, similar proposals that seek to expand the public 
domain by giving incentives to patent owners to put their inventions either directly in the 
public domain or at least in the paid public domain (dominio pubblico pagante) should 
construct upon the experience of systems providing for licenses of right that are not used in 
practice.
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ingredients.574 Such license represents a mixed type between voluntary and 
compulsory in the sense that it can be accorded or refuted by the authority but it 
is yet originated in the common will of the parties.575 Its inclusion in the CPI 
and the fact that such license is not a traditional compulsory license, alleviates a 
potential tension between antitrust and patent law, and also has the consequence 
that an abuse of dominant position in an antitrust sense would not be needed in 
order to apply this rule.576 Th e license has been deemed as a compromise that put 
an end to a confl ict that arose due to the over-extension in terms of duration of 
the Italian Supplementary Certifi cates of Protection with respect to the duration 
of the same Certifi cates in Europe577, but it can also be viewed as a middle path 
between obligatory and voluntary licensing, in which the antitrust agency 
intervenes, as some U.S. courts have done, only if negotiation between the parties 
fails.
574 See Giorgio Floridia and Marco Lamandini, Commento a Merck-Principi Attivi, misure 
cautelari, e Merck & Co., Inc V. ACS Dobfar s.p.a., CPA Chemical Pharmaceutical Generic 
Association, in Il Diritto Industriale, III, at p. 281. See also Floridia, in Auteri et al., 
supra note 552, at p. 261.
575 See Floridia & Lamandini, at p. 281, arguing that the license is voluntary not because it can be 
arbitrarily granted or denied but rather because it can only derive from the procedure of 
negotiations established by the law, which guarantee that both the interests of the patent 
owner and those of protecting a national market for the exportation of active principles: (free 
translation of the original text: “è volontaria, ma non perché possa essere arbitrariamente 
concessa o rifi utata, ma perché è solo dal concorso delle volontà delle parti che può scaturire 
quel regolamento negoziale che integra le condizioni previste dal legislatore affi  nché la licenza 
costituisca un giusto contemperamento fra l’interesse del titolare della privativa e l’interesse 
alla salvaguardia di un mercato nazionale di produzione di principi attivi destinati 
all’esportazione”).
576 See Ibid, arguing that the legislator tried to avoid the use of a rigid instrument such as 
compulsory licensing provisions with the protection of patented inventions, except in the case 
of unreasonable denial to negotiate under the procedures provided for by the CPI: (free 
translation of the original text: “il Legislatore ha evitato di interferire nell’interpretazione 
delle norme che defi niscono l’ambito di protezione dei certifi cati complementari di 
protezione; ha evitato di incrociare la tutela brevettuale con la normativa antitrust mediante 
lo strumento rigido della licenza obbligatoria; ma ha messo a disposizione delle contrapposte 
categorie un tavolo di conciliazione che favorisse la concessione di licenze fermo restando il 
deferimento all’Autorità Garante nel caso di rifi uto ingiustifi cato”. See Ubertazzi 528, at 
p. 482, referring the discussion on whether compulsory licensing entails to consider that a 
refusal to license is legal or not. “Il meccanismo della licenza volontaria mediate presuppone 
che il rifi uto di concedere la licenza non sia in se illecito. Da tempo e tuttavia in corso un 
ampio dibattito sulla questione se in alcuni casi il rifi uto di licenza non possa esere illecito: 
vuoi seconda la dottrina del patent misuse…vuoi piu in generale secondo il diritto antitrust”; 
and citing “ACGM 14388/2005, Boll. 23/2005, confermata da TAR Lazio 9–11–2005, IDI, 06, 
262; AGCM 15175/2006, Boll. 6/2006; CG 26–7–98, C-7/97.”
577 See Floridia and Lamandini, quoting the decision of the T.A.R. Lazio 7 marzo 2006 which 
held: “il caso in esame riveste caratteri di unicità per il contesto normativo che lo disciplina, 
caratterizzato da una eccessiva durata del CCP italiano” e secondo la quale, per eff etto della 
norma sulla licenza “rimediale” “i CCP italiani ancora in vigore risultano meno effi  caci in 
quanto circoscrivono al territorio italiano il godimento pieno della privativa da parte 
dell’impresa titolare”.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Th is chapter aimed at identifying and analyzing the use of ex-post liability rules 
for patent protection in their legal – international and national – context. Several 
observations emerged from a comparative description of the provisions under 
analysis. Th e starting point of this chapter was the importance of broadening the 
concept of ex-post liability rules as applied to patent law. In this sense, the chapter 
encompassed both the study of traditional compulsory licensing provisions as 
well as the cases when a court denies injunctive relief and opts for using a liability 
rule, a case that some authors describe as a compulsory license while some others 
do not. Following this broader concept, the chapter examined the main ex-post 
liability rules in patent law, within three specifi c case studies of national law: the 
U.S., the U.K. and Italy.
In the U.S. the emphasis of scholarly work and case law is given to the problems 
of patent hold-ups, the strategic use of patenting by businesses characterized as 
“trolls” and the increasing multi-component nature of current technologies. In 
contrast and until recently, U.S. patent law seemed to sustain the view that 
patentees are free to choose whether to practice or not their inventions and 
should not, in general, be compelled to license them. Th is view is refl ected in the 
absence of specifi c regimes of compulsory licenses for non-working or for 
dependent patents but has been lately changed, at least partially, under the infl ux 
of the eBay decision.
Th e examination of U.K. patent law and practice, serves to evidence the interface 
between remedies-based and compulsory licensing provisions. Whereas 
injunctions can be denied under equitable considerations, it has been commonly 
argued that problems of strategic use of patents, risk of blocking further 
technologies and lack of use of technologies could be better dealt with through 
the use of compulsory licensing provisions. Nevertheless, the denial of 
injunctions can also serve to tackle cases of “oppression” by right holders.578
Th e Italian case highlights the diff erences in the conception of rights and 
remedies within civil law countries yet the surprising similarity of arguments 
which have been produced with respect to IP remedies. A particular reference 
was made to preliminary injunctions, which frequently put an end to potentially 
long trial procedures performing a role similar to property rules in other 
systems.
578 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, arguing that: “It is important to bear in mind that the 
test is one of oppression, and the court should not slide into application of a general balance 
of convenience test”.
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Th e fi rst observation that emerges from this analysis is that common law 
countries have historically conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and 
hence subjected the award of this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a 
balance between the particular circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, a 
glimpse into the law as it is actually practiced has showed how injunctions have 
been habitually awarded in patent cases while the conception of remedies has 
evolved – mainly but not only through the use of economic arguments – towards 
favoring a strong or an automatic use of a property rule. Th is situation was more 
extremely in the U.S. and it was recently reversed by the eBay decision in 2006.
Th e situation is, in appearance, outstandingly diff erent in civil law countries, due 
to a diverse conception over both rights and remedies. Injunctions are not 
considered an equitable remedy and patent statutes as well as procedural laws do 
not subject their award to a factual inquiry. Although patent statutes frequently 
grant judges the power to award injunctions without compelling them to do so 
in all cases, the law in action seems to refl ect the view that a plaintiff  whose 
patent right is violated (infringed) is “entitled to” or has a “right to” obtain 
injunctive relief. Moreover, the reasoning of courts in patent infringement cases 
has tended to favor a strong property rule, even in the case of preliminary 
injunctions, an outcome that could pose particular problems, especially in 
certain industries.
In fact, understanding the dynamics of remedies is not only important and 
diffi  cult in the light of the remarkable diff erences between diff erent countries, 
but also with regard to their theoretical treatment, where remedies are oft en 
categorized either as a procedural matter or as part of substantive law:
“Part of the diffi  culty with conceptualizing remedies as a fi eld has been that remedies 
fi ts uneasily between the categories of substance and procedure. Remedies are central 
to litigation, but except for details at the edges, like the procedural rules for 
preliminary relief, remedies in the modern idea are not part of the law of procedure. 
Th e Supreme Court has correctly held that the measure of damages is substantive for 
Erie purposes. Th e same should be true of the standards for granting injunctions, 
although that question appears not to have been litigated. What or how much a 
plaintiff  recovers is part of plaintiff ’s substantive entitlement and not simply a rule 
for processing disputes”579
A second observation regards the importance of taking into consideration the 
interface between rights and remedies in order to understand the enhanced 
concept of ex-post liability rules. A remarkable diff erence between civil law and 
common law countries with regard to the legal treatment of rights and remedies 
579 Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: a History, 27 Review of Litigation 161, 
Winter 2008, 161–267, at p. 166 (footnotes omitted).
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consist precisely on whether it is the remedy or the right that sets the starting 
point for such analysis. In spite of such marked diff erence, none form of 
reasoning – either one focusing on remedies or one focusing on rights – could be 
a priori judged as more effi  cient. As it has been already noticed, it would be 
rather the capacity to adapt to the demands of society – in the case of patent law 
critically infl uenced by the dynamic evolution of science and technology – that 
could determine whether a system that focuses on the remedy or one that focuses 
on the right is better able to cope with such new necessities.580 A similar 
argument could be made with regard to the choice of each country of having one 
or another type of compulsory licenses or both, as in the U.K. case.
With regard to the apparent similarities and diff erences between legal systems, 
the chapter also evidenced how the interpretation of Italian courts of a 
presumption of “periculum in mora” in re ipsa, has similar outcomes to the 
application of an “automatic injunction rule” in the U.S., even in spite of the 
diff erent setting (preliminary or fi nal injunctions). On the one hand this 
interpretation aff ects the use of diff erent presumptions with regard to whether 
damages would be irreparable either in a fi nal or in a preliminary injunction. On 
the other hand this particular aspect shows the importance of studying each 
legal provision in its context, for instance, the Italian judicial practice of granting 
preliminary injunction which might more relevant for the purposes of 
investigating the use of property rules and its comparison with other countries, 
than other practices, including those related to fi nal injunctions.
Finally, this chapter identifi ed several common concerns with regard to the use 
of liability rules across several jurisdictions and times, namely, the diffi  culties 
and costs that a court (or agency) would face in order to calculate damages that 
substitute an injunction and the interpretation of the sound grounds to provide a 
compulsory license. Th is chapter touched upon some law and economic aspects 
of the problems surrounding the use and design of ex-post liability rules in 
diff erent patent systems. Th e next chapter focuses on the examination, under a 
law and economics viewpoint, of the grounds for granting ex-post liability rules, 
as they were identifi ed in this chapter.
580 See Di Majo, supra note 321, at p. 15, arguing that neither a reasoning conducted from the 
remedy nor one starting from the right can be a priori judged to better results, as this would 
depend on how easily the legal system might be adapted to the particular circumstances; 
(translation of the original text: “Non e detto, ad esempio, che ragionare per rimedi porti, in 
punto di tutela, a maggiori progressi rispetto al ragionare per diritti. Potrebbe essere il 
contrario. Tutto sta nel vedere con quale capacita di adattamento l’ordinamento dato e 
disposto a qualifi care diritto un determinato interesse oppure ad apprestare per esso un 
rimedio adeguato di tutela”).
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CHAPTER IV
EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: 
WHEN SHOULD THEY BE USED?
“Th e operations of patent sharks sometimes compel an 
inventor to obtain patents for articles which are never 
meant to be placed on the market. A fellow oft en gets 
up a machine, and somebody else comes along, and by 
getting patents through for certain parts, an give the 
inventor a great deal of bother and make him pay well, 
even if the inventor gets control of it”581
Th omas Edison, 1898
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e preceding chapters have sustained that strategic behavior and hold-ups are, 
in general law and economics, a key ground calling for the use of liability rules.582 
Th e legal overview of patent law also confi rms a rather ample space for the use of 
ex-post liability rules across diff erent jurisdictions. Nevertheless many law and 
economics scholars continue to disagree about whether transaction costs and 
holdups in the context of patented technologies constitute market failures and 
the frequency in which high transaction costs and strategic behavior occurs, 
among other controversial points. Moreover, the patent economics literature has 
confi ned the problem of strategic behavior to the specifi c case of patent hold-ups 
while directing most attention the even more narrow study of entities such as 
“patent trolls” rather than to strategic patent behavior in general.
581 Interview in Scientific American 78 (2): 19. Available at www.myoutbox.net/posa78n.htm; 
last accessed on March 20, 2009. See also McDonough, supra note 431, describing Th omas 
Edison as a “king of trolls” in a recent Article defending the business model of trolls: “For 
decades, this person held the U.S. record for the number of patents held by an individual – an 
astounding 1,093. Th is person primarily “described himself as an inventor,” and although 
many of his inventions were incorporated into products, he made a fortune from many 
patents that he never practiced. Not only did this man not practice nor have any intention of 
practicing many of his inventions, but he actually invented items specifi cally to deter 
innovation. Th is king of trolls was none other than Th omas Edison”.
582 See Chapter I for the general concepts of transaction costs and holdups and their application 
to the patent area.
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As a consequence, there is vast discrepancy with regards to the convenience of 
using patent liability rules. Moreover, the majority of law and economics 
contributions have focused on U.S. law and practice, in noticeable contrast with 
the overly importance of international patent harmonization. Th is chapter seeks 
to contribute to these debates by confronting the above mentioned economic 
insights, which constitute the theoretical grounds for applying ex-post liability 
rules with case studies arising from recent patent discussions in the U.S. and 
Europe.
Th e second section addresses the problem of patent hold-ups from the perspective 
of the specialized literature on the economics of patents hold-ups. Th e third 
section discusses the eBay and subsequent litigation within the U.S. as a case 
study of patent hold-ups and strategic behavior and argues for the use of a 
concept broader than patent hold-ups as treated in the economics literature. Th e 
fourth section refers to an even broader context for patent strategic behavior as it 
has been recently described in the European context. Th e fi ft h section examines 
the problems raised both in the U.S. and Europe while drawing policy 
conclusions in favor of focusing the discussion on the conduct rather than on the 
nature of the entity engaging in strategic behavior as well as proposing a concept 
of strategic behavior broad enough to encompass potential socially ineffi  cient 
behavior and yet, narrow enough to avoid distorting innovation incentives.
2. PATENT HOLDUPS: ECONOMIC THEORY
Recent scholarly work has argued that patent hold-ups might fi rstly impose losses 
in terms of static effi  ciency which are not suffi  ciently off set by expected dynamic 
effi  ciency gains in term of innovation incentives583 and that secondly; they might 
impose losses in terms of dynamic effi  ciency in the sense of blocking effi  cient 
subsequent innovations.584 Nevertheless, important divergences subsist among 
scholars with respect to the actual eff ects of hold-ups on effi  ciency. Even in a 
general non-patent context, some authors have argued that bilateral hold-ups are 
not necessarily ineffi  cient but would rather impose only distributional concerns. 
On the contrary, it is largely acknowledged that ineffi  ciencies do arise when 
negotiations are multilateral.585
Either in a bilateral or a multilateral case, however, hold-ups have been mainly 
studied in the context of incomplete contracts, when a party making specifi c 
583 See above Chapter I, Section 4.2.2, on Patent Hold-ups.
584 See Cotter, supra note 38.
585 See Cotter, supra note 38, at footnotes 60–61 and accompanying text, also citing from Lloyd 
Cohen, Holdouts, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and The Law 239 
(1998).
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investments is prone to opportunistic behavior by its counterpart in a contract. 
Specifi c investments are those that cannot be easily or at all translated into 
another useful use. Hence, a fi rm making specifi c investments which constitute 
sunk costs, becomes a potential target for strategic or opportunistic behavior.586 
Th e rational response to the risk of opportunistic behavior would range between 
the use of contracts and vertical integration between fi rms.587 However, as 
explained with more detail below, it is doubtful that contracts might avoid all 
risks of strategic behavior.588 In addition, vertical integration would not 
necessarily be desirable in some cases; especially those related to certain 
technological sectors and might as well give raise to further competition 
problems.589
Translated outside the realm of contracts, the risk of opportunistic behavior 
might arise whenever a party makes a specifi c investment. When the problem is 
subsequently applied to the patent context, which is characterized by an 
increasing prevalence of transaction costs and complex negotiations that 
frequently fail, the potential risk of being exposed to opportunistic behavior, 
including hold-ups is even greater.
In the patent context, specifi c investments are usually made by 2nd innovators in 
the development of products that embody some patented technology, either in 
the form of an improvement of a previous patented technology or through its 
incorporation in a multi-component product. If ex-ante negotiations for a license 
fail, or, as it has been recently argued, do not happen because of problems in the 
disclosure and notice function of patents, many innovators might refrain from 
making such specifi c investments in the fear of being held-up, and hence many 
technological improvements or new products might not come into existence or 
586 See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978), at p. 298 
explaining that: “when a specifi c investment is made and such quasi-rents are created, the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior is very real”.
587 Ibid at 298, arguing that: “as assets become more specifi c and more appropriable quasi rents 
are created (and therefore the possible gains from opportunistic behavior increases), the costs 
of contracting will generally increase more than the costs of vertical integration”.
588 See Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 162, at p. 2015, noticing that: “of course, patent pools do 
sometimes overcome these obstacles and successfully form. We simply note that the 
transaction costs can be substantial and that the presence of nonmanufacturing patent 
owners makes the formation of successful pools harder”. See also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 
p. 8, arguing that: “I see relatively little that private companies can do to overcome the hold-up 
problem without reform of the patent system itself. But there is quite a bit they can do to solve 
the complements problem, which itself is greatly exacerbated by the hold-up problem”.
589 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, discussing the possibility that certain patent policies, 
especially the denial of injunctive relief, for non-manufacturing companies, might have on 
the incentives for vertical integration as well as the potential harms arising from such vertical 
integration.
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might be delayed. Dynamic effi  ciency losses then may follow, especially because 
of the following conditions.590
Firstly, and although the patent system aims at enabling patentees to profi t and 
extract rents from their patented inventions, it is doubtful that extracting rents 
from hold-ups will benefi t society in terms of providing more incentives for 1st 
innovators, especially if the costs of such greater capture are taken into 
account.591 Secondly, most 2nd innovators are not merely users of technologies 
but rather innovators and the patent system does not only aim at fostering 1st 
innovations but also at the development of useful new applications and improved 
technologies.592 Th irdly, the complement characteristic of many patented 
technologies might lead to the problem of Cournot complements by which the 
fi nal product is priced above its social optimal.593 Fourthly, hold-ups might also 
add up to the losses due to a double marginalization problem, when both 
upstream innovator and downstream user are monopolists and as a consequence 
net social benefi ts will be lower.594
A specifi c case of hold-ups might arise under the above mentioned case of the 
negotiation of technical standards comprising several patented technologies. 
Th ese cases are increasingly important in today’s world as technical standards 
have become ubiquitous and of especial value for industries relying on compatible 
products and the use of networks and interfaces. When negotiations for the 
implementation of technical standards take place, it is important for all fi rms to 
know which patent(s) are essential for the use of such standard. Any fi rm making 
specifi c investments in developing a product according to the standard could be 
otherwise subject to opportunistic behavior if disclosure does not take place 
before the development of the product. In fact, the adoption of a standard reduces 
the available options ex ante in the sense that once the standard is set and the 
590 See Cotter, supra note 38 at p. 20.
591 Ibid at p. 20–21 arguing that: “there are reasons to doubt that the ability to extract substantial 
rents by practicing holdup produces much, if any, social benefi t in terms of dynamic effi  ciency 
(…) social welfare defi cit, given the magnitude of the short-term social costs. And network 
eff ects may make it hard for users to avoid these costs by switching to alternative 
technologies”.
592 Ibid, at p. 21: “enabling patentees to extract excessive rents from downstream users may 
inhibit investment on the part of downstream fi rms in developing new applications for patent- 
or standard-specifi c technologies. In a sense, producers of end products are not merely users 
of the patented invention, but rather might be thought of as sequential innovators”.
593 Ibid, at p. 21 “when multiple patents read on an end product, as will oft en be the case, holdup 
may exacerbate the “Cournot complements” problem”.
594 Ibid, at p 23, arguing that: “if both patentee and downstream user have some degree of market 
power, another consequence of patentees extracting “too much” rent may be to exacerbate 
this “double marginalization” problem. It is conceivable, of course, that in such a case the 
social benefi ts of inducing upstream innovation outweigh the social costs; the point is merely 
that holdup exacerbates those costs, and thus makes it marginally less likely that there is a net 
social benefi t”.
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industry decides to abide to such standard, the involved patents would acquire a 
value they did not have before. Such value is not inherent to the technology but 
rather derives from the specifi c investment made by fi rms in developing their 
products according to such standard.
Hence, whereas avoiding the use of the patent is not costly ex-ante, it will be very 
costly aft er the standard is set. Th e adoption of contractual terms such as FRAND 
or RAND595 precisely attempt to solve through a contractual commitment, the 
potential emergence of strategic behavior.596 However, it is still unclear that such 
contractual commitments might completely avoid hold-ups as it is precisely in 
the context of SSO’s negotiating technological standards that some fi rms have 
lately refused to abide to previously adopted commitments to license.597
Th e strategic behavior arising in this context that illustrates the close interface 
between antitrust and patent policy is oft en known as “patent ambush”.598 Th is 
conduct can be defi ned as a sub-type of patent hold-up that occurs in the context 
of negotiations for technological standards within an SSO when a member of 
such organization misleads other members into the adoption of a standard that 
595 Th ese almost equivalent terms describe licensing commitments adopted in the context of 
negotiated technical standards standing for a promise to license on Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory (RAND) and Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms, 
respectively.
596 See Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and 
the Th eory of the Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 351, 366–67 (2007), arguing that: “Th e holdup plays on 
a gap in projected returns that depends on continued access to the standardized technology: 
once the standard is set, users invest in making goods and services that use the specifi cation. 
If a user were then denied access to the standard technology and the standard-compliant 
assets were sold at salvage value, the return on those investments would be far lower than fi rst 
projected (when continued access was assumed). Aft er all, if other providers enjoy continued 
access to the standard and the interface-dependent market thrives, how much will consumers 
pay for the shut-out party’s nonstandard product? Th is scenario is not unique to the standards 
setting context. Economists have long called the problem “asset specifi city.” Th e RAND 
promise, which is an early agreement on the framework for later negotiation, is timed to take 
advantage of the tempering eff ect of the veil of ignorance and is designed to prevent this 
holdup problem”.
597 See Pat Treacy and Sophie Lawrance, FRANDly fi re: are industry standards doing more harm 
than good? Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2008, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
commenting on various cases including the Rambus and Qualcomm cases in the U.S. as well 
as the investigation by the European Commission and other cases in Germany and the U.K.
598 Whereas an ambush is oft en referred as a conduct rather than the entity that practices it, this 
latter is oft en assimilated to a “troll”. Th ere are multiple bibliographic references on SSO’s, 
patent ambushes, FRAND and RAND commitments. For a description of the role of SSO’s in 
the modern patent system see Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, Paper 24, available at: http://
repositories.cdlib.org/boaltwp/24. For the problem of hold-ups in the standard setting context 
see also Cotter, supra note 38 and Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162. For a view contrary to 
Lemley and Shapiro, see Miguel Rato & Damien Geradin, Can Standard-Setting Lead to 
Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of 
FRAND, 3 Eur. Competition J. 101, 107 (2007).
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
178 Intersentia
is or will be covered by a patent or patents that were not disclosed at that time.599 
Th e conduct consists in deceiving other members or in keeping patents hidden 
until the standard is set and lock-in occurs. In this sense, a patent ambush is a 
form of hold-up insofar as investments are sunk and SSO’s members are locked 
into the standard. Oft en, an entity engaging in patent ambush makes use of 
fi lling strategies, for instance, the fi ling of continuation or divisional applications 
in order to deceive; or else keeps her patent hidden until the standard is set.600
Th e practice of fi lling continuation applications is in fact recalled as the key 
reason that allowed Rambus to maintain its patent secret until the DRAM 
standards were developed.601 Additionally, in some cases such as Rambus itself, 
where aft er a long procedure that extended over 9 years the EPO decided to 
revoke Rambus’ patent, the involved patents might be of dubious validity.602 
Similar cases have been tackled either through the application of antitrust law, 
equitable defenses against enforcement of such patents or the application of 
unfair competition laws, illustrating the complementary nature of such 
statutes.603
599 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 43.
600 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: Th e 
Rambus and Broadcom Decisions, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 08–25 (June 2008), at 28–29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002.
601 See Harhoff  et al, supra note 165 at p. 95–96. Whereas the FTC found that Rambus had 
“unlawfully monopolized the markets for four computer memory technologies that have been 
incorporated into industry standards for DRAM chips”, the Court of Appeals decided for…
Information on the case Docket No. 9302 In the Matter of Rambus Incorporated is available 
on: www.ft c.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.shtm.
602 See Harhoff  et al, supra note 165, at footnote 47 and accompanying text. See also press release 
by EPO, informing about the revocation of patent 0525068 available at: www.epo.org/
about-us/press/releases/archive/2004/12022004.html, last accessed on August 13, 2009. 
However, the patent remains enforceable, for instance in Italy: http://v3.espacenet.com/
publicationDetails/inpadoc?CC=EP&NR=0525068A1&KC=A1&FT=D&date=19930203&DB
=EPODOC&locale=en_EP.
603 See Th omas Rosch, Remarks before the Newport Summit on Antitrust and Economics, 2008 
WL 2312363 (F.T.C.) referring the case of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051 
0094 (Consent Accepted For Public Comment, January 23, 2008), available at http:// www.ft c.
gov/opa/2008/01/ethernet.shtm (“N-Data”) whereby N-Data acquired patents held by 
National Semiconductor Corporation in the knowledge that this latter had made a one-time 
$1,000 licensing commitment. In this case, the FTC applied Section 5 of the FTC Act, alleging 
that N-Data’s conduct was an unfair method of competition and an unfair act because aft er 
the industry committed to the related standard N-Data refused to license in the above 
mentioned terms and demanded a higher royalty. See also the Statement of the Federal 
Trade Commission, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File no. 
051 0094 at 5–6, available at www.ft c.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf, arguing 
that: “in the standard-setting context with numerous, injured third parties who lack privity 
with patentees and with the mixed incentives generated when members may be positioned to 
pass on royalties that raise costs market-wide contract remedies may prove ineff ective, and 
Section 5 intervention may serve an unusually important role”.
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Summing up, the risk of being held-up can occur either in a bilateral or in a 
multilateral context, and both within or outside negotiations of technical 
standards. In all these cases, incentives for 2nd innovators might nevertheless be 
aff ected. However, the disagreement of scholars over the economic eff ects of 
hold-ups is even more acute in the case of patents.
2.1. ECONOMICS OF PATENT HOLDUPS: THE LEMLEY 
AND SHAPIRO MODEL
Diff erent economic models have been used to illustrate the problem of patent 
hold-ups. Some models attempt to study the impact of the availability of 
injunctive relief on negotiated royalties under a game theoretical approach 
considering that the outcome of negotiations depends on the threat point of each 
party, which is the value a party would obtain in case negotiations fail. Th e threat 
point of each party is itself dependent upon a number of relevant variables. Th e 
economic models described in this section aim at understanding how the 
availability of a property or a liability rule aff ects such threat points.
One such model foresees a patentee (1st innovator) that develops a technology 
which is incorporated in a downstream product by a potential infringer (2nd 
innovator).604 By the time a 2nd innovator develops the downstream product that 
infringes on the patented technology – at some cost – she might either be 
unaware that such technology is patented or might have doubts with regards to 
whether her product infringes the technology.605
Parties might negotiate ex-ante for a license, but if those negotiations fail, the 
patentee sues the 2nd innovator. Th e court has to determine whether the patent is 
valid and whether the product infringes the patent while some litigation costs 
will be imposed on the parties. Additionally, the fi nal outcome of litigation is 
604 See the model developed by Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162. See also critics developed by 
Denicolo et al., supra note 160 and Elhauge, supra note 38. Th e models principally illustrate 
the strategies that interested parties can adopt, the relevant variables that infl uence their 
payoff s and the decisions they would adopt under standard assumptions of rationality. 
Although the above mentioned models refer to a case of 1 upstream patentee and 1 
downstream manufacturer, with some changes the results might also be applied to the context 
of multi-parties.
605 Th e reasons why a fi rm designs a product using a patented invention range from the willful 
infringement of the patented invention to its independent invention and might be as well 
aff ected by the confl uence of patent strategies including delays in publication, fi lling strategies 
including the modifi cation of patent applications to include the infringing product, the fi le of 
divisional applications or continuations with important diff erences from the previous patent 
that might deceive 2nd innovators or the case in which a 2nd innovator is simply unaware of 
the patent or even if aware, has a reasonable belief that the product is not infringing.
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unknown to both parties and each of them will have some expectations from the 
results of the trial.
Before the fi nal decision, and if the plaintiff  has asked for it, the court might 
decide whether to award or not a preliminary injunction. Depending on the costs 
of litigation, expected duration, outcomes and cost from the trial, parties could 
also negotiate on the basis of this preliminary decision and reach a fi nal 
settlement.606 If litigation continues there is some probability that the court 
declares the patent valid and infringed and if this happens, the court will usually 
award damages as well as grant a fi nal injunction. Whereas before eBay, the 
probability that the court awarded an injunction was approximately 100% when 
the court found the patent valid and infringed, aft er eBay there is some 
probability that the court would nevertheless deny injunctive relief.607 At this 
point, parties can again negotiate in the shadow of the court’s decision but the 
threat points would have changed. If negotiations fail at this time, the infringer 
will have to stop all productive activity related to the infringing product.
In the model used by Lemley and Shapiro, the outcome of negotiations would 
depend among diff erent variables:
– V is the value of the patented feature to the downstream fi rm in comparison 
with the next best alternative technology.
– M is the margin earned by the downstream fi rm on its product.
– θ is the strength of the patent which refl ects the probability that the patent is 
found to be valid and infringed by the downstream fi rm’s product.
– C is the cost to the downstream fi rm of redesigning its product in order to 
avoid infringing the patent claims.
606 See Jean Lanjouw and Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? Th e Use of Preliminary Injunctions. 
Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, Part 1, October 2001, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=281238, analysing, from a law and economic point of view, the granting and 
abuse from preliminary injunctions in the U.S.
607 Th e set of cases (see appendix) analyzed in this thesis suggest that aft er eBay permanent 
injunctions are denied in approximately 31% and granted 69% of times whereas most U.S. 
commentators argue that before eBay, permanent injunctions (not preliminary ones) were 
awarded as a matter of course in all cases fi nding infringement and validity of patent. But see 
Denicolo et al. supra note 160, at p. 572–573, referring that previous research indicates that 
district courts awarded preliminary injunctions in 61% of cases (from the 1980s through the 
mid-1990s). Among those cases moving on to the Federal Court of Appeals over the same 
period, 58 percent of the injunctions granted were affi  rmed with percentages widely varying. 
In contrast, a study suggests that injunctive relief was awarded by federal district court cases 
in 1995, 1997, and 2000 only in 21% of the trials. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How 
Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of 
Patent Disputes, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 237 (2006), quoted by Denicolo et al.
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– L is the fraction of the downstream fi rm’s total unit sales during the lifetime 
of the patent that would be lost if the downstream fi rm were forced off  the 
market by an injunction.
– Finally, B is the bargaining skill of the patent holder, which refl ects a fraction 
of the combined gains from settling, rather than litigating, which are 
captured by the patent holder. B has a value from 0 to 1 and is usually 
assumed to be 0.5 refl ecting equal bargaining skills of the parties.
Th e model developed by Lemley and Shapiro studies how injunctions aff ect the 
threat points for parties bargaining over patent royalties and assumes that the 
bargaining skill of parties “B” remains constant. For the purposes of the analysis, 
the model needs to refer to a benchmark royalty that would be negotiated in an 
ideal patent system. Such benchmark, for Lemley and Shapiro, is B×V for an 
ironclad patent, that is, a patent that is certainly or almost certainly valid, 
whereas the benchmark is θ×B×V for other patents. Th e term θ discounts the 
benchmark by the probability that the patent is fi nally held valid and infringed.608 
Since reasonable royalties are calculated upon the basis of a hypothetical royalty, 
they argue that this benchmark can also be applicable for the calculation of 
reasonable royalties. Although they do not normatively argue for the use of such 
benchmark, they sustain that any rule signifi cantly altering it, might distort 
patent incentives.609 Th en, they consider two cases according to the best strategy 
for infringer in the case ex-ante negotiations fail:
– Th e “Litigate” strategy would be the best possible strategy for an infringer 
when the patent is relatively weak and redesign costs are relatively high in 
comparison with profi ts that the downstream fi rm would lose by withdrawing 
from the market while having to redesign its product. In this case, if 
negotiations fail, the best strategy is to defend during the patent suit and 
redesigning the product only if the infringer loses the suit and is unable to 
negotiate a license aft er losing. In particular, Lemley and Shapiro highlight 
that the negotiated royalty rate for a single patent tends to be hugely above a 
608 See Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 19, p. 75, 2005, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=567883, 
making the point that: “the actual scope of a patent right, and even whether the right will 
withstand litigation at all, are uncertain and contingent questions”. In this sense, patents are 
probabilistic rights and a value can be assigned to represent the strength of the patent, that is, 
the probability that once litigated it would not be declared invalid.
609 See Lemley and Shapiro supra note 162, at p. 2000, arguing that: “we do not mean that the 
benchmark royalty is the “right price” that should displace the workings of the market. To the 
contrary, as our use of the Nash bargaining model suggests, we are agnostic on how the 
cooperative surplus from bargaining is actually divided between the parties. We are, however, 
concerned to ensure that the law does not change the threat points that set the boundary 
conditions for this bargaining in ways that systematically move it away from the benchmark. 
If the law does so, the result, especially for weak patents, is that the patent system has distorted 
the market allocation of resources”.
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reasonable benchmark level if the value of a patented feature is small relative 
to the total value associated with the overall product. Th is follows from the 
fact that an injunction would cause the infringer not only to lose the value of 
the patented part but of the whole product.
– Th e “Redesign and Litigate” would be the best strategy for an infringer when 
the patent appears stronger. Here the infringer starts redesigning the product 
even while litigating, especially if the cost of redesigning is low in comparison 
with the prospective profi ts that it would lose if enjoined. However, the patent 
holder benefi ts from the fact that the infringer’s threat point in the 
negotiations involves incurring in redesign costs for sure and not just in the 
event that the patent survives litigation. Hence, the negotiated royalties would 
not be discounted by the patent strength. Th e gap between negotiated 
royalties and the ideal benchmark is higher the weaker the patent is, because 
the infringer is willing to settle for an amount that is greater than the 
expected value of the patentee’s contribution but less than the cost of 
redesigning the product while litigating.
– An extreme case happens when the value of the patented feature is zero 
because there would be alternative ways to redesign without infringing the 
patent. Th e zero benchmark refl ects that the infringer would not have 
negotiated a license ex ante and all negotiated royalties are “an overcharge 
based on holdup”.
Lemley and Shapiro conclude that the threat of injunctive relief for component 
products causes patentees whose inventions are only one component of a larger 
product to be systematically overcompensated. In addition, the ways in which 
U.S. courts have awarded reasonable royalties, especially for component 
inventions: “has made them into a tool for patentees to capture more than their 
fair share of a defendant’s profi t margins. Realigning the reasonable-royalty 
calculation with its intended purpose – compensation of patent owners – will go 
a long way towards reducing the incentives of patent plaintiff s to engage in 
opportunistic holdup”.610
According to Lemley and Shapiro, the calculations of reasonable royalties should 
take into consideration the availability of design around or non-infringing 
alternatives. Whereas courts currently analyze this factor when calculating lost 
profi ts, Lemley and Shapiro argue that this would also be pertinent for the 
calculation of reasonable royalties. Likewise, courts should take into 
consideration whether there are unpatented components on the infringing 
product; a factor that is actually contained in those mentioned by the typically 
610 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2044.
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applied precedent yet is oft en ignored.611 In this way damages might better refl ect 
the actual contribution of the patent, something that has been furthermore 
included in recent Bills proposing a reform of the U.S. patent act.612
In spite of presenting a model that underlines a potentially pervasive problem in 
patent law613, Lemley and Shapiro suggest that injunctive relief shall remain the 
baseline remedy for most patentees. Th ey argue that courts shall nevertheless 
limit the availability of injunctions in some cases, especially when inventions are 
only a minor component of a larger product and when the patentee’s principal 
interest in litigating patent infringement is to obtain licensing revenues. Likewise, 
they suggest that when the cost of redesigning the entire product is high relative 
611 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2018, explaining that while the case of Georgia-
Pacifi c v. United States Plywood 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) enumerated fi ft een factors 
that might be taken into account when simulating the hypothetical negotiation that would 
have occurred ex-ante, these factors are oft en reduced to only three issues: the signifi cance of 
the patented invention relative to the product and to market demand, the royalty rates people 
have been willing to pay for this or other similar inventions in the industry, and expert 
testimony as to the value of the patent.
612 See Cotter, supra note 38, citing the Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., §5 (2007), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h110–1908&version=pcs. See also H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., §5(a)(3) 
(2007), which passed the House of Representatives in fall 2007, but was removed in 2008 from 
the Senate calendar. A new proposal for reform of the Patent Act, §284(b) provides that in 
order to award reasonable royalties, courts shall consider the following circumstances: (2) 
relationship of damages to contributions over prior art – upon a showing to the satisfaction of 
the court that a reasonable royalty should be based on a portion of the value of the infringing 
product or process, the court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty 
under subsection (a) is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the 
patent’s specifi c contribution over the prior art. Th e court shall exclude from the analysis the 
economic value properly attributable to the prior art, and other features or improvements, 
whether or not themselves patented, that contribute economic value to the infringing product 
or process. (3) entire market value – upon a showing to the satisfaction of the court that the 
patent’s specifi c contribution over the prior art is the predominant basis for market demand 
for an infringing product or process, damages may be based upon the entire market value of 
the products or processes involved that satisfy that demand. (4) other factors – If neither 
paragraph (2) or (3) is appropriate for determining a reasonable royalty, the court may 
consider, or direct the jury to consider, the terms of any nonexclusive marketplace licensing 
of the invention, where appropriate, as well as any other relevant factors under applicable law. 
(5) combination inventions – For purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3), in the case of a 
combination invention the elements of which are present individually in the prior art, the 
patentee may show that the contribution over the prior art may include the value of the 
additional function resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of 
some or all of the prior art elements resulting from the combination.
613 Th e assertion that this might be a pervasive problem is not intended to judge on the actual 
frequency of hold-ups and strategic behavior in patent law, a – diffi  cult – question left  for 
empirical studies but it rather refl ects a known feature about modern technologies where 
many of them are incorporated in multi-component products “reading on” hundreds and 
even thousands of patented technologies, for which redesign might be costly either with 
respect (1) to the value of the infringed patent or (2) ex-post with respect to the cost of ex-ante 
redesign if the potential infringer was aware of the patent.
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to the value of the patented technology, courts shall deny the injunction. Even if 
such redesign costs are not so large, courts might award a stay in order to allow 
redesigning while calculating reasonable royalties for the time of such “allowed 
infringement”. Th ey suggest that courts should additionally take into 
consideration whether infringement was inadvertent as a prerequisite to deny 
injunctions. Conversely, in cases where the patentee might have been granted 
with lost profi ts, that is, when the plaintiff  and the defendant are competitors, 
courts shall grant an injunction but might still allow a stay according to the 
proportion of the value of the patented innovation.614
2.1.1. Refi nements and critics
Many scholarly comments have followed and criticized the above mentioned 
model. In practice, however, most of the dissimilar results and policy suggestions 
vary according to the assumptions considered necessary in order to fi nd a 
hold-up as well as whether such conditions are deemed to be more or less 
frequent in practice.
For instance, according to Cotter, additional requirements should be retained 
necessary in order to confi ne cases of patent hold-ups as much as possible615, 
namely: 1) that the patent contributes only to a portion of some multi-component 
end product; 2) that the exercise of market power is linked to the possibility that 
the patentee obtains an injunction preventing commercialization of the multi-
component product; 3) that the patentee is not a competitor of the potential 
licensee616 and 4) that a benchmark is found that provides guidance as to when a 
patentee is extracting a royalty above some reasonable threshold.
Th e last requirement is used to assess whether the royalty extracted by the 
patentee is above a reasonable threshold has been the source of further 
disagreement that clearly captures the divergences about other underlying points 
in discussion. Th e ideal benchmark proposed by Lemley and Shapiro, which is 
βθV617, means that injunctive relief systematically threatens to over-reward 
614 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162, at p. 2035–2045, providing policy suggestions in the 
light of patent hold-ups and royalty stacking.
615 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 23–26.
616 But see Ibid, adding that: “Of course, there might be mixed cases, in which the patentee 
competes in some markets and licenses its technology in others; holdup would be a risk in 
those markets in which the patentee does not compete, and would not be a risk in the others”.
617 Notice that the lower the reasonable threshold, the more cases that will be found to be in 
excess of that threshold and therefore categorized as hold-ups. Th e term β included in βθV 
represents a measure of the bargaining power of the patent holder, which is a variable ranging 
from 0 to 1 and usually assumed to be 0.5. Th erefore the threshold proposed by Lemley and 
Shapiro (βθV) would be lower than that proposed by Elhauge, which is not “discounted” with 
the bargaining power of the patentee (θV).
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component patent owners, given that it empowers them to bargain for royalties 
above that threshold. Conversely, Elhauge proposed that the accurate benchmark 
shall be θV.618 If this is the correct threshold, over-rewarding would occur only 
in a few cases, in particular:
– in cases of “strong surprise patents” only when “the fi xed costs of a redesign 
exceed the expected value of the patent, taking into account the odds that the 
patent claim will be found invalid”.
– in cases involving weak surprise patents only when “the value of the lost 
profi ts from the lag time to redesign plus the fi xed cost of a redesign exceed 
the value of the patent without any discount for its possible invalidity”
– in cases involving non-surprise patents, only when β > θ.
Cotter has argued that the Lemley and Shapiro’s benchmark is the correct one 
and that even when it is not, there would still be cases where over-rewarding is 
possible outside of those confi ned by Elhauge’s paper. Nevertheless, Cotter 
questions any distinction between βθv and θv, basically because it is not clear 
how, if ever, a court could possibly estimate β. In addition, he points out that 
when the courts seeks to replicate the hypothetical royalty the parties would have 
negotiated, they may not take into account the ex ante value of θ. Hence, Cotter 
concludes that the fundamental theoretical question about the ideal threshold 
should be how to estimate the value the parties would have placed on V, that is, 
the value of the patented technology.619
It is clear that calculating V might also be diffi  cult. In fact, Cotter suggests that 
there is a trade-off  between the diff erent proposed methodologies to calculate 
reasonable royalties. One option is theoretically correct in that it refl ects the 
value of the patented technology over the prior art with respect to alternative 
technologies but this option is administratively costly. Th e other approach is less 
costly but might create higher aggregate social costs”.620
More in general, commentators argue that switching to a liability rule would 
likely lead to errors and costs in calculating the appropriate royalty, and whereas 
party-negotiated royalties refl ect more accurately the value of innovations, court-
calculated royalties would tend to err in the sense of under-compensating 
patentees. An important counter-argument is that it is however possible that 
courts might err both in the sense of over-compensating or in under-
618 See Elhauge, supra note 38.
619 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 36. See the conclusions of this section below, broadening the 
restrictive defi nition of patent hold-ups according to the threshold proposed by Cotter, which 
is as well compatible with previous literature in the economics of patent improvement (Merger 
and Nelson).
620 Ibid, at p. 40.
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compensating.621 As expected, however, scholars do not only disagree about the 
potential biases of royalties calculated by courts but also about whether the 
current patent system over-compensates or under-compensates patent 
holders.622
2.1.2. Assumptions of the models
An important additional source of controversy between scholars regards the 
assumptions followed by each model. For instance, Denicolo et al. explain that 
the results of Lemley and Shapiro rely on the following assumptions: (1) that 
infringement is inadvertent; (2) that infringement is detected with certainty 
(something that is implicit in their model); (3) that it is costly to redesign the 
product ex-post compared with what it would have cost ex-ante and; (4) that the 
technology has several components and the value of the infringed patent is small 
compared to the total value of the infringing product. Th ey argue that 
notwithstanding the restrictiveness of their results in the light of these 
assumptions, Lemley and Shapiro have relaxed such assumptions for the 
purposes of drawing policy implications.623 Hence, they suggest that limiting 
injunctive relief should only be possible under the above mentioned restrictive 
621 Ibid, at p. 28–29, footnote 119 and accompanying text, indicating that “Indeed, if Lemley and 
Shapiro’s analysis is correct, courts in patent infringement cases sometimes may be more 
prone to overcompensate in the sense of awarding royalties in excess of those which the 
parties themselves would have agreed to ex ante and citing Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 162, 
and Mark Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profi ts from Reasonable Royalties, Stanford Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1133173, 2008, at 
p. 12–13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133173 claiming that “some patentees who 
can prove lost profi ts elect instead to seek a ‘reasonable’ royalty that is far in excess (of) what 
the parties would have negotiated”.
622 Compare for instance, Lemley and Shapiro supra note 162 suggesting that patent owners are 
systematically over-compensated with Denicolo supra note 26 and Denicolo et al., supra note 
160. Whereas Lemley and Shapiro based their model on the assumption of one-way 
complementarity, meaning that the product could have been designed without infringing the 
patent; Denicolo et al. develop a model in which innovations are complementary and fi nd that 
inventors are likely to be under-compensated and investment would be sub-optimal, given 
that: “With strictly complementary innovations fi rm A exerts a positive externality on fi rm B, 
and vice versa”. As a consequence, under-compensation occurs since fi rms exert positive 
externalities on one another.
623 See Denicolo et al. supra note 160, at p. 589, arguing that: “Assumption (i) is reduced to “no 
explicit copying,” a much easier hurdle to clear. Condition (ii), which is implicit in the 
theoretical model, is largely ignored, although it is crucial for obtaining the holdup results. 
Moreover, in the policy recommendation the important distinction between ex ante and ex 
post redesign costs is blurred. Finally, conditions (iii) and (iv) embed an additional 
assumption regarding the particular type of complementarity between components: although 
the stand-alone value of the technology owned by M is positive, that of the technology owned 
by I is zero. If all the multiple innovative components of a product are indispensable, however, 
the logic of the holdup problem, and hence the appropriate remedies, can be signifi cantly 
diff erent”.
Chapter IV. Ex-Post Liability Rules: When Should Th ey Be Used?
Intersentia 187
assumptions.624 Moreover and following an error-cost approach, they argue that 
any policy restricting the availability of injunctive relief should take into account 
the possibility of errors and that any such policy would only be desirable when 
hold-ups are suffi  ciently frequent as to call for a change in the baseline rule.625
With respect to inadvertent infringement, Denicolo et al. pose that a distinction 
should be made between the case of inadvertent infringement and infringement 
that even if not implying a mere copying, could not fall under the defi nition of 
inadvertent or innocent infringement. Assimilating cases in which copying or 
willful infringement is not proved to inadvertent infringement could be 
detrimental because it would create incentives to infringe patents. However, the 
identifi cation of inadvertent infringement is also diffi  cult. Although an 
inadvertent infringer might be defi ned as one that aft er performing a previous 
reasonable search did not fi nd any relevant patent that would be infringed, it is 
however debatable that such a previous “reasonable” search by the infringer 
would suffi  ce to avoid surprise patents nowadays. In this respect, Elhauge 
concludes that infringement can always be avoided because “the downstream 
fi rm can (unless patent search costs are insuperable) always assure it pays a 
royalty rate that does not exceed the true optimal rate” by “simply search[ing] 
the patent records to avoid surprise and then negotiate a license before 
designing”.626 However, many recent studies highlight that such a reasonable 
search is not possible in an important number of cases, making the exception 
“unless patent search costs are insuperable” to frequently become the rule.627
624 Denicolo et al., supra note 160 at p., concluding that “the theoretical circumstances under 
which patent holdup can occur are fairly narrow”.
625 Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 583–584 explaining that: “On the one side is the risk of 
denying an injunction to a patent holder in the absence of a signifi cant holdup problem, a 
type 1 (“false positive”) error. On the other side is the risk of granting an injunction to a 
patent holder who is indeed intent on holdup, a type 2 (“false negative”) error. Diff erent policy 
rules entail diff erent risks of type 1 and type 2 errors. If injunctions were granted routinely, 
for instance, type 1 errors would be avoided altogether but the probability of type 2 errors 
would remain. Conversely, with systematic denials of injunctive relief, the risk of type 2 errors 
would be avoided but a substantial risk of type 1 errors would emerge. Finally, categorical 
denials of injunctive relief, whereby injunctive relief is denied to certain types of patent 
holders, can produce both type 1 and type 2 errors if the category of fi rms for which injunctive 
relief is denied is not a clean match to the fi rms actually practicing patent holdup”. Th ey 
moreover criticize any attempt of developing a categorical rule that systematically denies 
injunctive relief for non-practicing entities. For the reasons mentioned in the precedent 
section we agree that such categorical rules might not bring benefi cial eff ects for patent 
policy.
626 See Elhauge, supra note 38, at p. 14.
627 See Cotter, supra note 38, at p. 25–26, counter-arguing the diffi  culty of previous patent 
searches and citing Bessen and Meurer.
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Th ere are additional problems with using a standard of due diligence in order to 
rule out willful infringement as it happens in the U.S. case.628 In practice, fi rms 
developing innovations in the U.S. oft en deliberately avoid performing a 
thorough patent search in order not to read previous patents. Otherwise, when a 
fi rm becomes aware of the existence of a patent it will be subject to an obligation 
to ask an opinion from a patent counsel or else risk to be found a willful infringer 
and potentially be obliged to pay treble damages.629 More in general, it is clear 
that a “due diligence” standard shall be subject to the court’s discretion in order 
to avoid parties behaving strategically with respect to the requirements set by 
any categorical rule as well as to adapt to future technological events that either 
facilitate or diffi  cult a previous search on prior art.630
Inadvertent infringement that occurs due to the incompleteness or costliness of 
patent information – even by eff ect of rules providing wrong incentives – might 
then produce or aggravate the risk of hold-ups. Th is would not only suggest that 
some limitation of injunctive relief might sometimes be needed but would also 
favor rules allowing the application of compulsory licensing provisions for 
infringers, at least when they are inadvertent.631 While a general drawback with 
628 See the CAFC decision in Re Seagate, supra note 472, correcting the threshold for willful 
infringement that was previously applied by the CAFC during the previous years, In fact, 
giving the punitive nature of enhanced damages, these should be considered as a deterrent 
mechanism, limited to cases of “recklessness” infringement. But see Cotter, supra note 38, 
agreeing with the new standard but disagreeing with the underlying analysis that relies on 
the probability that the patent would be declared valid and infringed instead than on the rate 
of detection, which is the relevant variable from an economic viewpoint.
629 See Mark Lemley and Ragesh Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, Vo. 18. p. 1085, available at ssrn.com/abstract, explaining how 
the willfulness rules create an important incentive for fi rms to avoid reading patents: “once a 
company becomes aware of a patent, it has an obligation to obtain a written opinion or risk 
later being held a willful infringer. To avoid this signifi cant cost, in-house patent counsel and 
many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to read patents if there is any way to 
avoid it”.
630 See Richard Epstein, Scott Kieff  & Polk Wagner, Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 2005 U.S. 
Briefs 130 (2006). at p. 591, arguing that: “Any party that did not use due diligence to fi nd 
out whether its conduct constituted infringement would be in the advantageous position of 
using its own neglect to undermine the legal protection otherwise available to a patentee. 
Potential infringers would have a palpable incentive to decrease inquiry into existing patent 
rights, which would in turn increase the number of infringement disputes”. And Ibid, arguing 
that: “To avoid those risks, and hence avoid encouraging even greater false positives, it is 
important that injunction policy require a defendant to establish not only that it infringed 
inadvertently, but also that it exercised due diligence in searching for any intellectual property 
right its product might have violated”.
631 See Chapter III, section 5.5.5. Other ex-post liability rules: compulsory licenses. Such 
possibility is found in the new Italian rule that allows good faith infringers to apply for a 
compulsory license. Yet the standard of “good faith infringer” has not been still interpreted 
by any court in the context of awarding a compulsory license. Whereas it will be diffi  cult to 
prove that either one was not aware of the patent, or that one had a reasonable doubt of the 
validity of the patent in the light of the presumptions of validity of patents and the public 
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limiting injunctive relief for inadvertent infringers is to give incentives to 
infringe patents, it is doubtful that awarding injunctions in cases of “good faith”, 
“inadvertent” or “innocent” infringement would help to achieve the optimal 
level of deterrence rather than tilting the balance towards over-deterrence. For 
the purposes of achieving optimal deterrence, it could be suffi  cient to consider 
the prospective of enhanced damages when willful infringement is proved and 
whether they are large enough with respect to the rate of detection.
A second point of controversy in the above mentioned models regards the rate of 
detection of infringement. Whereas the Lemley and Shapiro model seem to assume 
that every case of infringement is detected, Denicolo et al. criticize this assumption 
as unrealistic in the light that detection will occur only on a fraction of cases and 
as creating a problem of potential under-compensation for patentees.632
Indeed the probability of detection is an important variable from the economic 
viewpoint which is oft en proposed to optimally adjust the level of retrospective 
damages.633 However, courts should also be careful enough to avoid rendering 
the patentee better off  than he would have been without the infringement, or 
otherwise risk to make the strategy of “being infringed” profi table enough to 
encourage strategic behavior.634
Apart from the rate of detection, another variable that should probably be taken 
into account is the rate of settlement, as any previous agreement between 
patentee and infringer to put an end to the suit would probably refl ect lower 
royalties than the fi nal outcome discounted by the probability that the patent is 
found infringed. Th e eff ect of settlements might however, not be as signifi cant as 
in other fi elds due to the fact that a settlement in a patent case usually involves 
nature of patent documents, however, more oft en a defense could consist in a reasonable belief 
that one’s product does not infringe the patent or that the product was designed independently. 
Although this latter is not an exemption under patent laws it could be useful for the purposes 
of defi ning “good faith infringement”.
632 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 592, arguing that: “in the presence of a holdup 
problem, granting injunctive relief may not necessarily over-compensate the patent holders. 
Over-compensation requires that C is large relative to v if s is small. Th e smaller the 
probability of detection s, the more likely it is that we have an under-compensation problem”.
633 See Denicolo et al. supra note 160 at p. 592, footnote 72. See also Cotter, supra note 38, at p.30, 
footnote 127 and accompanying text, quoting also from Th omas F. Cotter, An Economic 
Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorneys’ Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 291,315 (2004); and proposing an argument that can also be applied to the award of 
injunctive relief: “in cases in which infringement of the type at issue is likely to go undetected 
in a great many cases, enhanced damages may be necessary to ensure adequate deterrence”.
634 See also Henkel et al., supra note 139, referring two ineffi  ciencies identifi ed by scholars in 
legal practice, namely patentee-friendly injunctions and the granting of excessive damage 
awards as drivers of ‘destructive’ strategies put in place by patent trolls or patent sharks that 
aim at appropriating innovation rents by threatening to patent-block other players’ R&D-
related value creation.
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also the payment of royalties to put an end to the controversy. In these cases, the 
payment of royalties or any other type of payment for the use of the patented 
technology happens in spite of the probability that the patent could have been 
considered invalid if the trial continued, with consequences that go beyond the 
private interests of the parties involved in the trial.635
A third debated assumption of the above mentioned models is the requirement 
that redesigning the product would be costly ex-post. Lemley and Shapiro argue 
that courts “should evaluate the cost that the infringing fi rm would have to incur 
to redesign its product and avoid infringing the patent. If this cost is high relative 
to the value that the patented technology has added to the infringing fi rm’s 
product, no permanent injunction should be issued”.636 However, it has been 
stated that whereas Lemley and Shapiro’s model assumes that redesign costs are 
zero ex ante and costly ex-post; their policy suggestions are broader and only 
require that the cost is high relative to the value that the patented technology has 
added to the infringing fi rm.637
Critics on the Lemley and Shapiro’s model argue that diff erent results hold when 
the infringed patent is essential for the innovative product. For instance, in the 
case of two complementary innovations which are both necessary to create a new 
product and which are hold by the patentee and the infringer, the optimal degree 
of patent protection should be higher.638 Likewise, in the case of multi-
635 See Lemley & Shapiro supra note 28, noting that patent invalidation is a public good which 
provides positive externalities to other competitors and hence tends to be under-supplies as 
well as describing the problems generated by reverse payments whereby patentees pay 
potential incumbents to drop claims of invalidity, a practice that has been found in the 
pharmaceutical sector in order to prevent the entrance of generic competitors.
636 See Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 162.
637 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 596, arguing that “If the suggested criterion were 
taken to mean that injunctive relief should be denied (or stays of injunctions routinely 
granted) whenever it is very costly or even impossible to design the product in a non-
infringing way ex ante, this injunction policy would penalize the most valuable patents – 
precisely, those that are most diffi  cult to circumvent even with full knowledge of the patent. 
Instead, to be consistent with the theory, the policy should indicate that to avoid injunctive 
relief an infringer must show not only that it is costly to redesign the product in a non-
infringing way ex post, but also that it could easily have designed the product in a non-
infringing way ex ante if only it had been aware of I’s patent (which again emphasizes the 
importance of the inadvertent infringement assumption)”.
638 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 594–595 explaining this specifi c case: “with two-way 
complementarity, innovators are more likely to be undercompensated and hence denying 
injunctions can be especially harmful. Intuitively, when both innovations 1 and 2 are needed 
to develop a product, a fi rm racing for innovation 1 exerts a positive externality on the fi rms 
racing to achieve 2, and vice versa. Th is positive externality is a source of distortion that tends 
to reduce the investment in R&D compared with the social optimum: the fi rm that fi rst 
achieves innovation 1 will only benefi t from its invention if component 2 is achieved as well 
Th us, the expected payoff  of each successful innovator is the reward in case of success 
multiplied by the probability (a fraction less than one) that both inventions are created.”
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component products, it has been argued that holdups would be a threat only 
when all the following conditions apply, namely that the patent covers a single 
component of a larger complex product, that one component is minor and has a 
small value and that a stand-alone product excluding the value of such patent 
must have been commercially and technically feasible ex ante.639
2.2. FROM PATENT HOLDUPS TO PATENT STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR
Th e aforementioned models off er highly dissimilar views that range from a broad 
defi nition of hold-ups to a limited set of cases and models with highly restrictive 
assumptions. Th ere is still another possible interpretation of economic models of 
patent hold-up which is also in tune with law and economics analysis. Even 
though the concept of patent hold-ups might indeed require a number of 
restrictive assumptions much more confi ned than those used in the policy 
recommendations of Lemley and Shapiro’s model, it is still the case that patent 
hold-ups are only one out of many possible diff erent types of strategic behavior 
belonging to the patent area. In fact, according to the insights of the previous 
chapter dealing with comparative case law as well as the interpretation provided 
below, there might be at least three diff erent problematic cases of patent strategic 
behavior. Th ese cases might or not qualify as hold-ups, depending on the 
particular assumptions used, yet they might impose losses in dynamic as well as 
static effi  ciency terms.
As a consequence, there will be cases in which it is costly to apply a property rule 
even if the downstream product is not multi-component or when the patented 
technology is essential – either part of a technological standard or not – in the 
sense that it could not have been easily invented around ex-ante. It is noteworthy 
that these apparently abstract cases largely correspond to most legal provisions 
and case law analyzed in the previous chapter.
Th e fi rst cases regard improvement patents or 2nd innovation patents that 
contribute to a much higher proportion of (social) value640 with respect to the 1st 
innovation. Th e case of improvement patents is much broader than the above 
discussed cases of hold-ups. Nevertheless, there might be compelling reasons to 
conclude that these cases call for a switch into a liability rule. Such cases have in 
fact been regulated for long time in the national laws of many diff erent countries, 
although not in the U.S. even though their implementation is confi ned to few 
cases. Th is is probably a consequence of the need to confi ne the application of 
639 Denicolo et al., supra note 160, at p. 596.
640 See Merges and Nelson, at p. 118–119 and Cotter, supra note 38 p. 18–19.
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such compulsory licenses as well as to the diffi  culty of proving that the 2nd 
innovation contributes in a larger proportion to the society.641
Th e second case envisions a company that has made important specifi c 
investments and is aft erwards held-up by the patentee. However, this case 
comprises at least two sub-types of cases. In one, the patent is part of the setting 
of a technological standard and in the second case (to which most models and 
critics refer) the infringer inadvertently uses a patented technology to the 
development of a multi-component product and is subsequently held-up.
Still, it is important to notice that the relevant variables to know whether a case 
falls within the above mentioned terms are diffi  cult to assess. In particular, a 
threshold is needed to evaluate the contribution in terms of value from either 
innovation. Th is would perhaps be easier in the case of a patent contributing to a 
minor part of a multi-component product than in the case of improvements 
when a 2nd innovation should have a higher social value than the 1st innovation. 
In fact, this result is compatible both with the much stringent standard for 
compulsory licenses for improvement patents and the restricted number of 
relevant case law. Th e following section examines diff erent cases of potential 
strategic behavior in the fi eld of patent law, in order to illustrate the above 
theoretical considerations with current practices both in Europe and the U.S.
3. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND EXPOST LIABILITY 
RULES
As explained above, strategic behavior might either enhance the ability of the 
patentee to extract monetary sums in excess of the real value of her patent and 
the potential for threatening to block subsequent innovation, which would cause 
sequential or 2nd innovators to refrain from investing in such technologies and 
hence, important static and dynamic effi  ciency losses. Th ese potential losses are 
an important ground calling for the use of ex post liability rules.
Of course the above mentioned losses are expected and cannot be ascertained 
accurately. However, courts might attempt to redress a situation of strategic 
641 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes in fact that compulsory licenses for the case of a 
2nd patent which cannot be exploited without infringing a previous 1st patent shall comply, 
with the following additional requirements: “(i) the invention claimed in the second patent 
shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic signifi cance in relation 
to the invention claimed in the fi rst patent”. Moreover, it is arguable, than in the light of such 
diffi  cult assessment, such compulsory licenses are subject to further limits such as requiring 
that: “(ii) the owner of the fi rst patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms to 
use the invention claimed in the second patent; and (iii) the use authorized in respect of the 
fi rst patent shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent”.
Chapter IV. Ex-Post Liability Rules: When Should Th ey Be Used?
Intersentia 193
behavior and under the current international patent rules are only authorized to 
do so in a case-by-case basis.642 From a policy perspective, the necessity of such 
examination by courts requires to further considering whether and to what 
extent is it advisable to prevent or redress patent strategic behavior without 
creating unduly burdens in terms of administrative costs and errors. As a fi rst 
step, this requires a proper identifi cation of the grounds to switch to a liability 
rule.
Law and Economics literature as well as an important thread of recent U.S. case 
law suggest that the problem of strategic behavior especially in the form of patent 
hold-ups is a growingly important reason calling for the use of liability rules 
notwithstanding its potential costs. Such theoretical fi ndings are complemented 
by empirical studies showing that strategic behavior is probably increasing in 
frequency and impact and that specifi c industries of growing importance in 
today’s economy that have been particularly exposed to the increasing use of 
strategic behavior. Some studies have found similar evidence for the case of 
Europe.643
Indeed, patent strategic behavior can take place in diff erent contexts, either 
through the use of a patent portfolio or individual patents and its eff ects can 
either be anticompetitive or not.644 Th e following sections attempt to give a 
broader landscape for patent strategic behavior, starting from a case study 
derived from recent case law. Practices that allegedly amount to patent hold-ups 
are then compared to other adjacent practices in order to better defi ne the scope 
of patent strategic behavior, which is the principal ground for the use of ex-post 
liability rules.
3.1. PROBLEMS PUT FORWARD BY EBAY V. 
MERCEXCHANGE
Th e U.S. case is noteworthy, since compulsory licensing provisions were largely 
absent from patent law and at the same time, the application of equity doctrines 
642 See Chapter II above, section 3.3.1. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, arguing that ex-post 
liability rules for patents are the only possibility allowed by the TRIPS Agreement in the sense 
of the requirements of Article 31 (a) which says that “authorization of such use shall be 
considered on its individual merits”.
643 See next section.
644 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165, proposing the following concept, which, however, would 
only apply to an entire patent portfolio and not to individual patents: “strategic use of the 
patent system arises whenever fi rms leverage complementarities between patents in order to 
attain a strategic advantage over technological rivals. Th is behavior is anticompetitive if the 
main aim and eff ect of strategic use of the patent system is to decrease the effi  ciency of rival 
fi rms’ production eff orts” (emphasis added).
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that gives discretion to judges in order to grant or deny injunctive relief had also 
been curtailed for a long time. In 2006, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged that injunctive relief rests within the discretion of district courts 
by pointing out that patent law cases should be governed by the traditional 
principles of equity in a decision that represented a major turning point in patent 
policy. In fact, whereas patent law is said to be distinctive in many diff erent ways, 
the uniqueness of patent law does not necessarily weight in favor of awarding 
injunctions in an automatic way. Indeed while patent’s unclear boundaries and 
the growing problems of patent notice and decrease of quality weight against 
using property rules645, the exclusive nature of patents as a mechanism to provide 
innovation incentives weights in favor.
Th ese two contradictory arguments were evidenced in the two concurring 
opinions given by Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in the eBay decision.646 In 
spite of being a unanimous decision, such divergent views provided little 
guidance for district courts to apply the traditional test in patent cases. Th is 
equitable test for the issuance of injunctions is probably the context in which 
ex-post liability rules have been discussed most extensively and thus a useful 
framework to analyze the underlying purpose of the rules647 potential problems 
with their application and also to give a sense of the current landscape in U.S. 
patent law with respect to their use.
According to the Kennedy’s opinion, treating injunctions as an equitable relief – 
and thus allowing the use of ex-post liability rules for infringed patents – could 
be a potential solution for three interconnected problems in the context of 
modern technologies: a) the impact of strategic behavior and specifi cally hold-
ups; b) the growing multi-component nature of products which can at the same 
time exacerbate the risk of hold-ups; and c) the increase in number and economic 
importance of patents of dubious quality.648
645 See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14 and chapter I, Section 4, “Property and Liability Rules 
in Patent Law”.
646 See eBay v. MercExchange, supra note 2.
647 See supra notes 336 and 406, explaining the method of comparative law, based upon the 
underlying function of legal rules.
648 In fact these three reasons are mentioned subsequently in the same paragraph: “An industry 
has developed in which fi rms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these fi rms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool 
to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When 
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce 
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal 
damages may well be suffi  cient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may 
not serve the public interest. Injunctive relief may have diff erent consequences for the 
burgeoning number of patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and 
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Th e following section analyses these three reasons649, which overall refl ect the 
underlying message that the modern patent landscape has greatly changed and 
that important opportunities have emerged for patent strategic behavior. Hence, 
these three main arguments in fact refer to such changing landscape and are all 
based on diff erent strategic behavior practices of modern times.
3.1.1. Strategic behavior
Th e Kennedy’s opinion argued in favor of the use of ex-post liability rules due to 
the increasing evidence of patent strategic behavior in its specifi c variant of 
patent hold-ups. Essentially, the further two reasons described below can also be 
rephrased in the context of patent strategic behavior. According to Justice 
Kennedy concurring opinion:
“An industry has developed in which fi rms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these fi rms, 
an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent (…)”650
3.1.2. Multi component patents
A second reason why injunctions should not be awarded as a matter of course 
arises when the patented innovation is just a small part of a multi-component 
product:
“When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies 
seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage 
in negotiations, legal damages may well be suffi  cient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest”.
legal signifi cance in earlier times. Th e potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of 
these patents may aff ect the calculus under the four-factor test” (footnotes omitted).
649 Th e arguments off ered by the Kennedy’s opinion are mentioned as a simplifi ed grouping of 
the most important arguments calling for the use of ex-post liability rules in the context of 
U.S. patent law. Th e Kennedy opinion in fact compiled a number of arguments elaborated by 
previous academic and policy discussion papers. Hence, the choice of referring to the 
Kennedy’s opinion is not motivated to a priori favor its conclusion but to discuss the potential 
grounds for the use of ex-post liability rules. Th ese grounds would not be possible to infer 
from the text of the majority’s opinion as this latter did not provide ulterior guide or any 
reasoning beside the traditional use of an equity four-factor test the opinion by Justice 
Roberts does not provide any ground for the use of ex-post liability rules but rather elaborates 
on the principal arguments against their use. For this reason, the arguments of this opinion 
are dealt in the next chapter.
650 See eBay v. MercExchange, (Justice Kennedy concurring), supra note 425 at p. 1842.
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In fact, there are two inter-related but diff erent arguments in such assertion. Th e 
fi rst is the inherent changing nature of innovations and the fact that modern 
patents are usually embed in multi-component products. Th is change, which 
does not pertain to patent policy but is rather an inherent characteristic of 
modern technologies, might be however problematic since most patent laws 
around the world, including the U.S. were designed when inventions were mostly 
of the one-patent/one-product type. Conversely, products of the information 
technology industries such as microprocessors, mobile phones, soft ware and 
DVD’s are frequently covered by a great number of diff erent patents.651
Although this is a largely empirical issue, which has been – at least partially – 
evidenced by recent studies, more opportunities for strategic behavior have 
emerged as a consequence of this transformation. Each manufacturer that seeks 
to develop a product using a previous patent(s) must either seek consent from the 
patent owner(s) or else risk that such use might be considered infringing. As 
explained in more detail below, the problem of patent hold-up is then fostered by 
the fact that a patent owner of a small part of a multi-component product can 
extract rents above the economic value of the patent by threatening to use an 
injunction to shut down the production of the whole multi-component product.
3.1.3. Dubious quality patents
Probably one of the most controversial parts of the Kennedy’s opinion is that 
which refers to some patents, especially those over business methods652, being of 
651 See Lemley, Shapiro, Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearing before the Subcomm. On 
Intellectual Property of the House Commision on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. 5 (2006).
652 It is oft en referred that patents on business methods were fi rstly allowed by the decision on 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc, in which it was held that a 
claimed invention is patentable if it “produces a useful, concrete and tangible result”. Th e 
CAFC has recently overturned such test in the en banc decision in Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008), whereby the CAFC reaffi  rmed the rejection of patent claims 
on a method of hedging risks within the trade of commodities and also rejected the machine-
or-transformation test” laid down in State Street Bank. A number of recent decisions have 
already interpreted the new test under Bilski, and for instance, in the decision of CyberSource 
Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 2009 WL 815448 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2009), it was even argued 
that the: “Th e closing bell may be ringing for business method patents”. Th e U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear the case, in a decision available at: www.supremecourtus.
gov/orders/courtorders/060109zor.pdf, June 1st, 2009, to answer two particular questions: (1) 
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must be tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or transform a particular Article into a diff erent state or thing … 
despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of patent eligibility 
for “any” new and useful process beyond excluding patents for “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.” And (2) Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-
transformation” test for patent eligibility, which eff ectively forecloses meaningful patent 
protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear Congressional intent that patents 
protect “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” 35 U.S.C. §273 and a decision is 
expected.
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dubious quality and hence problematic to enforce through the use of property 
rules:
“Injunctive relief may have diff erent consequences for the burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and legal 
signifi cance in earlier times. Th e potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of 
these patents may aff ect the calculus under the four-factor test”.653
Whereas such refl ection echoes widespread concerns about the convenience of 
patenting business methods and the quality of such patents, it in fact raises two 
important but diff erent questions. Th e fi rst question is whether it would be 
economically advisable to use property and liability rules in order to fi ne-tune 
the quality of patents or whether it is preferable to use a diff erent policy lever. A 
second question is to what extent courts can alter the balances already established 
by the Congress in patent law, especially with regards to the patentability of some 
inventions such as business method patents.
From an economic point of view it is important to ask whether a particular type 
of patent might present a problem for the overall system. Secondly, and even 
though it is assumed that the decreasing quality of patents imposes economic 
losses, it is important to know whether it is effi  cient to solve these problems 
through the use of property and liability rules or rather through the use of a 
diff erent policy lever. An alternative in fact would be to adjust the patentability 
requirements, including such patent doctrines deciding on the patentable subject 
matter, novelty and inventive step and to improve the quality of patents by 
improving the process of patent examination. In fact, losses might be imposed in 
a general category of patents if the costs of granting patents for such area surpass 
the benefi ts. As the main benefi ts from the issuance of patents are to provide 
innovation incentives, to disclose socially benefi cial information that could 
otherwise remain secret and to facilitate the commercialization of innovations, it 
is important to analyze whether such three justifi cations are achieved through 
the granting of business method or soft ware patents in spite of variegated 
critics.654 As explained below, from an economic point of view, both the use of 
policy levers associated with the quality of patents as well as the choice between 
property and liability rules would be necessary and complementary to tackle the 
current perceived problems in patent design.
653 See eBay v. MercExchange, (Justice Kennedy concurring), supra note 425 at p. 1842.
654 Th is chapter concentrates on the interface if any, between the uses of liability rules with such 
purported problems of the patent system beyond strategic behavior while it does not directly 
address the specifi c question of business method or soft ware patents, as it would fall out of 
the scope of this book.
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From a legal point of view, if courts opted for dealing with the problem of patent 
quality by systematically denying injunctions for some –problematic – categories 
such as business method patents, such decision could be criticized on the 
grounds of discrimination against a specifi c type of innovations in violation of 
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, it could be argued that 
correcting the problem of low patent quality and the patentability of some 
technological areas is not in principle a task for courts at the time of deciding on 
the available remedies for infringed rights.
It is evident that some types of patent might pose particular diffi  culties for courts 
when protected through an injunction.655 Nonetheless, the quality of patents, 
regardless of their type, might be aff ected through a set of patent strategies that 
include the use (and abuse) of divisional applications, continuations of 
applications and other fi ling strategies which might obscure the disclosure 
function of patents and increase the risk of inadvertent infringement.656 Such 
practices extend beyond the business method, soft ware or any other patent 
category.
Hence, two diff erent perspectives are implied in the problem of patent quality. 
One could be described as a “macro” perspective, responding to the question of 
whether a category such as business methods should be patentable at all. Th e 
same might happen with other problematic fi elds, including the patenting of 
information-based technologies, soft ware and certain biotechnologies of 
informational nature. Under the second perspective, which we could describe as 
“micro”, what is implied is not the technological category of the patents but the 
conduct of the patentee. Th is is the case of the burgeoning number of patents 
with complex, long and numerous claims, the use of fi ling strategies as divisional 
or continuation applications and, importantly, of any other similar strategy that 
might arise with time.
It could be argued that, whereas equitable doctrines are an adequate option to 
handle the second perspective of the problem, which is in any case a strategic 
behavior of patentees, the “macro” facet of patent quality is better dealt ex ante 
through the use of the above mentioned policy levers.
655 Th e claims of a patent constitute the boundaries of the patent and business method patents 
usually present vague claims, a higher number of claims than the average patent as well as 
other related problems. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Are business method patents bad for business, 
Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 16, 2000, 263–278.
656 See section below and also Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14. For a similar reasoning and 
warning in Europe see Harhoff  et al., supra note 165.
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4. THE LANDSCAPE OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
IN EUROPE
Important diff erences exist between important patent rules, practices and 
industry characteristics that divide the European landscape from that of the U.S. 
Amongst the most important features for the purposes of this discussion are the 
harmonization – and lack of harmonization – of certain European patent rules, 
the opportunity for forum shopping that arises from a fragmented landscape 
with regards to patent litigation as well as the opportunity provided by the 
competition between diff erent rules in place at the moment. Th e careful study of 
the characteristics of each patent system and their economic analysis would 
certainly be fundamental for the forthcoming harmonization, especially the 
projected European Patent Litigation Agreement and the Community Patent.657
Lacking a unitary system of litigation, each country’s patent litigation widely 
varies within Europe. France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are the countries producing the highest number of patent applications 
and have developed more specialized patent courts.658 In fact these four countries 
concentrate approximately 90% of patent litigation in Europe.659 Whereas patent 
litigation takes place either in the context of revocation proceedings in which the 
validity of patents is challenged or in infringement trials to enforce patent rights, 
the estimated probability that a patent is litigated varies between 1% and roughly 
3% in most patent systems660, with some further diff erences according to 
technical sectors, industries and countries.
Th e lack of a unifi ed European litigation system is said to have generated numerous 
problems that have in eff ect encouraged negotiations on the EPLA. Firstly, 
resources are duplicated and wasted in diff erent proceedings to enforce the same 
patent in various countries due to the territorial nature of patents and the absence 
of a European litigation court. Secondly, diffi  culties for trade might arise inside 
the EU due to the diverging outcomes of litigation which can cause one patent to 
be protected in one country while not in another. Th irdly, delays and hold-ups 
might follow because the fragmented nature of the system creates the opportunity 
to adopt delay strategies or the creation of entry barriers by raising the costs of 
657 Th is section attempts to provide a brief overview on the European patent litigation system, 
mainly focused on the issue of patent strategic behavior. While the analysis contained in this 
section is widely diff erent than the above section describing the U.S. in the context for strategic 
behavior this is fi rstly due to the absence of completely equivalent situations to be compared 
to the U.S. eBay and post eBay decisions. Secondly it is an attempt of broadening the allegedly 
narrow concept of patent hold-ups as understood in the context of U.S. patent debates.
658 See Harhoff , supra note 381.
659 Ibid, at p. 13.
660 Ibid, at p. 14.
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potential entrants.661 In fact, litigation and especially high litigation costs have 
been blamed to produce and worsen incentives for strategic behavior.662
A distinctive feature of European patent litigation is the existence of a procedure 
for post-grant opposition which off ers a lower cost mechanism to ask for the 
invalidation of patents. Lower cost opposition procedures have been perceived as 
a fundamental feature of the European patent system and several studies have in 
fact suggested transposing these rules into U.S. patent legislation in order to deal 
with some perceived fl aws in this system.663
Overall, most commentators highlight that the European patent system remains 
immunized from the problems aff ecting the U.S. in terms of strategic litigation 
including the emergence of patent trolls and hold-ups and the increasing 
importance of patent thickets as well as the decreasing quality of patents.664 Th is 
is said to be the consequence of several features of the European system including 
incentives embedded in EPO patent examination rules, such as higher fees, a tax 
imposed for applications with numerous claims and others which have assured a 
higher quality of examination as well as opposition procedures which provide a 
lower cost mechanism to weed out invalid patents.
Nonetheless, some recent studies providing a closer look on the European patent 
system have concluded that some of its laudable features might be either 
jeopardized or aff ected by the emergence of strategic patenting, an important 
increase in the number, complexity and lower quality of applications and also by 
the emergence of several instances of strategic litigation.665 Studies cite that such 
events have been worryingly accompanied by a drop in the number of opposition 
procedures.666 Th ese fi ndings are even more distressing as it is understood that:
661 Ibid, at p. 18.
662 Ibid at p. 11, arguing that “the cost level of litigation determines to what extent a potential for 
hold-up exists” and quoting from Ellis, T.S., Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs. 
Proceedings of the 1999 Summit Conference on Intellectual Property, University of 
Washington, Seattle. CASRIP Symposium Publication Series, 5, July 2000, 22–26, available 
at: www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf, last accessed on 
August 10, who argues that high litigation costs distort patent trade and the patent system.
663 See Paradise, Jordan K., Lessons from the European Union: Th e Need for a Post-Grant 
Mechanism for Th ird-Party Challenge to U.S. Patents. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science 
& Technology, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 315–326, 2005; available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897741, 
discussing opposition decisions at the EPO and advocating for the adoption of a similar third 
party opposition procedure in the U.S.
664 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165.
665 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165.
666 See Harhoff , supra note 381 at p. 45, arguing that: “opposition at the EPO used to involve more 
than 10% of granted patents in the early 1980s, but has declined to a level around 5%. One 
reason for the declining attractiveness may be the long delays in resolving opposition and any 
subsequent appeal cases. Th e unifi ed Patent Court would off er an interesting alternative”. See 
Chapter IV. Ex-Post Liability Rules: When Should Th ey Be Used?
Intersentia 201
“Fast and low-cost revocation proceedings are also a good defense line against “patent 
trolls” seeking to extort licensing fees from other parties based on weak or 
questionable patent rights”.667
Th e following section briefl y analyzes some of the fi ndings in recent studies on 
the European patent system that might have an impact in strategic patent 
practices and abusive behavior and that could be potentially tackled through the 
use of ex-post liability rules. As it was described in the previous chapter, most 
countries in Europe have national laws which include some sort of compulsory 
licensing provisions. If there is any lesson to be learned from the emergence of 
patent fi ling and litigations strategies in the U.S. which preceded and probably 
led to the U.S. Supreme court decision in the eBay case and other related cases 
adopting fl exible standards in order to sort out such problems, it is precisely a 
warning against completely rigid rules. Th is would especially be the case with 
the adoption of property rules without the possibility of exceptions for the 
enforcement of patents, either at the level of substantive law with the provision of 
compulsory licenses or at the level of enforcement law through the regulation of 
remedies such as injunctive relief as well as other compulsory measures which 
might be the object of harmonization in the years to come.668
4.1. INCIDENCE AND EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Recent studies have highlighted that an increasing number of applications, in the 
form of an “escalation” has been taking place within Europe in a way similar to 
this process in the U.S. patent system. Such patent race does not seem to respond 
to higher innovation or other factors but rather to an off ensive and defensive use 
of patents, especially in some technological areas:
“specifi c technology areas within the patent system are aff ected by competition 
between large patenting fi rms to build large patent portfolios. In our view the 
resulting patent portfolio races lead to increases in transactions costs and socially 
wasteful investments in the management of patent portfolios(…) Consequently we 
come to the conclusion that public policy should seek to reduce the incentives of large 
patent applicants to patent innovations of questionable novelty value”.669
also Graham and Harhoff  Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin 
Study of US and European Patents, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5680, London (2006).
667 See Harhoff , supra note 659, at p. 45.
668 See the proceedings of negotiations on the EPLA and the European Community Patent within 
the European context, supra note 379. See also negotiations of ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Act), supra note 291.
669 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165, at p. 277–278.
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Studies have suggested that such increasing “arms race” might aff ect 
predominantly small fi rms and individual innovators whereas it might not 
increase R&D expenditures but rather legal and administrative expenses directed 
at the utilization of any possible loopholes in the patent system.670 In fact, the 
strategic construction and use of patent portfolios has been accompanied by an 
increase in strategic behavior practices in the application process, which is 
documented in Europe under the following terms:
“Not only do fi rms make patents more comprehensive, longer and more complicated 
by adding claims. Th ey also increase the number of divisional patents and the number 
of patents that share the same priority. Both of these measures provide an indication 
that patent applicants are making it more diffi  cult for rivals to determine the precise 
content of their patents and thereby the degree of protection which fi rms will 
enjoy”(references omitted).671
Th e consequences of such landscape might be summarized as follows. Firstly, 
and from the perspective of the patent offi  ce, there has been an increasing 
number of patent applications and the use of several strategies that causes a 
decrease in the quality of patents due to constrained resources for patent 
examination and increasing workload. Th is result might additionally turn into 
in a vicious circle whereby low quality generates incentives to fi le even more 
applications.672 Secondly, from the perspective of patentees, strategic behavior 
might materialize in the form of strategic management of patents portfolio, 
strategic management of individual patents or clusters of patents, the use of 
patent fi lling strategies and the use of enforcement and litigation strategies.
“there is ample evidence that strategic patenting behaviour, such as we have 
documented it in this study, is having eff ects on fi rms’ behaviour that are highly likely 
welfare decreasing. Most importantly we can see that these developments are 
aff ecting the ability of the European Patent Offi  ce to fulfi l its mission.673
Such escalation of patents is more closely associated with some specifi c 
technological sectors. In some of these sectors the aim is to accumulate patents 
towards enabling cross-licensing whereas in others the goal is to block rivals. As 
a consequence, it has been suggested that competition policy should take into 
account such important diff erences in patent strategic behavior between 
670 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165, at p. 260 for the European landscape and a comparison with 
the U.S., citing previous studies backing up such conclusions. For the U.S. landscape see also 
Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14.
671 See Harhoff  et al., supra note 165, at p. 259.
672 See ibid at p. 264: “the inelastic supply of examination capacity and of legal expertise together 
with increased demand for examinations caused by the escalation mechanism may lead to a 
feedback loop which leads to steadily decreasing quality of granted patents”.
673 Ibid at p. 266–267.
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technological sectors and again, that it should avoid the use of one-size-fi ts-all 
solutions.674
Such diff erences by sectors are particularly manifested in the following changes: 
1) an increasing number of patent applications in practically all technological 
sectors; 2) an increase in the number of claims, especially in the areas of 
Information technology, Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics, Organic fi ne chemistry 
and Biotechnology and 3) an increase in the number of divisional applications in 
the areas of Telecommunications; Information technology; Audiovisual 
technology; Medical engineering; Pharmaceuticals, Cosmetics; Biotechnology; 
Agricultural and Food Machinery and Handling and printing.
Table 4. Th e changing landscape of patent use in Europe
Technological Sectors/
Patenting behaviour
Increase 
applications675
Increase 
claims
Increase 
divisional 
applications
Scores
Telecommunications Yes No Yes 2
Electrical Devices Yes No No 1
Information Technology Yes Yes Yes 3
Audiovisual technology No No Yes 1
Medical Engineering No No Yes 1
Analysis, Measurement 
and Control
Yes No No 1
Pharmaceuticals and 
Cosmetics
Yes Yes Yes 3
Organic fi ne chemistry Yes Yes No 2
Biotechnology Yes Yes Yes 3
Agricultural and Food 
Machinery
No No Yes 1
Handling and Printing No No Yes 1
Total 7 sectors 4 sectors 8 sectors
674 Ibid at p. 278, arguing that: “evidence of an escalation of fi rms patenting activities only in a 
subset of the technologies covered by patent protection by the EPO. Within these technology 
areas we fi nd evidence of two distinct patenting behaviors. Th e fi rst being directed towards 
cross-licensing of patent portfolios and the second focusing more on protection of own 
technologies and blocking of rivals. In consequence reviews of competition and enterprise 
policy need to recognize the diff erence between technology sectors. Th is is best achieved in 
sectoral reviews that take into account the competitive interaction of fi rms both in technology 
– and product markets”.
675 Defi ned as a particular increase in the number of patent applications or in the number of 
claims respectively as described in Harhoff  et al., supra note 165, analyzing the PAT Val 
survey and other previous studies.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
204 Intersentia
Table 5. Applications by IPC sectors and pharma sub-sectors
Year of Filing 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
All Sectors 100.702 110.115 106.341 106.341 123.761 128.724 135.425 140.882
Organic Chemistry 5.435 6.022 6.311 6.622 6.817 7.193 8.203 8.743
A61K*
Medicines 
2.876 3.650 3.762 4.515 4.988 5.110 5.562 5.687
Electric 
communication
technique
NA NA NA NA 12.120 12.843 13.488 14.409
Biochemistry
Genetic Engineering
NA NA NA NA
Source: Table 18: Total European and Euro-PCT (regional phase) fi lings at the EPO for all sectors, 
organic chemistry and A61K*; Final Report, European Commission, p. 162 plus added data on other 
sectors.
Table 6. Patent applications in IPC classes with most fi lings
IPC classes 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
Medical or veterinary 
science; Hygiene
17.006 16.742 15.752 14.688 13.770
Electric communication 
technique
14.842 14.409 13.488 12.843 12.120
Computing 9.520 8.981 8.969 8.664 8.134
Basic electric elements 8.901 8.147 8.062 7.541 7.385
Measuring; testing 8.206 7.524 7.151 6.525 6.700
Organic chemistry 8.016 7.940 7.463 6.570 6.188
Vehicles in general 4.513 4.305 4.322 4.175 3.901
Organic macromolecular 
compounds
4.001 3.835 3.709 3.331 3.113
Biochemistry; 
genetic engineering
3.953 3.970 3.847 4.098 3.975
Engineering elements 3.867 3.563 3.298 3.278 3.238
Sub-total 82.825 79.416 76.061 71.713 68.524
Others 63.736 61.309 59.122 56.966 55.182
Total 146.561 140.725 135.183 128.679 123.706
Source: EPO Facts and fi gures per year, available at: www.epo.org/about-us/publications/general-
information/facts-fi gures.html.
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4.2. A CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
SECTOR
Important diff erences remain within technological sectors, with some of them 
being more aff ected by the patents “arm race” and the emergence of strategic 
behavior practices. A sector oft en mentioned as “immune” to such problems and 
responsive to the incentives generated by the patent system is the pharmaceutical 
sector. However, recent studies have uncovered a number of problematic practices 
present in this sector as well as the increasing use of several patent strategies. 
Th is section is precisely motivated and drawn from the recently released Report 
on the Inquiry of the European Commission directed to investigate the European 
Pharmaceutical Sector. It is perhaps the most throughout and up-to-date 
evidence on patent practices, including strategic behavior, which is available in 
Europe at the time. In addition the inquiry in the pharmaceutical sector off ers 
an opportunity to confront with most other European studies – following the 
most debated cases from U.S. studies – that focus on the sector of information 
and communication technologies with the landscape of a sector that is usually 
assumed to benefi t from the patent system and to be the lively proof of its correct 
performance.
In addition, and without drawing defi nite conclusions – in the light of the 
complex features of this technological sector – it is probably not a coincidence 
that the majority of European case law analyzed in the previous chapter belongs 
precisely to this area.676 Th ere might indeed be systematic problems in the 
European Pharmaceutical industry but even in the absence of defi nitive 
conclusions it is yet possible to argue that the evidence weights in favor of 
maintaining proper spaces for a fl exible use of ex-post liability rules. Th e use of 
discretionary rules could be a complement rather than a substitute of other 
policy changes directed at a particular technological sector perceived as 
problematic as it happens with business method or soft ware patents in the U.S. 
Ex-post liability rules are probably necessary for a lower number of cases which 
nevertheless might have an important impact on the patent landscape. Such 
cases are precisely rooted in strategic behavior practices that mutate with time, 
might aff ect any technological sector and cannot be dealt with effi  ciently through 
the use of general or per se rules but rather through standards or rules of reason 
that are able to adapt to the particular circumstances of time and industry.
Th e Pharmaceutical sector inquiry performed by the European Commission 
indeed pertains to one of the most complex and important technological fi elds 
from the perspective of patent law. It is probably the technological sector with 
676 See Chapter III, sections 4. “U.K.” and section 5. “Italy”; analyzing case law from Italy and the 
U.K. respectively.
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the highest response to the economic incentives set by patent law677 but in 
addition to patent law, the pharmaceutical sector is subjected to a complex web 
of regulations that relate to the marketing approval of new substances, price 
controls and reimbursement systems.678 Th e pharmaceutical sector is important 
both in terms of R&D expenditure but also in its impact on the health of citizens 
and the correct functioning of national health systems.679
In 2008, the European Commission launched an investigation aiming at 
assessing “the reasons for observed delays in the entry of generic medicines to 
the market and the apparent decline in innovation as measured by the number 
of new medicines coming to the market”.680 Th e focus was directed towards 
inquiring on “the competitive relationship between originator and generic 
companies and amongst originator companies”. Th e Commission selected 43 
originator companies and 27 generic companies for in depth analysis, which 
together represented the 80% of the relevant turnover in the EU, being mostly 
larger scale companies active in more than one Member State. Th e inquiry and 
the report concentrated on the behavior of pharmaceutical fi rms, leaving aside 
any other changes inherent to the technological sector or fi nancial aspects that 
might also infl uence the innovativeness of the sector. For the purposes of the 
Inquiry and the Final Report, patents were classifi ed into two main types, 
primary patents protecting the active ingredient, and secondary patents, 
protecting all other aspects relating to a pharmaceutical product.681
Th e results of this Inquiry largely validate those of other previous studies, 
especially with regards to the increase in the number of patent applications682 as 
677 See Wesley Cohen, et al., Protecting Th eir Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper No. W7552 (Feb. 
2000), surveying managers of fi rms in the U.S. and fi nding that only in the Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical sectors, patents played an important role as incentives to invest in R&D.
678 See EC, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final Report, Staff  Working Paper, Part I, 8 July 2009, 
paragraph (39), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/
inquiry/staff _working_paper_part1.pdf.
679 Ibid at paragraphs (1), (11) and (12).
680 See Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the pharmaceutical 
sector pursuant to Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (Case No COMP/
D2/39.514), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/
decision_en.pdf, last accessed on August, 10, 2009.
681 See EC, Final Report, supra note 678, at paragraph (427), p. 164, explaining that: “Of the 
nearly 40,000 cases, some 87% were classifi ed by the companies as involving secondary 
patents, giving a primary: secondary ratio of approximately 1:7. Of applications still pending, 
93% were classifi ed as secondary (a primary: secondary ratio of approximately 1:13), whilst 
84% of the patents granted were classifi ed as secondary (a primary: secondary ratio of 
approximately 1:5).
682 But see the latest trend indicating a slightly lower number, in Final Report, ibid at paragraph 
(276), referring that: “In 2008, the EPO received 146,500 patent applications, an increase of 
3.6% compared to 2007. In 2008, in total, 49.5% of fi nal actions (outcomes) in examination 
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well as the increasing use of patent strategies which are doubtfully contributing 
to foster innovation incentives. Th e practice of fi ling divisional applications for 
instance has increased in the fi eld of pharmaceuticals683 in a way similar to the 
overall increase in all EPO applications, yet it remains at even higher relative 
levels.684 Opposition procedures are however more frequently used in the 
pharmaceutical sector and might have a countervailing eff ect with respect to the 
increasing number of applications.685 Some specifi c features are found in the 
pharmaceutical sector as generic companies tend to oppose almost exclusively 
secondary patents and to prevail in approximately 60% of fi nal decisions 
rendered by the EPO (2000–2007). At the same time, originator companies tend 
to oppose each other’s secondary patents and prevailed in approximately 70% of 
fi nal decisions.
However, in around 80% of cases, it took a long time of more than two years to 
arrive to a fi nal decision. It is important to recall that during this rather long 
period of time generic companies are not able to obtain a clarifi cation of the 
situation with respect to the patent and enter into the market. Further 
particularities of the patent pharmaceutical sector in Europe are the high 
concentration of the top selling products.686
Litigation procedures for invalidity and infringement are, as already explained, 
variable according to each national member state. One particular characteristic 
of litigation is that some national courts provide for separate procedures for 
enforcement and invalidation. As each procedure is independent, invalidity of 
the patent cannot be used in those cases as a defense against an enforcement 
action. Additionally, some national courts make it diffi  cult to challenge the 
validity of the granted European patent when opposition proceedings before the 
were grants, down from 51% in 2007. Th is lower percentage of grants may be seen as a fi rst 
result of the EPO’s increasing focus on ensuring the quality of granted patents”.
683 Ibid at paragraph (432), referring that the total number of voluntary applications for A61K* 
rose from 102 in 2000 to 470 in 2007 and compared to the number of overall application in 
A61K*, the relative share of divisional applications rose from 3.5% in 2000 to 8% in 2007.
684 Ibid at paragraph (432), referring that the number of voluntary divisional applications has 
grown in a parallel manner from 2.3% in 2000 to 4.9% in 2007, yet remains, in relative terms, 
on a lower level than in A61K*.
685 Ibid at paragraph (277), referring that 5.2% of granted patent applications at the EPO were 
opposed during 2007 and granted patent were revoked in 38% of cases and maintained in 
amended form in 30% of cases. Oppositions in the pharmaceutical sector tend to be more 
frequent (8%) than in organic chemistry (4%) and across all sectors (5%).
686 Ibid, at paragraph (440), referring that the top 20% of INNs (International Non-proprietary 
Name for pharmaceutical substances) by total number of patents granted and pending 
applications, account for 60% of all patents and applications, whilst the top 50% account for 
90%.
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EPO are pending and hence a fi nal answer from the EPO is needed before 
invalidity proceedings can continue in those courts.687
4.2.1. Patent strategies in the European pharmaceutical sector
Th e Final Report considered a number of practices used by “originator 
companies” in order to maintain exclusivity for their pharmaceutical products. 
Th is is fundamental for the sector, especially with respect to products with top 
sales (blockbusters) on which the Report particularly focused. In order to address 
the questions of why generic entry is blocked and why the number of new 
pharmaceutical substances has declined with time, the Report dealt with both 
competition between originator and generic companies as well as with 
competition between originator companies.
Strategies used by originator companies with respect to generic companies are 
important for competition law, patent law and regulation insofar as they might 
aim at delaying the entrance of generics by creating unduly barriers. Th e Report 
acknowledged two principal objectives of the strategies that originator companies 
might pursue in order to exclude competitors. Th e fi rst aim is maintaining 
exclusivity on blockbuster products during the whole period of the patent and of 
market exclusivity and avoiding challenges to the patent validity. Th is is mainly 
pursued through the fi ling of so-called patent clusters, that is, “a multitude of 
patent applications (on process, reformulation, etc.) protecting the product in 
addition to the base patent with the aim of creating several layers of defence”.688
Th e second aim is extending the period of exclusivity beyond the duration of the 
patent. Th is is pursued through the same multitude of fi lings during and towards 
the end of the period of patent protection. In practice, both objectives are 
pursued through overlapping strategies, as the same patent clusters for a given 
product might be able to protect against patent invalidity challenges as well as 
extending the patent period.689
Importantly, both of the above mentioned types of practices are used in tandem 
with enforcement procedures including preliminary and fi nal injunctions. For 
instance, by fi lling clusters of patents on slightly modifi ed versions of a chemical 
687 Ibid at para. (685), p. 245, “Th erefore it can take up to 7 years or something more to get a fi nal 
decision from the EPO. Some National Courts are particularly good at providing decisions 
quickly. […] National revocation action or actions may be fi led in parallel to a European 
Opposition in key territories or territories where prompt decision may be expected. Some 
National Courts may stay any such actions until the fi nal outcome of the European opposition 
is known, but many (for example UK and Belgium) will not if it appears that legal certainty is 
important and the proceedings at the EPO have some time still to run.”
688 Ibid at para. (476).
689 Ibid at p. 186–187, footnote 355.
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form, an originator company might then engage into an aggressive enforcement 
of such patents. In a series of documents obtained during the investigation, a 
testimony of one Originator Company expressly indicated the following:
“We were recently successful in asserting the crystalline form patent in [name of 
country], where we obtained an injunction against several generic companies based 
on these patents by ‘trapping’ the generics: they either infringe our crystalline form 
patent, or they infringe our amorphous form process patent when they convert the 
crystalline form to the amorphous form. […] Th e availability of ‘trapping’ strategy 
will be evaluated on an on-going basis”
Such modifi ed versions of a new molecule, which are oft en categorized as 
incremental or “secondary innovations” (slightly modifi ed chemical forms such 
as salts, esters and enantiomers) might be socially desirable insofar as they might 
enhance the safety and effi  cacy of a drug. However, it is still the case that such 
patents might in some cases be considered dubious in terms of patentability 
requirements, especially under the test of non-obviousness or inventive step. 
Th at means that even though society benefi ts of such innovations, the absence or 
dubious presence of the patentability requirements might signal that such 
innovations would have been developed even in the absence of patent 
protection.690 Th is seems to be the case in many European cases where patents 
have been revoked in 60% of opposition and appeal procedures against originator 
companies whereas the scope of the patents was reduced in another 15%, in 
procedures concerning almost exclusively such “secondary patents”. In cases 
litigated between an originator company and a generic company concerning the 
validity of patents, 55% of such patents were fi nally annulled.691
Filing strategies of pharmaceutical companies include the construction of patent 
clusters especially for the most (privately) valued patents. According to the 
inquiry individual medicines are protected by even 100 product-specifi c patent 
families, which can amount to 1,300 patents and pending patent applications 
across Member States. In addition, the number of patents and patent applications 
690 See Alessandra Arcuri and Rosa Castro, How Innovative is Innovative Enough? Refl ections on 
the Interpretation of Article 27 TRIPS from Novartis v. Union of India). Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008 Paper, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159821.
691 More specifi cally, originator companies won 53% of fi nal rulings concerning product patents, 
whereas nearly 70% of fi nal judgments handed on process patents 83% of cases regarding 
second medical use patents and 88% regarding fi rst medical use patents were favourable to 
the generic companies. Final Report, supra note at pp.226–227; arguing that: “Hence, it would 
appear that among litigated patents the strength of process patents, fi rst medical use and 
second medical use patents is relatively more limited and their challenge before court more 
oft en yields favourable results for generic companies”.
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is 140% higher for the top selling medicines in contrast to the rest of the 
sample.692
A second fi ling strategy is the use of divisional applications, which are a 
procedure provided by law in order to divide an initial or parent patent 
application. Whereas in theory, the divisional cannot extend the content of the 
original application or its protection period, in practice because the examination 
of divisional applications continues notwithstanding the outcome of the parent 
application – even if the parent application is withdrawn or revoked – a divisional 
can in fact extend the examination period of the patent offi  ce. Th is practice then 
entails great uncertainty over patents for generic companies and in fact, the EPO 
has recently limited their use.693
Th e report also enquired on the litigation practices used by originator companies, 
starting from the premise that the enforcement of one’s right is in itself enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights. Nonetheless the Report 
recognized the potentially detrimental eff ects that the use of litigation might 
impose to competitors when it is used mainly as a way to deter entry of generic 
companies and as a means to create obstacles for competitors, especially if they 
are smaller.694
Litigation was found to be rising and in a sample of 219 molecules, originator 
and generic companies referred more than 1300 patent-related out of court 
contacts and disputes concerning the launch of generic products corresponding 
to the period of 2000–2007, during which, the number of cases grew four times. 
From a total of 698 cases of patent litigation between originator companies and 
generic companies, 223 cases were settled, fi nal judgments were given in 149 
cases and 326 cases were either pending or withdrawn.695
Originator companies were found to have initiated the majority of the cases, and 
yet generic companies won 62% of the 149 cases. Th e procedures had an average 
duration of 2.8 years, but important variations were found between Member 
States. In 30% of the cases, litigation was initiated between the same parties in 
692 See European Commission, Communication from Th e Commission: Executive Summary of 
the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf, at p. 10.
693 See the Decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 
25 March 2009 amending the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention 
(CA/D 2/09) at: www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/decisions/archive/20090325.html.
694 See the Final Report, supra note 678, at p. 201, referring that: “litigation can also be an effi  cient 
means of creating obstacles for generic companies, in particular for smaller ones. In certain 
instances originator companies may consider litigation not so much on its merits, but rather 
as a signal to deter generic entrants”.
695 Ibid at p. 11.
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more than one Member State with respect to the same medicine and in 11% of 
the fi nal judgments that were studied in the report, there were two or more 
contradictory fi nal judgments on the same issue of patent validity or infringement 
across EU member States.696
Th e fi ndings of the Report confi rm the general conclusion of patent studies 
providing evidence that litigation is costly and lengthy. Th e total cost of patent 
litigation in the EU (for the years 2000–2007) with regard to 68 medicines was 
estimated to be above € 420 million. In addition, the fi nal report highlights the 
savings that could have arisen if a community patent and a unifi ed patent court 
were present.697
With regard to the use of preliminary injunctions, originator companies were 
found to have asked for one in 255 cases and to have obtained a favorable 
response in 112 cases. Th e average duration of such preliminary measure was of 
18 months and in 46% of cases where an injunction was granted the results of the 
proceedings consisted either in a fi nal judgments favorable to the generic 
company, or in a settlement apparently favorable to the generic company. Yet the 
Report highlighted the diff erences present in diff erent countries with regard to 
the requirements to obtain preliminary injunctions. For instance, the Report 
accounts that it companies perceive it is fairly easy to obtain preliminary 
injunctions in Belgium whereas the patent holder has to show that there is a 
serious issue to be tried in order to obtain an injunction in the U.K. and courts 
in Germany and the Netherlands are more inclined to take into consideration 
the merits of the case when considering whether to grant one.698
4.2.2. Policy suggestions of the Final Report
Whereas the data compiled by the inquiry and Final Report on the European 
Pharmaceutical Sector are an important contribution towards understanding 
this specifi c sector and the European patent landscape in general and especially 
with regards to patent strategic behavior, some of its policy conclusions are rather 
simplistic. Th e Report produced four main suggestions, namely: (1) Intensify 
Competition Law Scrutiny; (2) Rapid Establishment of the Community Patent 
and Creation of a Unifi ed Litigation System; (3) Streamlining the Marketing 
Authorisation Process and; (4) Improving Pricing and Reimbursement Systems 
and Developing a Pro-Competitive Environment for Generic Uptake. Whereas 
all these suggestions cover important aspects of the pharmaceutical sector, we 
696 Ibid at p. 11.
697 See EC, Communication from the Commission, supra note 692, at p. 12.
698 Final Report, supra note 678, at footnote 205.
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only focus on the fi rst two as they directly although only partially pertain to this 
debate.
In particular, the Report gave a quite complete view on the practices used by 
pharmaceutical companies which might prompt the future use of antitrust or 
projected reforms in the patent system. In contrast, the suggestions to cope with 
such problems were vague and limited. In the case of competition law, this might 
be understandable as the Report only sought to compile the basis for further 
eventual intervention.699 With respect to the interface between patents and 
competition law, the Report reiterates what has become a prevailing view: that 
the existence and exercise of an industrial property right are not themselves 
incompatible with competition law and yet they are not immune from antitrust 
intervention. However, these practices put in place either between originator 
companies700 or between an originator company and a generic company701 were 
considered to infringe competition law under exceptional circumstances.
With respect to the area of patent law, the incompleteness or biases of the policy 
suggestions of the Report might be the result of a lack of more consolidated data 
for some of the problems, practices and legal rules under analysis. Th e two main 
suggestions made in this context were to accelerate the projects of patent 
harmonization for the implementation of a community patent and the EPLA702 
and to continue to ensure the quality of EPO patents.703 In contrast with such 
699 See the Communication from the Commission, at p. 18: “Where appropriate, the Commission 
will make full use of its powers under antitrust rules (Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the EC-Treaty), 
merger control (Regulation (EC) No 139/2004)38 and State aid control (Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC-Treaty). Th e Commission, in close cooperation with the National Competition 
Authorities, will pursue any antitrust infringement in the sector, wherever required by the 
Community interest. Action can also be taken at national level and in areas which were not 
the primary focus of the inquiry or are outside its scope”.
700 See ibid at p. 19. “With regard to competition between originator companies in particular, 
defensive patenting strategies that mainly focus on excluding competitors without pursuing 
innovative eff orts and/or the refusal to grant a license on unused patents will remain under 
scrutiny in particular in situations where innovation was eff ectively blocked.”
701 See ibid at p. 19. “As regards competition between originator companies and generic 
companies, delays to generic market entry are a particular point of concern. Th e possible use 
of specifi c instruments by originator companies in order to delay generic entry will be subject 
to competition scrutiny if used in an anti-competitive way, which may constitute an 
infringement under Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty”.
702 See ibid at p. 21: “Th e results of the inquiry confi rm that the Community patent and unifi ed 
litigation system would create signifi cant cost and effi  ciency improvements, in particular by 
reducing the costs associated with multiple fi lings, by eliminating essentially parallel court 
cases between the same parties in diff erent Member States and by enhancing legal certainty 
through the avoidance of confl icting rulings. Th e Commission continues to make all eff orts 
leading to the rapid adoption of these instruments.”
703 Ibid at p. 21: “Stakeholders agree on the importance that European – and in the future 
Community – patents granted by the EPO should respond to a high quality standard. Strong 
support was further received by all stakeholders that the EPO should be enabled to accelerate 
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strong suggestions for further patent harmonization, for instance, the Report 
gave a quite incomplete view on the use of compulsory licensing in Europe:
“In Europe, compulsory licence provisions have been very rarely used in practice, 
including in the area of pharmaceuticals. In the sector inquiry, only two cases were 
identifi ed where compulsory licences had been issued. Both of these cases concerned 
Italy. In the fi rst case, the Italian Patent and Trademark Offi  ce referred the matter to 
the Italian Competition Authority (…) In the second case, the Italian Patent and 
Trademark Offi  ce itself granted a compulsory licence. Th is licence was subsequently 
revoked upon request of the two parties concerned aft er they had reached a 
settlement. Under the settlement, an exclusive licence was issued. As for compulsory 
licences in general, it has been submitted by the UK Intellectual Property Offi  ce that 
in the UK such requests – although not very common – have occasionally been made 
in other sectors than pharmaceuticals”.
Even though the practice of compulsory licensing has remained largely 
limited704, this information is clearly incomplete and confi ned only to a few 
cases. Th e Report does not certainly focus only on patent law and was rather 
elaborated from a competition law viewpoint. However, in both areas of law the 
practice of compulsory licensing is far more complex than stated by the above 
quoted footnote. Although this fact might only refl ect a normal limitation on the 
scope of the inquiry which could not possibly cover all strategic patenting 
practices and all patent rules involved, it is important to consider that one out of 
the four policy formulations of the Report is the “Rapid Establishment of the 
Community Patent and Creation of a Unifi ed Litigation System”. In contrast, 
such further processes of harmonization should previously give consideration to 
the diffi  culties that might surround the practice of compulsory licensing 
worldwide and also to the lessons learned through the latest case law in the U.S., 
to which the same Final Report refers.705
4.2.3. Beyond the European pharmaceutical sector
As mentioned above, the Final Report on the Inquiry about the European 
Pharmaceutical sector is an important source of information on patent “strategic 
procedures whenever possible. Based on its fi ndings of the sector inquiry, the Commission 
supports the recent initiatives by the EPO to “raise the bar”. In this respect the Commission 
welcomes the recent decision to limit the time period during which the voluntary divisional 
patent applications can be fi led. Th e Commission also supports the EPO in its eff orts to 
shorten the opposition and appeal procedures”.
704 See chapter III above.
705 Ibid at p. 6, arguing that “Poor quality rights can also contribute to problems with “patent 
trolls” that have arisen in the US judicial system”. Whereas we have argued that a 
categorization such as “trolls” does not effi  ciently tackle issues of patent strategic behavior, it 
is undeniable that these issues have been discussed in the context of the recently issued 
compulsory licenses in the U.S.
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behavior” within Europe. Beyond the European Pharmaceutical Sector, however, 
it is also possible to link some of these practices by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
which are described in the Report with the more general case of strategic 
behavior as described in U.S. current practice.
With this regard, patent strategic behavior might be divided into two diff erent 
types of practices. Th e fi rst group encompasses the practices related with patent 
fi lling, including clusters of patents, fi lling strategies with respect to the claims 
of the patent and with patenting many adjacent technologies. Th e second group 
encompasses practices related with the enforcement of patents, and is mainly 
represented by enforcement practice initiated by Originator Companies against 
Generic Companies. One of such practices uses precisely the possibility of 
obtaining injunctions and especially preliminary injunctions in order to 
maintain competitors out of the market, even when patents are of a dubious 
quality and validity.
An important diff erence between the Pharmaceutical sector and for instance, the 
information and communication technologies is that in this latter, products tend 
to be multi-component whereas most pharmaceutical products are thought to 
relate to the one-patent/one-product paradigm. Nonetheless, such premise is 
changing, not only due to the technical evoluation of the sector, where 
pharmaceutical substances are currently identifi ed by making use of complex 
methods, including the use of biotechnologies, which are associated with a multi-
component paradigm of patent protection but also by the use of strategies where 
patents are sought in many slightly modifi ed versions of such substances in order 
to create “clusters” and “thickets”. For both reasons, the possibility that 
Pharmaceutical companies act “strategically” is importantly present and 
furthermore aggravated by the impact of this particular sector on social 
welfare.706
Th is situation is noticeably not foreign to similar practices in other countries of 
the world, including the U.S. A widely discussed case in which these latter 
practices are put in evidence and in which Judge Posner gave an opinion as 
district judge, was that involving Originator Company SmithKline Beecham 
706 See Jeremiah Helm, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: Th e Disparate Impact 
of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 331 (2006), 
available at www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/helm.pdf, giving examples of “trolling-like” behaviour 
by pharmaceutical companies (Originator Companies), and specifi cally referring at p. 340: 
“Especially suspicious is the practice of listing patents of questionable validity in the Orange 
Book to keep generic fi rms off  the market. Th is allows the branded fi rms to maintain their 
monopoly pricing and extract greater profi ts from society as a whole. Th is opportunistic 
behavior, focused on extracting rents from society, is suspiciously similar to that of the patent 
troll holding up a large, established company”.
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Corp. and Generic Company Apotex Corp.707 Whereas Judge Posner had 
dismissed the case on infringement of SmithKline’s patent708, an interesting part 
of his opinion regarded the creation of a new equitable defense, whereby an 
infringer would be excused as long as the patentee’s behavior had inhibited “non-
infringing practice of the prior-art”.709 Although the CAFC declined to follow 
the reasoning by Judge Posner, at the end the patent was invalidated, apparently 
signaling that neither court was willing to validate the strategic behavior of the 
patentee:
“Th is behavior is certainly opportunistic, and Judge Posner, sitting by designation, 
was bothered by SKB’s actions. As a result, he postulated a number of alternative 
theories, some quite novel, which allowed Apotex to escape liability and bring the 
substantially pure anhydrate to market. Th e Federal Circuit initially declined to 
adopt any of Posner’s myriad approaches and invalidated the SKB patent based on 
public use. Aft er the original opinion was vacated en banc, the court subsequently 
invalidated the patent as inherently anticipated on remand”710 (footnotes omitted).
5. PATENT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR: 
TOWARDS A BROADER FRAMEWORK
Liability rules are normally justifi ed by the presence of high transaction costs 
and strategic behavior. However, recent patent discussions on the use of liability 
rules have mostly been confi ned to the problem of hold-ups. Additionally, patent 
hold-ups have been mostly identifi ed with the emergence of a business model in 
which fi rms oft en named patent trolls principally use patents as instruments of 
hold-up. Th is section discusses the notion behind patent trolls and hold-ups and 
argues in favor of preferring the latter concept as a normative threshold for the 
use of ex-post liability rules while a broader context for strategic behavior is 
proposed as a more adaptable alternative to the use of categorical defi nitions 
such as the current defi nition of hold-ups. Th e section revises diff erent purported 
defi nitions of actors engaging in patent hold-ups and strategic behavior while 
concluding that the focus of analysis should be the purported strategic conduct 
rather than any specifi c actor involved.
707 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1048–50 (N.D. Ill. 2003), 365 
F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), remanded 403 F.3d 1331 
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
708 Judge Posner’s opinion is available at: www.projectposner.org/case/2003/261FSupp2d1002.
709 See Dennis Crouch, SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex (Paxil), April 24, 2004, available at: 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2004/04/smith.html, last retrieved on December 15, 
2009.
710 See Helm, supra note 706, at p. 341.
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5.1. ACTORS: NONMANUFACTURING ENTITIES, TROLLS, 
AMBUSHES AND OTHERS
Th e emergence of a new business model in which fi rms use patents – and the 
threat of injunctive relief – in a strategic way, has generated distress on 
governmental agencies, innovators and the U.S. Supreme Court.711 Such concerns 
have also been expressed in some recent European reports712 and used by the 
eBay decision to call for the use of ex-post liability rules, specifi cally in the 
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy.713
A substantial part of the discussion following the eBay decision has in fact 
focused on the potential effi  ciency or ineffi  ciency of a business model where 
fi rms are oft en named trolls.714 Nevertheless many issues related to the emergence 
of such “new” business model still remain unclear and a source of divergence 
between scholars and policy makers. Among the unanswered questions are 
which type of fi rms are trolls and whether trolls – a particular type of entity – 
should pose a concern for policy makers or whether patent policy should focus 
on the particular type of behavior behind trolls.
To begin with, the label “troll”, an arguably pejorative term, which is oft en 
substituted with the name “non-manufacturing” or “non-practicing entities” 
(hereinaft er NMEs), comprises in fact a number of widely diff erent entities 
ranging from individual inventors, joint ventures and universities to fi rms 
specialized in fi nancing and enforcing patents. As a consequence it is diffi  cult to 
identify which type of fi rm – if any – threatens the correct functioning of the 
patent system and hence the incentives to innovate.
Th e question that naturally follows is whether it is the type of entity that should 
be the object of distress or whether any type of entity can – once the proper 
incentives are in place – act as a patent troll. If the last statement is correct, the 
analysis should focus on “trolling” behavior rather than on the aforementioned 
entities. Such result would be furthermore in line with the theoretical insights of 
law and economics that warn against a type of behavior – opportunistic behavior, 
strategic behavior and hold-ups – instead of warning against any special type of 
fi rms or individuals or against the intention, mission or principal activities of a 
fi rm. Th ese latter could at the most be used as a presumption or guide for judges 
711 See Federal Trade Commission, FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, supra note 5, at ch. 3, pp 38–39, also quoted in 
the Kennedy concurring opinion in eBay v. MerExchange, supra note 425 and 2, at p. 1842 
(Kennedy opinion).
712 See also Harhoff  et al., supra note 165.
713 See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
714 See infra note 127.
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or agencies when deciding whether they are in front of any allegedly harmful 
behavior.715
In what follows, it is suggested that from a law and economics point of view, it is 
more accurate to identify patent hold-up and strategic behavior independently 
and isolated from the entity that carries on such behavior. Th is would be the case 
if strategic behavior can be explained in both subjective (intentional) and 
objective terms.
Th e following section describes trolls and identifi es the various forms that trolls 
– understood as NMEs actively pursuing the enforcement of their patents – can 
adopt. At least three reasons are given why trolls should not be the potential 
object of a rule tackling with the above mentioned problems. Th e fi rst reason 
relates to the diffi  culty of fi nding a unitary legal and business defi nition of 
potential trolls. Th e second reason is historical because any business model and 
even the modus operandi of any entity intending hold-ups and strategic behavior 
is likely to evolve as technologies and rules change. Strategic behavior is largely 
adaptable and hence, the design of legal rules tackling with strategic behavior 
shall be as fl exible as possible. Th e third reason why a rule directed against trolls 
would not be desirable is that it could deter presumably effi  cient behavior while 
failing to encompass ineffi  cient behavior.
5.1.1. Defi nition and business models
Patent trolls have been generally described as companies that do not use their 
patents but rather devote their resources to licensing and/or enforcing them. 
Whereas the defi nition of NMEs comprises any patent holder that does not 
commercialize or works her invention, patent trolls have been oft en defi ned as 
patentees that do not only abstain from using their patents but rather wait until 
someone “infringes” and uses litigation and the threat of litigation and 
injunctions to actively enforce their patents.716 Th us – at least indirectly – it is 
715 See Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? (April 11, 2007). Stanford Public Law 
Working Paper No. 980776. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980776, advancing a 
similar argument and arguing that: “Universities will sometimes be bad actors. 
Nonmanufacturing patent owners will sometimes be bad actors. Manufacturing patent 
owners will sometimes be bad actors. Instead of singling out bad actors, we should focus on 
the bad acts and the laws that make them possible. We will solve the troll problem not by 
hunting down and eliminating trolls, but by hunting down and eliminating the many legal 
rules that facilitate the capture by patent owners of a disproportionate share of an irreversible 
investment”.
716 See Lisa Dola and Blaine Bettinger, Ebay and the Blackberry®: A Media Coverage Case Study 
(December 11, 2007). Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082220, illustrating how 
scholarly papers and even press articles about “patent trolls” have mushroomed in the 
follow-up of the eBay case. For the origin of the term “patent troll” see William Everding, 
“Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose”: Th e Predicament Legitimate Small Entities Face Post Ebay And 
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the typical element of hold-up that occurs when someone makes specifi c 
investments in a 2nd innovation, which oft en separates a troll from other types of 
NMEs.
Th ere is however a wide spectrum of diff erent sub-types of NMEs that might be 
classifi ed according to diff erent features717 such as the way in which inventions 
are developed, the ownership of patents and their commercialization policies.718 
NMEs have largely been classifi ed according to whether or not they perform any 
innovation activity into two main types: 1) research centers, universities or 
Th e Essential Role of Willful Infringement in the Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis, 
41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 189, referring that Peter Detkin created the term “patent troll” in 
1999 while being assistant counsel at Intel Corp. and aft er having being suited for libel due to 
the use of the term “patent extortionist”: “A patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of 
money off  a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in 
most cases never practiced”; and also explaining that Mr. Detkin aft erwards left  Intel to join 
Intellectual Ventures, which could itself be considered a patent troll. (See Intel, FTC and 
eBay’s defi nition). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. as Supporting 
Petitioners, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), No. 05–130, 
available at: http://patentlaw.typepad.com/eBay/eBayYahoo.pdf, last accessed on August 11, 
2009, posing that trolls: “do not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous 
patent claims that arguably encompass existing technologies relied on by companies with 
deep pockets(…)By acquiring these claims and threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent 
trolls seek and oft en receive economic settlements from genuine innovators and producers 
that greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in question”.
717 See for instance, Allison, Lemley and Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? Th e 
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 
1407796, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407796, classifying non-practicing entities in 
diff erent classes that include: 1) acquired patents, 2) university heritage or tie, 3) failed startup, 
4) corporate heritage, 5) individual inventor started company, 6) University government or 
NGO, 7) startup/pre-product, 9) individual, 10) industry consortium and 11) subsidiary of 
product company, and found that the most litigated patents were owned in a greater 
proportion by non-manufacturing entities, principally “licensing companies which are in the 
business of buying up and enforcing patents (“trolls” virtually by anyone’s defi nition)” and by 
companies started by the inventor but which do not make products. Also concluding, among 
other things, that features such numerous claims, more prior art citations, more forward 
citations, more assignments between issue and litigation, and larger numbers of continuing 
applications, which distinguish the most litigated patents from other patents could signify 
that “the most litigated patents are also the most valuable patents”, however warning that such 
higher value expresses private rather than social value of such patents.
718 Ibid at p. 39. See also McDonough, supra note 431, at p. 192–193, describing three types of 
trolls: 1) individual inventors that do not practice their patents; 2) companies that generate 
ideas for patenting and eventually licensing, e.g. Intellectual Ventures and 3) patent holding 
companies that buy patents for the only purpose of licensing and enforcing them, e.g. Acacia 
Research Corporation. Compare the mission of Intellectual Ventures LLC: “to assemble a 
world-class team to invent and invest in inventions with the intent of creating a new, dynamic 
marketplace where inventors are fairly compensated for their work and the public can be 
assured fair access to innovation”, available at: www.intellectualventures.com/background.
aspx, last visited on August 9, 2009 with that of Acacia Research Corporation stating that: 
“Acacia Research’s subsidiaries develop, acquire, and license patented technologies. Acacia 
controls over 100 patent portfolios covering technologies used in a wide variety of industries”, 
available at: www.acaciaresearch.com/aboutus_main.htm.
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companies devoted to R&D but not to the commercialization of their innovations 
and 2) companies specializing in the commercialization of or fi nancial 
intermediation and/or managing or enforcement of patents, especially through 
the use of patent litigation or threats of using patent litigation. Whereas many 
commentators have argued that the fi rst type of NME should have easier access 
to injunctive relief than the second719, some have considered both types of 
companies to be justifi ed upon effi  ciency considerations.720 Th e decision of 
abstaining from commercializing patented inventions is in the case of 
universities, research centers or companies specializing only in research, based 
upon economic reasons as specialization and effi  cient division of labor.721 A most 
effi  cient use of resources could arise when entities specialize, some of them 
focusing on research and some of them on commercialization. Hence, the mere 
fact that an entity invents and patents an invention with no intention to practice 
the technology does not seem to per se imply any effi  ciency problem.
Companies specializing only on patent enforcement and fi nancing activities have 
also been defended because of the special enforcement needs and the benefi ts 
provided by fi nancial intermediation in the patent area.722 One specifi c type of 
companies are funds operating on a similar basis to a normal fund with investors 
buying shares on the fund and the fund buying and managing patents or 
exclusive licenses on patents. However, and diff erently from a normal stock or 
bond fund, the commercialization and enforcement of the patent portfolio is 
particularly important given the complexities of patent litigation.723 Hence, apart 
719 See for instance Lemley, supra note 126. See also the eBay decision, supra note 2, 
acknowledging that: “For example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-
made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake eff orts 
to secure the fi nancing necessary to bring their works to market themselves”.
720 See McDonough, supra note 431. See also Ronald Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in 
the Soft ware Industry?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 961, 1024 (2005), arguing that: “Essentially, trolls are 
serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents 
that cannot be exploited eff ectively by those that have originally obtained them. Th at is not in 
and of itself a bad thing”.
721 See Denicolo, et al., supra note 160.
722 See McDonough, supra note 431, at p. 190, arguing that: “Th ese trolls act as a market 
intermediary in the patent market. Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and 
increased effi  ciency to the patent markets – the same benefi ts securities dealers supply capital 
markets –. Ultimately, this Comment suggests that the emergence of patent trolls is simply a 
stage in the natural evolution of the patent market”.
723 See McDonough, ibid, at p. 211–212, proposing the alternative name of “patent dealers” to 
substitute the pejorative label of trolls and arguing that patent dealers are effi  cient because 
they (1) create a credible threat of litigation that an individual inventor would not have by 
himself and “which encourages exchange, makes patents more liquid, and facilitates market 
clearing through price equalization”; (2) create liquidity and transform patents in 
“commodities” by matching patent owners with companies seeking to commercialize patents, 
managing transactions and providing a “central place of exchange” and they do so precisely 
by holding a patent inventory and licensing it to companies seeking specifi c technologies and 
fi nally; (3) patent dealers clear the market by equalizing prices and undertaking risks in a 
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from hedging risks as a typical fund, companies operating patent-based funds 
need to actively pursue the enforcement of their patents. It is the particular 
means used to enforce and commercialize their patents that is oft en criticized as 
troll-behavior.724
In addition to identifying effi  ciencies in the operation of NMEs, some analysts 
have considered that a rule disfavoring NMEs as a category – for instance by 
creating a presumption for denying injunctive relief – would favor big companies 
over small ones either intentionally or not.725 Whereas such argument might 
actually point towards a valid concern it is however troubling to conclude by 
suggesting that permanent injunction should always follow a fi nding of 
infringement because otherwise small companies would be at a disadvantage.
In fact, it can be argued that although the prototypical patent hold-up case 
involves a small NME suing a large company726, this would not be necessarily 
the case, and defendants (presumed infringers) are not necessarily big companies 
in all cases. A possible example – under a broader concept of strategic behaviour 
– would be the case of pharmaceutical companies which have presumably acted 
strategically in order to impede the commercialization of generics.727 Moreover, 
recent studies show that among other litigation patterns, small fi rms have a 
higher probability of being sued relatively to their R&D expenditure than large 
fi rms.728 Th is data could warn against associating typical troll cases with a small 
fi rm suing a large fi rm and especially against building policy suggestions on that 
basis.
market such characterized by information asymmetries among participants that might cause 
market friction induced by search and evaluation costs and lead to inconsistent pricing and 
eventually to a failure of the market.
724 In Europe, for instance, the company SISVEL specializes in the management and enforcement 
of some patents, also promoting the formation of patent pools. See mission of Societa Italiana 
per lo Sviluppo dell’Elettronica SISVEL, available at: www.sisvel.it/english/aboutus/mission 
last accessed in August 8th, 2009: “In short, SISVEL operates as a bridge between 
manufacturers that require access to key technology and patent owners that wish to license 
their portfolios to fi nance further research. Among its activities, SISVEL assists companies in 
preparing and executing a strategy to protect their R&D eff orts with eff ective intellectual 
property”. It is noticeable that SISVEL appears as applicant of approximately 93 patent fi ling 
applications at the EPO – search in esp@cenet.com, last visited in August 8th, 2009 –. See also 
Christoph, supra note 567, citing the case of SISVEL, which has been sometimes referred as a 
European patent troll.
725 See John Golden, ‘Patent Trolls’ and Patent Remedies. Texas Law Review, Vol. 85, p. 2111, 
2007, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=991698.
726 See among others, the above mentioned cases of Amado v. Microsoft , Paice v. Toyota and 
MercExchange v. eBay.
727 See Helm, supra note 706, describing examples of pharmaceutical companies acting like trolls 
in the sense of acting strategically including through the use of a threat to enjoin generic 
companies to avoid competition even when patents have expired.
728 See Bessen and Meurer supra note 14, at p. 123.
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A closely related argument against an absolute right to obtain injunctions for 
NMEs is based upon the misleading view that describes NMEs as “innovators” 
and large companies as “infringers”. Th is assertion is also part of a broader and 
much more complex issue that derives from the fact that patent law in principle 
does not provide for an exception in case of independent invention. Hence, even 
if a second innovator could or in fact arrived to the same innovation 
independently, there will still be patent infringement.729 In fact, several recent 
studies have underlined the diffi  culties behind assessing the intention of 
infringement (willfulness in the U.S.), which is important for the purposes of 
calculating damages. Th e problem is also closely related to the recently 
acknowledged fact that a great number of infringement cases occur inadvertently 
but rather due to the diffi  culties of an optimal prior art search and the increasing 
complexity of patent landscapes fi lled with thickets and complex clusters of 
patents over adjacent technologies.
In front to these realities it is probably advisable to reject both the a priori 
identifi cation of plaintiff s as presumed trolls and that of defendants as presumed 
infringers. If the controversy over hold-ups is rooted in the complexities of patent 
scope and the ambiguous results in the economic theory of patent improvement, 
as it has been recently argued730, most cases would actually refl ect a tension 
between fi rst and second innovators rather than a confl ict between innovators v. 
infringers or trolls v. innovators. Th ese reasons also weight in favor of 
maintaining a certain degree of discretion and fl exibility for the issuance of 
injunctive relief.
Additionally, studies have suggested that defendants (presumed infringers) are 
oft en fi rms that invest hugely in R&D, in contrast with the image of fi rms stealing 
other fi rm’s property and/or free riding on other’s innovation. Actually some of 
those presumed infringers have invested more on R&D than their plaintiff s in 
infringement suits.731 In the highly publicized case involving the manufacturer 
of Blackberry732, RIM, it has been argued that this latter had invested nearly half 
a billion dollars in developing this technology – much more than NTP’s R&D 
729 See also Christopher Cotropia and Mark Lemley, Copying in Patent Law. Stanford Public 
Law Working Paper No. 1270160, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160, arguing 
that “one of the most signifi cant diff erences between patent law and other areas of intellectual 
property is that copying is irrelevant to the determination of infringement”. See Stephen 
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Th e Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 
Economica 535 (2002).
730 See Cotter, supra note 38, arguing that disagreement about hold-ups was due to an underlying 
disagreement about the economics of patent improvement and citing the pioneering work of 
Merges and Nelson “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope”.
731 See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14, at p. 123. See also below Graph 1: Who fi les more 
patents?
732 See NTP v. Research In Motion, supra note 391.
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expenditures – even before knowing about the existence of the NTP’s patents. 
Furthermore, in many cases, including this one, patents have been subject to 
re-examination on multiple grounds that rise doubts with regard to the validity 
of the involved patents. However, decisions on infringement of patents, including 
preliminary and fi nal measures are independent from re-examination 
procedures. For all these reasons, an injunction might have potentially disruptive 
consequences even if it refers to a patent that might be eventually held invalid 
and/or relates to a technology that another fi rm has independently developed by 
making important investments in R&D.
In this sense, arguments in favor of awarding injunctive relief for NMEs that are 
research institutes or universities due to the fact that such entities invest in R&D 
are usually based upon the fact that the bargaining power they exercise would be 
necessary to recover their investments as well as being the basis for further R&D 
investments.733 Such arguments could also be applied to defendants that make 
important investments on R&D and are then object of hold-ups. Empirical 
studies have in fact showed that higher expenditures in R&D are associated with 
a higher probability of being sued for infringement.734 Moreover, studies have 
found that most infringers do not usually attempt to hide their infringing 
products, as one would expect if infringement were willful, and that only in a 
very small portion of cases – around 4% in the U.S. – defendants have been found 
to have willfully infringed.735 Th ese data is supportive of the thesis, sustained by 
some scholars, that it is inadvertent infringement more than intentional 
infringement that drives most litigation.736 In practice, again, the fact that either 
the defendant or the plaintiff  might invest in R&D, should only weight in favor 
of rejecting a categorical a priori identifi cation of both defendants and plaintiff s 
rather than suggesting which party should patent policy irrefutably favor.
733 A similar reasoning was developed by the circuit court in the case of Commonwealth Scientifi c 
& Indus. Research Organisation v. Buff alo Tech. Inc., supra note 462, which argued that CSIRO 
should be entitled to an injunction as it is a center that invested in R&D activities.
734 See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14, at p. 124.
735 See also Re Seagate, supra note 472.
736 See Bessen and Meurer supra note 14, at p. 124, arguing that: “this pattern is entirely 
consistent with the inadvertent-infringement explanation – the more a fi rm invests in 
technology, the more it inadvertently exposes itself to patents of which it is not aware”. See 
also Cotropia, and Lemley supra note 141, making a similar argument.
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Table 7. Who fi les more patents? Parties in US litigation fi ling patents at the EPO737
Case Plaintiff Patents 
fi lled 
in EPO
Defendant Patents 
fi lled 
in EPO
Tivo Inc. v. Echostar 
Communications Corp.
Tivo Inc. 228 Echostar 2
Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc. Visto Corp. 71 Seven Networks 34
MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc. MPT Inc. 7 Marathon Labels 
Inc
0
Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, 
Inc
Novozymes 3764 Genencor 3399
Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. 
v. Mylan Labs. Inc.
Ortho-Mc Neil 3 Mylan Labs 9
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond 
Innovation Tech. Co.
O2 Micro Int’l 5 Beyond 
Innovation Tech.
166
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, 
Ltd.
800 Adept Inc 3 Murex Securities 14
MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega 
Lift  Systems
MGM Well 
Services
2 Mega Lift  
systems
0
Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks 
Corp.
Brookout Inc 0 Eicon Networks 8
Commonwealth Scientifi c & 
Industrial Research Organisation v. 
Buff alo Technology Inc.
CSIRO 5604 Buff alo 
Technology Inc
707
Sanofi -Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc. Sanofi  
Synthelabo
3675 Apotex 313
Johns Hopkins University v. 
Datascope Corp.
J.H. University 6026 Datascope Corp 386
Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki 
Kaisha Molten
Baden Sports 1 Kabushiki 
Kaisha Molten
17
Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage 
Holdings Corp.
Verizon 1486 Vonage 84
Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte 
Fabricating Ltd.
Sundance Inc 8 Demonte 
Fabricating
0
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 
Nutrinova Inc.
Market 
Biosciences
1 Nutrinova 4
Broadcom v. Qualcomm Broadcom 8561 Qualcomm 34119
737 Th e table only shows the number of patent fi llings before the EPO of the main parties involved 
in several U.S. cases applying the eBay precedent. Th e number of fi lled patents is only a rough 
proxy for the capacity of innovation and investments in R&D of a company, however it gives 
an approximate sense of the fact that the typical case of infringement does not necessarily 
involve an innovative plaintiff  against a copyist infringer but rather, as sustained by Cotter, 
2008, supra note, mostly a problem between parties involved in patent improvements and 
sequential innovations.
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Case Plaintiff Patents 
fi lled 
in EPO
Defendant Patents 
fi lled 
in EPO
z4 Techs. v. Microsoft  Corp. z4 8 Microsoft 43677
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group Finisar 1626 Directv 766
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. Paice 42 Toyota 63874
Voda v. Cordis Corp. Voda 98 Cordis 4298
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC IMX 24 LendingTree 8
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc Praxair 6800 ATMI 21
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp Acumed 81 Stryker Corp 1112
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc. MerchExchange 5 eBay 588
Innnogenetics v. Abbott Innogenetics 1146 Abbott 26200
Amado v. Microsoft Amado 1 Microsoft 43677
Joltid v. Skype Joltid 2 Skype 77
NTP v. RIM NTP Inc 22 RIM 9621
Source: Search done in EPO sp@cenet database, last revised on August 8, 2009.
Graph 1. Who fi les more patents?
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5.1.2. Evolution of patent strategic behavior
Another reason why defi ning fi rms as “patent trolls” or NMEs would not be 
useful to weed out hold-ups without incurring in signifi cant costs and errors is 
that even if one such category was suffi  ciently homogenous at present, it would 
be likely to evolve rapidly. As a consequence, any policy measure targeting a 
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similar category of patentees would most probably fail. Th e reason is that entities 
anticipating such policy responses would probably mutate their strategies and 
change their business model, licensing practices and any other factor taken into 
consideration by courts in order to avoid any policy responses.
In fact, there are historical examples of strategic behavior put in place at diff erent 
periods of time by diff erent types of entities although with the use of similar 
litigation and patenting strategies. An example has been drawn from the U.S. 
agricultural sector following the creation – fi rst by the U.S. Patent Offi  ce and 
then on the patent statute – of a new type of design patents during the 1860s, 
which was meant to provide incentives for incremental innovations. In practice, 
this reform is said to have lowered the bar for the patentability of such designs 
and opened the door for an important increase in the number of applications. As 
a commentator explains, “patent sharks” – as they were named at the time – 
bought inactive patents, mainly in the agricultural fi eld, in order to sue 
inadvertent farmers who were using such patented products.738 At that time, the 
practice was criticized on grounds similar to those used now with respect to 
patent trolls.739 Moreover, patent sharks presumably emerged due to reasons 
comparable to those nourishing the emergence of patent trolls nowadays:
“Opportunistic licensers fl ourish when there is a large gap between the cost of getting 
a patent and the value that can be captured with an infringement action. Th is sort of 
arbitrage is likely to occur when: (1) those being sued cannot easily substitute away 
from the disputed technology; (2) the average scope of improvements in the industry 
is incremental, which makes the outcome of infringement litigation hard to gauge; 
and (3) the cost of acquiring and retaining patents is low”.740
Th e menace of patent sharks was fi nally tackled through the elimination of the 
design patents that made their emergence possible. Although the situation was 
diff erent from the multi-component and abstract nature of modern patents, 
some insights can still be learned for the purposes of today’s challenges. Recent 
scholarly commentary suggests that any patent reform would encounter 
signifi cant opposition given that the problem of patent trolls is confi ned to a 
particular type of patents. In the case of the modern controversy about patent 
trolls the more problematic sectors are business method and soft ware patents or 
more in general abstract patents of growing technological sectors as information 
and communication technologies and biotechnologies741:
738 See Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation. 
Notre Dame Law Review, June 2007, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=921252.
739 Ibid, arguing that: “At that time, the growth of sharks was blamed on excessive patent 
remedies, incompetent examiners, and the lack of compulsory licensing”.
740 Ibid at p. 6.
741 Ibid, discussing alternative reforms suggested at that time and why they possibly failed, and 
making the interesting point that one important reason why other alternative policy changes 
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“any proposal aff ecting substantive rights is a non-starter because most patentees are 
not susceptible to holdups. Whether this is just a fact of interest-group politics or a 
principled stance that remedies should be tailored to fi t harms, the point fl ows 
directly from the observation that only some types of patents are exposed to 
opportunistic licensors. In the eBay case discussed earlier, the eff ort to convince the 
Court to restrict injunctive relief (a form of compulsory licensing) was met with a 
stack of hostile amicus briefs from groups like the pharmaceutical industry that do 
not fear trolls. Similarly, the bills that are languishing in Congress seek to stop 
opportunistic licensing by overhauling standards on willful infringement and 
injunctive relief while altering the examination process by allowing third parties to 
challenge patents in an administrative proceeding”.742
Another similar practice to that employed by patent trolls, in the sense of 
exploiting the unawareness of potential infringers about an existent patent, was 
used for a long time by so-called “patent submarines”, which kept patents from 
being published during a long period of time following the application.743 Such 
practice was possible according to U.S. law, where a continuation could be fi lled 
for a patent whereas the fi rst application could be fi nally abandoned. Strong 
incentives to hide applications were importantly present when the duration of a 
patent was calculated from the time of issuance since the system allowed patents 
to remain secret until that time. Hence, the applicant could delay the issuance of 
a patent as long as she kept on fi ling successive patent continuations.
Several solutions were proposed to avoid patent submarines. In fact the patent 
reform that extended the duration of patents from 17 year from the issuance to 
20 from the application lowered the incentives for hiding applications but not 
necessarily for fi ling continuations.744 In 2001, an additional reform was needed 
to make the publication of patents mandatory aft er 18 months from the day of 
application in order to adapt the U.S. legislation to international standards. 
However, it is still possible for a patent applicant in the U.S. to keep a patent 
application secret as long as the applicant declares that he does not intend to fi le 
patents in jurisdictions requiring publication aft er 18 months. Th e USPTO hence 
proposed a revision on the rules governing such practice targeted at avoiding 
failed were the opposition of groups, especially of patent holders of other technologies, which 
lobbied against any such reform. In particular, some proposals for compulsory licensing were 
put forward. See ibid at footnote 98, quoting from 45 Cong. Rec. 398 (1878) (statement of 
Sen. Christiancy) (“Th ere is still another class of cases in which, for patents hereaft er to be 
issued, to prevent extortion, some rate of compensation should be fi xed by the statute… when 
the infringement consists in using the thing patented.”).
742 Ibid at p. 51.
743 Th e term patent submarine oft en refers to the patent in question, whereas the entity or 
individual engaging in such practice is also named a “troll” or “shark”. See Harhoff  et al., 
supra note 165, at p. 95.
744 Ibid at p. 95.
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abuses.745 Th e issue was subject to wide controversy and to the disagreement 
between industries holding diff erent views about the convenience of patent 
continuations. Th e controversy then centered on whether the USPTO was 
competent to issue such rules that might aff ect substantive patent law and in 
2009, the Federal Circuit issued a permanent injunction against the 
implementation of the rules proposed by the USPTO.746
A potential approach to avoid the abuse on the practice of patent continuations is 
the use of equitable doctrines, for instance the doctrine of prosecution laches, 
which allows declaring a patent unenforceable. Th is was the case in a land 
marking decision in which some patents hold by Jerome Lemelson747 were held 
unenforceable:
”Jerome Lemelson, a prolifi c inventor with close to 600 patents, is renowned among 
patent lawyers as the master of “submarine” patents – patents kept hidden for many 
years. Lemelson slowed the prosecution of his patents, sometimes for over twenty 
years. He waited until his technologies were independently invented and 
commercialized, and then he brought his patent to the surface and negotiated 
royalties aft er the potential licensees were locked into the patented technology. 
Although his patents covered breakthrough technologies as bar-code scanning, he 
did not contribute these breakthroughs to society”.748
A drawback with the doctrine of prosecution laches and probably with other 
doctrines such as equitable estoppel and patent misuse would be that they are 
likely to be applied only to a subset of cases under strict requirements that do not 
oft en allow to balance all the circumstances of the case. In the case of prosecution 
laches, an additional requirement is that the inaction of the patentee takes place 
over an important number of years.749
Moreover, and as above mentioned, it is still possible for an applicant to avoid 
the publication of the patent, as long as the applicant does not seek the fi lling of 
745 See the USPTO, Proposed Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, 
Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing 
Patentably Indistinct Claims, Notice of proposed rulemaking, available at: www.
uspto.gov/web/offi  ces/com/sol/notices/71fr48.pdf, last accessed on August 13, 2009.
746 Th e Eastern District of Virginia issued an injunction against the implementation of the rules 
considering that they were substantive rather than just procedural and hence aff ected rights 
of the applicants under the Patent Act. However, in March 2009, on appeal before the Federal 
Circuit, this latter overturned the decision by the District Court, upholding several of the 
proposed rules. Th e controversy continues and on July 6, 2009, the Federal Circuit agreed to 
rehear the case en banc.
747 Symbol Technologies v. Lemelson 301 F.Supp.2d 1147, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738 (D.Nev. 2004).
748 Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14, at p. 170.
749 See Cotter, supra note 38. See also Robert Merges and Jeff rey Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for 
Patented Standards, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1, February, 2009.
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applications outside the U.S. under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Given the size 
and importance of the U.S. market, in an important number of cases it could 
still be a rational and profi table strategy to keep applications hidden for as long 
as a potential infringer independently develops an infringing technology.
Finally, from an effi  ciency perspective, a rule that directly punishes trolls or 
NMEs would not be desirable. Such rule could be over-deterrent750, insofar as it 
could aff ect companies that presumably carry out effi  cient activities such as 
management and enforcement of patents. At the same time such rule could also 
be under-deterrent751, by failing to tackle the behavior of certain types of 
companies, which in spite of falling out of the defi nition of trolls, could 
nevertheless engage in trolling, e.g. universities or research centers and also 
manufacturing fi rms.
5.2. THE CONDUCT: TROLLING BEHAVIOR
Th e defi nition of patent trolls does not encompass all cases of detrimental 
strategic behavior involving potential losses in terms of static and/or dynamic 
effi  ciency and also unduly extends to cases beyond those losses. Hence, in the 
light of the necessity to examine alternative benchmarks, a natural alternative 
for courts to determine whether in a particular case, a plaintiff  is taking 
advantage of patent law doctrines to engage in hold-up or other similar type of 
ineffi  cient strategic behavior is to focus on the conduct rather than on the entity 
that is engaging in such practice.
In fact, some scholars have already proposed that the focus of study should not 
be “trolls” understood as the entities but “trolling” understood as a behavior. Yet 
others insist on using the defi nition of patent trolls or argue for the use of both 
factors (trolls and trolling behavior) as appropriate benchmarks:
“determining whether a particular patent holder should be awarded an injunction 
demands a fact-specifi c inquiry that cannot be reduced to a rigid checklist. But two 
factors are most important in distinguishing patent holders entitled to an injunction 
from patent trolls that are not. Th e fi rst is the nature of the entity. If it is an entity 
organized for the purpose of investing in litigation rather than innovation, a remedy 
at law is more than adequate to compensate any legitimate claims it might have. Th e 
second is whether the entity engaged in any strategic troll-like behavior designed to 
750 A type 1 error would happen under a rule that ends up in false convictions where the entity 
considered a troll is engaging in socially effi  cient behaviour.
751 A type 2 error would happen under a rule that ends up in false acquittals given that an entity 
that is not a troll under the above mentioned defi nitions or a NME, could nevertheless be 
engaged in patent strategic behaviour.
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increase disproportionately the settlement value of its claim. If such an entity set a 
trap for a productive fi rm, it should not be entitled to an injunction”.752
Moreover, and as it is explained with further detail below, “trolling” conduct can 
be said to pertain to the broader class of hold-ups. At the same time, hold-ups 
have been deeply analyzed by the law and economics literature and pertain to 
the broader concept of “strategic behavior”. Moreover, these types of conduct can 
also be identifi ed from a legal point of view through a diverse set of conditions 
that might include objective elements as well as subjective elements denoting 
intention.
Objective elements might include some external factors as the type of technology 
patented and whether it constitutes a small or an important portion of a multi-
component product and even if being a small portion, whether it is a core element 
of such product or just one trivial or minor element. Subjective elements 
understood as factors to analyze the hold-up intention of a plaintiff , might 
include considerations such as her past litigation pattern – using patents as a 
sword rather than a shield to protect innovations – whether the patented 
technology was plainly suppressed due to fi nancial hardships that made it 
diffi  cult to commercialize such inventions or whether it was an intended 
suppression as well as the specifi c causes of suppression or non-working.
Although an oft en cited principle in patent law is that patentees are free to work 
or not, and even to suppress their patented technologies from the market, such 
considerations might still matter under a rule or reason, equitable doctrine or 
case-by-case examination. If the intention of suppressing a patent is to block 
competition in a technological area, patents could also be in tension with 
competition laws.753 Although it is oft en acknowledged that patents do not per se 
confer market power or do not pose any a priori anti-competitive concern, it is 
also well-known that the abusive exercise of a patent does. Th is will be the case if 
patent suppression comports the emergence of more effi  cient standards or 
technologies. From an economic point of view such blocking would be 
detrimental for the promotion of innovation incentives and hence for the overall 
goals of patent law as well as competition law. Even if such conduct cannot be 
deemed as contrary to antitrust statutes of a particular jurisdiction or in the 
752 Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. as Supporting Petitioners, in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), No. 05–130, available at: http://patentlaw.
typepad.com/eBay/eBayYahoo.pdf, last accessed on August 11, 2009. Compare with Lemley, 
2008, supra note 712, focusing on trolling behaviour.
753 See Kurt Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology 
Suppression, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2002 
analyzing patent suppression and suggesting ways through which patent law and antitrust 
law could deal with this problem, including compulsory licenses for particular cases.
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particular circumstance of the case, such cases might still run counter to the 
goals of patent policy.
A leitmotiv of “trolling” and more in general of patent strategic behavior is 
precisely the intention of surprise that is present in the conduct of submarines, 
ambushes and trolls. Such surprise element of hold-ups has been already 
acknowledged by the CAFC as it:
“obliges the producer to pay [the patent holder] as much as it would cost to shift  to a 
noninfringing product, an amount, given investment in infringing systems, perhaps 
far more than a reasonable royalty [as determined preinvestment]. Th ese incentives… 
encourage patentees to adopt a strategy of ambush rather than providing fair 
notice.754
Th e above mentioned subjective or objective elements to judge the occurrence of 
troll-like behavior are not easy to discern. But they are neither impossible for a 
court to assess, especially given that some of the factors that were explained 
above with regards to patent hold-ups, such as willfulness of the conduct, 
likelihood of inadvertent infringement, cost of redesigning and impact of the 
patented technology on the infringing product, among others, are already 
considered – at least by U.S. courts – when calculating reasonable royalties and 
more recently within the application of the four-factor test to award or deny 
injunctive relief.
Moreover, and as we have sustained, trolling behavior is neither a new nor the 
sole basis calling for the application of a case-by-case reasoning to deny 
injunctive relief or to opt for the use of other type of ex-post liability rules. In 
fact, since the times of the fi rst major harmonized instrument for patent law, the 
Paris Convention, it was precisely the concept of patent abuse that provided one 
of the most important bases for switching into such rule.755 Legal provisions 
around the world have sanctioned diff erent conducts as abuse, misuse, anti-
competitive uses of patents as well as other similar grounds, which in an 
economic sense, might correspond with the concept of “strategic behavior”.
754 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1999) See also 
Brief Amici Curiae Yahoo, supra note, 163 and Note, Th e Disclosure Function Of Th e Patent 
System (Or Lack Th ereof), 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2007, 2024 (2005).
755 Under the well known standards of Article 5-A (2) of the Paris Convention, supra note 10: 
“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the 
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work”. Such provision is 
further subject to the requirements of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which nevertheless 
left  ample space for the implementation of compulsory licenses to correct the aforesaid 
abuses.
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Economic analysis has the further task of identifying the eff ects of such rules 
and helping to determine when such behavior shall be corrected through the use 
of a liability rule. Among other questions it is important to analyze whether 
there might be any anti-competitive eff ects aff ecting consumers or whether it is 
only competitors that are aff ected by such practices. Even if only competitors are 
aff ected by such practices, however, it is still possible that competitors have 
developed second or improved innovations and hence the use of fi rst innovations 
under a liability rule would still be socially benefi cial. Th is factor could be 
examined upon the basis of whether strategic behavior causes dynamic losses, 
static losses or both and in which cases a patentee should be liable according to 
such diff erent losses. Additionally it is also important to consider the suggestions 
of economic analysis about a proper defi nition of patent abuses and whether such 
defi nition(s) overlaps or complements those of antitrust law and unfair 
competition statutes.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Whereas law and economics studies justify the use of liability rules in the 
presence of high transaction costs, including in the form of “strategic behavior”; 
recent discussions on the use of patent liability rules have tended to focus on the 
purported problem of hold-ups. Th is chapter highlights that the adoption of such 
narrow focus is mainly due to the fact that discussions have followed the logic of 
notorious U.S. cases including the eBay and Blackberry litigation. Some analysts 
have further narrowed the concept of patent hold-ups concluding that liability 
rules would be preferable on effi  ciency grounds only on very specifi c context and 
under particularly restrictive assumptions. Furthermore, many studies have 
focused on the role of patent trolls in order to explain the emergence of a type of 
strategic behaviour that occurs when fi rms use their patents in order to extract 
large settlements above their economic value. Th is chapter argued that such 
focus is not correct as it might improperly conduce to condemn effi  cient behavior 
while still tolerating ineffi  cient behaviour from patentees.
In contrast, this chapter provided an alternative view on the question of when 
should patent ex-post liability rules be used. To this purpose, the chapter started 
from the main insights generated by recent case law in the U.S., the U.K. and 
Italy. Th ose cases not only addressed presumed patent hold-ups but also extended 
to cases of sequential and incremental innovation and of bargaining breakdown 
between the involved parties. A broader concept of strategic behaviour was then 
proposed in order to identify the potentially problematic cases where a liability 
rule might off er a superior outcome in terms of effi  ciency.
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Patent hold-ups have been furthermore linked to a particular type of patents, i.e. 
patents on business methods and to a particular sector, i.e. the information and 
communication technologies. Based upon those premises, it has oft en been 
argued that Europe is somehow immunized from the emergence of problems 
similar to those present in the U.S. which have recently justifi ed a major 
departure from the use of strong property rules in the patent fi eld. Consequent 
with the aim of providing a broader view on the problem that includes both sides 
of the Atlantic, the chapter examined the main features of the European 
landscape that are associated or might be related with high transaction costs and 
patent strategic behaviour. Not surprisingly, an increasing number of studies 
have reported the emergence of patent strategies related to the fi ling of single 
applications, the management of patent portfolios and litigation of specifi c 
patents.
A particular sector, which has opposed any reform towards the use of ex-post 
liability rules both within and outside the U.S. as well as exercised important 
pressure within international negotiations, is the pharmaceutical sector. Whereas 
the information and communication technologies have oft en been identifi ed as a 
problematic sector where patent strategic behaviour plays a central role, and 
where patens are used more as bargaining chips than to reward and incentivize 
innovation, the pharmaceutical sector is oft en cited as the paradigmatic case for 
patent protection. In contrast with this widely held view, the results of a recent 
inquiry performed by the European Commission on the European 
Pharmaceutical sector have put in evidence the increasing frequency and 
importance of strategic practices relating with the fi ling of patents, managing of 
patent portfolios and litigating pharmaceutical patents that might potentially 
aff ect innovation incentives as well as create unduly burdens for citizens in such 
a vital sector as health.
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CHAPTER V
EXPOST LIABILITY RULES: 
TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT DESIGN
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e previous chapter analyzed the main economic grounds for a switch into an 
ex-post liability rule to protect patent rights. Th e central problem identifi ed both 
by recent literature and case law is the occurrence of strategic behavior in 
multiple sectors, which has been facilitated by a changing technological and 
patent landscape. Hence, the previous chapter focused on the question of when 
should liability rules be used using a comparative perspective and hence, taking 
into account the particularities of the most relevant case law.
Using a similar approach, this chapter focuses on the costs arising out of the 
application of ex-post liability rules. While many critics against the use of liability 
rules have been largely formulated in abstract, an overview of specifi c cases 
might serve to refi ne those critics while highlighting the (potential) costs as well 
as the (potential) benefi ts of each alternative rule. Once more, the wave of cases 
applying the eBay precedent in the U.S. might serve precisely to confront the 
insights of previous theoretical studies with the insights of recent particular 
cases.
As it was previously illustrated by a comparison of the most important cases in 
selected jurisdictions, the design of a compulsory licensing provision is 
fundamental to its successful or even just workable application. In eff ect, 
previous theoretical discussions have coincided that the main cost arising from 
the use of liability rules is the diffi  culty in assessing the compensation for a non-
voluntary use of the patented technology. Hence, this chapter focuses on 
analyzing this particular cost. Two other main critiques against the use of ex-post 
liability rules, namely the eff ects on effi  cient bargaining between the parties and 
the potential uncertainties arising from the use of an ex-post liability rule are 
also briefl y addressed.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e second section focuses on the problem 
of implementing a liability rule in general. Th e third section analyses the problem 
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and diff erent approaches used to calculate a monetary compensation that 
substitutes a property rule. Th e third section concludes by suggesting a 
summarized cost-benefi t analysis of the alternative rules, ranging from 
categorical rules to open standards.
2. THE EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPOST 
LIABILITY RULES
Th e effi  ciency of any liability rule regime would depend upon whether the system 
preserves the incentives of patent law and/or is able to redress a situation where 
such incentives are unbalanced. Among other factors that would aff ect the 
capability of liability rules to preserve innovation incentives and to redress a 
situation of imbalance are the level of compensation that substitutes the property 
rule and the impact of the rule on the ability of parties to achieve a negotiated 
solution. In practical terms, the switch from a property to a liability rule is done 
under a “standard” of interpretation756 that foresees a balance of the 
particularities of the case, including a comparison of innovation incentives of 
the involved parties.
2.1. HOW COULD COURTS EFFICIENTLY APPLY EXPOST 
LIABILITY RULES?
A general framework to assess the alternative eff ects of property and liability 
rules must take into account static as well as dynamic effi  ciency eff ects. Liability 
rules might help in dealing with high transaction cost situations where otherwise 
bargaining would not have happened effi  ciently; hence ensuring potential static 
and dynamic effi  ciency gains. Nonetheless, liability rules impose important 
administrative costs as well as potential dynamic effi  ciency losses. An important 
question is then whether and how can courts decide upon the switch to a liability 
756 See law and economics literature on the use of rules v. standards, supra note 424. See Posner, 
supra note 68, at p. 590–591, explaining that: “to control behavior through a set of detailed 
rules rather than through a general standard involves costs both in particularizing the 
standard initially and in revising the rules to keep them abreast of changing conditions; as we 
have noted, a specifi c rule will obsolesce more rapidly than a general standard. Th e costs of 
governance by specifi c rules are particularly high for bodies like the Supreme Court or 
Congress, where every rule is very costly to promulgate. But oft en the benefi ts of 
particularization outweigh the costs. Th ese benefi ts are obtained at three levels: in guiding 
the courts themselves, in guiding the behavior of the people subject to the rule, and in guiding 
the behavior of the parties to actual disputes”.
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rule.757 Moreover, the question arises especially in Civil Law countries as to 
whether courts could engage in this type of balancing exercise.758
Th e balancing test in post-eBay cases
Th e above mentioned balancing exercise might take place, to a diff erent extent; 
either in the context of patent infringement cases or on compulsory licensing 
procedures but both cases share similar concerns. For instance, the calculus of 
the adequate remuneration has a vital importance either for the issuance of a 
compulsory license or for the substitution of injunctive relief with damage 
compensation.
With regards to the balancing test done by courts, the recent set of cases decided 
by U.S. district courts aft er the eBay decisions might serve to illustrate such 
common problems and the ways in which such courts have addressed them. For 
instance, U.S. district courts have been performing diff erent tests in order to 
facilitate the factual considerations of the four-factor test with regards to 
injunctions. Th e cumulative application of these tests might allow courts to 
effi  ciently screen cases of holdups and strategic litigation while granting 
injunctive relief in cases where innovation incentives might be aff ected in the 
absence of an injunction.759
Th is “multi-factor” test has at least attempted to include the following reasons. A 
fi rst important factor that has been taken into consideration is whether plaintiff  
and defendant are competitors. Many commentators have criticized the use of 
such factor, since, if adopted as the only test to judge on the availability of 
remedies, it could in practice discriminate against non-practicing entities that 
for diff erent reasons might lack resources to commercialize their inventions.760 
757 Of course, these questions depend upon the desired policy goals as conceived, tacitly or 
expressly in patent law. Such policy goals might express that the use of liability rules is 
desirable only when a property rule may cause potential dynamic effi  ciency losses by 
discouraging follow-on innovation; whether the use of liability rules would also be advisable 
when a property rule may cause static losses that surpass possible losses in terms of innovation 
incentives or whether liability rules might also be desirable when a property rule would 
impose important static effi  ciency losses, irrespectively of whether they surpass or not any 
dynamic effi  ciency gains.
758 See above Chapter III, Section 5. Italy, discussing the spaces for discretion that Judges might 
have in Civil Law countries.
759 Effi  ciency in this context could refer to several concepts. First, it could refer to the cost 
minimizing way in which courts might take account of costs derived from errors in granting 
injunctive relief and secondly it could refl ect the need to balance innovation incentives with 
access to knowledge and the use of technology by developers (infringers). In this analysis we 
follow the second option, considering both static and dynamic effi  ciency eff ects.
760 See Denicolo et al., supra note 160. See also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Th e Supreme Court 
Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop., Vol. 10:165 (2007), at p. 199–200, arguing that denying 
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In fact, when patentees compete with the infringer, courts have almost 
automatically found that the fi rst two factors are satisfi ed, deriving the corollary 
that competitors might lose market shares, reputation or goodwill as a result of 
infringer’s activities. Diff erently, when the patentee is not a competitor, courts 
have tended to rely on the competition test only if this is coupled with other 
complementary measures that suggest the inadequacy of injunctive relief: the 
patent covering a small component, the patentee’s willingness to license or the 
eff ects of an injunction or the lack thereof in innovation incentives.
Secondly, an innovation-eff ects test as it has been applied by few courts, which, 
in analyzing the balance of hardships test, have asked about the eff ects that an 
injunction would have in the innovation incentives. Th e U.S. Supreme Court had 
already recognized that a categorical rule denying injunctions for all non-
practicing entities was not in line with the discretionary nature of the four-factor 
test, explicitly referring to the case of “university researchers” and “self-made 
inventors” centers as capable of satisfying the four-factor test even if they would 
be willing to license their patents and would not be practicing or commercializing 
any of them. In such cases, it is straightforward to presume that innovation 
incentives would be harmed if a permanent injunction is not granted.761
A third possible test would refer to the multi-component nature of the product, 
which, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court would diff erentiate between 
cases, according to whether the patent covers only a small part of a multi-
component product or not. Such cases might exacerbate the risk of holdups if 
patentees are able to threaten to stop all activities related with the whole product, 
which was the case in the Blackberry and eBay litigation. Moreover, a patent 
reform has been discussed to apportion damages in such cases, as a 
complementary and necessary mechanism to avoid over-compensation.762
Overall, just the careful consideration of all factors might conduce to decisions 
that respect the equitable nature of injunctions. Th e adoption of one or several 
injunctions to non-competitors, would put small companies at a disadvantaged position 
before big rivals.
761 At least two post-eBay cases have concerned a university or research center. In Commonwealth, 
for instance, the court, decided to grant a permanent injunction, even in the absence of 
competition between the plaintiff  and defendant. Johns Hopkins University and Arrow 
International Inc. v. Datascope Corporation, No. 05–0759, 2007 WL 2682001 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 
2007), involved a University research center, but the court did not consider the innovation 
incentives for this particular type of patentees, instead basing its decision in the fact that 
co-plaintiff  Arrow International Inc. was a licensee which manufactured a product competing 
with the defendant’s. Cases such as Amado v. Microsoft  and the same eBay v. MercExchange 
instead regard an individual inventor but such cases are rare. See also Bessen and Meurer, 
supra note 14, concluding that the impact of small inventors in the U.S. patent system is very 
limited.
762 See supra note 613.
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tests to facilitate the interpretation of the particularities of each case might save 
on administrative costs and errors that courts might face with the examination 
of such factual considerations. Nonetheless, the adoption of any test as a defi nite 
answer to similar cases would again fall into the categorical application of rules 
that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in the eBay decision. Hence, courts have to 
engage into signifi cant fact-fi nding activity as well as deciding on such delicate 
issues as the determination of the appropriate compensation to substitute for 
injunctive relief. Th e next section discusses some of the options with regard to 
such diffi  cult task while the last section of this chapter compares the costs and 
benefi ts of each diff erent rule with a special emphasis on these problems.
3. A MONETARY SUBSTITUTE FOR A PROPERTY 
RULE
Th e law and economics literature on entitlement protection, its extensions to the 
case of IPRs and especially to patent law as well as recent debates on the 
exclusivity of patents have all coincided in one relevant aspect. Th e use of liability 
rules to protect patents entails the task – oft en deemed as discouraging or 
insurmountable – of calculating a remuneration or compensation that preserves 
the goals of patent law.
While most critics argue in a general way that such calculation is costly and/or 
impossible to be accurately performed, important insights have been already 
developed under diff erent patent doctrines that aim at setting up a compensation 
for past damages as well as in the context of adequate remuneration for traditional 
compulsory licenses. Th ese insights might contribute to a better understanding 
of how such determination might resemble an optimal amount. Th is section 
discusses the main insights produced in these dissimilar contexts with the aim of 
examining the calculation of an appropriate compensation or remuneration to 
be applied when a property rule is substituted with an ex-post liability rule.
Th e section highlights how diffi  cult and problematic might indeed be the 
calculation of a valid monetary substitute for property rules when a patent is 
protected through a liability rule. However, such exercise is neither impossible nor 
absent of the ordinary practice of courts and agencies. In patent infringement 
decisions, courts have to calculate a compensation for past damages in most cases. 
Agencies and courts have as well a vast experience in the estimation of an adequate 
remuneration in the context of compulsory licenses for a variety of cases.
Moreover, recent literature highlights how property rules are also costly to 
administer. Th is is the case when the patented technology is complex and diffi  cult 
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to be separated from other technologies763 and, in general when the patent notice 
system is not functioning correctly.764 In such cases, a chilling eff ect might 
preclude or off set any dynamic gains from patent protection, as further 
innovation might be blocked. When other factors such as the risk of bargaining 
failure surpass the information costs of liability rules, each alternative rule should 
be considered under diff erent settings. As a consequence, the argument that 
liability rules do not off er a viable solution in high transaction cost cases because 
it is too costly to determine the compensation cannot be sustained plainly, and 
must instead be confronted with the particular conditions of the case.
3.1. TRIPS: ADEQUATE COMPENSATION AND ADEQUATE 
REMUNERATION
In this fi rst sub-section, the legal and economic meaning of the “adequate 
remuneration” and “adequate compensation” thresholds established within the 
TRIPS Agreement765 are briefl y discussed. Contradicting the importance that 
scholars attribute to calculating such appropriate threshold, the issue of 
compensation or remuneration has received modest attention.766 In comparison, 
other issues related to compulsory licensing provisions, and in particular, the 
grounds for using compulsory licenses, especially with regards to the case of 
763 See Lemley and Weiser, supra note 72.
764 See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 14.
765 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes that one of the requisites for uses non-
authorized by the right holder that must be respected by member states is that: “(h) the right 
holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization”. Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement refers 
to payment of remuneration according to Article 31 and to “adequate compensation”: 
“ Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions of Part II 
specifi cally addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a government, 
without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the 
remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with 
subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, 
where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and 
adequate compensation shall be available”.
766 See Taubman, supra note 97; arguing that: “Debate and analysis on the compulsory licensing 
issue has concentrated on the substantive grounds, legal conditions and political economy of 
threatening to and actually issuing compulsory licenses. But the level of remuneration 
expected, and actually paid, may in itself become a trade issue, in part because it is an area of 
comparative uncertainty. Further, the level of entitlement due to the patent holder should in 
principle determine the remedies available in a dispute. Assessments about the likely cost or 
other implications of losing a dispute could infl uence a State’s choices when weighing costs and 
benefi ts of invoking a compulsory license as an instrument of public policy”. See also Daniel 
Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, Georgia Law Review, Vol. 
42:131 2007, at p. 153, noticing that: “Th e fl exibility of TRIPS opens up a number of methods 
for ascribing value to compulsory licenses. However, the subject of remuneration rules has 
received relatively little attention.93 If addressed at all, it is generally a small component – 
seemingly an aft erthought – in broader compulsory license discussions” (footnotes omitted).
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public health have been the focus of most discussions. Th e modest use of 
compulsory licenses makes it diffi  cult to foresee a serious discussion and/or 
further harmonization on the issue of compensation, notwithstanding the fact it 
is the most oft en cited argument against the use of liability rules in general and 
compulsory licenses in particular:
“Currently, a dispute over the level of compensation seems unlikely. If the scale of 
compulsory licensing under patents were to grow, under pressure of political and 
economic change, to rival that of the historic episodes of expropriation of property, 
there would be a similar systemic need to deliver pragmatic judgments on adequacy 
of compensation. A greater case load would induce pressure to produce judgments 
more responsive to the particular facts of each case, calling for clearer analytical 
tools”767 (footnotes omitted).
If a WTO panel were asked to interpret the concept of “adequate remuneration” 
in the context of a dispute settlement procedure, it could use several rather 
diff erent approaches, starting from the classical rules of interpretation in 
International Law and including a literal and a contextual reading.768 
Nonetheless, it is expected that any hypothetical decision in the context of the 
WTO would be “defendant-friendly” in the sense that given a dubious 
interpretation, a formula to be preferred would be the least onerous for the 
country under an obligation.769
Apart from the interpretation of “adequate remuneration” which is the threshold 
for compulsory licenses, a similar standard of “adequate compensation” is 
established by Article 44 with regard to infringement cases:
“Further textual guidance is given by Article 44.2 (…) One commentator reads this 
as requiring in eff ect that adequate remuneration should be the same as (commercial) 
damages awarded in infringement cases. TRIPS uses a similar formula when 
requiring that judicial authorities should be able, in the case of infringement of IP 
rights, to order ‘damages adequate to compensate for the injury’ caused by the 
infringement”770 (footnotes omitted)
767 See Taubman, ibid, at p. 958.
768 See ibid at p. 951, mentioning the diff erent approaches used by WTO panels, ranging from a 
literal reading to the application of a broader context, including national practices.
769 See Taubman, supra note 97, at p. 952, arguing that “Th is ‘defendant-friendly’ approach is 
reinforced by a literal reading of the text. Th e Appellate Body in applying the customary rules 
of treaty interpretation noted that ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the 
words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretative process: “interpretation must 
be based above all upon the text of the treaty”’. Dictionaries suggest ‘adequacy’ means mere 
suffi  ciency to meet a need. Since the term ‘equitable remuneration’ was available and is used 
elsewhere, a strict reading of adequacy may suggest only a minimum ‘safety net’, and not an 
equitable balancing of interests” (footnotes omitted).
770 See Taubman, supra note 97, at p. 956.
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In addition, other international law fi elds distinct from the international trade 
discipline might provide other (contradictory) insights with respect to the issue 
of compensation. For instance, investment law implies a threshold of 
compensation that aims at ensuring the protection for foreign investments. Th e 
application of investment protection to patent rights could be based on the fact 
that the defi nition of investment, contained in most of the currently existing 
investment treaties, includes intellectual property rights as a type of intangible 
investment.771
Nonetheless, the application of expropriation rules, especially with regards to the 
standard applicable to monetary compensation is still controversial and has not 
been directly addressed in any precedent so far. Th e insights elaborated by the 
economics of takings and compensation with respect to the incentives to take 
property and the incentives for ineffi  cient investments might contribute to a 
better understanding of the economic eff ects of such remuneration. Th e standard 
economic analysis of compensation in the cases of takings, argues for just 
compensation, which is less than full compensation, and equivalent to the 
discussion about damages in cases of breach of contract.772 Of course, the typical 
case of expropriation might greatly diff er from the type of compulsory license 
mostly discussed in this Th esis, not only with respect to the public interest goal 
that surrounds any expropriation but also with respect to the authorized user, 
which is oft en the government in expropriations whereas the cases here discussed 
have mostly regarded the use by other competitors or potential competitors of 
the patent owner. Nonetheless, the possibility of inducing socially ineffi  cient 
over-investment might be an important concern in the calculation of 
compensation for patent owners, especially in the context of International 
Investment Law, which oft en involves countries with highly dissimilar levels of 
development and other North-South contentious issues.773
Another important fi eld that might contribute to the interpretation of the 
compensation due to patent holders is human rights law, which would of course 
771 Compensation for expropriation in the context of investment treaties is usually defi ned in the 
formula dating from the Hull rule of “prompt, adequate and eff ective”. Th is treatment is oft en 
viewed as pro-investors and its potential application to intellectual property disputes, 
especially with regard to compulsory licenses is rather controversial. See Rosa Castro, 
Compulsory Licensing and Public Health: TRIPS-Plus Standards in Investment Agreements, 
Transnational Dispute Management, Volume 6, Issue 02 (August 2009), available at: 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/toc.asp?key=27. See also Taubman, 
supra note 97.
772 See Posner, supra note 68, at p. 64–65, arguing that “full compensation would probably be a 
mistake even if subjective values could be determined accurately at law cost. It might induce 
overinvestment in property that the owner had reason to think was likely to be taken 
eventually by the government”.
773 For a discussion on some of the contentious issues with regard to the application of investment 
law to patent protection and the issue of public health, see Castro, supra note 770.
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tilt in the opposite direction of investment protection and towards a lower 
threshold of compensation.
3.2. DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF COMPENSATION: 
AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK?
Diff erent references might be used in order to estimate the remuneration or 
compensation of patent owners when a liability rule is applied. Th e choice 
between such diff erent approaches oft en depends on whether the patent liability 
rule is a compulsory license, a damage award substituting injunctive relief in 
patent infringement cases or a mandated license in antitrust litigation involving 
a patent right. In addition, the absence of international harmonization with 
regard to the level of compensation has lead to the application of several diff erent 
standards in diff erent countries, as well as to a tension between diff erent 
international law fi elds, such as patent law, investment law and humanitarian law 
as described in the previous section.
Notwithstanding such complex array of mechanisms to calculate the 
remuneration for non-authorized use of patented technologies, there seems to be 
a practical convergence with regards to a level of payments, which oft en consist 
in royalties based upon the sales prices of patented products:
“Th is practical tension highlights one of the paradoxes of the increasing legalization 
of trade relations – constructing a legal pathway to determining the question of 
‘adequate remuneration’ is potentially fraught with complexity, and entails traversing 
competing doctrines and reconciling diff ering legal constructions (…) but these 
diverse ways of legalizing and constructing the question may in practice end up 
delivering very similar outcomes within a similar general band. Essentially, a 
‘reasonable’ royalty might lie within the region of 3–5% of the sales price of the 
product delivered under the NVUA, or would at least fall between the truly nugatory 
(say, 0.1%) and the unrealistically high (say, 15%). Th is apparent paradox of legal 
analysis may be resolved by simply welcoming this convergence as a symptom of the 
greater practical coherence and mutual consistency of these sets of international 
norms that are oft en assumed to be at odds with one another, and assumed to express 
irreconcilably diverse values”.774
Such alleged convergence might or might not mimic the optimal remuneration 
for the non-voluntary uses of a patent right. Nevertheless, in economic terms, 
the fact that most royalties might fl uctuate between known reference points or 
percentages might entail potential savings in administrative costs related to the 
774 See Taubman, supra note 97.
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calculation of such remuneration when fi xed thresholds are adopted, as it is the 
case with guidelines adopted by several countries for specifi c cases.775
In any case, the compensation or remuneration for patent owners might refl ect 
three possible levels with respect to the market price of the patented innovation. 
One possible level mimics the market price of the patented technology, as it 
happens with some compulsory licenses but also with reasonable royalties in the 
context of infringement. A second possible level surpasses such market price 
assuming a deterrent or punitive component as it happens with other doctrines 
on infringement damages such as lost profi ts776 and unjust enrichment but 
especially with punitive damages. A third possible level of compensation could 
be set below the market price threshold either due to humanitarian or other 
reasons of public interest or due to a punitive component against the patent 
holder, as it happens mostly in antitrust cases where the royalty can also be set at 
a zero price. Where the remuneration stands with respect to the market price 
will have eff ects in terms of economic incentives to innovate for the fi rst and 
second innovators as well as the incentives to bargain for a license, incentives to 
settle or to continue litigation. Th e following table summarizes these choices:
Table 8. Level of remuneration or compensation 
Level of damages Infringement Compulsory licensing Policy goals
Zero No Antitrust Punish anticompetitive 
behavior
Increase supply
Decrease price
Below market price Rarely (depends on 
jurisdiction)
Public interest cases
Antitrust
Increase supply
Decrease price
Market price Reasonable royalties Dependent patents
Lack of working
Compensation 
Above market price Punitive or treble 
damages
No Compensation
Deterrence
Th e following sections examine the diff erent ways to estimate the remuneration 
in cases of non-authorized uses in the context of traditional compulsory licenses 
and also on patent infringement cases. Th e economic insights on the optimal 
775 See James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on 
Medical Technologies, WHO/TCM/2005.1 (2005), available at www.who.int/medicines/
areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf, referring to several cases including 
infringement cases, compulsory licenses, licenses of right and the special case of the waiver of 
Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement and explaining and comparing the diff erent approaches 
used to calculate the remuneration for patent holders.
776 See Lemley supra note 623, analysing the reasonable royalties and lost profi ts thresholds and 
suggesting that the measure of reasonable royalties might produce higher levels of damages 
within the U.S.
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level of compensation and deterrence are briefl y reviewed and confronted with 
the available options to calculate the remuneration. With regards to the patent 
infringement case, a few remarks are provided about the main patent damages 
rules under a law and economics perspective with a special focus on the practice 
of granting forward-looking damages or ongoing royalties, a calculation that has 
taken place in recent cases applying the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
eBay.
3.3. REMUNERATION FOR COMPULSORY LICENSES AFTER 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
At fi rst sight, the case of patent infringement and compulsory licensing for 
dependent patents and lack of working should be markedly diff erent with regard 
to the remuneration of patent owners. Nonetheless, the level of remuneration 
tends to be linked in most debates and each level of compensation or 
remuneration to right owners seems to conduce to the other in the sense that the 
expected damages for patent infringement would most of the times infl uence the 
calculation of voluntary licenses and this latter would also exercise an infl uence 
over damage awards, which are oft en calculated with reference to a hypothetical 
royalty on a voluntary negotiation. Moreover, the remuneration in compulsory 
licenses is oft en calculated by referring the awards of damages provided by courts 
and by the available royalties from voluntary deals.777
Only the particular case of compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical patents 
under the Doha Declaration seems to follow a rather diff erent and humanitarian 
policy goal of “access to medicines for all”, as stated in the Doha Declaration. 
Nonetheless, even in this special framework, several scholars have also defended 
the use of patent damage awards and voluntary licenses as applicable 
thresholds.778 Th e most important problem of such approach is that the 
underlying policy goal of access to medicines might be contradicted if the level 
of remuneration is such that it does not solve the allocative effi  ciency problem of 
increasing supply and reducing the price:
“By imposing the market cost as a compensation measure, countries will only issue a 
compulsory license when negotiation fails or the desired quantities cannot be 
777 See Suzanne Scotchmer, supra note 29, at p. 211, referring to the circularity problem in the 
calculation of patent damages.
778 See for instance Cahoy, supra note 766, emphasizing the importance of remuneration for the 
controversy over compulsory licensing. Th e author argues in favor of using a market value 
approach for the determination of the compensation due in compulsory licensing cases, 
nonetheless proposing a three-tiered system that diff erentiates developed countries, 
developing countries and least-developed countries for the purposes of its calculation.
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produced by the patent owner. Such a system may create exactly the right kind of 
incentives” (footnotes omitted)779
In eff ect, while creating, or better, maintaining the incentives for R&D embedded 
in patent law, a market compensation level might undermine the goal of access 
to medicines for all, if such goal implies a cost reduction. To be sure, in that case, 
compulsory licensing would only remain a viable option for the hold-up cases 
when the patent owner attempts to extract a supra monopoly rent.780
In fact, the most developed discussion on the use of compulsory licensing and 
particularly on the remuneration regards the case of pharmaceutical patents, the 
Doha Declaration and the waiver of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. In 
spite of the controversy that surrounds most aspects of this topic, the emergence 
of guidelines and country study cases demonstrate that the issue of remuneration 
is not impossible to solve, at least once the policy goals of the particular patent 
liability rule are clearly identifi ed.781
In this particular case, the humanitarian and public health aspects diff er widely 
from the high transaction environments and hold-ups that call for the use of other 
liability rules. Not only is the economic case diff erent, but there are also 
distributional and equity concerns involved, that widely diff er from the economic 
reasoning used so far in this thesis. Moreover, in the case of compulsory licensing 
to address public health concerns, these licenses are usually provided under the 
framework of governmental licenses, whereby the government covers (and 
attempts to diminish) the cost of the royalties even though the manufacturer 
might be the same government or a generic company. So, in these cases, the 
government has to pay both the royalties to the patent holder as well as the costs of 
manufacturing the generic medicines. Were the royalties to be fi xed at the market 
level, the costs of issuing a compulsory license might be higher than the cost of 
manufacturing through the patent holder company, undermining the goal of this 
type of compulsory license, which is to reduce costs for the government acquisition 
of medicines with the aim of enhancing the access to medicines for the public.782
Th e case is diff erent in the context of dependent patents or lack of working when 
a competitor or potential competitor of the patent holder asks for a compulsory 
license or a damage award substituting an injunction in order to develop and 
commercialize a product that “uses” the previous patent. Th rough this action, 
the “benefi ciary” of such liability rule would be advancing a goal of dynamic 
effi  ciency in the sense of providing a diff erent product to consumers and 
779 Cahoy, supra note 766, at p. 159.
780 Ibid, at p. 160.
781 See Love, supra note 775.
782 See James Love, supra note 775.
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maintaining the incentives to further develop patented technologies. Th e cases 
might coincide, especially under the test put forward by the eBay case, which 
foresees that the interest of the public should be taking into consideration in the 
decision regarding injunctive relief, but in principle, the economic rationale is 
diff erent for patent liability rules aiming predominantly at dynamic effi  ciency 
goals and patent liability rules aiming predominantly at static effi  ciency goals.
3.4. PATENT INFRINGEMENT: THE GOALS OF DAMAGES 
SUBSTITUTING INJUNCTIONS
An examination of patent remedies indicates that, as it is the case in other legal 
fi elds, remedies are envisaged both to compensate and deter infringing activity. 
However, available remedies are thought to have a complementary role; it is 
usually conceived that damages aim at compensating for past losses and 
injunctions at deterring future infringing activity. It is important however to 
acknowledge that damages can also have a deterrent eff ect provided they are set 
at a threshold that makes the infringing activity unprofi table, e.g. in the case of 
punitive and enhanced damages783 whereas injunctions might and in fact do 
exert an eff ect on any possible settlement between the parties.
Th e above considerations are fundamental both for understanding how damages 
might constitute an appropriate substitute for injunctions and in order to 
perform any comparison between diff erent legislations. In such comparisons, it 
is important to take into consideration both the probability that an injunction 
will be granted and also the level of expected damages to be awarded. For 
instance, a country where damage awards are usually high and the possibility for 
enhanced or punitive damages exists, damage compensation in substitution of 
injunctions could still act as a quasi property rule, achieving both deterrence and 
compensation and sometimes even exceeding the optimal level for both goals. 
So, when a liability rule is warranted because the activity by the infringer would 
be effi  cient, and hence should not be deterred, high damages could take with one 
hand what the denial of injunctive relief had just given with the other. Conversely, 
when courts give relatively lower damage awards, which hence might not deter 
the infringing activity, the case for injunctions might be stronger in order to 
achieve an optimal level of deterrence.
In fact, the possibility of awarding enhanced damages with regard to the 
calculation of prospective relief has been analyzed by scholars although it is not 
a factor that is usually considered by courts. Th e argument is that enhanced 
783 See Smith, supra note 94, arguing that punitive damages are property rules whereas damages 
granted at a reasonable royalty threshold are liability rules.
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damages might truly substitute an injunction both by providing incentives for 
the infringer to negotiate a license as well as an economic incentive (or 
disincentive) to deter such infringing activity:
“Although not as powerful as the threat of injunctive relief, the knowledge that going 
forward the court may enhance the reasonable royalty damages by up to a factor of 
three, could give the defendant an incentive to enter into a license. Moreover, for a 
patentee who truly wants to exclude the defendant from using the patentee’s patented 
technology, enhanced damages may provide a suffi  ciently high economic disincentive 
to achieve this result without injunctive relief. In any event, the potential award of 
enhanced damages for future infringement is an element that has been missing from 
the analyses to date”.784
Th e problem, from a practical point of view, is to determine precisely where the 
optimal level stands, in order to know also the threshold beyond which, a damage 
award might be considered as equivalent to a property rule. Beyond such level, it 
is useful to remind that the costs of property rules will once again enter into the 
picture.785
Table 9. Damages calculations across diff erent jurisdictions
Lost profi ts Licensing fee Infringer’s 
profi ts
Can the plaintiff  
choose?
U.S. 35 USC Section 284.
Requirements: (1) 
demand; (2) 
marketing capacity; 
(3) absence of 
competition, 
non-infringing 
substitutes
Fall-back 
provision where 
lost profi ts cannot 
be or are not 
claimed 
No Yes 
Japan Section 102(1) Patent 
Act: multiplication 
of infringer’s 
turnover with profi ts 
the patentee would 
have made for such a 
number of products. 
Marketing capacity 
of patentee must be 
proven
Section 102(3) 
Patent Act: 
fall-back 
provision; estimate 
of royalty rate 
Section 102(2) 
Patent Act. Not 
applicable 
where patent 
was not used by 
patentee 
Yes
784 See Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, NYU 
Journal of Law and Business, Vol. 4:549, at p. 576.
785 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, John M. 
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 431 (2d Series), (Sept. 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1278062, at p. 8, arguing that “If patent damages were set too high, excessive 
transaction costs would be incurred and innovation would be stunted. On the other hand, if 
damages are set too low, inventions will be misappropriated excessively, and both transacting 
and innovating would likely be deterred”.
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Lost profi ts Licensing fee Infringer’s 
profi ts
Can the plaintiff  
choose?
Germany Section 249 Civil 
Code: restitution of 
the status quo ante. 
Limitation by 
production capacity 
and proof that 
infringing product 
could act as a 
substitute
Most common 
form of 
calculation, 
normally agreed 
upon in court 
settlement. No 
“infringer’s 
surcharge” can be 
claimed except for 
copyright matter 
(double royalty)
Based on the 
legal fi ction that 
infringer 
undertakes a 
business 
allocated to the 
patentee. 
Deduction of 
infringer’s 
expenses. 
Infringer’s 
marketing 
eff orts taken 
into account
Yes: claim for 
inspection of 
infringer’s 
accounts allowed 
prior to choice of 
calculation base 
UK Yes, likelihood of 
having made the 
infringer’s sales, 
deduction of 
infringer’s eff orts to 
commercialize
Yes, a notional 
royalty as the 
minimum of lost 
profi ts 
Yes, but rarely 
requested
 Yes, aft er review 
of the 
defendant’s 
commercial 
documents 
France Only if patent is 
used; calculated by 
amount of 
counterfeit 
products, loss of 
turnover 
(determined inter 
alia by the quality of 
the patent) and 
amount of lost 
profi ts. Market 
share of patentee 
considered
Where the 
invention is not 
used. Infringer’s 
turnover 
multiplied by an 
appropriate 
royalty rate 
No, clarifi ed in 
Patent Act 1968 
If patent is 
actually used: 
Yes
Th e 
Netherlands
Same as Germany.
Section 42(2) Patent 
Act 1910, Section 
70(3) Patent Act 
1995
Regarded as the 
minimum that can 
be claimed as lost 
profi ts 
Section 43(3) 
Patent Act 1910; 
Section 70(4) 
Patent Act 1995: 
the infringer 
should not be 
allowed to keep 
his profi ts
Yes, aft er 
inspection of 
documents 
Source: Reitzig et al., 2007 and own elaboration.
3.4.1. Post-eBay application
Applying the eBay precedent, courts have been faced with the special case of 
calculating patent infringement damages in substitution for injunctive relief. 
With this respect, the position of courts has not been uniform. Some courts have 
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awarded future damages786; some other courts have done nothing in the sense of 
declaring infringement and leaving it for the patentee to ask for future damages787 
and some others have issued compulsory licenses.788
Th ese three approaches used by U.S. courts applying the eBay precedent can be 
analyzed from a cost-benefi t point of view. Th e fi rst option used by courts has 
been to apply some measure of past damages to future or prospective damages, 
by using the measure of reasonable royalties and not of lost profi ts. Th e 
calculation of reasonable royalties in the U.S. is largely focused on a hypothetical 
negotiation that is governed by the principles stated in Georgia-Pacifi c, a series 
of 15 factors that might be taken into account when calculating such royalties. 
Th is method off ers the advantage of being predictable and avoiding further 
litigation costs.789
Under this option, error costs might however be large, especially when past 
damage awards are inexact. However, administrative costs would be lower than 
in the cases when another diff erent calculation is needed for prospective 
damages. Th e question is whether the court should consider that circumstances 
have changed in the light of the decision of validity and infringement so as to 
aff ect the hypothetical negotiation that was previously used. In this sense, two 
positions are possible. Firstly, one could argue that there is no need for any 
change in the hypothetical negotiation setting.790 However it could be counter-
argued that there is a need to take into consideration the change of circumstances 
aft er the decision of validity and infringement was taken.791
786 See Newcombe et al., supra note 784 at p. 569, citing: Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03–
1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) and Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota 
Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). 
However, in this latter case, the court imposed an “ongoing royalty that could be still 
considered as a compulsory licensing. In accordance to the authors: “Th e Federal Circuit has 
only just begun to express its views on the appropriateness of these varied remedies, allowing 
for the award of future infringement damages, which unlike a compulsory license, correctly 
keep the infringer in the status of an ongoing (and willful) infringer as opposed to a 
licensee”.
787 Ibid citing z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft  Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
788 Ibid citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 
(E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006). To this, we could add Paice v. Toyota (depending on the view one 
holds about the diff erences between ongoing royalties and compulsory licenses) and 
Innogenetics v. Abbott, supra note 463.
789 Ibid at p. 570.
790 Ibid at p. 571 arguing that: “One might argue that that it is fair to assume that any agreement 
reached during a hypothetical “negotiation” runs for the life of the patent. Under this theory, 
the patentee’s victory at trial merely confi rms certain key facts presumed during the 
hypothetical negotiation – validity and infringement – and validates the running royalty 
conceived in such a negotiation”.
791 See Ibid at p. 571, quoting from Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006–1610, -1631, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24357, at *51 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (“pre-suit and post-judgment acts of 
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A second alternative is that courts “do nothing” in a way similar to what a U.S. 
district court did when deciding the case of z4 v. Microsoft . In that case, the 
district court recognized that when a permanent injunction is denied, courts 
need to fi nd an effi  cient method for the recovery of future monetary damages 
post-verdict. In the case, the court judged that such effi  cient method could 
consist in abstaining from calculating prospective damages so that the verdict 
on injunctive relief was the following:
“Th e Court severs z4’s causes of action for post-verdict infringement (…) and orders 
z4 to fi le an appropriate complaint within ten days of the issuance of this 
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Th e Court orders Microsoft  to fi le an answer to 
z4’s complaint within the normal time allotted under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Furthermore, the Court orders Microsoft  to fi le quarterly reports in the 
new action beginning on July 1, 2006 indicating the number of units sold with regard 
to all Microsoft  products found to infringe z4’s patents in this case. Th is will preserve 
z4’s rights to future monetary damages in an effi  cient manner, while relieving 
Microsoft  of the hardship and expense that would be occasioned by the issuance of a 
permanent injunction”.792
Such order has in eff ect been interpreted as equivalent to omitting the calculation 
of forward damages while leaving it for the plaintiff  to fi le a separate (new) cause 
of action for post-verdict infringement.793
A third option for courts is to issue a compulsory licensing. Commentators and 
courts have disagreed about whether there is any (relevant) diff erence between 
issuing ongoing royalties and a compulsory licensing. Some scholars argue that 
ongoing royalties are fundamentally diff erent than compulsory licenses, 
especially as this latter mechanism somehow transforms the status of infringer 
into a forced licensee.794 In spite of the legal subtleties that might diff erentiate 
the issuance of an ongoing royalty from a compulsory licensing, from a law and 
economics perspective both methods share an important number of similarities. 
infringement are distinct, and may warrant diff erent royalty rates given the change in the 
parties’ legal relationship and other factors”).
792 See z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft  Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444–45 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
793 See ibid, at p. 573–574, arguing that: “the Court craft s such a remedy by severing z4’s 
continuing causes of action for monetary damages due to Microsoft ’s continuing post-verdict 
infringement of z4’s patents”.
794 See Newcombe et al., supra note 784, at p. 575, arguing that: (“First, the “license” may give 
rise to cross-licensing obligations, trigger most-favored-nation clauses whereby the patentee 
has to alter terms with other licenses, or aff ect any exclusive license that the patentee has 
granted. Second, a compulsory license changes the infringer’s status from an ongoing willful 
infringer to a licensed entity. Th at change in status could have major implications for 
determining whether a patentee is entitled to enhanced damages for future infringement”).
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As it was posed by Judge Rader’s dissent on Paice v. Toyota “calling a compulsory 
license an “ongoing royalty” does not make it any less a compulsory license”.795
Nonetheless, Judge Rader based his dissent on the fact that district courts should 
not merely consider the possibility of allowing parties an opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of such license, which go beyond the calculation of the 
royalty, but that they should actually be compelled to do so in the light of the 
possible disruptive costs of issuing such compulsory licenses. Th e opportunity 
for parties to negotiate the terms of a license is, in the opinion of Judge Rader’s 
dissent what diff erentiates an “ongoing royalty” from a “compulsory license” and 
would as well eliminate the harmful eff ects of compulsory licensing.796
It is doubtful, however, that such negotiations between the parties might indeed 
arrive at a more effi  cient calculation of the royalties aft er a costly litigation has 
been initiated and maintained for a long period of time:
“It is far from clear that providing the opportunity to the parties – who have just 
fought for several years – one more opportunity to settle before the court issues 
prospective relief will be a fruitful exercise once the threat of an injunction is 
eliminated (and setting aside the issue of enhanced damages). Other than eliminating 
future uncertainties on appeal and possible remand, there appears to be little 
incentive for the parties to reach such an agreement. Th e plaintiff  is unlikely to accept 
a royalty rate less than the jury awarded and the defendant has no incentive to pay 
more than that amount”797
Judge Rader’s dissent also focuses on the potential administrative costs that 
either option would impose to courts. Whereas the extrapolation of damages 
calculated for past infringement would entail lesser costs since it would not 
require an additional assessment of the changed circumstances, it would also 
impose potentially higher error costs:
“Evidence and argument on royalty rates were, of course, presented during the course 
of the trial, for the purposes of assessing damages for Toyota’s past infringement. But 
pre-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant 
diff erent royalty rates given the change in the parties’ legal relationship and other 
factors. When given choices between taking additional evidence or not, and between 
795 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006–1610, -1631, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24357, at 55 
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (Rader, J., concurring).
796 Ibid, arguing that: “To avoid many of the disruptive implications of a royalty imposed as an 
alternative to the preferred remedy of exclusion, the trial court’s discretion should not reach 
so far as to deny the parties a formal opportunity to set the terms of a royalty on their own. 
With such an opportunity in place, an ongoing royalty would be an ongoing royalty, not a 
compulsory license.”
797 See Newcombe et al. supra note 784, at p. 573.
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remanding to the parties or not, a district court may prefer the simplest course – 
impose its own compulsory license. Th is simplest course, however, aff ords the parties 
the least chance to inform the court of potential changes in the market or other 
circumstances that might aff ect the royalty rate reaching into the future”.798
Finally, another important case of a district court applying the eBay precedent 
was that of Innogenetics v. Abbott, where the court granted an injunction 
accompanied with an ongoing royalty plus a fee corresponding to the entrance 
in the market. On appeal, the CAFC reversed the decision for abuse of discretion 
and denied the permanent injunction. Th e reason was that, in the opinion of the 
court, a market-fee entry plus ongoing royalty was considered to be suffi  cient to 
ensure the plaintiff ’s relief and hence totally substituting the need for injunctive 
relief. In this case the court considered that forward-looking damages are a good 
substitute for injunctive relief.799 Th e following table summarizes the diff erent 
choices that courts might use in substituting an injunctive order with monetary 
damages.
Table 10. Cost-benefi ts of damage calculation methods in post eBay cases
Approach Benefi ts Costs Cases
Extrapolating past 
damages for the 
future
Less administrative 
costs 
More error costs Voda v. Cordis Corp.
No calculus Less administrative 
and error costs 
Uncertainty
Continuous litigation 
Z4 v. Microsoft 
Ongoing royalty/
Compulsory licensing
Less error costs More administrative 
costs
Innogenetics v.
Abbott
Paice LLC v. Toyota 
Motor Co.
Amado v. Microsoft 
License is imposed 
only if voluntary 
negotiations fail
Administrative and 
error costs are saved if 
voluntary 
negotiations succeed
Double transaction 
costs? Negotiation 
costs; plus 
administrative and 
error costs in case 
negotiations fail
Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota 
Motor Co.
(Judge Rader dissent)
798 Ibid.
799 See John Skenyon, Christopher Marchese and John Land, Patent Damages Law and Practice, 
§3:20.50, Database updated August 2008, referring also the case of Amado v. Microsoft  Corp., 
517 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 2008): “Th ere, the district court awarded a post-verdict royalty which 
consisted of trebling of the original jury verdict rate of $.04 per unit. Th e Federal Circuit was 
“unable to determine” whether the award was reasonable or not, and it was vacated”.
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3.4.2. Law and economics of damage remedies
Th e majority of law and economics analysis considers that damage awards should 
achieve compensation and deterrence pursuant to the goal of providing (and 
preserving) suffi  cient incentives for innovation. Most economic models are based 
upon innovation incentives but face the diffi  culty of the changing economic 
landscape and function for patents. If indeed patents are not mainly or at least 
not necessarily conceived in the majority of industries as instruments to foster 
innovation incentives and if the optimal level of R&D is in itself diffi  cult to be 
identifi ed, a model based upon incentives to transact might be closer to the 
current problems of patent law. An alternative is then to consider optimal 
incentives to transact instead of optimal incentives to invest in R&D800, as has 
been recently proposed in an academic article that develops a model to determine 
optimal remedies for patent infringement, based upon the optimal incentives to 
transact with patents.
Th e model is arguably a better alternative to models based upon incentives for 
R&D, given the multiple problems of this latter approach. A normative conclusion 
of this model is that the use of per se rules such as the automatic rule for 
injunctive relief in place before the eBay decision should be abandoned. Th e 
model also suggests that the intention of the infringer and the cost of patent 
searches are taking into consideration in order to decide whether or not to award 
injunctive relief as well as justifi es an independent invention defense.801 In spite 
of the inherent diffi  culty of calculating actual values, the model suggests some 
guidelines in order to determine whether or not to award extra-compensatory 
damages.802 In addition, the model argues in favor of using the unjust enrichment 
measure for calculating patent damages803, a standard for damage that was 
abandoned in the U.S. but is still applicable in several other countries.
Economic analysis still has to produce more defi nite conclusions with regard to 
the optimal level of compensation for patent owners. In the meanwhile, it is 
important from a policy point of view to compare all the costs and all the benefi ts 
associated with the use of property and liability rules to protect patent rights.
800 See Heald, supra note 785.
801 See Heald, supra note 785, arguing that courts should not increase the award of damages or 
accord injunctive relief where the defendant has engaged in a reasonable search before 
infringement and yet failed to discover the plaintiff ’s patent.
802 Ibid, explaining that: “Along with the eBay decision, the model supports the other important 
CAFC decision in the case, which also disfavor the automatic application of a rule that 
indicated the use of treble damages when a failure to search patents occurred. Th e decision in 
Seagate, takes into account the possibility that sometimes, patent searching would be 
ineffi  cient, and enhance damages would be over-deterrent under such circumstances (…).
803 Ibid, arguing that: “Economic research has yet to… off er any effi  ciency argument for the 
abandonment of unjust enrichment, the most commonly used regime into the 1960.”
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4. OTHER COSTS OF PATENT LIABILITY RULES
4.1. INTERFERENCE WITH BARGAINING OUTCOMES
Many commentators have argued that liability rules disfavor the voluntary 
bargaining between the parties, a solution that would be better if compared with 
a forced license. Th is is because parties themselves are supposed to be better able 
to negotiate all terms of a license, including the royalties. In this light, property 
rules have been defended as a better mechanism to induce effi  cient bargaining 
between the parties and the emergence of contractually negotiated mechanisms 
such as patent pools and their equivalents in copyright law.804
However, some of these comments disregard the potential emergence of strategic 
behavior which is precisely what precludes an effi  cient bargaining between the 
parties. In fact, it is in the context of patent pools and specifi cally during the 
negotiation of technological standards that some of the most recent cases of 
hold-ups (so called patent ambushes) have taken place. As Shapiro has described, 
it is possible to diff erentiate between diff erent types of transactions costs and 
whereas patent pools and collective organizations can help to decrease the 
transaction costs related with the presence of multiple parties and the necessity 
to clear many rights, they are doubtfully capable of dealing with potential hold-
up.805
4.2. EXPOST LIABILITY RULES AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Whether strict rules or fl exible standards should govern the protection of patent 
rights has been the object of long discussions and growing interest by scholars, 
courts and policy-makers. For instance, the rule for equitable relief as interpreted 
by eBay while being part of a historical tradition, poses new issues in the context 
of IP and innovation in our days. On the one hand, allowing more discretion to 
district courts might increase uncertainty. Th is can be detrimental especially for 
technological fi elds requiring great amounts of investment and surrounded by 
uncertain results, which is the typical case of the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries. On the other hand, the fact that courts can apply the four-factor test 
in the light of particular circumstances can be welcomed as technologies change, 
become more complex and are poorly understood by policy makers and as 
diff erent costs and incentives are in place for diff erent industries while patent law 
remains inherently uniform.806
804 See Merges, supra note 126 and Kieff , supra note 124.
805 See Shapiro, supra note 151.
806 See Michael Carroll, supra note 56.
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In this sense, if patent policy is guided by effi  ciency, it must attempt to balance 
legal certainty with the capacity to adapt to technological changes or else risk 
that rules become obsolete and hinder rather than foster innovation. Th is balance 
is easier to achieve through equity decisions adapted to particular circumstances 
such as the increasing number and importance of multi-component industries, 
patenting information-based products and the emergence of patent-thickets and 
anti-commons.
Th e application of the four-factor test aft er the eBay case has indeed been 
characterized by legal uncertainty. In fact, the same eBay decision did not 
provide enough guidance for district courts relative to the task imposed upon 
them, resulting in some confl icting decisions.807 Nonetheless, such legal 
uncertainty should be compared with the costs arising from the use of a rigid or 
categorical rule awarding injunctive relief, which was not only rejected by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in eBay but that is also not in tune with the analysis 
presented in the previous chapters with regard to emerging “strategic behaviour” 
practices of patentees.
5. COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE RULES
Th e prospective costs and benefi ts of protecting patents through a property or a 
liability rule should be measured either in static or dynamic effi  ciency terms. In 
fact, whereas the traditional justifi cation of patent compulsory licensing 
provisions has been posed in static effi  ciency terms, the newest literature 
examining the denial of injunctions and the case law adopting this form of ex 
post patent liability rules has underlined the potential losses from the use of 
property rules in environments with high transaction costs and strategic 
behavior from the perspective of static and dynamic effi  ciency losses808:
(1) Th e static effi  ciency losses that arise from the ability of 1st innovators of 
extracting rents from a holdup due to the highest prices imposed to both 
second innovators and fi nal users. With regard to the relationship between 
the fi rst and second innovators, there are also distributional consequences in 
the sense that the ability of holding-up puts the 1st innovator in a bargaining 
position that allows her to extract a higher surplus at the cost of the 2nd 
innovator surplus.
807 See supra notes 457 and 458 as well as accompanying text.
808 Th is section draws on the analysis contained in Cotter, supra note 38; Bessen and Meurer, 
supra note 14 and Lemley& Weiser, supra note 72.
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(2) Th e dynamic effi  ciency losses that arise when, given the distributional 
consequences favoring 1st innovators at the cost of the surplus of 2nd 
innovators; the second innovator anticipates such windfall and limits or 
abstains from investing in a second innovation. Such losses might be higher 
in the presence of multi-component innovations, where the possibility that 
each 1st innovator extracts similar rents might amount to royalty stacking.
(3) Dynamic effi  ciency losses due to rent-seeking “investments” of 1st 
innovators to induce hold-ups through the use of fi lling strategies such as 
increasing the number of patent applications over slightly diff erent 
technologies, draft ing complex and numerous claims, fi lling continuations 
and divisional applications. Th ese practices might lead to a more general 
eff ect, which cancels out the capacity of the patent system of disclosing 
effi  cient information and providing effi  cient notice of patented innovations.
(4) Investments of 2nd innovators to avoid hold-ups among other activities in 
ineffi  cient patent searching, i.e. searching beyond reasonable and rational 
terms, which precisely responds to the presence of fi ling strategies, patent 
thickets and in general, the increasing number and complexity of patent 
documents and the ineffi  ciency of the patent notice system.
5.1. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF RULES
Combining the choice of type of protection (property rule or liability rule) and 
the type of interpretation to apply such protection (whether it is a per se rule or 
rule of reason) we might obtain four possible combinations. However the table 
below diff erentiates between liability rules, according to whether the reasons for 
basis for applying to such rule is a ban on strategic behavior or whether it is based 
upon a compulsory license on non-working or dependent patents. Th e tables 
below refl ect an overview of the costs and benefi ts of such possible 
combinations.
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Rule v. Standard Exceptions Entitlements Examples
1. Strict property rule
– Subject to a per se 
rule
Only public interest 
exceptions 
Right holder always 
gets injunction 
against infringement
Pre-eBay decisions; 
Continental Europe; 
U.K.
2. Property rule
– Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard
Ban on strategic 
behavior 
– Right holder gets 
injunction unless 
there are (either 
intention or 
presumption) of 
hold-up
– If hold-ups occur 
Decisions applying 
eBay v. MercExchange
3. Liability rule
– Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard 
Ban on strategic 
behaviour
Right holder is 
entitled to injunction 
unless infringer 
applies for liability 
rule
– Balancing test where 
right holder gets 
injunction unless the 
balance of hardship 
favors defendant in 
some U.K. decisions
– or, compulsory 
licensing as a defense 
for some (good faith) 
infringers
4. Liability rule
– Subject to a rule of 
reason/standard 
– Non-working 
innovations
– Dependent 
innovations
2nd innovator is 
entitled to 
compulsory license 
under grounds 
established by law
Compulsory licensing 
for either infringers 
(ex-post) or non-
infringers (ex-ante)
5. Liability rule
– Subject to a per se 
rule 
None, the property 
rule is transformed 
into a right to 
compensation 
2nd innovator is 
always entitled to 
apply to a compulsory 
license 
Not possible for WTO 
country members
Nonetheless, rule number (3) and rule number (4) are both ex post liability rules 
subject to a rule of reason and only diff ering on whether infringers might also be 
entitled to a compulsory license, hence, in the following analysis, they are treated 
as one rule, obtaining the possible combinations ranging from a protection 
favoring property rules to one favoring liability rules through a per se rule and 
the intermediate choices of rules of reasons or standards favoring either a 
property or a liability rule.
Rule 1. Property rule subject to a per se rule
A cost-benefi t analysis: private costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
1st innovator Ineffi  cient investments in fi ling/
negotiation strategies
Higher rents
2nd innovator Ineffi  cient investments in previous 
patent search
None 
Chapter V. Ex-Post Liability Rules: Towards an Effi  cient Design
Intersentia 257
A cost-benefi t analysis: social costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
Society – Misalignment of incentives which 
might be not proportional to the 
value of innovation
– Ineffi  cient investments in previous 
patent search
– Ineffi  cient investments in fi ling/
negotiation strategies
– Higher prices for fi nal consumers
– Less incentives for 2nd innovators
– Higher prices for 2nd innovators, 
possibly royalty stacking 
– Incentives to invest in (patentable) 
R&D
– Saved administrative and error 
costs in analyzing both the 
grounds to switch into a liability 
rule and deciding any possible 
compensation
Rule 2. Property rule subject to a rule of reason (ex post liability rule)
A cost-benefi t analysis: private costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
1st innovator Rents from hold-up – Rents from a property rule
2nd innovator – Less search costs 1st innovations
A cost-benefi t analysis: social costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
Society – Prices might still be high for fi nal 
consumers
– Administrative and error costs
– Incentives to invest in (patentable) 
R&D
– Less ineffi  cient investments in 
previous patent search
– Less ineffi  cient investments in 
fi ling/negotiation strategies
Rule 3. Liability rule subject to a rule of reason
A cost-benefi t analysis: private costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
1st innovator – Lower rents
– Less bargaining power
2nd innovator Subject to the interpretation 
of the court
Less search costs
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A cost-benefi t analysis: social costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
Society – administrative and error costs in 
analyzing the grounds to switch 
into a liability rule
– administrative and error costs in 
calculating the royalties
Rule 4. Liability rule subject to a per se rule
A cost-benefi t analysis: private costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
1st innovator – Lower rents
– Less bargaining power
2nd innovator – Higher rents
– More bargaining power
A cost-benefi t analysis: social costs and benefi ts
Potential costs Potential benefi ts
Society – administrative and error costs in 
calculating the royalties
– less incentives to invest in 1st 
innovations
– saved administrative and error 
costs in analyzing the grounds to 
switch into a liability rule
– more incentives to invest in 2nd 
innovations when benefi ts surpass 
costs
6. CONCLUSIONS
Th is chapter focused on the cost side of patent liability rules. As it is oft en argued 
in economics as well as legal studies, the administration of liability rules imposes 
important costs. In particular, the calculation of the appropriate compensation 
for patent owners is oft en presented as so diffi  cult and costly as to make property 
rules look preferable in comparison.
Contrary to this view, there is a recently growing understanding that property 
rules might also impose costs of their own in a signifi cant magnitude. Th is is the 
case of patent law, where the boundaries of patented inventions are oft en unclear 
and embedded in increasingly complex claims. Before this reality, the task of 
mimicking the market through the calculation of the optimal remuneration 
might indeed be less costly, at least in some cases. Pursuant to the analysis of 
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previous chapters, this would be the case in the presence of patent strategic 
behavior.
In addition, and without attempting to enter in the specialized fi eld of damage 
calculation, this chapter compared the methods used to calculate remuneration 
focusing especially on the new sub-set of cases from the U.S. as they present 
some alternatives to more traditional ways of calculating the remuneration under 
a liability rule. Notwithstanding the important diff erences between the context 
of compulsory licenses and damage calculation in patent infringement cases as 
well as the diff erences pertaining to each national law, the principles underlining 
patent protection suggest that the diffi  culties surrounding this calculation are 
not insurmountable. Moreover, such diffi  culties should be always compared with 
the costs associated with the use of pure property rules as neither option is free 
from costs.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Th is research began with the objective of providing new insights on the use of 
liability rules to protect patent entitlements. Th e project was ambitious since the 
economic analysis of patents is a well-developed fi eld and the particular 
framework of property and liability rules had already been examined by 
renowned economic and legal scholars. Nonetheless, previous research had 
resulted in contradictory callings for and against liability rules in patent law and, 
in eff ect, an interesting controversy surrounded the possibility of limiting the 
exclusivity of patent rights. A large amount of previous discussions focused 
either on the use of compulsory licensing provisions in the context of the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration and access to 
medicines, or on the interface of IP rights and antitrust regulation. In contrast 
with the important amount of literature produced about these cases, many 
studies highlighted the fact that patent liability rules were seldom used in 
practice.
Soon aft er this research was initiated, the case of NTP v. Research in Motion809 
(RIM) regarding some patents held by the former company and used in the 
BlackBerry manufactured by RIM, captured the attention of the patent 
community. Th e case was also popular among the public opinion as the news 
warned about the possibility that an injunctive order against RIM would have 
shutdown the whole service for users of this device. Following the denial of 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, the controversy was settled on March 
2006. Hence, in spite of the great amount of discussion generated by scholars, a 
decision addressing the potential disruptive eff ects of a property rule did not 
arrive at that time.
Nonetheless, a similar case promptly arrived as the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the case of eBay v. MercExchange810, which likewise regarded a 
patent holder that did not practice her patents and threatened to shut down a 
popular website for online trading. Th e U.S. Supreme Court decision of 2006 
809 See supra notes 391, 415, 416 and accompanying text.
810 See eBay v. MercExchange, supra note 2, and Chapter III, section 3.1. Th e eBay case, explaining 
the case and the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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served as the starting point of a line of patent infringement cases using a factual 
test in order to consider whether or not to grant injunctive relief. Scholarly 
controversy rapidly fl ourished, but most discussions focused on the issue of 
holdups and specifi cally on the emergence of a particular type of fi rms sometimes 
denominated as “patent trolls” or “non-manufacturing entities”.
Such case law provided a unique opportunity to produce new insights under a 
widely known framework as the property and liability rules. Th e research plan 
was to provide a comparative view of several patent systems using a law and 
economics methodology to examine patent liability rules. Besides attempting to 
analyze this new case law, this research work examined a variety of cases 
addressing diff erent inter-related problems. Finding a sub-set of cases that could 
be compared to those applying the eBay precedent in the U.S. was a diffi  cult task. 
On the one hand, the equitable nature of injunctions can only be found in 
common law countries. On the other hand, the counterpart sub-set of cases 
applying compulsory licenses are few and dispersed throughout the world. 
Nonetheless, the framework of property and liability rules is precisely useful in 
that it allows – if broadly interpreted – bringing together a wider number of cases 
apparently diff erent from the legal point of view but sharing the important 
feature of transforming the way in which patent entitlements are protected.
A number of fruitful conclusions emerged precisely from the fact that the 
“liability rules” label describes such varied cases where patent rights are protected 
through a right to get a remuneration that substitutes the right to exclude. Th is 
conclusive chapter provides an overview of the fi ndings of each chapter, the main 
implications of the fi ndings of this research both for theoretical and policy 
discussions as well as some suggestions for future research.
1. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Th e central question of this Th esis was whether and to what extent can the use of 
liability rules for patent protection be supported on effi  ciency grounds. In order 
to answer this question, the Th esis analyzed the use of patent liability rules from 
a historic, economic as well as a legal point of view while developing and then 
focusing on the concept of ex-post liability rules as currently applied in the patent 
fi eld. Th e answer to the research question was affi  rmative in the sense that, under 
certain circumstances, the use of patent liability rules might be superior in 
effi  ciency terms. Th e most diffi  cult issue, to which the Th esis provides a partial 
answer, is the identifi cation of such circumstances as well as the evaluation of the 
(potential) costs and (potential) benefi ts of both property and liability rule in the 
context of patent law.
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2. FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH
Th e fi ndings of this research may contribute in several ways to current theoretical 
and policy discussions in the patent fi eld. In particular, each chapter aimed at 
testing the general research question from a diff erent perspective and allowed a 
particular contribution.
2.1. CHAPTER I
Th e fi rst chapter undertook a review of the literature addressing property and 
liability rules both in general and with regards to IP and patent law in particular. 
Solid theoretical reasons were found in the law and economics literature that 
support the use of liability rules in many fi elds, including patent law. A basic 
insight from the law and economics literature is that liability rules are superior 
to property rules when transaction costs are high in comparison with the 
administrative costs inherent to the administration of property rules. Whereas 
such normative proposition has been the subject of multiple extensions and 
critics, its explanatory logic continues to be applicable to multiple legal problems. 
In this sense, the literature on entitlements conceives property and liability rules 
as alternatives to protect entitlements according to the relative costs and benefi ts 
of each rule.
In the light of this framework, the fi rst chapter undertook a critical review of the 
application of these insights to the IP fi eld. In spite of the divergences in the 
patent economics literature, a recurring concern regards the potential costs of 
strategic behavior and the potential excesses of patent protection. In contrast to 
this, however, the application of the entitlements literature to the IP and patent 
fi elds has been rooted in a restricted view.
One contribution of this chapter was bringing together the insights developed by 
recent patent literature focusing on transaction costs in the patent fi eld and the 
specifi c consequences of patent strategic behavior together with the insights from 
a long-standing application of compulsory licensing provisions in patent law. Th e 
most recent patent literature has addressed the use of a type of liability rule 
administered by courts that deny property rule protection in some patent 
infringement cases and limit the relief of patentees to the grant of damage 
compensation.
In this sense, the chapter set up the framework for the following chapters that 
analyze both types of ex post liability rules for the patent case, keeping in mind 
that one type of liability rule is usually included in substantive provisions of patent 
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law, whereas the other belongs to enforcement or procedural rules. In particular, 
the second and third chapter analyzed both types of rules from a historical and 
legal perspective, keeping in mind the law and economics framework that makes 
it possible to bring them together under the liability rules umbrella.
2.2. CHAPTER II
Th e second chapter focused on the use of patent liability rules from a historical 
viewpoint. Th e choice of incorporating a historical perspective had a special 
advantage for this particular research question. Th e use of patent liability rules 
as well as other inter-linked patent controversies has historically emerged at 
diff erent times. Th e problems faced by today’s patent system are driven by the 
particular features of modern and high technologies and indeed far away from 
the mechanical type of invention that was the prototype that experts had in 
mind when draft ing the fi rst national and international patent statutes. 
Nonetheless, the lessons from the most important patent reforms and processes 
of harmonization can still enlighten many modern patent law discussions.
Th e main lesson from history is that liability rules have actually played an 
important role throughout the history of patents. Th e fi rst example of liability 
rules were compulsory licensing provisions when a patent was not worked in the 
country granting protection. In their origin, hence, compulsory licenses created 
a balancing mechanism that was incorporated in the international system to 
substitute the much harsher measure of patent forfeiture in cases of lack of 
national or local production. Hence, compulsory licensing entered into the 
patent landscape as an improvement in the protection of patentees at the same 
time that it allowed countries to continue the defense of their national spaces by 
maintaining local requirements.
Another important lesson from history is that, on the one hand, the extension of 
patent protection, and on the other hand, the limitations and exceptions of patent 
law, have clearly oscillated with time. Traditional compulsory licensing 
provisions have already been the object of much discussion and analysis. In 
contrast, the importance that enforcement provisions might have for the use of 
liability rules in patent law was far less known until recently and may indicate a 
fl uctuation in patent law, this time towards a more restricted view on patent 
protection. Th e 2006 decision on the eBay case could be in fact understood as 
part of a broader trend towards restraining an excessive expansion of patent 
protection in the U.S.811
811 Th is interpretation could be valid if the eBay decision is analyzed in the context of other 
recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned in supra note 315.
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In the international context, important requirements for the use of liability rules 
were set for by the TRIPS Agreement and in fact, a great amount of the 
controversy aft er the enactment of the TRIPS referred to the limitations on the 
use of compulsory licenses.812 In contrast with substantive patent law 
harmonization, enforcement is a late comer in the international arena and mostly 
remains a national issue depending on each country’s legal system and traditions. 
Th e possibility of denying injunctions, subjecting them to equitable 
considerations that vary case-by case is rooted in the common law distinction of 
courts of equity and courts of common law, while a largely diff erent approach is 
used by civil law countries where legal analysis has emphasized rights over 
remedies. Nonetheless, countries that view IP rights as absolute rights have 
always conceived them, to a varying extent, as limited rights. Such limits are set, 
among other doctrines by the application of compulsory licenses.
An observation that emerged was that common law countries have historically 
conceived injunctions as an equitable remedy and hence subjected the award of 
this remedy to a factual test that aims at striking a balance between the particular 
circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, a glimpse into the law as it is actually 
practiced showed how injunctions have been habitually awarded in patent cases 
while the conception of remedies has evolved – mainly but not only through the 
use of economic arguments – towards favoring the use of strong property rules. 
Th is situation was more extremely in the U.S., yet it was recently reversed by the 
eBay decision.
Th e situation is – at least apparently – diff erent in civil law countries, due to a 
diverse conception over rights and remedies where injunctions are oft en 
conceived as a right, or inherently inseparable from the right. Th e law in books 
in many countries usually follows a language similar to that of Article 44 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which only obliges countries to grant the authority to judges 
in order to issue injunctions without compelling them to do so in all cases. 
However, the law in action seems to refl ect that a plaintiff  whose patent right is 
infringed is entitled to obtain injunctive relief.
In this sense, the chapter analyzed the interface between rights and remedies 
that allows countries from diff erent legal systems to converge in the law in books 
and diverge in the law in action. It seems that in the light of the information 
available at our times, no system can be considered a priori as more effi  cient 
according to whether remedies dictate or are separated from the nature of rights. 
Th is is even more important in a dynamic fi eld as patent law, where the progress 
of technology demands the ability of adapting to the particular challenges of this 
fi eld.
812 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.1. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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2.3. CHAPTER III
Th e third chapter developed the concept of ex post liability rules for patents in 
order to compare and analyze these provisions in patent law. Th e analysis 
referred to the international level as well as to three specifi c national patent laws: 
the U.S., the U.K. and Italy. Some important conclusions were drawn from each 
specifi c case. In the U.S. the emphasis of scholarly work and case law has been 
given to the problems of patent hold-ups, the strategic use of patenting by 
businesses characterized as “trolls” and the increasing multi-component nature 
of current technologies. In contrast, U.S. patent law seemed to sustain the view 
that patentees are free to choose whether to practice or not their inventions and 
should not, in general, be compelled to license them. Th is view is refl ected in the 
absence of specifi c regimes of compulsory licenses for non-working or for 
dependent patents.
Th e U.K. patent law is an interesting case to understand the interface between 
remedies-based and compulsory licensing provisions. Whereas injunctions can 
be denied under equitable considerations, it has been commonly argued that the 
problems of strategic use of patents, the risk of blocking further technologies and 
the lack of use of technologies could be better dealt through the use of 
compulsory licensing provisions. Nevertheless, the denial of injunctions has also 
served to tackle extreme cases of “oppression” by right holders without admitting 
a “balance of convenience” test.813
Th e Italian case highlights the diff erences in the conception of rights and 
remedies within civil law countries yet the surprising similarity of arguments 
with respect to IP remedies. A particular reference was made to preliminary 
injunctions, which frequently put an end to potentially long trial procedures 
performing a role similar to property rules in other systems. Th e reasoning of 
courts in patent infringement cases has sometimes favored a strong property rule 
in the sense that some Italian courts have presumed the requirement of 
“periculum in mora” in re ipsa for patent infringement cases. Th e outcome is 
similar to the application of an “automatic injunction rule” in the U.S. and hence, 
some courts have “tilted the table” in favor of patent owners that can easily 
obtain a preliminary injunction that sets up favorable terms for a settlement.814 
Th is could pose particular problems, especially in certain sectors, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry where delays in allowing the entrance of generic 
products can generate signifi cant welfare losses.
813 See Jaggard v Sawyer, supra note 294, arguing that the balancing test is one of oppression, and 
the court should not slide into application of a general balance of convenience test.
814 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 607, using the term “tilting the table” to describe the eff ect 
of preliminary injunctions in the U.S.
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In addition to these particular conclusions by country, the comparative 
examination performed in this Th esis, produced some suggestions to improve 
the use of patent liability rules. For instance, the eBay case, highlights that 
compulsory licensing might contribute to dynamic effi  ciency when strategic 
behavior might otherwise preclude follow-on innovation. Secondly, while a 
question mark surrounds the practical utility of compulsory licenses as they are 
seldom used815, the rule applied in the eBay case suggests an important defi ciency 
of traditional compulsory licenses which are seldom available in cases of patent 
infringement.
Th e chapter also identifi ed how a common concern with regards to the use of 
liability rules across several jurisdictions and times is the diffi  culty and cost that 
a court (or agency) would face in order to calculate damages that substitute an 
injunction and the interpretation of the sound grounds to provide a compulsory 
license.
2.4. CHAPTER IV
Th e fi rst chapters focused on a positive analysis and hence on the questions of 
when and how are patent liability rules used. Th is chapter instead addressed the 
normative question of when should patent liability rules be used. From a law and 
economics perspective, several misconstructions on the application of the 
liability rules framework to patent law were found. Whereas studies justify the 
use of liability rules upon the presence of high transaction costs, including 
strategic behavior; recent discussions on the use of patent liability rules have 
tended to focus on the problem of patent hold-ups. Th e adoption of such narrow 
focus is mainly due to the fact that discussions have mostly followed the 
renowned U.S. case of eBay.
In addition, some studies have proposed a narrow defi nition of patent hold-ups 
and suggested that the use of patent liability rules be limited to a very specifi c 
context with particularly restrictive assumptions. Furthermore, another 
extremely narrow approach is to focus on the fi gure of patent trolls as business 
entities that make use of their patents mainly through litigation and the threat of 
using litigation in order to extract large settlements above the economic value of 
their patents. Th e principal message of this chapter was that such restricted views 
815 Nonetheless, it is oft en argued that compulsory licenses have an important eff ect as 
negotiations happen in the shadow of such rules but any blocking eff ect would prevail in case 
they are not used because of an ineffi  cient design. Below we explain some of the features that 
might lead to such ineffi  cient design. One of these is the fact that they are not available as a 
defense within patent infringement cases, at least for the case of inadvertent or good-faith 
infringers.
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are misleading in that they might improperly suggest condemning effi  cient 
behavior while still tolerating ineffi  cient behavior from patentees.
In contrast, an alternative view of the question of when should patent ex-post 
liability rules be used was provided. Th e main insights generated by the analysis 
of national practices holds that problematic cases refer to patent hold-ups but 
also the problem of sequential and incremental innovation and the potential 
bargaining breakdown that might occur between the involved parties. A broader 
concept of strategic behavior was then proposed in this chapter that might off er 
guidance as to when a liability rule might off er a superior outcome in terms of 
effi  ciency.
Patent hold-ups have been furthermore linked to a particular type of patents, i.e. 
patents on business methods and to a particular sector, i.e. the information and 
communication technologies. Based upon those premises, it has been oft en 
argued that Europe is immunized from the emergence of some of the problems 
recently faced in the U.S. patent system. Th is chapter contributed to such debate 
by examining the main features of the European landscape that are associated or 
might be related with high transaction costs and patent strategic behavior. 
Several recent studies have found an emergence of patent strategies both related 
to the fi ling of single applications, management of patent portfolios and litigation 
of specifi c patents.
A particular sector, as the pharmaceutical, which has been distinguished from 
the problematic features of sectors such as information and communication 
technologies and where patents are said to play a major role, was recently 
confronted with the results of a recent inquiry performed by the European 
Commission on the European Pharmaceutical sector. Th is inquiry put in 
evidence the increasing frequency and importance of strategic practices with 
regard to pharmaceutical patents, which might potentially aff ect innovation 
incentives as well as create unduly burdens for citizens in such a vital sector as 
health.
2.5. CHAPTER V
Th e last chapter of this thesis concentrated on the cost side of patent liability 
rules. As it is oft en argued in economics as well as legal studies, the administration 
of liability rules might impose important costs. It is oft en mentioned that the 
calculation of the appropriate compensation for patent owners would be so 
diffi  cult and costly that property rules would be preferable in comparison.
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Contrary to this view, is the recent understanding that property rules might also 
impose signifi cant costs, for instance when the boundaries of patented inventions 
are unclear and entrenched in increasingly complex patent claims. Facing this 
reality, the calculation of the optimal remuneration might indeed be less costly, 
at least in some cases. Coinciding with the analysis of previous chapters, this 
would be the case in the presence of patent strategic behavior.
In addition, and without attempting to enter in the specialized fi eld of damage 
calculation, this chapter compared the methods used to calculate remuneration 
focusing especially on the new sub-set of cases from the U.S. as they present 
some alternatives to more traditional ways of calculating the remuneration under 
a liability rule. Notwithstanding the important diff erences between the context 
of compulsory licenses and damage calculation in patent infringement cases as 
well as the diff erences pertaining to each national law, the principles underlying 
patent protection suggest that the diffi  culties surrounding this calculation are 
not insurmountable. Moreover, such diffi  culties should be compared with the 
costs associated with the use of pure property rules.
3. IMPACT AND APPLICATIONS OF THIS 
RESEARCH
3.1. LESSONS FROM THE ENTITLEMENTS LITERATURE 
TO THE PATENT FIELD
Th e application of the property and liability rules framework to the particular 
case of patent law has produced several interesting fi ndings. In particular, this 
research allowed clarifying several points of misunderstanding which had biased 
the use of liability rules to protect patent rights. A fi rst fi nding regards some 
defi ciencies of previous theoretical analysis based upon a limited view of patent 
law. In spite of the long-lasting presence of compulsory licensing provisions in 
patent law, their study has been largely confi ned. For instance, a fi rst commonly 
stated view is that patent compulsory licensing provisions were largely absent 
from U.S. law. A second commonly held view is that patent compulsory licensing 
is potentially benefi cial from a static effi  ciency viewpoint while it is detrimental 
from a dynamic effi  ciency viewpoint.
Contrary to such views, this research found that the presence of liability rules in 
patent law has only oscillated in time. Likewise, it was highlighted how this 
presence has also permeated U.S. patent law, as demonstrated by the new wake of 
cases aft er eBay but also through historical examples of the application of 
compulsory licenses by antitrust authorities. In addition, this research showed 
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how, in some situations, protecting a patent through a liability rule can achieve 
objectives of dynamic as well as static effi  ciency. Th is is the case when a property 
rule would otherwise preclude further investments in R&D activity due to the 
fear of being exposed to patent strategic behavior.
In addition, the recent case of eBay in the U.S. has re-opened discussions about 
the use of patent liability rules but has also been similarly surrounded by a 
number of debatable conclusions. A fi rst misunderstanding is refl ected in the 
narrow view that liability rules are only justifi ed when hold-ups are frequent; 
costly in comparison with the purported costs of liability rules and cannot be 
solved by means of contractual agreement by the interested parties. Contrary to 
this view, this research shows that law and economics supports the use of patent 
liability rules in a wider number of cases. More in general, those cases would 
arise when patent strategic behavior imposes costs higher than those arising 
from the switch to a liability rule.
A second contentious view is that the eBay decision and applications of this 
precedent is only possible in the framework of equitable doctrines in common 
law countries. Conversely, patent liability rules nowadays tend to converge into a 
model of ex post rules, under a case-by-case reasoning that fully considers the 
particular circumstances of the case. Th us, even though it might be easier to 
imagine such type of liability rule in a common law country, a similar reasoning 
might be applied with respect to compulsory licenses for patents in civil law 
countries as well.
3.2. PATENT POLICY: EFFICIENCY AND OTHER GOALS 
OF PUBLIC INTEREST
Th is thesis used economic analysis in order to analyze the use of ex-post liability 
rules in patent law. Under an economic approach to law, the guiding policy 
principle is that of effi  ciency. However, an important concern that was refl ected 
throughout the analysis is the presence of other important public interest goals 
in patent law. Indeed, the interface between effi  ciency and those other public 
interest goals, such as fairness and distributive concerns has been reiteratively 
the object of multiple discussions within and outside of the patent realm.816
816 See e.g., Kaplow and Shavell 54. See also Richard Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on the 
Substance of Fairness, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 32 (January 2003); on the 
particularities of IP law see Farber, Daniel A., & McDonnell, Brett. (2003). Why (and How) 
Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface. UC Berkeley: Boalt Hall. Retrieved from: http://
escholarship.org/uc/item/60c8d09h.
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Under the law and economics literature patents are mainly justifi ed as temporary 
exclusive rights that foster innovation incentives. However, and consequent to 
the conclusions of this research, the guiding principle of effi  ciency requires that 
exclusive rights over technological and scientifi c knowledge do not preclude their 
further advancement. Effi  ciency indeed suggests that patent rights should not 
extend beyond a social optimal in order to avoid that patents encroach upon 
other goals such as access to knowledge. In a similar way, goals such as social 
justice also call for limitations on the exclusive nature of rights817:
“Th ere are essentially two reasons why we might be concerned about the dynamic 
described above. One is fear that parties may fail to come to terms in these cases even 
where the infringing product would not confl ict with any development of the IP by 
its owner, thus resulting in wasted resources and the loss of potentially large gains 
from trade. Th e other is the belief that even if the parties do come to terms, it is 
undesirable for the IP owner to command a disproportionately large share of those 
gains where they result primarily from the other party’s productive investments. Th is 
latter position can be understood as a belief about the demands of equity, based on a 
particular notion of distributive justice. Or it might be understood as another form 
of effi  ciency concern, based on the idea that overcompensating IP owners at the 
expense of people who make productive downstream use of their works will skew 
investment incentives in an unproductive manner”.818
Hence, both effi  ciency and other public interest grounds support the need for 
patent policy to address several current problems. For instance, there are reasons 
to believe that certain technological areas will benefi t more from other incentive 
mechanisms diff erent than patents. Recent proposals for prizes and public-
private partnerships in order to provide incentives for research related to 
neglected diseases are a vivid example of a failure of private IPR’s to provide 
suffi  cient incentives for R&D. Such mechanisms were not evaluated in this 
research, but other research has highlighted the importance of incentive 
mechanisms that can be an alternative to patent protection in areas where patents 
have failed to deliver.819
817 See Rosa Castro, Ex-post Liability Rules: a Solution for the Biomedical Anti-commons? In 
Intellectual Property Law: Economic and Social Justice Perspectives, Flannagan 
and Montagnani Eds., Edward Elgar Publishing (2010). See also Giovanni Ramello, Access to 
vs. exclusion from knowledge: Intellectual property, effi  ciency and social justice, P.O.L.I.S. 
department’s Working Papers 90, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice – POLIS 
(2007), available at: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/ramello100.pdf.
818 See Christopher Newman, Infringement as Nuisance. Catholic University Law Review, 
Forthcoming; George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
09–17. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354110.
819 See World Health Organization, Report of the World Health Organization Expert 
Working Group on Research and Development Financing, January 2010, available at: 
www.who.int/phi/documents/ewg_report/en/index.html, discussing other alternative 
mechanisms to fi nance R&D activities.
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Diff erent reasons would also justify precluding patent protection for some types 
of technologies. One example is the case of business method patents where it is 
oft en argued that patents do not exercise a positive eff ect on R&D, or at least not 
positive enough to outweigh the costs imposed by this type of patents. Patents on 
business methods have incremented at an exponential rate, imposing unduly 
burdens for patent offi  ces to screen out “good” from bad “patents”. Th is 
detrimental eff ect is not only circumscribed to the fi eld but obviously, the 
administrative burdens imposed by the examination of these patents probably 
aff ects the scarce resources of patent offi  ces in general, hence translating into an 
structural problem pertaining to all patent fi elds. In addition, the great private 
value relative to the social value of these patents has created enormous 
opportunities for patent strategic behavior as well as incentives for the 
benefi ciaries of this protection to engage in rent-seeking activities, including 
lobbying for lenient legislation with regard to these patents.
Th e aforementioned problems and their solutions in terms of substituting patent 
protection in certain cases are only adjacent to the main research question of 
this Th esis. Th e central question of this Th esis rather dealt with the type of 
protection that should be accorded to patent rights, once it is decided that such 
protection is preferable than its complete absence. In this sense, the use of 
liability rules is an option that stands in the middle from either full protection or 
the absence of protection for patents in certain complex cases. Liability rules 
cannot however be proposed as a solution either to problems where the complete 
absence of patent protection would be superior or those where full patent 
protection would be better. But the use of liability rules to protect patents 
remains an important option for implementing patent policy grounded in 
effi  ciency as well as other public interest goals. Whereas much previous research 
had focused on the fairness and development justifi cations for the use of liability 
rules for patents, this research highlighted that their use can also be supported 
under effi  ciency grounds, both on a static and a dynamic effi  ciency perspective. 
A possible convergence then exists between effi  ciency and other public interest 
goals of patent policy in the sense that the use of patent liability rules will 
sometimes be supported by both grounds.
3.3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PROPERTY
One question that reiteratively appeared in the analysis of patent liability rules 
regards the nature of IP entitlements and the interface between the nature of the 
right and the remedy used to protect it. Th e question of whether IP rights should 
be granted the same treatment as real property has been the object of much 
recent discussion in the U.S. following the eBay case and various Bills for patent 
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law reform proposed to the U.S. Congress during the last few years.820 One of the 
most important advocates of the extension of property rights treatment to IP is 
Professor Epstein, who fi led one of the numerous amici briefs in the eBay v. 
MercExchange case arguing in favor of maintaining a “structural unity” between 
real property and IP. Professor Epstein, as well as other scholars have interpreted 
that the property rule protection for real property would only be denied under 
cases of necessity and applying such logic to IP, he concludes that such cases will 
be rare in patent law:
“To be sure, the likelihood that these necessities will arise in the context of intellectual 
property is lower than it is with respect to tangible property, for it is highly unlikely 
that persons will need to infringe patents in order to escape with their lives. But the 
class of cases in which this issue is raised is not empty. Indeed, it is just those cases 
that are tracked by the Federal Circuit below when it references “public health” 
dangers as a category of reasons that could lead to a suspension of patent property 
rights.”821
Indeed, one can argue that this interpretation was followed in the U.S., especially 
by the CAFC, before the decision of eBay and that it is still probably shared by 
some courts in the U.S. as well as other countries. But as this research showed, 
such interpretation has not prevailed throughout patent history and it is not 
supported by economic reasoning. On the contrary, an appropriate contribution 
of property rights theory to patent law highlights the importance of taking into 
account that property law has also provided for mechanisms to ensure that 
society benefi ts from such protection. In addition, a well balanced application of 
property rights theory to patent law would take into account the similarities as 
well as the diff erences between both fi elds. Such diff erences are refl ected in 
mechanisms of patent law that do not have a strictly identical equivalent in real 
property, including liability rules.
One of the most important examples is that of eminent domain or expropriation 
which permits a government to take private property upon the payment of 
compensation. Whereas such provision can be compared not only with the 
expropriation of IP rights but also with compulsory licenses in cases of public 
utility or governmental uses, the varied cases of patent liability rules described 
in this research cannot be restricted to such limited example with respect to 
tangible property. Limitations and exceptions are much more profuse in patent 
law, precisely because this fi eld is based upon a diff erent dynamic which requires 
820 See supra note 613.
821 See Epstein, Kieff  & Wagner, supra note 631.
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balancing the interest of inventors, second innovators and fi nal users of 
innovation.822
Contrary to the view of IP rights as refl ecting the logic of property, Professor 
Menell and other scholars have argued against the application of such unitary 
structure to both fi elds. Th e reasoning, which is similar to that used by this 
Th esis is that neither history, nor legal or economic reasons clearly sustain a 
completely uniform treatment of both fi elds:
“While there are certainly historical connections and functional parallels between 
“intellectual property” and “property,” philosophical, legal, economic, and political 
bases for protecting intellectual property and tangible property diff er in signifi cant 
ways”.823
A Lockean conception of property as a natural right implies that property should 
be protected from any private or government interference. Th is is for instance 
refl ected in the U.S. interpretation of the Constitutional taking clause that 
grounds the protection of property rights on liberty. Nonetheless, those opposing 
an unrestricted application of a property rights approach to IP, sustain that the 
Constitutional mandate for Congress “to promote the progress on Science and 
the Useful Arts” is based upon a diff erent justifi cation. Menell, for instance, cites 
a 1790 speech by President George Washington to the Congress that preceded 
the enactment of the fi rst patent and copyrights legislation and to which the 
House of Representatives responded that:
“We concur with you in the sentiment that (…) the promotion of science and 
literature will contribute to the security of a free Government; in the progress of our 
deliberations we shall not lose sight of objects so worthy of our regard.”
According to Menell, IP rights fundamentally diff er from the Blackstonian 
view824 of property rights as absolute, perpetual and exclusive rights. For these 
purposes, Menell and other scholars highlighting these fundamental diff erences, 
cite, among other features, the limited duration, exceptions and limitations 
entrenched in IP laws. Compulsory licenses are an important example of when 
822 To this we may add other patent law exceptions such as experimental research which have no 
equivalent for tangible property. Experimental research exemptions may have probably been 
neglected for reasons similar to those described with respect to compulsory licenses, that is, 
their absence or current limitation within U.S. law, which has been the most infl uential patent 
law legislation, at least for the fi eld of law and economics.
823 See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, Regulation, Vol 
30, No. 3, Fall 2007.
824 William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 2, Chapter 1, at p. 2, 
“defi ning property as that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe”.
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the exclusive right is transformed into a remunerative right following a special 
approach of patent statutes. In substance, this position highlights the economic 
rationale of IP rights as a mechanism to provide innovation incentives and solve 
the public goods problem that aff ects the production of knowledge and 
information. Patent rights nevertheless create costs in the form of a deadweight 
loss, the potential inhibition of further research and the inexact allocation of 
resources in R&D which are not necessarily produced by the most effi  cient fi rms 
under the infl uence of patent incentives. Such costs are even more critical in 
cumulative innovation and sequential innovation settings, so that exclusive and 
unlimited rights would hinder rather than foster the objectives of IP protection 
and hence the importance of keeping in mind the necessity of a patent system 
balanced with exceptions and limitations.
Outside of the U.S. debate, the conception of property and IP as natural rights is 
followed by several other countries. Nonetheless, the utilitarian theories of IP 
rights and patent law have permeated the most important processes of 
harmonization around the world. Although the TRIPS Agreement only defi nes 
IP rights as “private rights”825, it is noticeable that it does not fi x any position 
with respect to whether IP rights belong or not to the realm of other property 
rights. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which refers to the objectives of the 
agreement, establishes that:
“Th e protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations”826
Closely related to this question is that on the interface between rights and 
remedies in the sense of how the system determines the type of protection rule 
to be applied. As it was pointed out in this Th esis, patent laws can use two 
diff erent types of reasoning with regard to this issue. Th e fi rst approach considers 
that the nature of the right determines the remedy, and hence a property right 
would deserve protection through a property rule. Under the second approach, it 
is the remedy that determines the nature of the right, for instance, the availability 
of a property rule would determine that the right in question is a property right.
Hence, whereas diff erent legal traditions privilege diff erent solutions, the results 
of this research suggest that it is not possible to establish which solution would 
be more effi  cient. Th e specifi c problems of patent law require that the reasoning 
825 See Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement.
826 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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used to establish which protection rule to adopt, should be responsive to the 
problems posed by the development of new technologies. In this sense, one might 
argue that a remedies-based approach would be more fl exible than a rights-based 
approach in that it would permit to choose a diff erent type of remedy and balance 
its prospective costs and benefi ts.
Nonetheless, this research evidenced that the law in books can widely diff er from 
the law in action, so that the practical relevance of such diff erences might be less 
intense than it appears. Th e law in books of common law countries puts an 
emphasis on remedies whereas the law in books of civil law countries emphasizes 
the nature of the right and judges are more limited to decide upon the available 
remedies outside their statutory defi nition. Nonetheless, the law in action in 
common law countries has tended to converge in the development of 
presumptions and case law interpreting IP rights as deserving property 
protection and/or an automatic entitlement to injunctive relief precisely by 
emphasizing the nature of the right. Th is was the case in the U.S., at least before 
the eBay case. Hence, the fi ndings of this research would support the common 
law solution insofar as it is the remedy and not the conception of IP rights as 
property that is emphasized. Nonetheless, a closer look into the law in action 
suggests that either making the right determine the remedy or vice versa can lead 
to effi  cient or ineffi  cient solutions.
Th is is also confi rmed by the diff erences with regards to the justifi cation of IP 
rights in diff erent legal traditions. Countries from continental Europe tend to 
follow a French conception of IP as natural rights or personality rights where 
creativity and invention supports the recognition of rights belonging to the 
individual. Th e U.S. has for instance a diametrically diff erent approach which 
refl ects a utilitarian approach to IP and patent protection.
Whereas such diff erent legal traditions have largely recognized that IP rights are 
limited in nature, limitations have been frequently misinterpreted. A typical 
misconception is that the only limit to IP rights should be their duration. Such 
statement is contradicted by the historical presence of limitations and exceptions 
in patent law, including the use of liability rules. A second statement addressed 
by this research was the view that substantive IP laws contain rules that balance 
benefi ts and costs of the system, so that enforcement should not attempt to fi x 
such balance.827 Notwithstanding the diverse views with respect to IP rights, 
827 See Canada – Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 
(EC-Canada) case at the WTO, where the Dispute Settlement Body noted with regards to the 
standards of interpretation for the TRIPS Agreement that: “Both the goals and the limitations 
stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when doing so as well as those of 
other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and purposes.” See also 
supra notes 51, 52 and 53 and accompanying text.
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countries of civil law and common law traditions have progressively adopted 
incremental levels of protection for IP entitlements so that it is not possible to 
plainly assume that substantive laws are always following an adequate balance. 
Th is suggests fi rstly that enforcement rules should also be interpreted in the light 
of the objectives of patent law. Secondly, it is a confi rmation that neither a 
common law nor a civil law approach is better able to deal with current patent 
law problems.
One of the most important conclusions from this research is to confi rm the 
detrimental eff ects of any unbalanced view that privileges the need for protection 
and loses sight of the need of a balanced patent system. In contrast, all legal 
traditions have for long recognized this need, not only by establishing a limited 
duration but also through patent scope and the design of proper limitations and 
exceptions. Although compulsory licenses and other liability rules are only part 
of this complex system, they have played a historical role in the patent fi eld that 
has refl ected the evolution in time of the justifi cations for patent protection. 
Compulsory licenses fl ourished at a time of controversy between a protectionist 
view of patents and the development of an ideological confl ict between free trade 
and monopoly. In that context, compulsory licenses entered into the patent 
landscape as an ambiguous instrument of national protectionism and a middle 
ground solution for more protectionist measures as patent forfeiture in the 
absence of local working.
In our times, the international patent landscape has largely evolved side by side 
with the international trade system. But this evolution, as it has been argued by 
many renowned authors before, has not been a balanced one. Strong interests 
have surrounded many land marking reforms in the IP and the patent fi eld.828 
Th e study of patent liability rules confi rms the need for balancing mechanisms 
that act as contention devices for the indiscriminate increment of patentability, 
patent scope, patent duration and above all, as it was the focus of most of this 
analysis, of an indiscriminate use of enforcement measures that refl ect such 
unbalanced view.
Summing up, it is not the reasoning that starts from the right or from the remedy 
that might be ineffi  cient. Both systems might lead to a well-designed or to a badly 
designed patent system. It is rather the misconception of patents and IP rights as 
unlimited rights that might impose severe losses in static effi  ciency terms as well 
as block rather than foster innovation in the future. Of course, if one’s view of 
property refl ects a Blackstonian “absolute” view, the conception of IP rights as 
property will determine an unlimited extension of protection. Such view would 
be incompatible with the historic, legal and economic justifi cations of patent 
828 See Landes and Posner, supra note 15 and Scherer, supra note 480, among others.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
278 Intersentia
rights as almost every country in the world has traditionally provided for 
exceptions and limitations for patent protection.
Under effi  ciency grounds, every patent system should be careful in maintaining 
such exceptions and limitations while fi ne-tuning those that might run against 
other objectives such as those embedded in the TRIPS Agreement, which include 
free trade and technology transfer. From this analysis, it is easy to conclude that 
patent liability rules, constructed either on the traditional way or on other 
equitable doctrines do not run counter to the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which, at this time, at least partially refl ects a global understanding in the IP 
fi eld. Article 7, 8 and 40 as well as the preamble829 of the TRIPS Agreement seem 
to support such view although their interpretation in relation to other provisions 
such as articles 27 and 28 on patent rights and articles 30 and 31 on exceptions 
and other uses not-authorized by the patent holder is still highly controversial.830
3.4. RULES OF INTERPRETATION: THE ROLE OF COURTS 
AND AGENCIES
One of the most oft en raised critiques to the analysis of the eBay case in the 
context of traditional compulsory licenses regards the impossibility that 
countries of civil law tradition undertake a similar type of equitable analysis. In 
part, this is due to diff erences in the legal traditions but in some other countries 
an important constraint regards the additional (and scarce) resources that would 
be needed to enforce the law if courts were asked to engage in substantial fact 
fi nding activity. Th is is even more critical with respect to patent law where courts 
lacking specialization struggle with the diffi  culties of a highly technical fi eld.
Nonetheless, this research put in evidence that the utilization of ex-post liability 
rules for patents requires a similarly in-depth activity from the courts or agencies 
whether under the application of an equitable doctrine to deny injunctive relief 
or through the issuance of a compulsory license. In this latter case, as it was 
highlighted several times, the TRIPS Agreement imposes that each compulsory 
829 See preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, expressing that: “Desiring to reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote eff ective 
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to 
legitimate trade” (…) “Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems 
for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives”.
830 It is oft en argued that articles 7 and 8 express non-operational rules. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the balance referred in Article 7 is already refl ected in the text of the Agreement; 
although such interpretation would signify that these articles are meaningless even if included 
in the text of the agreement.
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license is considered in its own individual merits as well as mandates that the 
“adequate remuneration” that should be awarded to patent holders be calculated 
according to “the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic 
value of the authorization”. Th e second requirement is probably the most 
complicated and costly part once the authority has decided the switch from a 
property rule to a liability rule. Th e fi rst requirement, that each compulsory 
license be considered in its own merits curtails the possibility of saving up costs 
by awarding compulsory licenses in “blanket”. Th e possibility of using 
compulsory licenses as well as administering them effi  ciently would hence, 
greatly depend on their design just as it happens with the application of equitable 
doctrines in Common Law countries.
3.5. THE DESIGN OF PATENT LIABILITY RULES
An interesting aspect of Italian patent liability rules that was analyzed in this 
Th esis is a new provision included in the 2005 Industrial Property Code that 
would allow good faith infringers to apply for a compulsory licensing. Infringers 
were previously excluded from applying for a compulsory license in the context 
of patent litigation for infringement. Th is was apparently one of the most 
important obstacles for the use of compulsory licenses, as demonstrated by 
important cases such as Chiron v. Sorin, which regarded the development of an 
improved version of an immunodiagnostic kit for HCV that infringed upon the 
controversial patent held by Chiron.831 Nonetheless, it is possible that a rigid 
interpretation of such formula might in practice preclude any important change 
in the way compulsory licenses are administered. If compulsory licensing 
provisions are indeed to play a role in practical terms, more fl exibility is needed 
with regard to some of the constraints surrounding their use. Th is is just an 
evident example of an improper design that has precluded the use of compulsory 
licenses in situations where – at least in effi  ciency terms – society would have 
gained from such use.
Similar arguments can be raised with regard to the eff ective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. In eff ect, some of the requirements of 
831 See above discussion in Chapter III, Section Other ex-post liability rules: compulsory licenses. 
Th e Chiron patent was subject to litigation in an important number of countries. See Keith 
Maskus, Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right, CSR, No. 19, November 
2006, available at: www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PatentCSR.pdf, at p. 19–20, 
referring how: “Since that time Chiron has aggressively enforced its patent, and critics claim 
that its enforcement has held up research by other fi rms and agencies for years (…) A 2003 
study by the National Academy of Sciences also singled out Chiron as a company with a 
reputation for limiting access to its patents. Moreover, a number of small companies interested 
in extending research on hepatitis C claim to have abandoned that research because of an 
inability to license the Chiron patent.”
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Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement have precluded its use. Th e most oft en 
discussed requirement is that of Article 31(f) that “any such use shall be 
authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use”. A problem with this requirement arises because the 
countries that precisely need to use this system are constrained if they lack or 
have insuffi  cient manufacturing capacities to produce locally such products 
under a compulsory license. Th is case was addressed by paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration and then transformed into the fi rst proposal for amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement.832 Nonetheless, it is oft en argued that the exception provided 
either by the Doha Declaration and now on the proposal for amendment has not 
facilitated the use of compulsory licenses especially by developing and least 
developing countries.
Another problematic requirement is the one established in Article 31(b), by 
which “such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user 
has made eff orts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such eff orts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time”. Th e same Article 31(b) established a possible 
derogation of this requirement in cases of “a national emergency” or “other 
circumstances of extreme urgency” or “in cases of public non-commercial use”; 
and in the same Article 31(k), it is also established that conditions of 
subparagraphs (b) and (f) do not have to be applied “where such use is permitted 
to remedy a practice determined aft er judicial or administrative process to be 
anti-competitive”.
Hence, draft ers of the TRIPS Agreement considered that such conditions would 
have disfavored or blocked the possibility of using compulsory licensing in such 
cases. However, and as it was shown in this research, similar reasons would 
hinder the use of compulsory licenses in cases of patent strategic behavior, which 
is precisely when they are needed the most. Such problem has been already 
evidenced in both of the cases analyzed here. In the context of the eBay case in 
the U.S. the solution has been to by-pass the requirements of Article 31, giving 
that the possibility of denying injunctions is also embedded in Article 44 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Nonetheless, in some of the cases applying the eBay precedent 
to deny injunctive relief “the proposed user” (infringer) had made previous 
832 Th e TRIPS Council has extended the period giving an additional two-years term for countries 
to approve the amendment in two occasions. See Amendment Of The Trips Agreement – 
Extension Of The Period For The Acceptance By Members Of The Protocol 
Amending The TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/711, 18 December 2007, available at: www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-711_e.pdf and Amendment Of The Trips Agreement – 
Second Extension Of The Period For The Acceptance By Members Of The Protocol 
Amending The TRIPS Agreement, 17 December 2009, available at: www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-785_e.pdf.
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“eff orts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions” but such eff orts were not successful within a reasonable 
period of time. From that perspective, eBay case law might still comply with 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. In the same eBay v. MerExchange case, the 
company eBay attempted to negotiate a license but it was aft er such negotiations 
failed that MercExchange sued for patent infringement.
Th e question remains whether, from an effi  ciency viewpoint it is advisable to 
require negotiations with the patent holder as a prerequisite for applying for a 
liability rule. Strategic behavior, which is one of the most important factors 
preventing effi  cient bargaining would preclude any fruitful eff ect from such 
negotiation while such requirement might impose an unduly burden for potential 
users. Th e problem of this requirement is that liability rules are thought to 
facilitate effi  cient bargaining in environments with high transaction costs and in 
this sense, they provide a mechanism that is less costly or solves the bargaining 
breakdown that would otherwise preclude effi  cient transactions under the 
property rule. But such transaction costs are precisely formed by those arising 
out from the negotiation, and especially by the costs produced by opportunistic 
behavior of the parties involved in such negotiation. Th e requirement of 
paragraph (k) of Article 31 hence imposes an additional cost of “prior eff orts” to 
obtain a voluntary license as a requirement to opt for a liability rule in cases 
where transaction costs are already high.
In addition, one of the most important cases here discussed which is that in 
which the infringer is unaware of the existence of the patent, its validity or 
precise scope would be completely precluded from the possibility of applying a 
liability rule to prevent strategic behavior. A possible interpretation is that the 
requirements of Article 31 do not apply for the case of restricting the availability 
of injunctions as allowed by the text of Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement. As 
suggested, one possibility for courts applying an equitable appreciation of the 
facts of the case in order to grant or deny injunctions is to mandatorily require a 
negotiated solution from the parties as it was suggested in the case of Paice v. 
Toyota.833 According to Judge Rader, the fact that the court mandates such 
solution instead of just suggesting that parties do so, would allow to actually 
diff erentiate an ongoing royalty from a compulsory license, hence avoiding any 
doubts with respect to the application of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. In 
spite of the possible compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement, these requirements 
seem to impose great costs from an economic point of view that might even 
preclude the use of compulsory licenses. Th is issue as well as other pointed out 
below are open for future research and dissenting opinions as this specifi c line of 
case law is just starting to develop in the U.S.
833 See Judge Rader’s concurring opinion, supra note 795.
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4. FUTURE RESEARCH
As it is the typical case, this research raised more questions than the answers it 
provided. It is clear that effi  ciency supports the alternative use of property and 
liability rules according to particular circumstances; that such rules are now 
mostly applied ex-post; and that the costs implied in their use are sometimes 
outweighed by the costs of using a property rule. Nevertheless, further research 
is needed in order to clarify the precise conditions to use such rules, their 
approximate costs and benefi ts and the multiple diff erences in their application 
to various technological sectors. Certainly there is an abundant literature and 
multiple previous empirical researches done, but there is still a need to connect 
such empirical evidence with the theory behind patent protection as well as with 
the legal framework regarding protection, limitations and exceptions of patent 
law and especially of patent enforcement rules. With regard to these questions, 
there are some areas in which more theoretical work is needed as well as some 
projects of harmonization where the use of patent liability rules needs to be 
seriously considered.
4.1. OTHER IP RIGHTS: COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
Th is research started from a general view of liability rules in IP but concentrated 
on the specifi c features of patent law. Nonetheless, there are many consequences 
for other IP rights as well. For instance, whereas trademark law does not provide 
for compulsory licensing provisions pursuant to Article 21 of the TRIPS 
agreement, common law countries still are able to limit the (abusive) enforcement 
of trademarks. A refl ection should hence be made in the sense that other IP 
statutes need to give serious consideration to rules preventing abuse of the rights 
and especially the abuse in the enforcement of rights.
For a long time, liability rules have also been proposed in several areas, including 
for the protection of undisclosed information, and more specifi cally the clinical 
data used to obtain marketing authorization of pharmaceutical products.834 
Whereas such proposals have been widely addressed by scholars, they have been 
largely neglected by policy makers. Other proposals relate to the copyrights fi eld, 
including one to make certain fair uses subject to appropriate compensation, 
834 See Jerome Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual 
Property Law: Th e Case for a Public Goods Approach (January 1, 2009). Marquette 
Intellectual Property Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2009, available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1433392, citing those proposals as well as the resistance against them as well as 
arguing in favor of treating clinical trial data as a public good.
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thereby creating a liability rule similar to those used in patent law insofar as their 
application is not automatic and needs a revision from a court.835
4.2. PUBLIC CHOICE APPLICATIONS
Particular developments in U.S. patent law, including the recent decisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the CAFC could be interpreted as a new fl uctuation in 
the trend of IP protection.836 As it was confi rmed also by this research, the 
national regulation of patents as well as international harmonization processes 
have been subjected to expansion and contraction waves. A similar argument is 
oft en made with respect to the interface between antitrust law and IP law. For 
instance, it is oft en pointed out that antitrust law had a preeminent role during 
the 1940’s, then it had contracted during the 1980’s, coinciding with a period of 
great expansion for the protection of IP rights.837
Likewise, the oscillation in the use of patent liability rules might respond to a 
similar rationale. Positions contrary to the use of patent liability rules might only 
be a refl ection of a movement towards an excessive increment of patent protection 
during the past decades. Underlying the utilization of a property rights’ rhetoric 
there is probably a willingness to extend patent protection without appropriate 
balancing mechanisms, and hence, a matter for public choice analysis.838
Additionally, this research has evidenced that effi  ciency does not preclude but 
actually requires a balance in patent law that includes rules to avoid or put a 
remedy to strategic behavior, including patent hold-ups. Th is might be achieved 
through the use of exceptions and limitations and defenses in patent infringement 
cases. Moreover, in some cases, as it was already pointed out, the solution is not 
to use liability rules but to completely re-think the protection of certain rights, as 
it is the case with some matters lately considered as patentable. Hence, the use of 
liability rules is only an alternative among many other policy levers839 that 
probably need to be readjusted. But more extreme reforms, as Menell accurately 
has pointed out, would be likely subject to great pressure from interest groups:
835 See Th omas Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1271, advancing 
such proposal.
836 See supra note 315.
837 See for instance, Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP 
Expansion, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04–03, available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=634224.
838 See Landes and Posner, supra note 15, on the necessity of explaining certain the expansion of 
some IP rights under public choice theory.
839 See supra note 4, defi ning policy levers.
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“more fundamental adjustments to the patent system are called for to distinguish 
among the very diff erent fi elds of inventive activity covered by patent law. But given 
the various political and other impediments to such a direct cure to the patent 
system’s root ills, more fl exibility at the remedy stage looks to be a good utilitarian 
compromise”840
Future research should compare the costs and benefi ts of the application of 
liability rules in comparison with other policy levers also taking into account a 
public choice dimension. One situation analyzed in this thesis was the case of 
dubious quality patents whereby it is oft en argued that patentability requirements 
or the restriction of patentable subject matter are the proper tools to deal with 
these issues.841 It would be interesting to revise this and other problematic issues 
that were only touched upon indirectly in this research and that might be 
explained in public choice terms as well as suggest the least costly alternatives for 
policy reform.
4.3. ANTITRUST AND IP INTERFACE
Th e focus of this thesis was the study of patent liability rules embedded in patent 
law, but the application of antitrust statutes is an important factor that was 
mentioned in several related discussions, including the legal tools available in 
diff erent countries to immunize from patent strategic behavior. Hence, this 
research addressed some but not all of the questions that arise from the 
perspective of the interface between antitrust and patent legislation.
Whereas the modern vision of antitrust and patent law sustains that both work 
“in tandem to bring new and better technologies, products, and services to 
consumers at lower prices”842, it is widely acknowledged that a number of 
potentially anticompetitive practices by patentees might pose challenges for a 
balanced IP-antitrust policy. Th e exclusivity of patent rights signifi es that in 
principle, a patentee might refuse to grant a license to any potential user. As this 
research evidences, however, there are a number of exceptions to this rule in the 
form of compulsory licenses or the denial of injunctive relief for patent rights.
840 Peter Menell, Intellectual Property and the Law of Land, Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 
2007–2008; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1078982, available at: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1078982.
841 See Chapter IV, Section 3.1.3. Dubious quality patents.
842 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and 
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), 
available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
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Moreover, antitrust laws around the world also foresee the possibility of requiring 
a compulsory license and sanctioning patentees which use their patents in an 
anti-competitive way. Th e TRIPS Agreement explicitly allows countries to grant 
such compulsory licenses and even authorizes countries to waive certain 
requirements as the prior negotiations and “adequate remuneration” in such 
cases.843
Yet, controversy surrounds many questions, including, when should a refusal to 
license a patent be considered anti-competitive, whether this problem should be 
held by antitrust law, patent law or both and how to determine the realm of each 
fi eld. Th ese questions are not new but the abundant law and economics literature 
evidences that there are neither complete nor totally convergent answers.844
Th is thesis analyzed a type of refusal to license patent rights and the legal tools 
available for potential users from the perspective of patent law. However, one 
important case that was also discussed is that of hold-ups arising under the 
framework of standard setting organizations when a patentee conceals a patent 
that is essential to a standard and only discloses such patent to litigate potential 
infringers aft er the standard has been set. Th is case has been described as a 
special instance of patent hold-up whereby a patent ambush waits until the rest 
of negotiating parties have sunk their costs by locking into a specifi c technological 
standard and then sues them, most times even in spite of an assumed FRAND or 
RAND commitment.845
Whereas some authors suggest that this problem could be better held by contract 
law or unfair competition, the argument advanced here is that patent law, should 
intervene when dynamic effi  ciency is threatened. Th is would be the case if the 
deceiving conduct of a patentee causes potential relevant parties to SSO’s to 
abstain from disclosing and participating due to fears of investing and then 
suff er a hold-up by an “ambush”. Since the goals of both antitrust law and patent 
law are mostly conceived as complementary, more research is needed to 
understand the proper role of antitrust and patent statutes in these as well as 
other cases of patent strategic behaviour.
843 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.1. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
844 See Cotter, supra note 38.
845 See supra notes 596–599 and accompanying text.
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
286 Intersentia
4.4. FURTHER NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION
Th e discussion of this research has been a recurrent issue of controversy over the 
last few years, in various national, international and European forums. Th e issue 
is likely to be debated also in the near future.846 Discussion continues in the U.S. 
as the eBay precedent is just starting to be applied in patent decisions as well as 
in other IP fi elds. Consequent to the problem of over-enforcement, several bills 
for patent law reform have addressed the problem of calculating patent damages 
and proposed the rule of “apportionment of damages” by which compensation to 
right owners should refl ect “only [the] economic value properly attributable to 
the patent’s specifi c contribution over the prior art”. As predictable, such 
proposal has been contentious, envisioned by some as the required complement 
to the eBay decision in order to avoid problems of over-enforcement and tackle 
with patent strategic behavior and by others as a prospective erosion of patent 
profi ts.847
In the meanwhile, European authorities are trying to move forward negotiations 
for further patent harmonization as the European patent landscape remains 
fragmented and patent enforcement remains a national issue. In this sense, the 
draft  European Patent Litigation Agreement and the Community patent are 
among the most important initiatives that will still be discussed in European 
context during the forthcoming years.848 While these proposals for the EPLA 
and the Community patent have received a recent impetus, they have also met 
with important resistance.
Although such instruments will likely contain a compromise between the 
countries in terms of the use of compulsory licenses and enforcement provisions, 
their discussion might also be a useful moment for the construction of a properly 
balanced European patent system. Any future harmonization with regard to 
patent substantive and enforcement standards should take into account the 
lessons learned with regard to the use of property and liability rules and more in 
general with regard to the importance of limitations and exceptions in patent 
law. Th is is critical in a time where the EPO starts to face important problems 
with respect to an overload of patent applications and a decreasing quality of 
granted patents. In this sense, further harmonization processes should not lose 
846 See supra notes 5 on discussions centered on the U.S. patent system; 6 on International 
discussions about exceptions and limitations in patent law, including the use of liability rules; 
and 380 on similar discussions between Europe.
847 See supra note 613. See also Maskus, supra note 831 and Scherer, supra note 480, discussing a 
potential patent law reform in the U.S.
848 See supra notes 378, 379 and 380 and accompanying text, describing these projects for future 
harmonization.
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sight of the need to balance the aspirations of users of the patent system which 
mainly seek to save on patent application costs and the needs of users of 
technologies that might oft en be also second innovators that would benefi t from 
a system that preserves the proper balances as well as of fi nal users of technologies 
and society as a whole.
Th ere are further important initiatives at the international level that need to be 
seriously examined in the context of this discussion and more in general in the 
context of discussions on a properly balanced patent system. Among the most 
important examples are the regional and bilateral free trade agreements oft en 
signed between the U.S. or the EU on the one hand and one developing or least 
developed country on the other hand. Such treaties oft en contain commitments 
that go beyond the level of protection set up by the TRIPS Agreement even 
though the economic case for patent and IP protection in general is lower for the 
case of these latter countries.849
In addition to these treaties, there are several global initiatives for harmonization. 
One such initiative is the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) promoted by the 
WIPO and which has recently stalled due to the resistance of developing 
countries, which are nevertheless signing other bilateral treaties. Th e other most 
recent example is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Act, a multilateral treaty 
proposed by OECD countries and which has been moreover surrounded by non-
disclosed negotiations.850 Th e future of international patent law depends on a 
properly balanced and informed negotiation of any forthcoming treaty. In such 
negotiations, a balance must be preserve both in substantive as well as in 
enforcement rules, keeping in mind also the diff erences, which might seem 
obvious and are nevertheless oft en confl ated between piracy and counterfeiting 
activities on the one hand and the use of limitations, exceptions and defenses in 
patent law on the other hand.
849 See Vivas, supra note 771 and Castro, supra note 287 on TRIPS-plus agreements and new 
international IP standards aff ecting developing and least developed countries.
850 See supra note 291.
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APPENDIX
COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS
Table 11. Compulsory Licenses for public interest reasons
Country/Treaty Provision
Paris Convention 5-A
TRIPS Article 31 “other use without authorization of the right holder”, plus 
Articles 1, 7, 8, 27.1, 30 and 44
US 28 USC 1498, concerns uses of patents or copyrights by or for the 
government. Th e US government does not have to seek a license or negotiate 
for use of a patent or copyright and any federal employee can use or 
authorize the use of a patent or a copyright. Th e right owner is entitled to 
compensation, but cannot enjoin the government or a third party 
authorized by the government, to prevent the use.
Spain LEY 11/1986, de 20 de marzo, de Patentes.
Artículo 90. 1. Por motivo de interés público, el gobierno podrá someter en 
cualquier momento una solicitud de patente o una patente ya otorgada a la 
concesión de licencias obligatorias, disponiéndolo así por Real Decreto.
2. Se considerará que existen motivos de interés público cuando la 
iniciación, el incremento o la generalización de la explotación del invento, o 
la mejora de las condiciones en que tal explotación se realiza, sean de 
primordial importancia para la salud pública o para la defensa nacional.
Se considerará, asimismo, que existen motivos de interés público cuando la 
falta de explotación o la insufi ciencia en calidad o en cantidad de la 
explotación realizada implique grave perjuicio para el desarrollo económico 
o tecnológico del país.
3. El Real Decreto que disponga la concesión de licencias obligatorias 
deberá ser acordado a propuesta del Ministerio de Industria y Energía. En 
los casos en que la importancia de la explotación del invento se relacione 
con la salud pública o con la defensa nacional, la propuesta deberá 
formularse conjuntamente con el Ministro competente en materia de 
sanidad o de defensa, respectivamente.
4. El Real Decreto que someta una patente a la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias por su importancia para la defensa nacional podrá reservar la 
posibilidad de solicitar tales licencias a una o varias empresas 
determinadas.
5. Cuando el interés público puede satisfacerse sin necesidad de generalizar 
la explotación del invento, ni de encomendar esa explotación a una persona 
distinta del titular de la patente, el Real Decreto podrá disponer el 
sometimiento condicional de la patente a la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias, autorizando al Ministro de Industria y Energía para que 
otorgue al titular un plazo no superior a un año para iniciar, aumentar o
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mejorar la explotación del invento en la medida necesaria para satisfacer el 
interés público. En tal caso, el Ministro de Industria y Energía, una vez oído 
al titular de la patente, podrá concederle el plazo que estime oportuno o 
someter la patente de forma inmediata a la concesión de las licencias. Una 
vez transcurrido el plazo que, en su caso, hubiere sido fi jado, el Ministro de 
Industria y Energía determinará si ha quedado satisfecho el interés público, 
y, si no fuera así, someterá la patente a la concesión de licencias 
obligatorias.
Art.141.Espropriazione.
1. Con esclusione dei diritti sui marchi, i diritti di proprieta’ industriale, 
ancorche’ in corso di registrazione o di brevettazione, possono essere 
espropriati dallo Stato nell’interesse della difesa militare del Paese o per 
altre ragioni di pubblica utilita’.
2. L’espropriazione puo’ essere limitata al diritto di uso per i bisogni dello 
Stato, fatte salve le previsioni in materia di licenze obbligatorie in quanto 
compatibili.
3. Con l’espropriazione anzidetta, quando sia eff ettuata nell’interesse della 
difesa militare del Paese e riguardi titoli di proprieta’ industriale di titolari 
italiani, e’ trasferito all’amministrazione espropriante anche il diritto di 
chiedere titoli di proprieta’ industriale all’estero.
Table 12. Compulsory Licenses for lack of working
Country/Treaty Provision Practice
Paris Convention 5/A. “Each country of the Union 
shall have the right to take legislative 
measures providing for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to prevent the 
abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, 
failure to work”.
N/A
TRIPS 31 No panel decision interpreting 
Article 31, only on Article 30. 
See Canada – Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/
DS114/R, 17 March 2000 
(EC-Canada).
U.S. No provision and long history of 
rejection. Aft er 2006 eBay v. 
MercExchange decision it is possible 
if the district court denies injunctive 
relief for non-working entities
Post-eBay decisions
U.K. Section 48 of the UK Patents Act 
1977 as amended by the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act, 1988
N/A
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Italy Article 70 of the CPI, if the invention 
is not worked in any country of the 
European Union, European 
economic Space or the WTO or if 
even though it is being worked, 
production is not proportionate to 
the national needs.
N/A
France Article L-613–12, reformed to allow 
granting as exclusive or non-
exclusive granting
Rarely granted
Lyons Court of Appeals, September 
11, 1997; 1998 PIBD III. 167; 1998 
JCP ed. E Chronique at 172
Spain Artículo 86.
Artículo 87. 1. Una vez fi nalizado el 
plazo establecido en el artículo 83 
para iniciar la explotación de la 
invención protegida por la patente, 
cualquier persona podrá solicitar la 
concesión de una licencia obligatoria 
sobre la patente, si en el momento de 
la solicitud, y salvo excusas legítimas, 
no se ha iniciado la explotación de la 
patente o no se han realizado 
preparativos efectivos y serios para 
explotar la invención objeto de la 
patente, o cuando la explotación de 
ésta ha sido interrumpida durante 
más de tres años.
2. Se considerarán como excusas 
legítimas las difi cultades objetivas 
de carácter técnico legal, ajenas a la 
voluntad y a las circunstancias del 
titular de la patente, que hagan 
imposible la explotación del invento 
o que impidan que esa explotación 
sea mayor de lo que es.
N/A
Table 13. Compulsory Licenses for dependent patents
Country/Treaty Provision
Paris Convention 5/A
TRIPS Article 31
U.S. N/A
U.K. Section 48 of the UK Patents Act 1977 as amended by the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act, 1988
European 
Directive 98/44/
EC on the Legal 
Protection of 
Biotechnological 
Inventions
Article 12 cross-licensing of patents in cases where there is another 
invention or a new seed variety that provides a “signifi cant technical 
progress of considerable economic interest.” 
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Italy Article 71 of the CPI
Spain Artículo 89. 1. Cuando no sea posible la explotación del invento protegido 
por una patente sin menoscabo de los derechos conferidos por una patente 
o por un derecho de obtención vegetal anterior, el titular de la patente 
posterior podrá solicitar una licencia obligatoria, que será no exclusiva, 
para la explotación del objeto de la patente o de la variedad objeto del 
derecho de obtención vegetal anterior, mediante el pago de un canon 
adecuado.
2. Cuando no sea posible obtener o explotar un derecho de obtención 
vegetal sin menoscabo de los derechos conferidos por una patente anterior, 
el obtentor podrá solicitar una licencia obligatoria, que será no exclusiva, 
para la explotación del invento protegido por la patente, mediante el pago 
de un canon adecuado.
3. Si una patente tuviera por objeto un procedimiento para la obtención de 
una sustancia química o farmacéutica protegida por una patente en vigor, 
tanto el titular de la patente de procedimiento como el de la patente de 
producto, tendrán derecho a la obtención de una licencia obligatoria no 
exclusiva sobre la patente del otro titular.
4. Los solicitantes de las licencias a que se refi eren los apartados anteriores 
deberán demostrar:
a) Que la invención o la variedad representa un progreso técnico 
signifi cativo de considerable importancia económica con relación a la 
invención reivindicada en la patente anterior o a la variedad protegida por 
el derecho de obtención vegetal anterior.
b) Que han intentado, sin conseguirlo en un plazo prudencial, obtener del 
titular de la patente o del derecho de obtención vegetal anterior una licencia 
contractual en términos y condiciones razonables.
5. Cuando según lo previsto en el presente artículo proceda la concesión de 
una licencia obligatoria por dependencia, también el titular de la patente o 
del derecho de obtención vegetal anterior podrá solicitar el otorgamiento, 
en condiciones razonables, de una licencia por dependencia para utilizar la 
invención o la variedad protegida por la patente o por el derecho de 
obtención vegetal posterior.
6. La licencia obligatoria por dependencia se otorgará solamente con el 
contenido necesario para permitir la explotación de la invención protegida 
por la patente, o de la variedad protegida por el derecho de obtención 
vegetal de que se trate, y quedará sin efecto al declararse la nulidad o la 
caducidad de alguno de los títulos entre los cuales se dé la dependencia.
7. La tramitación y la resolución de las solicitudes de licencias obligatorias 
por dependencia para el uso no exclusivo de una invención patentada, se 
regirán por lo dispuesto en la presente Ley.
La tramitación y la resolución de las solicitudes de licencias obligatorias por 
dependencia para el uso no exclusivo de la variedad protegida por un 
derecho de obtentor se regirán por su legislación específi ca.
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INJUNCTIONS
Table 14. Injunctions for patent infringement in International Treaties
Treaty Provision
TRIPS Agreement
PART III: Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
Section 2: Civil and 
Administrative Procedures and 
Remedies
Article 44. Injunctions
Th e judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a 
party to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the 
entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of 
imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual 
property right, immediately aft er customs clearance of such 
goods. Members are not obliged to accord such authority in 
respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a 
person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to 
know that dealing in such subject matter would entail the 
infringement of an intellectual property right.
2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and 
provided that the provisions of Part II specifi cally addressing 
use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a 
government, without the authorization of the right holder are 
complied with, Members may limit the remedies available 
against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance 
with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the 
remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies 
are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments 
and adequate compensation shall be available.
U.S.–Peru Trade Promotion Act
Article 16.11: Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
Civil and Administrative 
Procedures and Remedies
In civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, each Party shall provide that its 
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to 
desist from an infringement, in order, inter alia, to prevent the 
entry into the channels of commerce in the jurisdiction of 
those authorities of imported goods that involve the 
infringement of an intellectual property right immediately 
aft er customs clearance of such goods, or to prevent their 
exportation.
(Bolded text goes beyond TRIPS) However, a salient TRIPS-
plus feature is contained in what is omitted in the article 
rather than what is prescribed, e.g. the lack of reference to the 
TRIPS’ exceptions in cases of non-willful infringement and 
most importantly in cases related to subparagraph (h) of 
Article 31.
Agreement on the establishment 
of a European patent litigation 
system
(Draft , December 2005).
Article 62. Injunction
Th e European Patent Court may order a party infringing or 
threatening to infringe a European patent to cease and desist 
from any act infringing the patent under Articles 33 or 34.
Notes. See Art. 44 TRIPS.
DE, FR, MC and NL delegations and one expert supported the 
idea of considering whether the right to request an injunction 
should expire aft er a certain time period; cf. Art. 67 on the 
limitation of the right to claim damages.
(Emphasis added)
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European Enforcement 
Directive851
CHAPTER II
MEASURES, PROCEDURES 
AND REMEDIES
Article 11: Injunctions
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is 
taken fi nding an infringement of an intellectual property 
right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer 
an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the 
infringement. Where provided for by national law, non-
compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be 
subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view to 
ensuring compliance. Member States shall also ensure that 
rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe an intellectual property right, without 
prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC.
(Bolded text goes beyond TRIPS).
Andean DECISION 344
Common Regime on Industrial 
Property
SECTION VIII
Legal protection of the patent
Article 51 
Th e owner of the patent or the person who considers himself 
entitled to a patent by virtue of this Decision may institute any 
actions claiming ownership or indemnifi cation that are 
available to him under the national legislation of the Member 
Country concerned.
Without prejudice to any other action that may be available 
to him, the owner of the patent may, aft er the patent has been 
granted, bring action for damages against any person who, 
without his consent, has exploited the patented process or 
product, where such exploitation took place aft er the 
publication date of the patent application.
In cases of alleged infringement of a patent relating to a 
process for the manufacture of a product, the defendant shall 
be responsible for proving that the process used by him to 
manufacture the product is diff erent from that protected by 
the patent allegedly infringed. To that end it shall be assumed, 
in the absence of proof to the contrary, that any identical 
product manufactured without the consent of the owner of the 
patent has been manufactured by means of the patented 
process if:
(a) the product manufactured by means of the patented 
process is new;
(b) there is a reasonable likelihood that the identical product 
was manufactured by means of the process, and the owner of 
the process patent is not able to establish, aft er reasonable 
eff ort, what process actually was used.
In the submission of proof to the contrary, due account shall 
be taken of the legitimate interests of the defendant with 
respect to the protection of his trade and manufacturing 
secrets.
(Emphasis added)
851 Within European Law, a Directive, diff erently than a Regulation should be transposed into 
national legislation. Th erefore, in spite of the fact that it might be regarded as domestic 
European law I have included it along with other international treaties because countries 
enjoy a signifi cant degree of discretion to implement its provisions.
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POSTEBAY CASES IN THE U.S.
Table 15. Summary of injunctions granted and denied aft er the eBay case
Cases Competitors Non-competitors Total
Granted Injunctions 28 cases852 1 Case
Commonwealth v. 
Buff alo
29 granted 
injunctions
69%
Denied Injunctions 2 Cases
– Innogenetics v. 
Abbott (on appeal)
– Praxair v. ATMI
11 Cases853 13 injunctions denied
31%
Total cases 30 competitors 12 non-competitors 42
852 Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfi eld Servs.; Telequip Corp. v. Change Exchange; Tivo Inc. v. Echostar 
Communications Corp.; Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg.; Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights 
Prods; 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp; Rosco v. Mirror Lite Co.; Smith & 
Nephew, Inc. v. Sythes (U.S.A.); Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp.; Transocean 
Off shore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp.; Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc.; 
MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc.; Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc.; Ortho-McNeil 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc.; O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.; 
800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd; MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift  Systems, LLC.; 
Sanofi -Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc.; Miniauction, Inc. v. Th omson Corp.; Allan Block Corp. v. E. 
Dillon & Co.; Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.; Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki 
Kaisha Molten; Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.; Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte 
Fabricating Ltd.; Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc.; Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.
853 Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp.; MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.; Voda v. Cordis Corp.; 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.; z4 Techs. V. Microsoft ; Amado v. Microsoft ; Acumed LLC v. 
Stryker Corp.; IMX v. LendingTree LLC; Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs; Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV 
Group; Sundance Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd. (D.C.).
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SUMMARY OF SELECTED CASES APPLYING THE 
EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE PRECEDENT
GRANTED INJUNCTIONS
1. Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfi eld Servs., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (D. Okla. 2006)
Parties Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfi eld Servs.
Citation U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51669 (D. Okla. 2006)
Patent(s) 6,655,475
“Product and method for treating well bores”
Current International Class854 E21B 27/00 (20060101);
E21B 27/02 (20060101);
E21B 21/00 (20060101);
E21B 033/13 
Claims855 35 claims
3 independent claims
Infringing Technology Poly Drill Sticks, a product used in the treatment of oil wells
Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm)
“As a result of Defendants’ infringement, Plaintiff s suff ered 
injuries in addition to lost sales. Specifi cally, Plaintiff s note 
that they lost market share and “the opportunity to maintain 
their own polymer stick to as the industry standard” and that 
their “reputation for innovation” was damaged as a result. 
(Pls.’ Reply at 8–9.) Th us, damages, either awarded by the jury 
or trebled, do not necessarily take into account other items of 
loss”.
Willful infringement “given the fi nding of willful infringement and because there 
have been no indications that Defendants do not still possess 
an inventory of these products or the ability to secure more, 
the Court is unpersuaded that there is no need for an 
injunction”
854 For information about the International Patent Classifi cation see www.wipo.int/
classifi cations/ipc/en/. See also Joshua Lerner, Th e Importance of Patent Scope: an Empirical 
Analysis, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 1994), at pp. 319–
333, using the IPC as a proxy of patent scope, however limiting to the fi rst four digits of the 
Code.
855 According to Niels Stevnsborg and Bruno van Pottelsberghe, at p. 163, applications with a few 
independent claims and a limited number of dependent claims would constitute a ‘good’ 
patent. Th e EPC in fact establishes higher fees for applications having more than ten claims at 
fi ling. Moreover, “the number of claims is, in addition, also closely linked to the breadth of 
claims, e.g. a very broad independent claim may become considerably more limited in scope 
if combined with one or more of its dependent claims”.
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2. Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y 
Aug. 15, 2006)
Parties Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch.
Citation U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61469 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 15, 2006).
Patent(s) Patent 5,830,055
“Coin/token canister and ejection mechanism”
Current International Class G07D 9/00 (20060101);
G07D 1/00 (20060101);
G07D 001/00
Claims 15 claims
5 independent
Infringing Technology Poly Drill Sticks, a product used in the treatment of oil wells
Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm)
“monetary damages are not an adequate remedy against future 
infringement because ‘the principal value of a patent is its 
statutory right to exclude’”. 
Ceased infringement does not 
preclude injunction 
“the fact that an infringing defendant has apparently, at least 
temporarily, ceased its infringement is not a basis for the court 
to deny a permanent injunction against future infringement 
unless the evidence is very persuasive that the infringing 
defendant will not resume its infringement”
Public Interest “without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude 
granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value 
it was intended to have, and would no longer be as great an 
incentive to engage in the toils of scientifi c and technological 
research.”
3. Tivo Inc. V. EchoStar Communications Corp., 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669–70 
(E.D. Tex. 2006)
Parties Tivo Inc. V. EchoStar Communications Corp
Citation 446 F. Suppl. 2d 664, 669–70 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
Patent(s) 6,233,389
“Multimedia time warping system”
Current International Class G11B 27/10 (20060101);
G11B 27/034 (20060101);
H04N 5/775 (20060101);
G11B 27/031 (20060101);
H04N 5/44 (20060101);
H04N 5/00 (20060101);
G11B 27/032 (20060101);
G11B 27/024 (20060101);
G11B 27/022 (20060101); H04N 5/782 (20060101); G11B 
27/00 (20060101); H04N 7/16 (20060101); H04N 005/92 
Claims 61 Claims
4 Independent 
Infringing Technology DVR’s
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Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm
Loss of market shares for new 
industries with sticky 
consumers)
“Loss of market share in this nascent market is a key 
consideration in fi nding that Plaintiff  suff ers irreparable harm 
– Plaintiff  is losing market share at a critical time in the 
market’s development, market share that it will not have the 
same opportunity to capture once the market matures. One 
thing the parties agree on is that DVR customers are “sticky 
customers,” that is they tend to remain customers of the 
company from which they obtain their fi rst DVR.
“Th us, the impact of Defendants’ continued infringement is 
shaping the market to Plaintiff ’s disadvantage and results in 
long-term customer loss. Th is is particularly key where, as is 
the case here, Plaintiff ’s primary focus is on growing a 
customer base specifi cally around the product with which 
Defendants’ infringing product competes. And, as Plaintiff  is 
a relatively new company with only one primary product, loss 
of market share and of customer base as a result of 
infringement cause severe injury”
Public Interest Th e public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent 
system. Th is interest is served by enforcing an adequate 
remedy for patent infringement – in this case, a permanent 
injunction. Th e infringing products are not related to any 
issue of public health or any other equally key interest; they 
are used for entertainment. Th e public does not have a greater 
interest in allowing Defendants’ customers’ to continue to use 
their infringing DVRs.
4. Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. Minn. 
2006)
Parties Floe Int’l, Inc. v. Newmans’ Mfg.,
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59872 (D. Minn. 2006).
Patent(s) Patent 5,738,379
“An improved trailer structure constructed of light-weight 
material and especially adapted for hauling snowmobiles”
Current International Class B62D 63/06 (20060101);
B62D 63/00 (20060101);
B62D 021/20
Claims 17 Claims
3 independent
Infringing Technology Snowmobile trailers
Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm)
Citing eBay with no discussion of the four-factor test
5. Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights Prods., 2006 U.S. WL 5700252 (E.D.Mo.)
Parties Litecubes LLC v. Northern Lights Prods.
Citation 2006 U.S. WL 5700252 (E.D.Mo.))
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Patent(s) 6,416,198 on a Illuminable beverage accessory device 
Current International Class F21V 1/00 (20060101);
F21V 1/10 (20060101);
A47G 19/22 (20060101);
A47G 21/00 (20060101);
A47G 21/18 (20060101);
F21V 33/00 (20060101);
F21V 033/00 
Claims 44 Claims
3 independent 
Infringing Technology Lighted artifi cial ice cubes that were designed, as a novelty 
item, to be placed in beverages
Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm)
“Potential customers in the United States were buying 
infringing devices sold and imported by Defendant, instead of 
purchasing the products sold by Plaintiff s. Plaintiff 
VanderShuit went through the time and expense of developing 
the patented device and obtaining legal protections for his 
invention in the form of a patent, trademark and copyright. 
Defendant has no such protection and seeks to poach 
customers in the United States in violation of Plaintiff s’ rights. 
Th e Court believes that an injunction is necessary in order to 
prevent Defendant from continuing to sell and import its 
infringing products in the future”
Scope of injunction Th e parties disagreed as to the scope of the injunction. 
6. 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70256 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006).
Parties Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp.
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70256 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006).
Patent(s) 5,897,930
Multiple embossed webs
Current International Class C09J 7/02 (20060101);
B29C 59/02 (20060101);
A61F 013/02 ();
E04F 015/16 
Claims 12 Claims
2 independent 
Infringing Technology EZ Series Fleet Marketing Film
Arguments of the court
(irreparable harm)
Litigation costs
“3M has spent nearly fi ve years litigating to protect its interest 
in this patent”
Unwillingness to license “and has consistently refused to execute a licensing agreement 
with Avery” Having lost at trial, Avery wants to force 3M to 
grant a license that 3M refused to grant before trial. Th e Court 
will not disturb 3M’s determination that its business interests 
will not be served by the licensing of this product”
Ex-Post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law
320 Intersentia
7. Transocean Off shore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp. 
Parties Transocean Off shore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 
GlobalSantaFe Corp.
Patent
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73366, 13–14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006)
Patent(s) 6,047,781 Multi-activity off shore exploration and/or 
development drilling method and apparatus
Continuation
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 
(20060101); E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 15/02 (20060101); 
E21B 019/20 
30 claims
7 independent
Current International Class 6,056,071
Multi-activity off shore exploration and/or development 
drilling method and apparatus
Continuation
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 
(20060101); E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 15/02 (20060101); 
E21B 007/12 
42 claims
10 independent
Current International Class 6,068,069
Multi-activity off shore exploration and/or development 
drilling method and apparatus
Continuation
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 19/00 (20060101); E21B 
15/00 (20060101); E21B 15/02 (20060101); E21B 007/12
26 claims
6 independent
Claims  6,085,851
Multi-activity off shore exploration and/or development drill 
method and apparatus
B63B 35/44 (20060101); E21B 7/12 (20060101); E21B 19/00 
(20060101); E21B 15/00 (20060101); E21B 15/02 (20060101); 
E21B 015/02 (); B63B 035/44
13 claims
2 independent
Infringing Technology Deep water drilling rigs
Scope of injunction
(contended) 
“Transocean asks the court to enter a permanent injunction 
prohibiting [GSF] “from making, using, selling, off ering to sell 
or importing the Development Drillers I and II, or any drilling 
rigs not more than colorably diff erent, in the United States for 
the term of the
patents.”
“Asserting that the injunction Transocean seeks is overly 
broad, GSF argues that the injunction should be limited to 
prohibit only actual operations on one well by the Development 
Drillers” 
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Small component “the structures on GSF’s Development Driller rigs that the 
court found to infringe the apparatus claims of the patents-in-
suit (…)are not small components of those rigs but, instead, 
structures that are related to the rigs’ core functionality”
Compulsory licenses “the court is persuaded that if it does not enter a permanent 
injunction, it will force a compulsory license on Transocean 
that will not contain any of the commercial business terms 
typically used by a patent holder to control its technology or 
limit encroachment on its market share”
Other arguments “GSF has not only used the Development Driller rigs equipped 
with the infringing structure to compete for the same 
customers and contracts as Transocean, but also to win 
contracts over competing bids from Transocean.”
Willingness to license “Nor is the court persuaded that the mere fact that Transocean 
is willing to consider licensing its invention to GSF and others 
on “fair grounds” is suffi  cient to defeat Transocean’s request 
for a permanent injunction. It is undisputed that Transocean 
makes and markets deep water drilling rigs equipped with the 
patented invention”
8. Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc.
Parties Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc.
Citation 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91453, (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
Patent(s) 5,857,201
Enterprise connectivity to handheld devices
Current International Class G06F 17/30 (20060101); H04L 29/08 (20060101); H04L 29/06 
(20060101); G06F 017/30 
Claims 19 claims
2 independent
Patent (s) 6,324,542 (continuation of the 5,857,201)
Enterprise connectivity to handheld devices
Current International Class G06F 17/30 (20060101); H04L 29/08 (20060101); H04L 29/06 
(20060101); G06F 017/30 
Claims  40 claims
6 independent
Infringing Technology 
Arguments of the court
Irreparable harm 
“Although future damages may compensate Visto for an 
approximate loss, that does not make them adequate in the 
sense that they are a suitable proxy for injunctive relief. What 
makes legal remedies inadequate under the circumstances of 
this case is the inability to calculate the plaintiff ’s future losses 
with precision”
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9. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc
Parties Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc
Citation No. 05-cv-160-KAJ (D. Del. 2007)
Patent(s) Patent 6,867,031 on amylase variants
Current International Class C12N 9/28 (20060101);
C12N 9/26 (20060101);
C11D 3/38 (20060101);
C11D 3/386 (20060101);
D06L 1/14 (20060101);
D06L 1/00 (20060101);
C12N 009/28 ();
C12N 015/56
Claims 5 claims
3 independent claims
Infringing Technology 
Arguments of the court
Irreparable harm 
“Novozymes has suff ered irreparable harm because of 
Genencor’s infringement of Novozymes’s right to exclude 
others from practicing its patent. Contrary to Genencor’s 
argument (D.I. 209 at 37, 39), the Supreme Court in eBay did 
not state that loss of the right to exclude could not be 
irreparable harm. Rather, the Court simply rejected the 
proposition that the patentee’s right to exclude should always 
lead to injunctive relief for patent infringement”
Damages not adequate
(Lost profi ts not available)
“Because Novozymes markets its technology by licensing it to 
a subsidiary, the legal remedy of lostprofi ts damages is not 
available. Even if it were, the statutory right to exclude 
represents a benefi t that, under these circumstances, cannot 
be equated by an award of cash. Th ese are head-to-head 
competitors, and Novozymes has a right, granted by Congress, 
not to assist its rival with the use of proprietary technology”
Independent invention “Th us, while Spezyme Ethyl infringes Novozymes’s patent, 
Genencor and EBS apparently developed the enzyme on their 
own”
Factors that amount to willful 
infringement 
“the most relevant Read factor here is the question of “whether 
the [**50] infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a 
good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not 
infringed.” Read, 970 F.2d at 827. Genencor’s decision to 
continue infringing without a good faith belief in the ‘031 
patent’s invalidity is the basis for my fi nding of willful 
infringement, and it supports an award of enhanced damages.
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10. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co. 
Parties O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.
Citation No. 04–32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D.Tex. March 21, 2007)
Patent(s) 6,259,615
High-effi  ciency adaptive DC/AC converter
Current International Class
(2)
H02M 7/505 (20060101);
H02M 7/5387 (20060101);
H02M 7/523 (20060101);
H05B 41/282 (20060101);
H05B 41/28 (20060101);
H05B 41/285 (20060101);
H05B 41/392 (20060101);
H05B 41/39 (20060101);
H02M 003/24 ();
H02M 003/335
Claims 19 claims
4 independent
Patent(s) 6,804,129; continuation application of U.S. patent 6,396,722, 
which itself is a continuation application of U.S. patent 
6,295,615, on a high-effi  ciency adaptive DC/AC converter
Current International Class
(2)
(11)
H02M 7/505 (20060101);
H02M 7/5387 (20060101);
H02M 7/523 (20060101);
H05B 41/39 (20060101);
H05B 41/282 (20060101);
H05B 41/28 (20060101);
H05B 41/285 (20060101);
H05B 41/392 (20060101);
H02M 003/335 ();
H02M 003/24 ();
H05B 037/02 
Claims 30 claims
4 independent
Infringing Technology 
Arguments of the court
Irreparable harm
Direct competitors
the court “has recognized the high value of intellectual 
property when it is asserted against a direct competitor in the 
plaintiff ’s market”. 
“Because BITEKs co-defendants purchase in the same market, 
O2 micro will suff er irreparable harm absent an injunction 
directed towards them”
When Defendant is a foreign 
company
Defendants are foreign companies so plaintiff  has “little 
assurance that it could collect monetary damages”
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11. Commonwealth Scientifi c & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buff alo 
Technology Inc.
Parties Commonwealth Scientifi c & Industrial Research Organisation 
v. Buff alo Technology Inc.
Citation 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 600–02 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
Patent(s) 5487069 on a Wireless LAN
Current International Class H04L 5/02 (20060101);
H04L 12/28 (20060101);
H04L 1/18 (20060101);
H04L 1/16 (20060101);
H04L 1/00 (20060101);
H04B 007/01
Claims 72 claims
10 independent
Infringing Technology 
Previous bargaining “In 1998, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(“IEEE”) contacted CSIRO to request assurance that CSIRO 
would license its patent to companies wanting to implement 
the IEEE’s 802.11a standard on reasonable and non-
discriminatory (“RAND”) terms once the IEEE approved the 
802.11 standard, which pertains to WLANs. CSIRO agreed” 
CSIRO contacted companies using its patent but they refused 
to license it.
Arguments of the court
A research institution
CSIRO is the principal scientifi c research organization of the 
Australian Federal Government: “CSIRO is a research 
institution and relies heavily on the ability to license its 
intellectual property to fi nance its research and development. 
Th e revenue from licensing its intellectual property is used to 
fund further research and development for frontier projects”
Arguments of the court
Competition
“CSIRO has shown that its harm is not merely fi nancial. While 
CSIRO does not compete with Buff alo for marketshare, CSIRO 
does compete internationally with other research groups – 
such as universities – for resources, ideas, and the best 
scientifi c minds to transform those ideas into realities”
Arguments of the court
Reputation
“CSIRO’s reputation is an important element in recruiting the 
top scientists in the world (…) “Delays in funding result in lost 
research capabilities, lost opportunities to develop additional 
research capabilities, lost opportunities to accelerate existing 
projects or begin new projects”
“Its reputation as a research institution has been impugned 
just as another company’s brand recognition or good will may 
be damaged”
Small components v. essential 
patents
“Buff alo’s infringing use of CSIRO’s technology is not limited 
to a minor component of the technology. Th e ‘069 patent is the 
core technology embodied in the IEEE’s 802.11a and 802.11g 
standards”
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12. Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp. 
Parties Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.
Citation No. 05–0759, 2007 WL 2682001 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2007)
Patent(s) 5,766,191
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation catheter system
(Continuation)
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61M 1/00 (20060101); A61B 017/22
Claims 7 claims
2 independent
Patent(s) 6,824,551
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation catheter system
(Continuation)
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61M 1/00 (20060101); A61B 017/22
Claims 39 claims
3 independent
Patent(s)  7,108,704
Percutaneous mechanical fragmentation catheter system
(Continuation)
Current International Class A61B 17/22 (20060101); A61B 6/00 (20060101)
Claims 52 claims
2 independent
Infringing Technology ProLumen device
Arguments of the court
Irreparable harm 
Direct and only competitor. 
Incentives to infringe “If the plaintiff s do not obtain injunctive relief, others may be 
encouraged to infringe their patents and risk litigation, thus 
devaluating the plaintiff ’s property…as the “principal value of 
a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the 
patent grant weighs against holding that monetary damages 
will always suffi  ce to make the patentee whole”…
Plaintiff ’s manufacturing 
capacity
Plaintiff s have suffi  cient manufacturing capacity to meet the 
demand currently met by Datascope.
13. Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp. 
Parties Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.
Citation (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2007)
Patent(s)
Th e patents (specifi cation shared) provide 
a server for enhanced name translation, 
which can be used but is not limited to 
implement an internet telephone. Th e 
invention is “particularly advantageous 
for processing of voice telephone 
communications through the internet”. 
6,282,574,
Method, server and telecommunications system for 
name translation on a conditional basis and/or to a 
telephone number
Continuation
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Current International Class H04Q 3/00 (20060101); H04L 12/64 (20060101); 
H04L 29/12 (20060101); H04L 29/06 (20060101); 
H04M 15/00 (20060101); H04M 7/00 (20060101); 
H04M 3/493 (20060101); H04M 3/487 (20060101); 
G06F 015/16 
Claims 30 claims
9 independent
Patent(s) 6,104,711
Enhanced internet domain name server
Current International Class H04L 12/64 (20060101); H04L 29/06 (20060101); 
H04M 7/00 (20060101); H04M 15/00 (20060101); 
H04L 29/12 (20060101); H04Q 3/00 (20060101); 
H04M 3/493 (20060101); H04M 3/487 (20060101); 
H04L 012/64
Claims 37 claims
7 independent
Patent(s) 6,359,880
Public wireless/cordless internet gateway
Divisional application
Current International Class H04Q 7/26 (20060101); H04M 7/00 (20060101); 
H04Q 7/38 (20060101); H04L 012/66 
Claims 14 claims
3 independent
Infringing Technology Telephone service using the Voice over IP (VoIP) 
technology 
Arguments of the court
Stays and inventing around
One factor that is relevant to the balance of the 
hardships required by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in eBay was not considered by the district court, 
namely whether the district [court should have 
allowed time for Vonage to implement a workaround 
that would avoid continued infringement of the ‘574 
and ‘711 patents before issuing its injunction. 
Verizon had a cognizable interest in obtaining an 
injunction to put an end to infringement of its 
patents; it did not have a cognizable interest in 
putting Vonage out of business. However, as Verizon 
points out, Vonage made no request for a workaround 
period to the district court, and Vonage has already 
had several months since the district court’s 
judgment to implement a workaround”
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DENIED INJUNCTIONS
14. Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd.
Parties Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd.
Citation No. 02–73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007)
Patent(s) 5026109 on a Segmented cover system
Current International Class B60J 7/02 (20060101);
B60J 7/06 (20060101);
B60D 025/06 
Claims  18 claims
3 independent
Infringing Technology Quick Draw system
First instance Injunction denied 
“Not only did Sundance delay in fi ling suit and seeking 
injunctive relief, the market for tarp systems contains many 
other competitors and non-segmented cover systems have a 
larger percentage over segmented systems. Moreover, as 
DeMonte points out, [*8] the segmented cover is but one 
feature of its Quick Draw system. Th us, it cannot be said that 
Sundance’s licensees are losing sales to DeMonte expressly 
because of its infringement of the segmented cover. It is 
possible that lost sales are due to a desire for other features of 
the Quick Draw system or are sales lost to other competitors 
in the marketplace. Sundance simply cannot tie alleged lost 
sales to the nature of DeMonte’s infringement”
Willingness to license “Indeed, Sundance licenses the ‘109 patent to others, and 
off ered to license it to DeMonte prior to fi ling suit against it, 
thus demonstrating that money damages are adequate. Th eir 
conduct against DeMonte and others (Aero) indicates an 
interest only in obtaining money damages against accused 
infringers”
Interest of customers and 
employees
“due to the fact that a injunction would harm third parties 
(DeMonte’s employees and customers) and given the nature of 
the marketplace, this factor does not weigh in Sundance’s 
favor”
Appeal Injunction granted (No. 02–73543, 2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 19, 2007))
15. z4 Techs. v. Microsoft  Corp. 
Parties z4 Techs. v. Microsoft  Corp.
Citation 434 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2006)
Patent(s) Patents 6,044,471
Method and apparatus for securing soft ware to reduce 
unauthorized use
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Current International Class G06F 1/00 (20060101);
G06F 21/00 (20060101);
H04L 009/32
Claims  45 claims of which 26 independent
6,785,825, Method for securing soft ware to decrease soft ware 
piracy
176 claims
48 independent
Average Claims 111/48
Irreparable harm Any harm from future infringement could be compensated 
through a reasonable royalty. While z4 had argued that 
monetary damages for future infringement were not an 
adequate remedy because they could not compensate z4 for 
the loss of “its right to exclude Microsoft ”, the Court deemed 
z4’s argument as implying “that a violation of the right to 
exclude under the patent act can never be remedied through 
money”. On the contrary, the eBay rule established that the 
right to exclude alone is not suffi  cient to support a fi nding of 
injunctive relief and cannot lead to conclude that remedies 
other than an injunction cannot adequately compensate a 
patent holder. 
Monetary damages are not 
adequate
“when an infringer saturates the market for a patented 
invention with an infringing product or damages the patent 
holder’s good will or brand name recognition by selling 
infringing product or damages”.
Balance of hardships “the potential hardships Microsoft  could suff er if the 
injunction were granted outweigh any limited and reparable 
hardships that z4 would suff er in the absence of an injunction” 
because the patent covered a very small component of the 
soft ware products that infringe upon this patent.“Although it 
is impossible to determine the actual events that would follow 
the deactivation of Microsoft ’s product activation serves, it is 
likely that the market would see an increase in pirate versions 
of the soft ware”. 
16. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Parties Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Citation Paice LL.C, v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al. CV-211-DF., 16, 
August 2006. 
Patent(s) Patent 5,343,970 on a Hybrid electric vehicle
Current International Class B60L 11/12 (20060101);
B60K 6/04 (20060101);
B60K 6/00 (20060101);
B60L 11/02 (20060101);
B60K 23/04 (20060101);
B60T 1/00 (20060101);
B60T 1/10 (20060101);
B60K 006/04
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Claims 40 claims of which 5 independent
Patent 6,209,672
Current International Class B60K 6/00 (20060101); B60K 6/04 (20060101); B60K 006/04
Claims 33 claims of which 7 independent
Patent (s) 6,554,088, a continuation in part of the ’672 patent. 
Current International Class B60K 6/04 (20060101); B60K 6/00 (20060101); B60L 15/20 
(20060101); B60H 1/32 (20060101); F02B 37/18 (20060101); 
F02B 37/00 (20060101); F02B 37/12 (20060101); F02B 37/16 
(20060101); F01N 3/20 (20060101); F02D 41/00 (20060101); 
F02M 35/10 (20060101); B60K 006/04 (); B60L 011/02 
Claims 9 claims of which 1 independent
Infringing technology hybrid transmission system of cars 
First instance
Irreparable harm
Probability to license
the court considered that licensing eff orts can also be aided by 
monetary relief plus fi ndings on validity and infringement of 
its patents. What most likely would be aff ected is the 
bargaining position of the plaintiff .
First instance
Small component 
Patent concerns a small component of the fi nal product. Since 
the vehicles were introduced to the market during the 2006 
model year, “enjoining their sales will likely interrupt not only 
defendant’s business but that of related businesses, such as 
dealers and suppliers. Th e burgeoning hybrid market could 
also be stifl ed as the research and expense of bringing its 
product line to market would be frustrated.”
Appeal
Ongoing royalties and voluntary 
v. compulsory licenses
“We use the term ongoing royalty to distinguish this equitable 
remedy from a compulsory license. Th e term “compulsory 
license” implies that anyone who meets certain criteria has 
congressional authority to use that which is licensed. See, e.g., 
17 U.S.C. §115 (“When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical 
work have been distributed… under the authority of the 
copyright owner, any other person… may, by complying with 
the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to 
make and distribute phonorecords of the work.” (emphasis 
added)). By contrast, the ongoing-royalty order at issue here is 
limited to one particular set of defendants; there is no implied 
authority in the court’s order for any other auto manufacturer 
to follow in Toyota’s footsteps and use the patented invention 
with the court’s imprimatur” (footnote 13)
“Perhaps the most apparent restriction imposed by §283 is that 
injunctions granted thereunder must “prevent the violation of 
any right secured by patent.” We have previously held that this 
statutory language limits the scope of activities that may be 
enjoined. See, e.g., Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 777 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (holding that noninfringing acts may not be 
enjoined). Th e more diffi  cult question raised by this case, 
however, is whether an order permitting use of a patented 
invention in exchange for a royalty is properly characterized as 
preventing the violation of the rights secured by the patent 
(…)”
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“Under some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for 
patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate. 
In Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey–Owens Ford Co., 758 
F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985), this court upheld a 5% court-
ordered royalty, based on sales, “for continuing operations.” 
Although the parties in that case contested the amount of the 
royalty, styled a “compulsory license” by the court, there was no 
dispute as to the district court’s authority to craft  such a remedy. 
See id. In the context of an antitrust violation, “mandatory sales 
and reasonable-royalty licensing” of relevant patents are “well-
established forms of relief when necessary to an eff ective 
remedy, particularly where patents have provided the leverage 
for or have contributed to the antitrust violation adjudicated.” 
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973)”
“But awarding an ongoing royalty where “necessary” to 
eff ectuate a remedy, be it for antitrust violations or patent 
infringement, does not justify the provision of such relief as a 
matter of course whenever a permanent injunction is not 
imposed. In most cases, where the district court determines 
that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district 
court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license 
amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented 
invention before imposing an ongoing royalty. Should the 
parties fail to come to an agreement, the district court could 
step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing 
infringement (…) In this case, the district court, aft er applying 
the four-factor test for a permanent injunction and declining to 
issue one, imposed an ongoing royalty sua sponte upon the 
parties. Th us, this court is unable to determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion in setting the ongoing royalty 
rate. Accordingly, we think it prudent to remand the case for 
the limited purpose of having the district court reevaluate the 
ongoing royalty rate. 
District Court on remand, 609 
F. Supp. 2d 620; 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32723
“the Court has given the parties full and fair opportunity to 
set their own ongoing royalty rate. Having failed to come to 
an agreement, the Court fi nds, based on the evidence 
submitted at the evidentiary hearing, that signifi cant changes 
in the legal relationship between the parties as well as other 
economic factors justify the imposition of a diff erent royalty 
rate to compensate Paice for Toyota’s continued, voluntary, 
and willful infringement.
17. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc. 
Parties Praxair, Inc, and Praxair Technology Inc, v. ATMI, Inc. and 
Advanced Technology Materials, Inc. 
Citation Civ. No. 03–1158-SLR (D.C. Delaware, Mar 27, 2007)
Patent(s) 6007609 on a Pressurized container with restrictor tube 
having multiple capillary passages
Current International Class F17C 7/00 (20060101); F17C 7/04 (20060101); F17C 
13/04 (20060101); B01D 053/04 
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Claims Claims
19 of which 2 independent
Patent (s) 6045115 on a Fail-safe delivery arrangement for pressurized 
containers
Current International Class F17C 7/00 (20060101); F17C 7/04 (20060101); F16K 
1/00 (20060101); F16K 1/30 (20060101); F17C 13/04 (20060101); 
F16K 031/365 
Claims 20 claims of which 3 independent
Irreparable harm Th e court based the denial of injunctive relief on Praxair 
failure to meet the burden of proof:
“Praxair has not provided or described any specifi c sales or 
market data to assist the court, nor has it identifi ed precisely 
what market share, revenues, and customers Praxair has lost 
to ATMI”.
Praxair failed to prove why it would have diffi  culties 
calculating damages going forward and how money damages 
could not adequately compensate for “lost market share” or 
any “lost research opportunities”.
Monetary damages are not 
adequate
Although Praxair stated “that it spends $75 million per year in 
R&D and that denying protection to its rights to exclude 
through injunctions it would have “no incentive to innovate” 
and its patents “would be eff ectively meaningless” the court 
however added that “Praxair does not explain why money 
damages could not suffi  ce to compensate for any lost 
opportunities to conduct research due to budgetary 
constraints”
Further developments Both patents were later declared unenforceable for inequitable 
conduct (Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 387, 397 
(D. Del. 2007)). 
Appeal Th e CAFC partially reversed decision on unenforceability and 
inequitable conduct. Since parties came to a settlement where 
Praxair will not seek an injunction against ATMI, the CAFC 
did not touch upon the issue. 
Dissenting opinion on the 
Appeal
Dissenting opinion of Judge Lourie
“…Th e Supreme Court, in eBay, did not rule out entitlement to 
a permanent injunction when one competitor in a two-party 
market has been found to infringe a patent of another 
competitor. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394, 
126 S. Ct. 1837, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006) (“[W]e take no 
position on whether permanent injunctive relief should or 
should not issue in this particular case, or indeed in any 
number of other disputes arising under the Patent Act.”). It 
held only that the traditional four-factor test should be 
applied. Id. Th e district court here seemed to be impressed 
with the fact that both companies were large companies with 
substantial revenues, and that the infringing materials 
constituted a small portion of those revenues, implying that 
the patentee would not be suffi  ciently harmed by the denial of 
the injunction (…) However, it is important to recognize that 
a patent provides a right to exclude infringing competitors,
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regardless of the proportion that the infringing goods bear to 
a patentee’s total business. Th erefore, provided the four-factor 
test has been met, a patentee should be able to exclude 
competitors who sell only a small amount of an infringing 
product or competitors whose sales of an infringing product 
constitute only a small portion of its sales or of the patentee’s 
sales. Otherwise, the patent right becomes devalued”
18. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc.
Parties eBay Inc and Half.com v. MercExchange LLC.
Citation WL 2172587, No. 01–736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2007)
Patent(s) Patent 5845265 on consignment nodes
Current International Class G06Q 30/00 (20060101); G06Q 20/00 (20060101); G06F 017/60 
Claims  29 claims of which 5 independent 
Patents 6202051 on Facilitating internet commerce through internet 
worked auctions
Current International Class G06Q 20/00 (20060101); G06Q 30/00 (20060101); G06F 017/60
Average Claims 52 claims of which 8 independent
Balance of hardships the court considered fi rstly that potential hardships for 
MercExchange were likely to be low because the company was 
willing to license its patents and was not competing with eBay. 
It also ascertained that the harm of a dubious patent (still the 
process before the U.S.P.T.O. is ongoing) would impose on the 
defendant was important. Nevertheless, the court recognized 
that the third prong did not clearly favor any party because of 
the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the patent, 
whether they had been designed around and whether the 
plaintiff  could, in association with other companies, start 
competing with eBay as well:
“With the future so speculative in this continually-developing, 
complex scenario, the court cannot confi dently determine in 
which party’s favor the balance of hardships tips”.
Public interest “…both common sense and caselaw suggest that “the public-
interest factor oft en favors the patentee, given the public’s 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the patent system.” 
Odetics, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 795; see TiVo, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 670 
(“Th e public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent 
system.”). Were the protection of a strong patent system the 
only relevant consideration, there would not be reason to go 
through the four-factor test or at least to consider the public 
interest. On the contrary, the district court highlighted 
“integrity of the patent system will always be a consideration 
in the public interest analysis” courts should also consider 
other relevant factors as “the type of patent involved, the 
impact on the market, the impact on the patent system, and 
any other factor that may impact the public at large”. In this 
case, aft er reviewing these facts, the court concluded against 
the entry of an injunction.
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Further developments Ongoing PTO reexamination procedures
Both patents are continuations of previous applications 
19. Innogenetics, N.V. vs. Abbott Laboratories
Parties Innogenetics N.V. vs. Abbott Laboratories
Citation Innogenetics, N.V., v. Abbott Laboratories, 05-C-0575-C, 
January 3rd, 2007
Patent(s) 5846704 on a “process for typing of HCV isolates”
Current International Class C12Q 1/70 (20060101); C12Q 1/68 (20060101); C12Q 001/70 (); 
C12Q 001/68 (); C12Q 019/34 
Claims 13 claims of which 1 independent
Irreparable Harm Th e district considered the fact that Innogenetics manufactures 
but does not commercialize the tests, which is done by Bayer. 
However it concluded that its reputation and market share 
were at stake. Th e court considered it improper that a 
plaintiff ’s willingness to license its patents as suffi  cient to 
establish that the patent holder would not suff er irreparable 
harm if an injunction did not issue.
“It would denigrate the value of plaintiff ’s patent rights to 
allow defendant to continue to sell plaintiff ’s invention as its 
own in exchange for the same fee it would have paid without 
a lawsuit”. (emphasis added). 
Public Interest Public interest the court found that plaintiff  had
“Ample capacity to supply HCV diagnostic products, that 
plaintiff ’s manufacturing process complies with Good 
manufacturing Practices and that its products comply with 
FDA labeling requirements”.
“Plaintiff  proff ered evidence that even if it were unable to 
manufacture the diagnostic product for a short period of time, 
the risk to public health would be non-existent, for two 
reasons. First, other diagnostic techniques exist and would 
suffi  ce, even if they are not as eff ective as the patented 
technique. Second, Hepatitis C is a chronic disease that does 
not require instant genotyping. A delay in obtaining a test 
would not have any perceptible adverse eff ect on a person 
suff ering from the disease”. However, the court denied 
enhanced damages because “defendant’s infringement was not 
willful.
Appeal On appeal the court reversed fi nding abuse of discretion, 
denying the permanent injunction and granting a compulsory 
license, holding that a reasonable royalty at a high level that 
includes an entry fee can substitute the injunction. 
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20. Amado v. Microsoft 
Parties Carlos Amado vs. Microsoft  Corporation
Citation WL 2172587, No. 01–736 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2007)
Patent(s) Patent: 5293615 on a Point and shoot interface for linking 
database records to spreadsheets whereby data of a record is 
automatically reformatted and loaded upon issuance of a 
recalculation command
Current International Class
Claims 21 claims of which 2 independent
Infringement “Th e jury found that Access 95 and Excel 95, and Offi  ce 
Professional 95, which includes Access 95 and Excel 95, and 
all subsequent forms of those products infringe claim 21 of the 
‘615 patent both literally and under the doctrine of 
equivalents”
Inventing around  “Microsoft  continues to sell versions 2002 (XP) and 2003 of 
Offi  ce Professional and Access, which the jury found infringed 
Amado’s ‘615 patent. However, during the pendency of its 
appeal, Microsoft  designed, implemented, and released a 
soft ware fi x to remove the infringing functionality from its 
products”
Small component “Moreover, Amado’s patent only covers a very small 
component of the infringing products – claim 21, the only 
claim that the jury found Microsoft  Offi  ce and Access 
infringed, covers a single feature linking Access and Excel. See 
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“When the 
patented invention is but a small component of the product 
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction 
is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal 
damages may well be suffi  cient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest”). Th us, Amado’s injury can be adequately 
compensated through monetary damages”
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GENERAL ARGUMENTS USED IN POSTEBAY CASES
Table 16. Injunctions and incentives to innovate
Cases analyzing the infl uence of permanent 
injunctions on incentives to innovate
Sanofi  v. Apotex
CSIRO v. Buff alo
Table 17. Cases analyzing the “Small-Component” Patent argument856
Case Injunction Arguments of the court
Amado v. Microsoft Denied See above summary
Paice LLC v. Toyota 
Motor Corp.
Denied See above summary
z4 Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft  Corp.,
Denied See above summary
Commonwealth Sci. & 
Indus. Research 
Organisation v. Buff alo 
Tech. Inc.
Granted “Th e right to exclude becomes more urgent when 
the product is the invention. Th is case is not the 
situation that concerned Justice Kennedy; 
Buff alo’s infringing use of CSIRO’s technology is 
not limited to a minor component of the 
technology. Th e ‘069 patent is the core technology 
embodied in the IEEE’s 802.11a and 802.11g 
standards. Buff alo’s products are designed to 
provide the wireless functionality of the IEEE’s 
802.11 and 802.11 g standards. Since Buff alo’s 
infringement relates to the essence of the 
technology and is not a “small component” of 
Buff alo’s infringing products, monetary damages 
are less adequate in compensating CSIRO for 
Buff alo’s future infringement”. 
Trading Tech Int’ Inc 
v. eSpeed Inc
In this case that “TT off ered testimony that the 
features of MD_Trader that make it patent able 
over prior art are not simply small components 
of a larger package, but are the central features 
that make MD_Trader the popular soft ware 
program that it is. Th e balance of hardships 
weighs in favor of an injunction”
Broadcomm v. 
Qualcomm; MPT v. 
Marathon Levels
Granted Th e PTT service is a cutting edge service. Th e 
availability of such a service is highly desired by 
consumers and of benefi t to them. QChat has 
technological advantages over other services, 
including scalability, reduced [*15] call setup 
latency, and increased reliability. It is not a “small 
component” in the analysis for injunctive relief” 
856 Methodology: a Lexis search of cases citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. Federal and 
State Cases retrieved 210 cases and further focus through the term “small component” 
narrowed the search to 8 cases.
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Table 18. Cases analyzing compulsory licenses 
Case Injunction Arguments of the court
Commonwealth Sci. & 
Indus. Research 
Organisation v. Buff alo 
Tech. Inc.
Granted “A compulsory license will not adequately 
compensate CSIRO for Buff alo’s continued 
intentional infringement. Th e royalty payment 
would be extrapolated from a determination of 
Buff alo’s past sales, which may not adequately 
refl ect the worth of the patent today to Buff alo. 
Further, such a royalty payment does not 
necessarily include other non-monetary license 
terms that are as important as monetary terms to 
a licensor such as CSIRO”
Paice V. Toyota Denied Circuit Judge Rader, concurring
“…calling a compulsory license an “ongoing 
royalty” does not make it any less a compulsory 
license. To avoid many of the disruptive 
implications of a royalty imposed as an 
alternative to the preferred remedy of exclusion, 
the trial court’s discretion should not reach so far 
as to deny the parties a formal opportunity to set 
the terms of a royalty on their own. With such an 
opportunity in place, an ongoing royalty would 
be an ongoing royalty, not a compulsory license”.
“In this case, because the court imposed an 
ongoing royalty on the parties sua sponte aft er 
denying injunctive relief, the parties had no 
meaningful chance to present evidence to the 
district court on an appropriate royalty rate to 
compensate Paice for Toyota’s future acts of 
infringement. Evidence and argument on royalty 
rates were, of course, presented during the course 
of the trial, for the purposes of assessing damages 
for Toyota’s past infringement. But pre-suit and 
post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, 
and may warrant diff erent royalty rates given the 
change in the parties’ legal relationship and other 
factors. When given choices between taking 
additional evidence or not, and between 
remanding to the parties or not, a district court 
may prefer the simplest course – impose its own 
compulsory license. Th is simplest course, 
however, aff ords the parties the least chance to 
inform the court of potential changes in the 
market or other circumstances that might aff ect 
the royalty rate reaching into the future.
In most cases, the patentee and the infringer 
should receive an opportunity at least to set 
license terms that will apply to post-suit use of 
the patented invention. Th is general principle has 
deep roots in both law and policy. Projecting the
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costs to be incurred for what would otherwise be 
future acts of infringement is necessarily a 
speculative exercise, even for the most stable 
markets and technologies. As licenses are driven 
largely by business objectives, the parties to a 
license are better situated than the courts to 
arrive at fair and effi  cient terms. Aft er all, it is the 
parties, rather than the court, that will be bound 
by the terms of the royalty. Particularly in the 
case of the patentee, who has proven infringement 
of its property right, an opportunity to negotiate 
its own ongoing royalty is a minimal protection 
for its rights extending for the remainder of the 
patent term.
Amado v. Microsoft Denied “Although these cases show a general disfavor for 
compulsory licenses, they do not establish a 
categorical rule, barring any type of compulsory 
license. In fact, contrary to Amado’s assertion, 
this Court has the authority to issue a 
“compulsory” license by staying an injunction 
pending appeal, as recognized by the Federal 
Circuit (…)”
“Th us, even if the stay, in eff ect, results in a 
compulsory license, there is no prohibition 
against allowing such a “compulsory license” 
pending appeal when, as in the instant case, the 
Court determines that such a stay is appropriate 
aft er evaluating the four factors (…) In addition, 
the Supreme Court recently held that not all 
patentees are entitled to an injunction against 
post-trial infringement. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. 
District courts applying eBay and following the 
guidance of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence have 
awarded monetary damage for future 
infringement based on the jury’s reasonable 
royalty calculation. See, e.g. z4 Techs., Inc., 434 
F. Supp. 2d at 442”
Table 19. Burden of proof to show irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies
Case Burden of proof Injunction 
Praxair vs. ATMI Highest:
– “Praxair has not provided or described any specifi c 
sales or market data to assist the court, nor has it 
identifi ed precisely what market share, revenues, and 
customers Praxair has lost to ATMI”.
– “Praxair does not explain why money damages 
could not suffi  ce to compensate for any lost 
opportunities to conduct research due to budgetary 
constraints”
Denied
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Case Burden of proof Injunction 
Novozymes “evidence demonstrated that plaintiff  originally 
secured an 80% market share with its patented 
product, which fell to approximately 50% aft er 
infringing competitor’s market entry”.
Granted
Transocean vs. 
Globalsantafe
the court accorded a permanent injunction where the 
customer base is small and the defendant has not only 
used the infringing technology to compete for the 
same customers and contracts as plaintiff  but also to 
win contracts over competing bids from plaintiff .
TiVo v. EchoStar plaintiff  was “a relatively new company with only one 
primary product” and the parties agreed that 
customers tend to remain loyal to the company from 
which they obtained their fi rst DVR recorder, 
“shaping the market to plaintiff ’s disadvantage and 
resulting in long-term customer loss”).
Granted
Table 20. Cases subjected to appeal
Sundance Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 2007 
WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007)
Injunction granted
MPT Inc. v. Marathon Labels Inc., 2007 WL 
4351745 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 2007) 
Injunction reversed as overly broad
Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 
503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2007) 
Injunction not an abuse of discretion
Amado v. Microsoft  Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 26, 2008) 
Dissolution of injunction not an abuse of 
discretion
Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 
2008 WL 834402 (Fed. Cir. March 31, 2008) 
Injunction affi  rmed without comment
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SAMENVATTING 
VAN HET PROEFSCHRIFT
In dit proefschrift  wordt het gebruik van aansprakelijkheidsregels (“liability 
rules”) voor de bescherming van octrooiaanspraken bestudeerd, waarbij de 
aandacht vooral uitgaat naar een specifi eke soort regel, die ex post wordt 
genoemd omdat zij ex post door een gerecht of instelling wordt toegepast en 
ontworpen. Het onderzoek gaat uit van de vooronderstelling dat octrooien in de 
rechtseconomische wetenschap weliswaar worden gedefi nieerd als exclusieve 
rechten, maar dat er in bepaalde omstandigheden zowel economische als andere 
dwingende redenen zijn om de exclusiviteit van octrooirechten om te zetten in 
een recht op schadevergoeding. In feite bieden verscheidene in octrooiwetten en 
jurisprudentie vastgelegde rechtsbeginselen in verschillende jurisdicties de 
mogelijkheid in bepaalde omstandigheden over te schakelen van een 
eigendomsregel (“property rule”) op een aansprakelijkheidsregel.
Ondanks de exponentiële groei van de rechtseconomische literatuur over 
octrooien, werpt de opkomst van nieuwe technologieën en ondernemingsprak-
tijken voortdurend belangrijke nieuwe vragen op voor wetenschappers en be-
leidsmakers. Dezelfde uitdagingen doen zich voor bij de keuze tussen eigen-
doms- en aansprakelijkheidsregels voor de bescherming van octrooiaanspraken 
en vooral bij het creëren van een goed ontwerp van aansprakelijkheidsregels. 
Aansprakelijkheidsregels worden in het octrooirecht gebruikt zowel op het 
niveau van het materiële recht, in de vorm van dwanglicentiebepalingen, als op 
het niveau van het executierecht, d.w.z. via de selectieve weigering van kort 
gedingen en de vervanging daarvan door schadevergoedingen. Niettemin wer-
ken de meeste juristen en economen met een enge opvatting van octrooiaanspra-
kelijkheidsregels.
Er is een begin gemaakt met het dichten van deze kloof, in eerste instantie 
door de inzichten van wetenschappelijk werk en meer recentelijk door de discus-
sies naar aanleiding van een uitspraak van de Supreme Court in de VS in de zaak 
eBay versus MerExchange. Uit deze zaken blijkt een toenemende invloed en fre-
quentie van strategisch octrooigedrag, die zouden kunnen nopen tot het toepas-
sen van aansprakelijkheidsregels. De zaken werden opgelost door gerechten in 
de VS, een land dat van oudsher weigert dwanglicentiebepalingen op te nemen 
als oplossing voor het mogelijk vastlopen van onderhandelingen, en een land met 
een weifelende houding ten aanzien van het bestraff en van misbruik van octrooi-
rechten. Hoewel deze discussie in Europa niet dezelfde impact heeft  gehad, krijgt 
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de kwestie steeds meer aandacht in het kader van een mogelijke afname van de 
kwaliteit van octrooien, een toename van het aantal rechtszaken en praktijken 
van strategisch gedrag, en verdere plannen om de procesvoering en het materiële 
Europese octrooilandschap te harmoniseren.
In een meer algemeen perspectief weerspiegelt dit debat de zorg over de mid-
delen die worden ingezet om octrooien te beschermen en over het raakvlak tus-
sen octrooirechten en rechtsmiddelen. Vandaar dat veel wetenschappelijke dis-
cussies zich geconcentreerd hebben op de vraag of octrooirechten al dan niet 
eigendomsrechten zijn, en of de rechtsmiddelen al dan niet de aard van het 
onderliggende recht moeten volgen. Daar waar octrooirechten worden 
beschouwd als een recht tot uitsluiting, hebben het misbruik van het materiële 
en het executierecht inzake octrooien en de starre interpretatie van eigendoms-
regels tot een groot aantal nadelen geleid.
De controverse die is ontstaan na de zaak eBay heeft  de mogelijkheid aange-
toond dat niet-praktiserende octrooi-eigenaren en –houders die een minimale 
bijdrage leveren aan een uit meer componenten bestaand product geneigd zou-
den kunnen zijn strategisch gebruik te maken van rechtszaken en de dreiging 
om deze producten te verbieden, om zo fi nanciële regelingen los te krijgen die 
niet in verhouding staan tot de technische en economische bijdrage van hun 
octrooien. Strategische praktijken zouden ook gevoed kunnen worden door 
nieuwe paradigma’s op het gebied van innovatie en technologieën, bijvoorbeeld 
het afnemende belang van octrooien voor één vercommercialiseerd product ten 
opzichte van octrooien voor kleine componenten van complexe producten, als-
mede de ontwikkeling van de economische functie van octrooien van een instru-
ment voor het belonen van innovatie tot een defensief en off ensief bedrijfsinstru-
ment. Van belang is dat juridische regels en rechterlijke uitspraken die niet 
overeenstemmen met dergelijke innovatieparadigma’s of met de onderliggende 
functie van octrooien een verdere aanzet kunnen geven tot strategisch gedrag.
In dit proefschrift  wordt geanalyseerd of en onder welke voorwaarden het 
recht van de octrooihouder tot uitsluiting moet worden omgezet in een recht op 
schadeloosstelling (bijv. een aansprakelijkheidsregel). De vraag wordt benaderd 
vanuit een juridisch en economisch perspectief door de effi  ciencyeff ecten te ver-
gelijken van het gebruik van eigendomsregels enerzijds en aansprakelijkheidsre-
gels anderzijds voor de bescherming van octrooirechten in het licht van het hier-
boven beschreven kader, zowel op internationaal als op nationaal niveau. De 
conclusies wijzen erop dat een coherent octrooisysteem gebruik kan maken van 
eigendomsregels in algemene octrooizaken en daarbij genoeg ruimte kan laten 
aan uitzonderingen en beperkte aansprakelijkheidsregels, die vanuit juridisch, 
historisch en economisch perspectief verdedigbaar zijn.
In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift  wordt getracht een meer alge-
meen kader voor aansprakelijkheidsregels in het octrooirecht te bieden. Daartoe 
zijn de inzichten die in de literatuur over het gebruik van traditionele dwangli-
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centies zijn ontwikkeld, samengebracht met de meest recente literatuur over een 
octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregel gebaseerd op de “law of remedies” van landen 
waar het gewoonterecht geldt. De effi  ciencyresultaten van zowel eigendoms- als 
aansprakelijkheidsregels worden geanalyseerd vanuit een tweeledig perspectief: 
materieel en op basis van de rechtsmiddelen. Verder wordt in dit hoofdstuk een 
vergelijking gemaakt tussen verschillende soorten aansprakelijkheidsregels 
waaraan een vergelijkbaar principe ten grondslag ligt, en worden zij onderschei-
den van systemen die hun rechtvaardiging vinden in andere beleidsdoelstellin-
gen, zoals het publieke belang. Ten derde wordt het theoretische kader van eigen-
doms- en aansprakelijkheidsregels bezien in het licht van het moderne 
octrooilandschap. Daarbij wordt bijzondere aandacht besteed aan de impact van 
rechtsmiddelen in de huidige discussies over het vermeende onvermogen van 
octrooisystemen om effi  ciënte prikkels te bieden binnen een veranderend tech-
nologisch en economisch landschap.
Het tweede hoofdstuk geeft  een historisch overzicht van het gebruik van 
octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels. In dit hoofdstuk komt het ontstaan van het 
octrooirecht en dwanglicentiebepalingen aan de orde, met name in de context 
van internationale octrooiharmonisatie en het onderhandelingsproces vóór en 
na de TRIPS-overeenkomst, vanuit het perspectief van het debat over de eigen-
doms- en aansprakelijkheidsregels. Aan de hand van de uitgebreide defi nitie van 
octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels in het eerste hoofdstuk, worden de handha-
vingsregels in de TRIPS-overeenkomst besproken met een bijzondere nadruk op 
het uitvaardigen van rechterlijke bevelen en de mogelijkheid om die bevelen te 
vervangen door schadevergoedingen. Verder worden in dit hoofdstuk de debat-
ten geanalyseerd die volgden op de implementatie van de TRIPS-overeenkomst, 
zowel wat betreft  dwanglicentiebepalingen als octrooirechtsmiddelen. Ten derde 
wordt een korte samenvatting gegeven van de octrooiharmonisatie in Europa en 
de implementatie van de Handhavingsrichtlijn voor zover die betrekking heeft  
op het debat over eigendoms- en aansprakelijkheidsregels. Ten slotte wordt een 
kort overzicht gegeven van de verschillende historische en juridische benaderin-
gen van de behandeling van rechterlijke bevelen en schadevergoedingen in lan-
den waar het Romeinse recht of het gewoonterecht geldt.
Dit historische overzicht is van belang om inzicht te verwerven in enerzijds 
de oorsprong van aansprakelijkheidsregels als een beleidsontwerpinstrument 
waarmee de doelen van het octrooirecht in evenwicht kunnen worden gebracht 
met de bescherming van mededinging en het vermijden van strategisch gedrag, 
en anderzijds de evolutie en implementatie van verschillende soorten octrooi-
aansprakelijkheidsregels. De geschiedenis is daarnaast essentieel om inzicht te 
verwerven in de juridische verschillen en overeenkomsten in het gebruik van 
rechtsmiddelen in het algemeen en hun bijzondere ontwikkeling in het octrooi-
recht, zowel in landen met Romeins recht als in de gewoonterechtlanden, waar-
van in hoofdstuk drie een verdere analyse volgt. De geschiedenis toont aan dat 
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de buigzaamheid van het octrooirecht door de tijd heen wisselend is geweest en 
dat verschillende soorten aansprakelijkheidsregels sinds de eerste internationale 
harmonisatieprocessen in de meeste rechtsgebieden in hoge mate aanwezig zijn 
geweest.
Hoofdstuk drie levert een bijdrage aan het debat over eigendoms- en aan-
sprakelijkheidsregels in het octrooirecht door bestudering van het gebruik van 
ex post aansprakelijkheidsregels die worden toegepast door gerechten in drie 
specifi eke landen: de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Italië. Dit 
hoofdstuk bevat een vergelijkende rechtseconomische analyse van algemene 
bepalingen, alsmede octrooibepalingen en jurisprudentie inzake de overschake-
ling van een eigendoms- op een ex post aansprakelijkheidsregel. Het concept van 
ex post aansprakelijkheidsregels wordt gehanteerd om het feit te benadrukken 
dat alle onderzochte regels, of zij nu uit wettelijke bepalingen of uit de jurispru-
dentie stammen, door rechters worden toegepast en per zaak worden gehanteerd, 
en daarmee veel meer lijken op het soort aansprakelijkheidsregels dat gebruikt 
wordt in de literatuur over aanspraken (te beginnen met het werk van Calabresi 
en Melamed), dan bijvoorbeeld ex ante dwanglicenties. Bovendien ligt de recht-
vaardiging van die regels vaak meer in de noodzaak strategisch gedrag en het 
vastlopen van onderhandelingen te voorkomen dan in de impact van bijvoor-
beeld hoge onderzoekskosten en andere redenen die het gebruik van ex ante aan-
sprakelijkheidsregels op het gebied van de intellectuele eigendom vereisen.
In dit hoofdstuk worden drie specifi eke zaken onderzocht. Allereerst de 
dwanglicentiebepalingen voor een octrooi dat niet uitgeoefend is; ten tweede 
dwanglicentiebepalingen voor een octrooi dat afh ankelijk is van het gebruik van 
een eerder geoctrooieerde uitvinding; en ten slotte de mogelijkheid dat rechters 
een schadevergoeding toekennen als vervanging voor een kort geding, wanneer 
dit rechtsmiddel wordt geweigerd in het kader van een octrooi-inbreukzaak. Het 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat de voorwaarden om te kiezen voor een aansprakelijk-
heidsregel, ondanks het TRIPS-kader en de overeenkomsten tussen deze zaken, 
in de verschillende nationale rechtsstelsels sterk uiteenlopen. In alle voornoemde 
gevallen mogen rechters echter kiezen voor bescherming van een octrooi door 
middel van een ex post aansprakelijkheidsregel en ze komen vergelijkbare obsta-
kels tegen bij de toepassing van een redenering per zaak en bij de berekening van 
de aan de octrooihouder verschuldigde schadevergoeding. Het hoofdstuk eindigt 
met de conclusie dat het merendeel van de juridische en economische bijdragen 
gericht is op de Amerikaanse wet en praktijk, in opmerkelijk contrast met het 
duidelijke belang van internationale Verdragen die het materiële en executierecht 
inzake octrooien regelen, alsmede de complicaties van sterk uiteenlopende regels 
in de verschillende landen.
In hoofdstuk vier wordt deze enge opvatting in de rechtseconomische litera-
tuur, die sterk gericht is op de ervaringen in de VS, verbreed. Zo worden in dit 
hoofdstuk de inzichten die zijn ontwikkeld door de rechtseconomische literatuur 
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toegepast op de specifi eke kenmerken van een selectie van octrooisystemen en 
het internationale octrooikader dat in het vorige hoofdstuk aan bod is gekomen. 
Eerst wordt het standaardmodel geanalyseerd dat door verschillende juristen en 
economen wordt gebruikt om “patent hold-ups” te bestuderen, en worden de 
belangrijkste aannames en resultaten van dit model bestudeerd. Vervolgens wor-
den deze aannames en resultaten naast de belangrijkste zaken gelegd die in het 
vorige hoofdstuk zijn beschreven, om de redenen voor het gebruik van ex post 
aansprakelijkheidsregels in termen van effi  ciency te beoordelen. Voorbeelden 
van dergelijke redenen zijn de meest recente discussies over patent hold-ups, en 
het ontstaan van “patent trolls” en van strategisch octrooigedrag in het algemeen. 
Hoewel het overgrote deel van de geanalyseerde jurisprudentie afk omstig is uit 
de VS, worden deze resultaten ook naast recente studies van het Europese 
octrooilandschap en een specifi ek onderzoek nafar de Europese farmaceutische 
sector gelegd. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een opsomming van de verschillende 
manieren waarop strategisch octrooigedrag zich kan voordoen en de behoeft e 
aan een fl exibel, d.w.z. ex post, gebruik van octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels voor 
sommige specifi eke gevallen.
In hoofdstuk vijf komt de kwestie aan de orde van het berekenen van de juiste 
schadevergoeding om een eigendomsregel te vervangen, een van de belangrijkste 
punten van kritiek op het gebruik van aansprakelijkheidsregels in het octrooi-
recht. Het hoofdstuk begint met een bespreking van de aanwezige drempels om 
die vergoeding te berekenen binnen verschillende contexten, zoals octrooi-
inbreuk en het gebruik van dwanglicenties. Dan worden de belangrijkste lessen 
bestudeerd die getrokken zijn uit de toepassing van het eBay-precedent in de VS 
met betrekking tot de berekening van een dergelijke vergoeding. Ten slotte wor-
den de verschillende beschikbare regels onderzocht en vergeleken in termen van 
kosten en baten, met specifi eke aandacht voor de administratiekosten en kosten 
van fouten die voortkomen uit het gebruik van aansprakelijkheidsregels en met 
inbegrip van de belangrijke kwestie van het bepalen van de schadevergoeding. 
Deze kosten worden vergeleken met de mogelijkheid en impact van strategisch 
gedrag.
In hoofdstuk zes worden ten slotte de belangrijkste bevindingen van het 
proefschrift  bestudeerd en interessante gebieden voor toekomstig onderzoek 
genoemd. Wat de algemene literatuur over aanspraken betreft , worden de inzich-
ten van die literatuur getoetst op het specifi eke terrein van octrooien, waarbij 
enkele misvattingen in de toepassing van deze algemene literatuur op de speci-
fi eke context worden verduidelijkt. De conclusies van dit onderzoek zijn ook 
relevant voor het debat over effi  ciency enerzijds en billijkheid anderzijds. In die 
zin toont dit proefschrift  aan hoe het gebruik van octrooiaansprakelijkheidsre-
gels zowel door het argument van effi  ciencybehoeft e als door de wens van billijk-
heid kan worden onderbouwd. Wat betreft  het debat over de vraag of octrooien 
en intellectuele eigendomsrechten als eigendom in de traditionele betekenis moe-
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ten worden beschouwd, heeft  dit onderzoek de gevaren aan het licht gebracht van 
een starre benadering die octrooirechten automatisch een bepaald soort bescher-
ming toekent. Niettemin is uit dit onderzoek ook gebleken dat er zowel een even-
wichtig als een onevenwichtig octrooisysteem kan bestaan onder verschillende 
opvattingen over de aard van octrooirechten of over het raakvlak tussen rechten 
en rechtsmiddelen. Om tot een echt evenwichtig octrooisysteem te komen, moet 
er voldoende ruimte worden gelaten aan beperkingen en uitzonderingen. Uitein-
delijk komt uit dit onderzoek de belangrijke overweging naar voren dat elk stel-
sel van octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels zorgvuldig ontworpen moet worden. In 
termen van effi  ciency betekent dat niet alleen dat het systeem moet streven naar 
minimale kosten van het gebruik van een aansprakelijkheidsregel en beperking 
van het gebruik daarvan tot de specifi eke gevallen waarin dat nodig is, maar ook 
dat het systeem geen onnodige beperkingen opwerpt die de noodzakelijke toe-
passing ervan zouden kunnen verhinderen. Een dergelijk effi  ciënt ontwerp zou 
bovendien het gebruik van octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels mogelijk maken 
ongeacht de juridische traditie van het land, dus ongeacht of dat het Romeins 
recht of het gewoonterecht is.
Hoewel dit onderzoek zich richt op octrooien, zijn er interessante aspecten 
die meer specifi ek toegepast zouden kunnen worden op andere terreinen van 
intellectueel eigendom, met name op auteursrechten, waar een vergelijkbaar 
risico van strategisch gedrag en anticommons al is opgemerkt. Het proefschrift  
raakt ook aan enkele aspecten betreff ende de toepassing van antitrustwetgeving, 
maar het delicate raakvlak tussen dit terrein en de IE-wetgeving moet nog verder 
onderzocht worden. Ook de “public choice” wordt genoemd om de belangrijke 
beleidshervormingen op het vlak van de IE te verklaren, en zou op een interes-
sante manier kunnen worden toegepast op de specifi eke problemen die in dit 
proefschrift  zijn beschreven. Ten slotte is de belangrijkste implicatie voor beleid-
smakers die actief betrokken zijn bij diverse harmonisatieprojecten, dat beknot-
tende uitzonderingen en beperkingen op octrooirechten, met inbegrip van het 
gebruik van octrooiaansprakelijkheidsregels, het risico met zich mee kunnen 
brengen innovatie af te remmen en daarmee de doelstellingen van het octrooi-
recht tegen te werken.
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